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ABSTRACT 
Platform work is a type of work using an online platform to intermediate between 
platform workers, who provide services, and paying clients. Platform work seems to be 
growing in size and importance. This study explores platform work in the EU28, Norway 
and Iceland, with a focus on the challenges it presents to working conditions and social 
protection, and how countries have responded through top-down (e.g. legislation and 
case law) and bottom-up actions (e.g. collective agreements, actions by platform 
workers or platforms). This national mapping is accompanied by a comparative 
assessment of selected EU legal instruments, mostly in the social area. Each instrument 
is assessed for personal and material scope to determine how it might impact such 
challenges. Four broad legal domains with relevance to platform work challenges are 
examined in stand-alone reflection papers. Together, the national mapping and legal 
analysis support a gap analysis, which aims to indicate where further action on platform 
work would be useful, and what form such action might take. 
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GLOSSARY 
Term Definition 
atypical contracts 
Contracts that do not conform to those in standard work. Examples 
include part-time, fixed-term, temporary, casual and seasonal work 
contracts 
atypical employment/work See non-standard employment/work 
bogus self-employment 
Business activities that do not include any managerial or proprietary 
tasks and which possess the attributes of an employment relationship 
but without entitlement to the corresponding labour law protections
1
 
clickworkers 
Platform workers who engage in small-scale and repetitive online 
work, such as tagging images 
collaborative economy 
A term sometimes used instead of platform economy, sometimes with 
normative or non-economic connotations 
crowdwork(ing) 
A type of platform work where clients place an open call for services 
to a large, global body of potential crowdworkers 
employee 
A worker that is in a contractual employment relationship with 
another person (an employer) in return for remuneration 
employer 
A natural or legal person that is bound by one or more natural persons 
(employees) via an employment contract 
employment contract 
The contract that formalises the employment relationship between an 
employee and employer: characterised by the subordination of an 
employee to an employer 
employment relationship 
The relationship characterised by an employment contract or service 
contract between the employer and employee 
food delivery riders 
A type of platform worker providing services intermediated by a food 
delivery platform such as Deliveroo, Foodora, or UberEats 
genuine self-employment 
When the contractual status and factual characteristics of a natural 
person's work are both self-employment: distinguished from bogus 
self-employment 
homeworker 
One who performs work from home or other premises of their 
choosing, creating a product or service specified by an employer 
independent contractors 
A person contracted to provide services to another entity as a non-
employee 
intermediary 
A person, business, or function that serves to connect one or more 
entities to facilitate exchange of information, goods or services 
job quality 
A multi-disciplinary, multidimensional concept that is generally 
understood as ‘the extent to which a job has work and employment-
related factors that foster beneficial outcomes for the employee, 
particularly psychological well-being, physical well-being and positive 
attitudes such as job satisfaction’2 
non-standard 
employment/work Work that diverges in one or more aspects from standard work 
online labour platform 
A term sometimes used to distinguish a platform (as in platform work) 
from other sorts of platforms. For example, Facebook and Uber are 
                                           
1
 See Eurofound (2008) 
2
 Holman (2013) 
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both online platforms, but only the latter is an online labour platform 
online platform 
An online service that facilitates communication between one or more 
parties, especially to exchange services for payment 
platform 
An online platform on which services are exchanged for payment 
(unless otherwise specified) 
platform economy Economic and social activity facilitated through online platforms 
platform work 
All labour provided through, on, or mediated by online platforms in a 
wide range of sectors, where work can be of varied forms, and is 
provided in exchange of payment 
platform worker A natural person providing platform work 
self-employment 
A broad set of labour practices wherein a natural person earns income 
without an employment relationship with an employer; both bogus 
self-employment and genuine self-employment are types of self-
employment. 
sharing economy 
A term sometimes used instead of platform economy, sometimes with 
normative or non-economic connotations, and sometimes referring 
specifically to 'sharing' goods or services through an online platform 
standard 
employment/work 
Employment relationships between a natural person (employee) and a 
natural or legal person (employer) that are indefinite (open-ended) 
and full-time 
traditional 
employment/work 
Employment relationships between a natural person (employee) and a 
natural or legal person (employer) that are indefinite (open-ended) 
and full-time, especially prior to the platform economy 
worker 
Anyone who performs work for pay, regardless of employment status, 
and without legal connotations (unless otherwise specified, especially 
in discussions of EU law) 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
Platform work is a small but diverse and seemingly growing form of labour. 
Platform work differs from many traditional patterns of work, and while it may increase 
labour market access and lead to innovation and entrepreneurship, and in so doing help 
achieve EU policy objectives, it also challenges existing labour and social law 
frameworks. European policymakers and stakeholders have highlighted the need for 
better understanding of platform work so its potential can be maximised and its harms 
minimised. 
Against this background, this study combines fieldwork and desk research, and both 
legal and socioeconomic perspectives, for each of the 28 EU Member States, plus Norway 
and Iceland, as well as for the EU level. The primary goal is to assess, in view of the 
particular challenges faced by platform workers, whether EU action is required 
to improve their working conditions and social protection, and if so, what form 
such action could take. 
 
Conceptualisations 
Platform work is understood as all labour provided through, on, or mediated by 
online platforms in a wide range of sectors, where work can be of varied forms, 
and is provided in exchange for payment. It features a triangular relationship 
between platform, platform worker and client, using online intermediation. The 
intermediation largely uses technology and algorithms, is often intransparent, and may 
significantly affect working conditions, for example, by its impact on the allocation and 
organisation of work, and the evaluation of platform workers. This ‘black box of 
intermediation’ is a distinguishing feature of platform work. 
Platform work refers to very heterogeneous forms of work. We can distinguish between 
platform work types based on three primary factors: 
 Location: whether a task is performed online (from anywhere with an internet 
connection) or on-location; 
 Complexity: higher- or lower-skill requirements; 
 Allocation of work: primarily determined by platform, platform worker, or 
client. 
Platform work can be grouped with other types of non-standard work or self-
employment. Non-standard work refers to arrangements that diverge from a full-time, 
open-ended employment contract with one employer. Platform workers rarely have an 
employment contract with the platform and are mainly considered self-employed in 
practice. This self-employment can be bogus or genuine, but it is often difficult to 
distinguish between them, and there may also be differences across countries, types of 
platform work, and even individuals using the same platform in the same city. 
The size or prevalence of platform work is much debated and estimates vary widely. 
According to the COLLEEM II survey data3 for 16 EU countries, an average of 11% of the 
adult population has performed platform work at least once. Those who rely on platform 
work for their main income are far fewer, averaging 1.4% of adults. The most common 
platform work tasks include online clerical and data entry. Men are much more likely to 
perform transportation and delivery services, while women perform more translation and 
certain on-location services (e.g. housekeeping or beauty services). The survey also 
                                           
3 JRC’s COLLEEM II survey 
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finds that those performing platform work as a primary or secondary occupation 
(relying on it for a large proportion of their income) are less likely to be employees 
than those performing platform work sporadically. Platform workers’ employment status 
is often unclear even to the platform workers themselves, which means that self-
reporting of status can affect the reliability of aggregate data. 
The future trajectory of platform work is also much debated. Available data and expert 
opinion suggests the total number of platform workers is growing and likely to continue 
to do so, with demand for certain services (e.g. training AI, care for the elderly or 
childcare) likely to grow more than for others (e.g. tasks more prone to automation, and 
food delivery or personal transport services). Moreover, certain characteristics of 
platform work are becoming more common in the overall labour market (e.g. algorithmic 
management). 
 
Challenges for platform workers 
The challenges related to the working conditions and social protection of platform 
workers are mapped in accordance with a job-quality framework based on the Work, 
Employment and Social Relations (WES) model.4 This model consists of three 
dimensions: work, employment, and social relations. We also consider ‘other’ 
challenges relevant to platform work. 
Potential challenges facing platform workers were assessed and summarised by their 
significance (high, medium, low, or none), what types of platform work seem most 
affected, and their specificity (specific to platform work, common for non-standard 
work, or present in the general labour market). Figure 1 shows how many of these 
challenges are not specific to platform work. 
Figure 1: Challenges summary  
 
 
Challenges were found to vary a great deal across different types of platform work. For 
example, the physical environment differs for online and on-location forms of platform 
work, and autonomy in work organisation changes depending on whether the client, 
platform, or platform worker determines which tasks are performed, when and how. The 
                                           
4 Lamberts, M. et al. (2016), Jobkwaliteit in België in 2015. Analyse aan de hand van de European Working 
Conditions Survey EWCS 2015 (Eurofound), HIVA Onderzoeksinstituut voor Arbeid en Samenleving; Leuven 
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importance given to particular challenges also varies across countries, depending on 
their policy and legal frameworks. For example, social protection may be a greater 
challenge in countries where the self-employed have significantly less statutory coverage 
than employees. A summary of the WES dimensions and significant platform work 
challenges (of high or medium importance) follows. 
The work dimension primarily concerns job content, working conditions and work 
organisation, which impact physical and psychological risks for the platform worker. The 
use of technology, apps and algorithms particularly affects this dimension, which 
therefore contains certain challenges more specific to platform work. 
Of highest concern for platform workers are the challenges of autonomy in the allocation 
of tasks; of surveillance, direction, and performance appraisal; and of physical 
environment. Autonomy in work organisation is assessed to be of medium concern. 
The employment dimension relates to the formal context in which a platform worker 
performs tasks, such as their employment status, the nature and content of their 
contract with the platform, the level of social protection, and the composition of their 
earnings. It also entails issues that directly affect a platform worker’s personal life, such 
as working time, training and career opportunities. This dimension contains some of the 
most discussed challenges of platform work, including employment status, social 
protection and earnings, which are also significant issues in non-standard work. 
The challenges of highest concern are employment status, determination of employer, 
and contracts (including type, termination, and provision of contractual information). The 
medium concern challenges are social protection, earnings (including wages, fees and 
price setting), and working time. 
The social relations dimension concerns social relations and interactions, social 
dialogue and representation at work, both formally and informally. Social support is an 
important resource for the well-being of platform workers that can help achieve work-
related goals, encourage personal growth and compensate for job demands. These 
challenges are mostly common to non-standard work. 
Two challenges in this category are assessed as significant for platform workers: 
representation (high concern), and adverse behaviour and social treatment (medium 
concern). Notably, the latter is also a concern in the general labour market. 
The ‘other’ dimension covers challenges that do not fit within the previous categories 
but are nevertheless important for platform workers: undeclared work, cross-border 
issues, and data protection. Each is assessed as a medium challenge, but these are 
some of the least understood issues in platform work. 
 
National tools and responses to platform work challenges 
Mapping national responses to platform work helped us understand which strategies 
exist and how effective they are. Responses were listed by category, with legislation, 
case law and administrator/inspectorate action constituting top-down responses, and 
collective agreements, platform actions, and platform worker actions considered 
bottom-up responses. Descriptive data for each response was also provided, such as 
who initiated the response, the degree of implementation, and so on. 
There were 177 responses from the 30 countries, including regional and local 
levels. The number of responses varied widely from country to country, from zero to 
nineteen. This variation may reflect how some countries consider platform work to be 
less of a challenge, or have adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach, or that some gave fewer 
but more wide-reaching responses. In some countries (e.g. Iceland, Malta, and 
Bulgaria), platform work has hardly registered as a topic of concern, whereas in others 
(e.g. Spain, Germany, Italy, and France) numerous stakeholders have taken concerted 
action. Most responses concerned employment status (54), representation (46), 
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earnings (32), and social protection (31), indicating that policymakers and social 
partners are likely to be especially aware of challenges in these areas.  
Top-down responses 
National legislation specific to platform work is very rare in the EU28, Iceland and 
Norway. Working conditions and social protection of platform workers do not generally 
constitute the direct material scope of national statutory legislation. France is the only 
country that has enacted national legislation with a view to improving the labour and 
social rights of platform workers.5 
Other recent national legislation has indirectly tried to regulate working conditions and 
social protection of platform workers, either through defining the employment status of 
the platform workers, by regulating the working conditions and social protection for 
persons in non-standard employment, or by strengthening rights and protection of the 
self-employed. Such legislation mostly concerns specific business sectors, such as 
personal transportation services (provided by platforms such as Uber) and food delivery 
services (from platforms such as Deliveroo). 
Rather than focusing on working conditions or social protection, national legislation 
has, especially initially, primarily aimed to ensure fair competition and effective 
market functioning in specific market segments such as personal transportation. Two 
main approaches entail deregulating the traditional business sectors, and explicitly 
applying existing standards and requirements to the new (platform) entrants. National 
legislation may also focus on proper registration of platforms and taxation for 
platform work alongside other sources of income. 
Case law on platform work was reported in 16 of the 30 surveyed countries. 
Many cases are ongoing, and many rulings are being appealed, so it is difficult to draw 
clear and firm conclusions. Initially, numerous cases in national courts concerned 
competition law issues and the personal transport sector. Most court cases 
considered whether the services provided by Uber or similar platforms amount to 
taxi/transport services, or those with different standards and requirements, for example 
limousine or information society services.  
National labour courts play a key role in defining the employment status of 
platform workers, with many cases ruling on this, especially those providing personal 
transport and food delivery services. However, courts have reached different conclusions 
from similar evidence. These contradictory rulings reflect the different facts and 
arguments raised in court, and the discretionary power of labour judges, who assess 
facts on a case-by-case basis. Overall, national case law has thus far only modestly 
improved clarity on employment status of platform workers. 
Inspectorates and administrators have targeted undeclared work, social 
protection contributions and coverage, safe working conditions and even 
employment status, with authorities in Belgium, Denmark, France, Sweden and the UK 
particularly active. However, inspectorates often struggle to address platform work, 
which typically occurs in private spaces (homes) or dispersed public spaces (city 
streets), rather than a ‘normal’ static workplace. 
Bottom-up responses 
Bottom-up responses focus more on the challenges of representation, earnings, 
physical environment and working time, and especially involve food delivery. 
Eight formal collective agreements between platforms and platform workers 
were identified, with more pending. In several cases trade unions (e.g. Germany’s 
                                           
5
 Given the timeframe of the study, some of the most recent developments at national level (e.g. in some 
sectors late 2019 in Italy) could not be included and analysed – demonstrating the fast-changing nature of the 
policy and regulatory framework of platform work.  
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NGG and IG BAU, and the Norwegian Transport Union) assisted platform workers in 
organisation and negotiations, while in other cases platform workers organised 
independently. These agreements cover a single platform, groups of similar platforms in 
a country, or even national sectoral level (e.g. logistics). 
Platform workers have organised strikes and demonstrations to improve 
working conditions. Some have also created or joined cooperatives and collectives 
(e.g. the Koeriers Kollektief [Courier’s Collective] in Belgium and cooperative SMart in 
multiple countries). These aim to improve the collective voice and social protections, 
among other goals. 
Some platforms have taken action to address working condition challenges 
faced by platform workers, or manage criticism of their practices. Several platforms have 
modified their terms and conditions or specific practices to avoid legal challenges such as 
lawsuits on employment status. Others have registered with national authorities or trade 
associations, either voluntarily or through legal necessity, thereby formalising their 
participation in labour markets. 
Other forms of self-regulation have emerged, such as platforms creating 
partnerships to provide platform workers with insurance and training. Some platforms 
have signed on to charters or codes of conduct, agreeing to abide by certain principles 
and decent work standards. Some of these initiatives appear to be innovative and 
promising in addressing working conditions and social protection. The Frankfurt 
Declaration,6 Crowdsourcing Code of Conduct,7 and Carta dei diritti fondamentali del 
lavoro digitale nel contesto urbano8 [Charter of fundamental rights of digital work in the 
urban context] are examples covering various forms of platform work. 
In a few cases, platforms have taken punitive or ‘union-busting’ actions against 
platform worker organisation. But others have encouraged platform workers to organise 
and engage in social dialogue. 
 
Instruments and actions at EU level  
European institutions have released communications and initiated research specific to 
platform work. Recent EU labour legislation explicitly refers to platform work as a type of 
non-standard work and introduces material provisions with specific relevance for 
platform workers who have an employment relationship.  
This study assesses the relevance of EU law to platform work challenges. Twenty-one EU 
instruments were selected for in-depth analysis, based on their probability of impacting 
the working conditions and social protection of platform workers, and grouped as 
follows: 
 Non-standard work: Part-time Work Directive, Fixed-term Work Directive and 
Temporary Agency Work Directive;9 
 Health and safety: Health and safety for fixed-term work Directive and 
Pregnant Workers Directive;10 
                                           
6
 Fair Crowd Work (2016), “Frankfurter Erklärung zu plattformbasierter Arbeit | Vorschläge für 
Plattformbetreiber, Kunden, politische Entscheidungsträger, Beschäftigte und Arbeitnehmerorganisationen”, 
Declaration, Frankfurt, December 
7
 IG Metall (2019), “Report of the activities of the Ombuds Office of the Code of Conduct for Paid 
Crowdsourcing, 2017-2018”, IG Metall, January 
8
 Comune di Bologna (2018), “Carta dei diritti fondamentali del lavoro digitale nel contesto urbano”, May 
9
 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
(OJ L 14, 20.1.1998); Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed-term work (OJ L 175, 10.7.1999); Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9–14) 
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 Individual labour rights: Written Statement Directive, Transparent and 
predictable working conditions Directive (TPWC) and Working Time Directive;11 
 Collective labour rights: Information and consultation Directive, Insolvency 
Directive, Collective Redundancies Directive and European Works Council 
Directive;12 
 Work-life balance: Parental Leave Directive and Work-life Balance Directive;13 
 Social protection: Recommendation on access to social protection;14  
 Various aspects of non-discrimination: Employment Directive, Race Directive, 
Gender equality in employment Directive, Gender equality in access to goods and 
services Directive, Gender equality of self-employed Directive and Gender 
equality in social security Directive.15  
We further consider the General Data Protection Regulation16 (GDPR) and Regulation 
2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online 
intermediation services17 (P2B). Competition law and collective bargaining as well as 
data protection are handled separately in two reflection papers annexed to the study. 
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Scope of EU action 
The EU has the ability, where justified, and in accordance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, to set minimum requirements in the area of social 
policy. However, and especially regarding working conditions, social legislation and policy 
for platform workers remains mostly under Member States’ competences. In this 
context, the EU has gradually taken legislative action, mostly in the areas of 
employment and working conditions. 
In terms of personal scope, the assessed EU legislation that regulates working conditions 
under Article 153 TFEU applies to ‘workers’, referring to people with an employment 
relationship or contract. The personal scope of the assessed EU directives hinges on 
national legislation defining the concepts of ‘worker’, ‘employee’, ‘employment contract’, 
or ‘employment relationship’. Through its extensive case law, however, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has gradually developed an EU-wide concept of 
‘worker’ determined by the criteria of ‘subordination’ or ‘direction’. This helps ensure the 
effectiveness of some directives that rely on national definitions of ‘worker’. CJEU case 
law also ruled that bogus self-employed platform workers are to be reclassified as 
workers (under the EU meaning of the concept) irrespective of the status agreed upon 
by the contractual parties or defined in national legislation.  
In this context, the following considerations are central: 
 Platform workers who are classified as workers (including bogus self-employed 
platform workers) fall within the remit of EU labour legislation. 
 Platform workers who are self-employed fall outside the scope of EU labour 
legislation. 
Still, platform work profoundly challenges the binary divide of ‘workers’ and 
self-employed that has been the cornerstone of labour legislation at national and 
international level for decades. Evidence suggests varying approaches and 
interpretations between EU Member States, and even within the same Member State for 
labour and social law. Overall, the determination of self-employed versus ‘worker’ has a 
crucial impact on applicable legislation and hence on the working conditions and 
protection against social risks of individual platform workers. 
In assessing the material scope of the legislation, two instruments were found to be 
particularly relevant and adequate for one or more significant challenges in the area 
of working and employment conditions for platform workers: the Transparent and 
predictable working conditions Directive (TPWC) and GDPR. Neither instrument, 
however, addresses all (significant) challenges of platform workers and may require 
further adjustments to content and/or complementary action regarding enforcement, 
especially in the case of GDPR. The TPWC Directive’s legal base in Article 153 TFEU 
means it is limited in personal scope to workers and hence does not apply to the genuine 
self-employed. The TPWC Directive, however, is relevant to challenges including 
protection against abusive practices, obligatory information provision, the right to 
parallel employment, protection against 'dismissal' (suspension, termination and other 
restrictions), the right to effective legal redress and several rights relating to working 
time. GDPR applies to all natural persons, and is relevant for establishing the right to 
access personal data, including data concerning work allocation, work performance and 
evaluation, and the right to data portability. As both are fairly new, our assessment is 
preliminary. 
Platform work generally qualifies as non-standard employment, and several of its 
challenges are common to all types of non-standard work. EU legislation has tackled 
these challenges, particularly through the non-standard work directives, and the new 
TPWC Directive and Work-life Balance Directive. The Council Recommendation on access 
to social protection is also of particular interest to the protection of rights of persons in 
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non-standard forms of employment, the genuinely self-employed, and persons 
transitioning between labour market statuses. Enforcement of the relevant EU 
legislation, and the issue of the minimum qualifying periods applicable to social 
protection and parental leave schemes, are of particular relevance for platform workers 
who work digitally with limited human supervision, at varying locations and often on 
fragmented and small-scale tasks. 
All other assessed EU legislation (collective labour rights, health and safety, and working 
time) has varying relevance for platform workers, but only applies when there is an 
employment relationship. Furthermore, these instruments are not adapted to the 
specific working environment of the platform workers, and/or use concepts that 
are not entirely fit for the purpose of regulating platform workers’ working conditions. 
While somewhat broader in scope than platform work, P2B is an important step: an EU 
legislative action addressing challenges specific to platform practices. P2B has great 
relevance for platform workers, particularly regarding fair and transparent 
intermediation when they are classed as ‘business users’ of information society 
intermediation services. P2B is to some extent comparable with the TPWC, covering as it 
does issues such as obligatory information provision, the right to notice in case of 
contract revision, and restrictions on dismissal or equivalent measures. In personal 
scope P2B applies to ‘business users’ – self-employed natural persons who exchange 
services or goods with clients (legal persons) via an online intermediary service – which 
includes a portion of self-employed platform workers. However, it is unclear at present 
how many platform workers will be affected. Further limitations to personal scope are 
also evident. P2B, for example, defines online intermediation services as ‘information 
society services’, which does not include all types of platforms through which ‘work’ is 
allocated and organised. 
Assessment of the EU instruments finds that: 
 Since the adoption of the TPWC Directive, platform workers who have an 
employment relationship, and bogus self-employed platform workers that have 
been reclassified as such by national judiciaries, have access to a wider scope of 
protected labour rights, specifically in relation to working conditions. However, 
there still needs to be better enforcement of their collective labour rights as 
enshrined in current EU legislation. 
 Self-employed platform workers who are economically dependent on a 
single platform, and who work solo and in precarious situations, appear 
to be the most vulnerable and least protected by individual and collective 
labour rights, or by social protection legislation at both national and EU level. For 
the small amount of self-employed who qualify as business users of information 
society intermediation services, P2B should soon ensure access to similar (and in 
some respects better than) protections of working conditions to those provided 
for by EU labour legislation.  
 The TPWC Directive and P2B have only very recently been adopted and it is 
necessary to ensure their effective implementation. 
 
Gap analysis 
We analysed the extent to which national responses and selected EU instruments 
address the most significant challenges of working and employment conditions facing 
platform workers. The national and EU-level responses were rated by the extent to which 
they addressed the individual challenges. For national responses we considered the 
percentage of countries with one or more relevant responses, whereas for EU legislation, 
we considered its personal scope, relevance, and adequacy. 
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Table 1: Summary of gap analysis 
Note: In ‘countries w/responses’, the ‘total’ column refers to the percentage of countries with any relevant 
response, not the sum of on-location and online. P2B and GDPR could significantly influence these 
assessments, especially those deemed indeterminate. N/A: Assessed tools are not applicable to the challenge, 
NP: natural persons, W: workers, SE: self-employed. *Workers and self-employed are both in the personal 
scope of legislation, but certain additional limitations may effectively limit which platform workers are covered 
(See 7 of the study for a full key). 
 
While very few responses target working conditions and social protection for all 
platform workers, over half of all national responses specifically concerned personal 
transportation and (food) delivery platforms. This may reflect a lack of awareness of 
online platform workers, or the difficulty of addressing challenges associated with online 
platform work at national level. 
Overall the gap analysis suggests the following: 
 Virtually no significant challenges are entirely resolved by national or EU 
responses and instruments. The sole exception is data protection, but even for 
this challenge, proper enforcement must be ensured. 
 National responses at least partly address the most significant challenges for on-
location platform workers, but do very little for online platform workers. 
 Platform workers meeting the criteria for worker status are generally better 
protected, yet even here EU tools are not always fit for purpose because of the 
differences between traditional and platform work. 
 In spite of recent legislative initiatives, the impact of assessed EU instruments is 
still limited in addressing the working conditions and social protection challenges 
of platform workers, in particular when they are self-employed. 
 
Conclusions and policy pointers 
All platform workers, irrespective of their employment status, could benefit from 
measures that aim for better (or more suited to platform work) protections in terms of:  
(i) obligatory and timely provision of information about the terms and conditions 
of collaboration, including on work allocation, organisation and evaluation, as well 
as on a series of other dimensions specifically related to platform work 
businesses;  
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(ii) advance notification, and for the right to an explanation in cases of refusal to 
open an account, and of both temporary and more permanent termination of the 
collaboration;  
(iii) access to effective and timely out-of-court dispute-resolution mechanisms;  
(iv) appropriate and transparent data protection when collecting and processing 
personal and behavioural data;  
(v) ‘collective’ rights, including rights to be represented, informed and consulted, 
and the right to conclude agreements; and  
(vi) effective application of the non-discrimination principle. 
The most vulnerable forms of self-employment, non-standard work and indeed 
all forms of work share many significant challenges with platform work. 
Policymakers should be aware of these commonalities and consider broader approaches 
rather than specific measures. 
Employment status remains a core issue when addressing working conditions 
and social protection challenges for platform workers at national and EU levels. 
Most platform workers are self-employed, which excludes them from the personal scope 
of much labour and social legislation at national and EU levels. In the types of platform 
work that are more prone to bogus self-employment, determining specific platform 
workers’ employment status is frequently challenging; case law moves very slowly on 
this issue and has not offered much clarity. Policymakers may therefore consider actions 
that make it easier to identify and reclassify bogus self-employed platform workers, and 
clarify which platform practices are incompatible with self-employment. 
Challenges related to intermediation, including algorithmic management, are 
largely unaddressed, especially at national level. Intermediation in platform work 
can entail surveillance, performance appraisal, and intransparent contracts. These 
features seem to be growing beyond platform work as well. GDPR, P2B, and the TPWC 
Directive are extremely important for increasing transparency and addressing such 
issues. However, P2B only impacts a portion of self-employed platform workers, and the 
TPWC Directive can only help platform workers with an employment contract. While the 
actual impact of these tools on platform work is not yet fully clear, EU institutions may 
consider further modifications or clarifications to ensure more platform workers fall 
within their personal scope, and enforcement is effective. 
Online platform workers are less visible and receive little attention, despite them 
being probably the most numerous, and doing a form of work that is often inherently 
cross-border. This implies that national authorities will find it difficult to address the 
challenges of this type of work, while it is a more natural fit for EU action. 
Besides regulatory options, the EU and Member States could consider 
promoting voluntary codes of conduct or charters for platforms to commit to 
upholding fair working conditions, for example to ensure dispute resolution mechanisms 
are available to all platform workers, in a similar way to P2B requirements. 
Finally, lack of data and the very recent adoption of relevant responses and 
instruments limit our understanding of platform work. Coordinated action by 
policymakers would ensure that high-quality data contribute to evidence-based actions, 
social security coordination, and prevention of abuses and undeclared work. Moreover, 
new national and EU legislation discussed in this study should be closely monitored to 
assess whether it is sufficient, or if amendments or entirely new instruments are 
required. 
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Europe stands on the brink of a new industrial revolution, 
driven by new-generation information technologies […]. 
European Parliament (2019) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Digitalisation, or the transformation of processes through new digital technologies, 
continues to drive social and economic change. With this backdrop, the platform 
economy has rapidly expanded in size and relevance. Online platforms such as Uber and 
Deliveroo have quickly grown, spawned imitators, and disrupted economies and labour 
markets around the world. Other types of online platforms such as Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) and Jovoto have facilitated new types of outsourcing and innovation.  
One function of such digital platforms is to leverage technology to intermediate supply 
and demand for services, typically using internet-connected computers and 
smartphones. When services are exchanged for payment, this phenomenon is known as 
platform work.18 
Researchers, policymakers, social partners and others have engaged in dialogue and 
debate about platform work as it has grown in relevance across Europe. But a conflicted 
narrative has emerged. Most of the literature recognises that platform work brings the 
potential for both opportunities and challenges. Benefits include greater labour market 
participation, economic growth, and social and technical innovation. However, platform 
work also creates challenges for regulatory regimes, competing industries, and the well-
being of platform workers (Eurofound, 2018). 
The focus of this study is the latter: understanding the working conditions and 
social protection challenges of platform workers.  
1.1 Previous key research and main findings 
Policymakers have benefited from the existing research on platform work (Aloisi, 2015; 
Eurofound, 2018; De Stefano, 2016; Lenaerts et al., 2017; Risak and Lutz, 2017), and 
more recent publications, including from EU-OSHA (2017), Eurofound (Eurofound, 
2018), the ILO (Berg et al., 2018), and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission (Brancati et al., 2019; De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018; Pesole et 
al., 2018), and other studies, have enabled preliminary conclusions to be drawn on the 
working conditions and social protection of platform workers in the EU. 
First, ‘platform work’ refers to many different sorts of work arrangements. This 
heterogeneity can make it more difficult to consistently determine liability and assign 
responsibility when things go wrong, such as work accidents or disputes between 
platform workers and clients, and therefore properly apply labour and social regulations.  
                                           
18
 The definition and conceptualisation are developed in Section 3. 
Platform work is all labour provided through, on, or mediated by online platforms in 
a wide range of sectors, where work can be of varied forms, and is provided in 
exchange for payment.  
 
Platform worker refers to a natural person providing platform work. 
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Second, platform work presents difficulties for existing regulatory frameworks. 
This is partially because the parties19 involved in platform work, and their legal 
relationships, differ from those in standard work (Eurofound, 2018). Rather than 
traditional management structures, platform work tends to rely on algorithmic 
management. Moreover, platform work is considered a more ‘flexible’ form of work,20 
whereas labour and social law frameworks remain better suited for more traditional 
forms of work (ETUC, 2017).  
Third, the employment status of platform workers is often unclear. For example, 
employment status can be different even for platform workers using the same platform 
in the same country (De Groen et al., 2018a). Most national legal frameworks would not 
hold that platforms act as employers,21 though this assumption has been challenged by 
legal scholars (Prassl and Risak, 2016). Arguments have also been made both for 
(Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016) and against (Aloisi, 2015) applying an intermediate 
employment status, between employee and self-employed, to certain platform workers. 
Fourth, platform workers face substantial practical and legal difficulties in 
organisation and collective bargaining. To help mitigate power disparity and prevent 
abusive situations, employees generally have the right to collective representation, with 
the employer as counter party. However, factors such as their dispersed working 
locations, lack of recognition that platform work qualifies as ‘work’, frequent turnover, 
unclear employment status, and competition and cartel laws (Kilhoffer et al., 2017), 
make this extremely difficult. Depending on the type of tasks performed and particular 
platform used, platform workers can be cooperating or competing, and this further 
challenges the suitability and practicality of more traditional collective bargaining 
arrangements (Eurofound, 2018). Although new forms of organisation and 
representation have been explored, the evidence indicates that most platform workers 
have little bargaining power. 
As a result, platform work can create challenges for decent working conditions. 
These include a lack of career advancement opportunities, income insecurity, 
psychosocial stress, and unsafe working environments.22 Platform workers are also at 
risk of reduced access to social protection; they often forego social protections, pay 
for more expensive options, or rely on social protection from a main occupation where 
they have an employment contract (ESIP, 2019; Eurofound, 2018).23 
1.2 Knowledge gaps and research objectives 
Previous research has found that platform workers can face significant challenges in their 
working conditions and social protection. If existing regulatory frameworks insufficiently 
address these challenges, additional action may be appropriate at EU or national level. 
However, significant gaps in our understanding of both challenges and regulatory 
frameworks remain. 
First, no existing research covers the entirety of the EU, Norway and Iceland, 
even as the challenges of platform work and corresponding policy or regulatory 
responses vary a great deal between countries (Lenaerts et al., 2017). We lack a 
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 Platform, platform worker, and client – see Section 3. 
20
 See discussion of Challenges for platform workers in Section 4.  
21
 This assumption is being challenged, especially by case law and legislation. See National tools and 
responses to platform work challenges. 
22
 See Challenges for platform workers. 
23
 This is because social protections like pension, paid sick days, and accident insurance are often interlaced 
with employment contracts (and funded at least in part by employers). Note, however, that the statutory and 
effective access to social protections varies a great deal across Member States. See especially Eurofound 
(2018a) and EU-OSHA (2017). 
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complete picture of relevant policy and regulatory developments that accounts for both 
EU and national initiatives.  
Second, available information focuses on a variety of issues, platforms, and 
countries, all assuming slightly different understandings of what constitutes platform 
work. This creates a patchwork body of evidence that makes it difficult to 
comprehensively assess working conditions and social protection for platform workers in 
Europe. 
Third, much of the research lacks a multidisciplinary approach. Understanding 
platform work in all its complexity requires an approach combining policy, social, and 
legal perspectives. 
This study, therefore, seeks to contribute to a greater understanding of platform work 
and the challenges facing platform workers with a comprehensive mapping of the 
challenges and responses relating to their working conditions and social protection in the 
EU28, Norway and Iceland. Up-to-date24 information on the regulatory environments and 
relevant developments affecting all types of platform work has been analysed by:  
1) identifying the relevance, diffusion and nature of these challenges for working and 
social conditions;  
2) mapping national developments;  
3) examining select EU legislation that may affect working conditions and social 
protections; 
4) assessing the extent to which national and EU measures address the challenges. 
The study thereby provides evidence on whether additional national or EU action, and 
provides pointers as to what form such action might take. 
1.3 A need for EU action? 
While the European Commission (2016a) has shown awareness of the challenges 
associated with platform work and is considering further action, the debate continues as 
to whether and to what extent the EU could and should also act. In the meantime, the 
European Parliament25 and EU-level social partners26 have advanced EU-level proposals 
to address social challenges facing workers in the platform economy (EU-OSHA, 2017).  
First, because platform work impacts the EU principle of proportionality, a clear 
understanding of its size and prevalence is needed, which impacts the EU 
principle of proportionality.27 Its dynamic and fast-changing nature keeps the 
evidence scattered and quickly outdated (De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018), and some argue 
that data collection and other action at EU level could lead to a better understanding of 
platform work (Eurofound, 2018).  
Second, any EU action must respect the principle of competency.28 While the EU 
has the ability29 to set minimum requirements in the area of social policy, notably with 
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 See Methodology and Limitations and constraints on timeframe. 
25
 See Report on a European Agenda for the collaborative economy, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2017-
0195+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
26
 See “ETUC resolution on digitalisation: ‘towards fair digital work’”, available at 
https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-resolution-digitalisation-towards-fair-digital-work#.WeYb77jg18E 
27
 Treaty on European Union, Article 5, states ‘the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’. The size and prevalence of platform work are further 
discussed in Size, prevalence, and expected evolution of platform work in the EU. 
28
 The EU has exclusive competences in certain areas, shared competences with Member States, and 
supporting competences. See Title 1 of Part 1 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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regard to working conditions, social and labour law remains mostly under Member 
States’ competence. Several studies have pointed out that the transnational 
character of the platform economy would justify an EU regulatory framework, 
where the principle of subsidiarity in the field of social and labour law could be applied 
(Eurofound, 2018; EU-OSHA, 2017). Such a framework may be appropriate in the 
context of the EU’s interest in maintaining a well-functioning Digital Single Market30 and 
ensuring proper competition (Dittrich, 2018). At present, regulatory and policy responses 
vary greatly across Member States, creating a mosaic of markets and leading to calls for 
a common policy response at European level. 
Third, policymakers are cognisant of the potential trade-off between innovation and 
new regulation (Ranchordás, 2015). Even if granted that additional regulation could be 
useful, new regulatory constraints may hinder innovation and the economic potential of 
platforms. A frequent discussion point concerns whether existing national and EU 
regulations may suffice, if properly applied and enforced, and the extent to which new 
legislation or other actions may be required (De Groen et al., 2018a). 
Thus, the debate continues over the possible regulatory framework for platform work at 
EU and national level. Recent developments, such as the European Pillar of Social Rights 
(EPSR),31 could suggest a timely opportunity to better monitor new forms of employment 
at a supranational level, and coordinate Member State initiatives (Pesole et al., 2018). 
1.4 Structure of the study 
The remainder of the study is as follows: 
Section 2 Methodology explains how the research was carried out. 
Section 3 Conceptualisation of platform work forms the conceptual basis for 
platform work, particularly in what distinguishes platform workers from other types of 
workers. It also briefly covers the types of platform work, the size of platform work in 
the EU, and the expected evolution of the platform economy. 
Section 4 Challenges for platform workers gives a framework for assessing job 
quality and then applies it to information collected from an extensive literature review 
and several types of fieldwork. This Section seeks to identify the kinds of working 
conditions and social protection challenges platform workers face, for which types of 
platform work, and in which countries. 
Section 5 National tools and responses to platform work challenges gives a 
framework for classifying and comparing tools and responses and then applies it to a 
mapping of tools and responses at national level for the EU28, Norway and Iceland.  
Section 6 Instruments and actions at EU level horizontally assesses selected EU 
legislation for its impact on the working conditions and social protection of platform 
workers. It further considers non-legislative EU actions. 
Section 7 Gap analysis: which challenges remain to be addressed? builds on the 
previous content to assess the extent to which challenges have been addressed by 
national and EU tools and responses. 
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 Where justified, and according to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
30
 The Digital Single Market strategy discusses platform work and the platform economy more broadly, though 
most attention is paid to technological innovation as a means for economic growth and competitiveness, and 
reducing intra-European barriers to doing business. Less focus is paid to the social dimension and the 
challenges that platform workers face (European Commission, 2017). However, the European Parliament 
Resolution reacting to the Digital Single Market Act calls on Member States to ensure employment and social 
policies are fit for digital innovation, entrepreneurship, and the growth of the platform economy and its 
potential for more flexible forms of employment. See European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2016 on 
Towards a Digital Single Market Act (2015/2147(INI)). 
31
 See discussion in 6.2.3. 
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Section 8 Conclusions and policy pointers brings together all findings and offers 
pointers for future policy consideration and research. 
After the body of the study, we include additional inputs to the research. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
The study relied on a mixed-methods approach with desk research and several types of 
fieldwork. The scope of the research was the EU28, Norway and Iceland from 2013 to 30 
June 2019.32 The study covers all types of platform work meeting the definition in Figure 
3. 
The overarching objective of this study is to provide an evidence-based analysis of the 
challenges faced by platform workers with regard to their working conditions and social 
protection. It reviews policy and legal responses to those challenges at national and EU 
level, and based on this analysis, examines the potential need for further EU action. 
The research team undertook this research in four main steps. Step 1 conceptualised 
platform work (see Section 3) and mapped the challenges it presents to working 
conditions and social protection (see Section 4). Step 2 gathered data on tools and 
responses to these challenges (see Section 5). Step 3 analysed a selection of EU 
instruments for their relevance to challenges platform workers face (see Section 6). Step 
4 synthesised all this evidence with a gap analysis (see Section 7), and conclusions and 
policy pointers (see Section 8). 
This Section outlines the research questions used in the study, methods of data 
collection and analysis, quality control, and limitations and constraints. 
Throughout, the research was carried out in full compliance with the European 
Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines. Special attention has been paid to vulnerable 
groups and issues related to discrimination and inequality. 
2.1 Research questions and data collection 
The research questions were designed to allow the research team to meet the 
overarching goal of the study: to assess whether further EU action on platform work is 
merited. Table 2 lists the research questions, which step or steps of the research process 
addressed them, and which research methods were utilised. 
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 In a few exceptional cases, tools and responses were updated in early December 2019. 
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Table 2: Addressing research questions 
  
Research questions 
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Challenges                   
conceptualisation  How do we conceptualise platform work and its challenges? X       X X       
mapping  
Which challenges are present, and where? X X     X X X     
How prevalent are the challenges? X X     X X X X   
analysis 
How significant are the challenges? X X   X X X X X X 
How are the challenges likely to develop in the future? X X   X X X X X X 
Responses                   
mapping  
What are the national responses to the challenges? X X     X X X X   
What are the EU responses to the challenges? X   X   X X       
analysis  
Are existing national responses adequate now, and in the foreseeable 
future?   X   X X X X X X 
Are existing EU responses adequate now, and in the foreseeable future?     X X X X X   X 
Overarching objective                   
analysis  
Is further EU action needed?       X X X X   X 
What particular EU action/s is/are suggested?       X X X X   X 
Note: Step 4 covers each research question insofar as it summarises all results. 
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Two main phases of desk research were conducted. An initial phase established the 
current knowledge base to avoid duplicating existing research. A second round of more 
targeted desk research was conducted at the beginning of each step, and throughout as 
needed. 
This initial desk research was broad in scope and supported all tasks. It was based on 
keyword searches and a review of relevant academic and other providers of analysis. It 
covered academic and grey literature on platform work in general and in relation to 
working conditions and social protection, developments at national and EU level with 
regard to policy, legislation, regulation, and collective agreements, media and public 
debates on platform work, existing data and efforts to quantify the platform economy, 
and similar topics. Legal documents, publications of policymakers and social partners, 
existing databases, articles published on traditional and social media channels, opinion 
pieces, and communication from platforms were also considered. Literature from 
different scientific disciplines, such as law, economics, and sociology, was consulted to 
form a complete perspective on platform work. 
A second round of desk research was carried out at the start of each step to ensure that 
any knowledge or data gaps were addressed. This stage focused on the specific topic 
and objectives of each step. For Step 1, the initial desk research was complemented with 
literature on (the working conditions and social protection of) other employment types 
that have characteristics in common with platform work, for example temporary agency 
work. For Step 2, additional efforts were made to gather literature in the national 
language of each country of the EU28, Norway and Iceland, with particular attention paid 
to the six Member States for which a focus group was organised. For Steps 2, 3 and 4, 
further desk research was performed to collect relevant policy and legal documents that 
support policy and legal analyses. Finally, the second round of desk research also helped 
ensure that the latest literature and evidence were absorbed. 
The research team also undertook extensive fieldwork to gather new data and 
complement the desk research. Stakeholders, including policymakers, academic and 
legal experts, platform representatives and social partners representing employers and 
workers, national administrators, labour inspectorates and occupational safety and 
health (OSH) authorities more broadly, and business sector associations were all 
consulted. 
The research team was responsible for preparing the list of stakeholders (including back-
up options), which was refined with input from the European Commission. Each 
stakeholder was sent an invitation to participate, a letter on behalf of the commission 
addressed to potential participants, a data protection notice and a privacy statement.  
Semi-structured interviews were held with stakeholders and different interview 
templates were developed for each interview partner for the respective step of the 
research. The results of the interviews were used throughout the analysis to gain 
conceptual clarity, provide the background to the research and verify the results of the 
analysis.  
Country expert surveys were carried out with one socio-economic and one legal expert 
for each country, making a total of 60 survey responses. The experts were identified 
through the existing expert network, the research team and informal networks. The 
surveys included both unique and shared sections to ensure comparability and 
triangulate information, while making use of the expert knowledge of respondents.  
The experts received detailed instructions on how to complete the surveys, which asked 
them to catalogue policy responses according to the prescribed typology and address all 
stages of implementation, including initiated but abandoned, pending or under 
discussion, or partially or fully implemented. While the focus was on responses, experts 
were also invited to catalogue particularly relevant tools. They were asked to describe 
responses in detail, including aspects such as the initiator of the development (e.g. 
government, social partners or other stakeholders), the scope of the development (e.g. 
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the types of platform work or platform workers covered), the focus of the development 
(e.g. direct or indirect impact on platform work), the degree of implementation, the 
timing of the development (e.g. proactive or reactive, response to specific incident), the 
originality of the development (e.g. new law or modification of existing) and other key 
characteristics. In addition to their mapping of national developments, experts were 
asked to include relevant literature to obtain further information and cross-validate it 
with the desk research. Country expert surveys were thus used to provide an 
assessment of the severity of individual country challenges, a mapping of the most 
relevant national responses and tools, and a review of the most pertinent literature.  
Focus groups were held for six countries,33 to learn more about especially interesting 
policy developments and trends with potential relevance at EU level. Countries were 
selected on whether particularly original policy developments or experimental 
approaches to platform work had occurred there. Each focus group had between six and 
twelve participants consisting of at least one policymaker, academic or legal expert, 
social partner, platform representative, and platform worker.34 
Finally, a validation workshop was held in Brussels where stakeholders, including 
policymakers, academic and legal experts, social partners, platform representatives and 
platform workers, were consulted on the findings. This workshop focused on confirming 
findings of the gap analysis, addressing any potential shortcomings of the conclusions, 
and discussing the merits of policy pointers. 
2.1 Data analysis 
Turning to the analysis, the research team explored both legislative and non-legislative 
aspects of challenges arising from platform work, and potential national and EU-level 
responses. This allowed for a broad, multi-disciplinary analysis of platform work 
across the EU28, Norway and Iceland. The question about the potential need for EU 
action in the field of platform work was addressed in a structured way, relying on the 
information gathered throughout all project steps and delivering the final conclusions 
and policy implications of the study. 
In Step 2, special attention was paid to any national developments that referred to 
existing EU framework, both legislative and non-legislative. Examples of these 
are the EPSR, or the European Commission recommendations and directives, especially 
those on non-standard work, on individual rights, for anti-discrimination measures and 
relating to work-life balance, as well as law relating to areas such as competition law and 
labour mobility.  
These are analysed in Step 3, and findings were also used to draw conclusions about 
what kind of EU action would be particularly appropriate, based on a detailed and 
systematic analysis of the most relevant selected areas of EU social law and related case 
law. Limits with respect to their relevance and application to platform workers will be 
identified and solutions to address these limits are proposed. 
Step 4 first condensed and systematised the information gathered through the country 
experts survey and national focus groups. The aim was to perform a comparative 
analysis and in particular look for patterns of national developments across different 
countries (i.e. similar developments, either in content or form, which emerge in 
countries that share the same characteristics). Step 4 establishes whether challenges 
are recurring in several countries and examines whether challenges appear to have the 
same roots or consequences within the socio-economic system. In addition, special 
attention is paid to challenges that emerge across the EU and appear to show a 
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 Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia. 
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 In one country, however, the platform worker declined to participate at the last minute. 
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transnational character or are a result of the transnational nature of specific types of 
platform work, meaning EU action could play a significant role.  
The analysis also assesses the extent to which existing national developments or 
existing EU legislation potentially relating to national legislation address the 
challenges, to understand what - if any - role the EU may have in complementing such 
national developments. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to show what role EU 
initiatives are already playing in addressing the challenges of platform work through 
national developments, which will in turn inform their appropriateness and possible 
scope in the future. 
In sum, the combined analysis of findings seeks to establish whether challenges relevant 
at EU level are addressed by existing EU initiatives and national developments, 
highlighting possible gaps. In addition, it assesses whether and how, based on existing 
linkage, national developments and EU initiatives can complement each other. 
2.2 Quality control 
Several methods were employed to ensure quality control was maintained throughout 
the research. 
First, a team of quality control managers provided input at critical junctures in the 
research. This multidisciplinary team comprised leading European authorities on platform 
work, who brought expertise from the legal, socio-economic, and academic spheres.  
Second, findings were confirmed through triangulation.35 Findings derived from different 
sources or research methods were thus validated against one another, and their 
robustness across different national contexts, types of platform work, types of platforms 
or workers, both within and across tasks, could also be verified. Information that could 
not be validated through triangulation has either not been included in the final study or a 
note included stating that the information in question was derived from just a single 
source. Preference has been given in this study to information derived from academic 
(peer-reviewed) publications, legal texts, policy documents and other validated sources. 
Information primarily derived from stakeholder consultations, or anecdotal evidence 
more generally, has been clearly indicated as such. 
Third, this research has benefited from frequent consultations with the European 
Commission. This has helped to ensure that the most suitable experts were identified, 
the most important upcoming events and legislation were accounted for, and that the 
methodology and content of the research were subject to rigorous review. 
2.3 Limitations and constraints 
A few constraints on the study should be noted. First, the quality of existing data on the 
size and prevalence of platform work in the EU is suboptimal, and predicting future 
developments is very difficult.36 Moreover, many relevant responses (e.g. court cases 
and legislation) are new or pending. This makes assessing the gaps in working 
conditions and social protection a more difficult task. For practical reasons, a cut-off date 
of 30 June 2019 was implemented, with changes in legislation or other significant 
developments after this date not considered, except for a few exceptional 
circumstances.37 
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 Findings derived from a single source were either not included in the final report, or noted (e.g. with a 
footnote or brief statement in text) as less certain. 
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 Data limitations are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.2.  
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 For example, the Recommendation on Access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, a key 
initiative as part of the rollout of the European Pillar of Social Rights, was only adopted 7 November 2019. A 
few pieces of particularly relevant national legislation have also been updated past the cut-off date. 
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Second, while the analysis aims to establish a comprehensive mapping of responses at 
the national level, time and logistical constraints meant that only a selection of EU law 
could be analysed. The specific legislation38 was agreed upon between the research team 
and the European Commission based on its likelihood of impacting working conditions 
and social protection for platform workers. However, this is a non-comprehensive 
analysis of EU law. Furthermore, the P2B Regulation39 was not originally a part of the 
legal analysis but added partway through the research. Therefore, it is not assessed to 
the same depth as other EU instruments.  
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 Covered in Section 6. 
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 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and the Council on promoting fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation services (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57–79). 
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3. CONCEPTUALISATION OF PLATFORM WORK 
The conceptualisation and definition of platform work has been a topic of much scholarly 
discussion. Similar and overlapping terms include crowdwork, gig work, and a plethora 
of others, as explored by a number of high-quality research papers (Coyle, 2016; 
Codagnone et al., 2016; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016; Martin, 2016; Maselli et al., 2016; 
Frenken and Schor, 2017).  
The European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies expressed its 
preference for the more neutral terms ‘platform economy’ and ‘platform work’, which 
avoid potentially misleading connotations (Forde et al., 2017). For this reason, ‘platform 
work’ is the preferred term for this study.   
The remainder of this section further explains the notion of ‘platform work’, ‘worker’, and 
other key conceptualisations. 
3.1 Standard and non-standard employment 
Before addressing platform work, it is useful to think of the traditional or ‘standard’ 
employment relationship as a reference point. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Conceptualisation of standard employment 
 
Source: adapted from Hasle (2007). 
Standard employment or ‘standard work’ refers to a full-time, open-ended 
employment contract with one employer. As shown, employers and employees are 
traditionally bound by an employment contract or employment relationship. The 
employment contract typically stipulates the rights and obligations of both parties, such 
as the scope of the services and tasks to be performed by the employee, working hours, 
the remuneration they will receive, and so on. Employees perform their services under 
the ‘direction’ or ‘subordination’ of the employer. However, employees would have no 
direct contractual relationship with a client. At most, employees render a service on 
behalf of their employer (ILO, 2016). 
Non-standard employment or ‘non-standard work’ refers to all forms of paid labour 
that deviate from the standard reference or ‘standard work’ such as part-time work, 
fixed-term work, temporary agency work, casual work, student jobs, zero-hour 
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contracts, and on-call work. This typology (Eurofound, 2017a) also includes self-
employment, although unlike the other non-standard forms, it does not correspond to an 
employment relationship in any legal sense.  
Non-standard employment does not necessarily entail precarious working conditions. It 
can also refer simultaneously to situations with an employment relationship, as is the 
case for temporary agency workers in the EU,40 and part-time or fixed-term contract 
employees. However, many of the safeguards built into standard employment do not 
always apply to non-standard employment (e.g. dismissal protection or paid sick leave), 
and thus non-standard employment can create challenges for working conditions 
(Eurofound, 2017b).41 
Platform work, when performed without an employment relationship, is an example of 
non-standard employment. Platform work challenges the fundamentals of the standard 
reference; for example, (but with exceptions) platform work usually has no employer 
giving the platform worker instructions in the traditional sense, remuneration is typically 
paid per task rather than as a wage or salary, and work can take place on more than 
one platform. 
Although this study investigates job quality challenges in platform work, there are other 
forms of non-standard work that could have similar challenges. As a starting point for 
this analysis, casual work, interim work and portfolio work is briefly discussed to 
illustrate the overlap and differences. 
Casual work is irregular, on-call or intermittent work characterised by instability and 
discontinuity, facilitated by the use of ICT, and without the prospect of permanent work 
(European Parliament, 2000; Eurofound, 2018a). Like platform workers, casual workers 
experience a high degree of flexibility, but also face irregular employment relationships, 
which lead to unclear legal coverage and a lack of social protection and representation. 
Lower wages (due to very low guaranteed hours and only completed work being paid), 
insecurity, changing workplaces and limited guidance cause higher precariousness and 
occupational risks (De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018; Vereycken and Lamberts, 2018; 
Eurofound, 2018a; ILO, 2019a). Platform workers seem to have higher levels of 
autonomy in choosing their working hours than casual workers in general, and on-call 
workers in particular. 
Interim or temporary agency workers enter a company to answer a periodic or 
suddenly increased need for certain skills (ILO, 2019b). Similarly to platform work, 
temporary agency workers have various skills and education levels, and operate in 
diverse sectors (Vereycken and Lamberts, 2018; Eurofound, 2018b). Although both 
types of employment are set within triangular relationships, the role of temporary work 
agencies is more extensive than the role of platforms. Additionally, while there is some 
diversity in the legal arrangements governing temporary agency work, the basic 
functions and legal relationships of the temporary work agency, worker and user firm are 
more or less identical across Europe.42 This is in stark contrast to the diverse 
arrangements in platform work (WEC-Europe and UNI Europa, 2018). Whereas 
temporary agencies are de jure, wherein the employer and temporary agency workers 
are classified as employees, platforms typically claim they provide only a matching 
service between labour supply and demand,43 and platform workers are usually 
considered self-employed (ibid). 
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 Under Directive 2008/104/EC, all temporary agency workers must have an employment contract. 
41
 See also Lamberts et al. (2016) for discussion of the European Working Conditions Survey’s findings on non-
standard working conditions. 
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 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 defines each 
party in temporary agency work and regulates their legal relationships. 
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Portfolio work refers to ‘small-scale contracting by freelancers, self-employed or micro 
enterprises, conducting work for a large number of clients’ (Eurofound, 2018b: p. 14). 
Portfolio work is common in the creative sector, where it could support the career 
development of professionals (Vereycken & Lamberts, 2018). As with some types of 
platform work, portfolio work in principle puts the worker in charge of the choice of 
tasks, working hours and workplace (Vereycken and Lamberts, 2018; Eurofound, 
2018b). Portfolio workers risk health problems similar to those encountered by platform 
workers, as both are prone to working during illness, disturbed work-life balance and 
limited social interactions (Eurofound, 2018b). 
In spite of the heterogeneity in platform work and non-standard forms of work, there are 
shared characteristics such as short-term contracts, unstable and unpredictable work 
schedules, and non-conventional workplaces. But in stark contrast with platform 
work, and despite some differences across Europe, standard employment, and even 
some forms of non-standard employment,44 has rather consistent and clear 
legal relationships. (WEC-Europe and UNI Europa, 2018).  
Therefore, some of the challenges platform workers face in the area of working 
conditions and social protection are linked to factors also found in other (non-
standard) forms of work. Some challenges, such as discrimination, may also arise in 
the broader labour market, but potentially have a bigger impact on platform workers 
given that some are particularly vulnerable, for example those who are younger, less 
experienced in the labour market, or recent migrants (Eurofound, 2018).  
Other challenges are specific to platform work. For example, many platforms use 
intransparent and disadvantageous terms and conditions, and may alter these without 
notifying platform workers (Graham et al., 2019). Clickworkers45 risk unique forms of 
psychosocial stress and non-payment, and this type of work only became possible with 
the advent of online platforms. This study will attempt to clearly distinguish between 
challenges particular to (a given type of) platform work, and non-standard work 
arrangements. 
A final but particularly important type of non-standard employment is self-
employment, which refers to many different types of work. Eurofound finds that 
roughly half of self-employed people have high levels of job quality, whereas a quarter 
are characterised by economic dependence, low levels of autonomy, and financial 
vulnerability (2017c). 
In this study, the term ‘self-employed’ is used to refer to anyone who works and earns 
remuneration outside the context of an employment relationship and is thus 
contractually self-employed. 
An important distinction to make is between false or ‘bogus’ self-employment and 
‘genuine’ self-employment. Bogus self-employment refers to individuals who are 
factually employees (subordinate to an employer), but for reasons connected to the 
evasion of regulatory legislation, are contractually self-employed (Eurofound, 2017c). 
The opposite status is sometimes called genuine self-employed, which refers to 
individuals whose factual circumstances and contractual status are both aligned with 
self-employment. 
                                                                                                                                   
intermediaries versus simple online marketplaces, and how this can impact platform workers, see De Groen et 
al. (2018). 
44
 For example, under Directive 2008/104/EC, temporary agency work is defined and many contractual 
obligations established for all parties. Most relevant, all temporary agency workers in the EU must have an 
employment contract. 
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 Platform workers using platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower, or Clickworker. 
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3.2 Conceptualisation of ‘worker’ 
The term ‘worker’ (NL: werknemer, FR: travailleur, DE: Arbeitnehmer, ES: trabajador) 
may have different meanings when used in different EU languages and/or in different 
contexts. It may even have different legal interpretations.  
In English, ‘worker’ commonly refers to all who work (travailleur, trabajador, and so on), 
irrespective of their legal employment status or classification in most national labour law 
frameworks. By this understanding worker would include travailleurs salariés and 
travailleurs non-salariés, werknemers and zelfstandigen, employees and the self-
employed. 
The terms ‘worker’ and ‘employee’ have both been used in EU labour legislation, the 
latter word most often being used in older directives and specifically those that concern 
collective labour rights. Most recent EU labour legislation, however, uses the concept of 
‘worker’. Both terms have the same legal connotation in EU labour legislation and refer 
to an employment relationship. 
Settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has given an EU-
autonomous interpretation to the concept of ‘worker’. In the Lawrie Blum case,46 decided 
under the free movement of workers framework, the CJEU defined a ‘worker’ as ‘a 
natural person who for a certain period of time performs services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for remuneration’. This definition of ‘worker’ has 
also been applied by the Court to the concept of ‘employee’ in older EU directives. 
However, there is no single definition of worker in EU law; it varies according to the area 
in which the definition is to be applied.47  
One should remain very careful and not lose the nuances, as the terms ‘worker’ and 
‘employee’ may still have a slightly different meaning across the different directives, 
depending on whether they refer to the national legislative definition of each Member 
State, or to the autonomous EU meaning of ‘worker’ as interpreted by the CJEU. Member 
States’ national legislation differs with regard to the concept of worker or employee, and 
differences may even exist between labour and social protection legislation of a 
particular country.  
Under EU law, the key criterion for establishing the existence of an employment 
contract, and hence classification of ‘employee’ or ‘worker’, is that of subordination. The 
CJEU has given a broad interpretation of this criterion, which may go much further than 
that determined by national legislation. In other words, the concept of subordination 
under EU law may be broader than the one provided under national law with the 
consequence that a person may be considered as self-employed under national law and 
as ‘worker’ or ‘employee’ under EU law. In such cases, the person should be covered by 
the protection of the relevant EU directives. There are, however, countries where the 
subordination requirement has been interpreted more broadly by national legislation or 
national courts than the current interpretation of the CJEU and/or where the 
subordination requirement has been complemented by other and newer criteria in order 
to determine the status of a worker.48 
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 In Austria, economic dependency is taken into account for determining the status of an employee in social 
security law apart from the personal dependency criterion which is similar to the ‘subordination requirement’ 
and the key determinant under labour law. In several countries there is no statutory definition of ‘employee’ 
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In addition to the boundary given by the degree of subordination, which differentiates 
between a worker/employee and a self-employed person, another boundary is relevant 
to platform work: that of the marginality of the economic activity. Under a certain 
threshold, an activity can be considered (by national or EU law) as too marginal or 
ancillary to be an economic activity (be it performed by a worker or self-employed 
person). The CJEU has, however, interpreted the criterion of ‘genuine and effective 
activity’ very broadly, also identifying as workers those doing a limited number of hours 
per week (e.g. five and a half), working students, au pairs,49 or students working for 
four days during the holiday period. In some cases, national legislation seems to set 
stricter thresholds.50 
In this study, we use the term ‘worker’, as in ‘platform worker’, without any 
legal connotation, unless specifically noted as otherwise. In these exceptional 
cases, we state that we mean ‘worker’ as defined by national law, specific EU legislation, 
or by the autonomous EU meaning of the word.  
3.3 Conceptualisation of platform work(er)  
The conceptualisation of platform work consists of two parts: identifying what platform 
work is compared with other types of work; and distinguishing between different types 
of platform work.  
In this study, platform work is understood as all labour provided through, on or 
mediated by online platforms in a wide range of sectors, where work can be of 
varied forms and is provided in exchange for payment. This definition is derived 
from Eurofound (2018) and visualised in Figure 3. 
                                                                                                                                   
employees (which corresponds to the EU concept of ‘worker’ as the UK concept of ‘worker’ refers to a third 
category who is neither an employee nor a self-employed) and those who are not. The tests have included: 1) 
the control test – i.e. the level of control exercised by the employer; 2) the integration test – i.e. the extent to 
which a person is integrated into an organisation; 3) the economic reality test – i.e. looking at the contract as 
a whole and deciding whether the individual was in business on their own account; 4) the multiple factor test – 
i.e. that there are a variety factors that could apply depending upon the circumstances; and 5) mutuality of 
obligation – i.e. whether there is an obligation upon the employer to provide work and whether there is an 
obligation upon the employee to carry it out. In Ireland, courts assess the mutuality of obligations, right to use 
substitutes, the degree of integration in the workplace, the economic realities as criteria next to the right to 
control and the degree of control exercised by employers. In Poland, the statutory labour law definition of 
worker includes the criterion of economic, social and personal risk sharing by the employer apart from the 
subordination and supervision dimension, the personal provision of the services and the remuneration 
requirement. 
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 The term ‘au pair’ refers to a young person who is temporarily hosted by a family, and provided room and 
board in return for light everyday family tasks. 
50
 See Section 5. 
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Figure 3: Conceptualisation of platform work 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The core features of platform work are a triangular relationship between platform, 
platform worker and client, and online intermediation.51 Technology plays an 
important role in work organisation, by using algorithms to pair clients and platform 
workers, for example. Many forms of platform work involve smaller tasks, which 
are part of a larger process (i.e. fragmentation and micro-tasks). Services are provided 
on demand and the work is usually provided on a temporary or piecemeal basis. 
Typically, platform workers do not have a long-term or stable relationship with the client 
they are providing the services for, but there are some exceptions where platforms allow 
their platform workers to have repeat clients or build up their own clientele. Platform 
workers typically have no long-term relationship with the platform either. 
However, it is important to note that the model in Figure 3 is very basic: a 
simplification to help understand the labour element of platform work. In practice, many 
variants and exceptions are possible, and more actors and intermediaries may be 
involved. Furthermore - and critical for working conditions, social protection, and the 
notion of subordination - the platform’s intermediation can entail from minimal to 
very significant control over platform workers. 
A few examples help illustrate the limits of this conceptualisation, when considering the 
broader value chain of platform work. With personal transportation platforms, there are 
frequently other actors (in addition to the basic three). For example, platform workers 
may rent a car from a person or business. In Portugal, a platform worker cannot work 
directly for Uber; rather, a transport company must have an employment contract with a 
driver, and the company in turn has a commercial contract with Uber. In food delivery 
platforms, the platform typically has two separate clients per transaction – the natural 
person receiving the delivery, and the restaurant preparing it. A number of food delivery 
platforms, such as Foodora in Austria, also formally employ some of their platform 
                                           
51
 In some exceptional cases, intermediation can take place through other means, such as through phone calls 
or in person. 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
42 
workers, making the legal relationship between two parties much more clear-cut. Some 
platforms (e.g. cleaning platform Helpling) allow clients to select individual platform 
workers. In the case of Uber and food delivery platforms, the idea is to make platform 
workers as fungible (replaceable) as possible, homogenising provided services (Schmidt, 
2019). 
These and other exceptions demonstrate that the wide heterogeneity of platform work 
(e.g. type of services, party setting price, and level of platform worker autonomy) makes 
it very difficult to settle on a universally accurate model, and to disentangle platform 
work from other types of non-standard work (Fabo et al., 2017; Eurofound, 2018; Riso, 
2019a). Nevertheless, the essence of platform work remains the exchange of 
services and payments, with terms and conditions, and intermediation provided 
by the platform. 
The legal relationship between platform and platform worker, and between platform 
worker and client, are exceptionally difficult to pin down. In fact, platform workers in the 
same city working through the same platform may have different employment statuses 
(Eurofound, 2018). Compared with other forms of work, platform work’s most 
distinguishing feature is the ‘black box’ of intermediation. 
 Typology – distinguishing types of platform work 3.3.1
Platform work is very heterogeneous, and it is important not to overgeneralise when  
considering all its forms (Eurofound, 2018). Different types of platform work have 
specific and shared working condition challenges.52 Moreover, policy or legislative actions 
often apply to a single platform or platform type, rather than all platforms meeting the 
definition provided above.53 
To help group similar platforms, the research team drew from existing typology of 
platform work to identify characteristics especially important for working conditions. 
These are as follows and as shown in Figure 4. 
Skill requirement for tasks: higher- or lower-skilled (De Groen et al., 2016) 
Location of tasks: online or on-location (De Groen et al., 2016) 
Selection process: decision made by platform, platform worker, or client (Eurofound, 
2018) 
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 For example, work performed on-location has been the focus of more collective action (Kilhoffer et al., 
2017). 
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Figure 4: Typology of platform work 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration adapted from De Groen et al (2016); AMT refers to Amazon Mechanical Turk; 
on-location can refer to at the client’s premises, or performed elsewhere (such as a public space, e.g. city 
streets). 
Note: though platforms usually tend towards one of the four quadrants, the figure is a spectrum rather than a 
typology. This figure is a simplification of very diverse forms of work and intermediation structures. 
 
Online platform work refers to tasks that platform workers perform from any suitable 
location on their electronic devices. In the literature, it may also be referred to as 
‘crowdwork’, ‘location-independent’, ‘web-based’, or ‘online freelancing’ (e.g. Schmidt, 
2017). In most cases, platform workers perform this type of work in their own workplace 
(e.g. home) using a computer. 
On-location platform work must take place in a specific physical location. However, the 
matching still takes place online as in the case of online platform work. What differs is 
the final step: whether the execution of the task takes place online or requires physical 
proximity. In the literature, on-location may instead be referred to as ‘work on demand 
via app’, ‘location-specific’, ‘location-based’, or ‘physical’ (Schmidt, 2017). This type of 
work is often at the client’s premises but may be performed elsewhere. For example, 
retail intelligence tasks take place in a private store, home renovation tasks might 
necessitate fabricating wood or metal pieces in a private workshop, and personal 
transportation and delivery take place in public spaces such as city streets. 
On-location platform work seems to be better known and more discussed and debated 
than online platform work. The former is certainly more visible; these platform workers 
are easier to identify and organise, which has contributed to greater social partner 
involvement (Kilhoffer et al., 2017). 
The distinction between lower- and higher-skilled tasks refers to the service for which 
payment is exchanged, and not the skill level of the platform worker, or the overall skill 
level required. For example, clickwork (via AMT or similar) may include image 
recognition and data entry – small-scale, simple tasks that generally require no 
specialised training. However, the organisation of such work may entail highly complex 
strategies to find the best-paid tasks, such as writing and leveraging algorithms, as well 
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as subcontracting tasks to a larger network.54 Food delivery (via Deliveroo or similar), 
usually requires little or no training. Still, some platform workers doing these tasks use 
management and interpersonal skills to oversee others and organise and conduct 
negotiations between workers and management.55 Thus, lower- and higher-skilled are 
simplifications of the complexity, scale, and specialisation required for tasks, and should 
not be interpreted as absolute or normative judgements. 
When helpful, the research team also considers other elements that differentiate various 
sorts of platform work, such as task allocation and autonomy levels for platform 
workers. 
Note also that a great variety of online platforms, including social networks such as 
Facebook, e-commerce websites such as Amazon and Etsy, and sharing services such as 
CouchSurfing, are discussed under the umbrella of the platform economy (Fabo et al., 
2017). By this study’s understanding, these are a part of the platform economy in the 
broadest sense but are not examples of platform work.56 
 Size, prevalence, and expected evolution of platform work in the EU  3.3.2
To address the main question of this study, some discussion of the size and expected 
evolution of platform work is required. The more people take part in platform work, and 
the more it is expected to grow, the more significant its associated challenges and the 
stronger the case for intervention.57 This section provides a brief overview of the topic. 
How prevalent is platform work? 
Measuring platform work is fraught with conceptual and technical challenges, 
such as considering the number of platform workers, the amount and frequency of work 
performed, and the revenue generated. As of autumn 2019, the most complete overview 
of data on platform work seems to be Riso (2019b), which discusses and attempts to 
mitigate these challenges in great detail. Conceptual challenges include definitional 
complexity and a lack of standardised terminology, as briefly discussed above. As 
an example of technical challenges, data on platform work is not or cannot be 
gathered in most of the ways that data on other forms of work can be, for 
example national labour surveys and administrative reporting.58  
Because of these challenges, estimates on the size and prevalence of platform work have 
used a variety of conceptualisations of platform work and methodological strategies, for 
example, online, offline, or mixed surveys, administrative data, and big data. As a result, 
estimates on the size and prevalence of platform work are often vastly 
different, and little consensus exists (Fabo et al., 2017; Kilhoffer et al., 2017; Riso, 
2019b).  
Two recent studies on platform work illustrate these differences in estimations. Huws et 
al. (2019), using survey data, found that 17% of the working-age population in Spain 
earn money from platform work at least weekly, and 10.5% less than weekly. 
Meanwhile, 20.4% in Spain were found to be seeking, but not undertaking, platform 
work. This would imply that 48.1% of adults in Spain are active or one-time platform 
workers or trying to become one. Brancati et al. (2019), using COLLEEM II data (also 
from surveys), finds that 18% of Spanish internet users between the ages of 16 and 74 
years have at some point performed platform work, 4.7% at least monthly, and 4.1% 
sporadically. Clearly the latter estimate is much more modest than the former, and this 
                                           
54
 See Annex I: Synopsis Report of consultations. 
55
 See Annex I: Synopsis Report of consultations. 
56
 For further discussion, see Annex II: A note on what is not platform work. 
57
 With respect to the proportionality principle of EU action. 
58
 The UK has attempted to address this with specific questions in labour force surveys.  
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reflects conceptual and technical differences in the research methodologies. 
Conceptually, for example, survey respondents may not fully understand what is meant 
by platform worker.59 And one clear technical difficulty is that individuals responding to 
online surveys (especially for a payment) are more likely to be platform workers than 
the general population (De Groen et al., 2017a). 
To better understand the size and prevalence of platform work in Europe, the research 
team considered available data (Eurobarometer, Eurostat, COLLEEM, etc.) covering the 
size of platform work in (all or many) EU Member States. The research team assembled 
these datasets and performed a simple correlation test to understand how similar or 
dissimilar these estimations are. Strikingly, existing estimates of the size of platform 
work in Europe are almost completely uncorrelated. This provides strong evidence 
that current measurements of platform work in the EU cannot be compared and 
are of questionable reliability.  
Nevertheless, some sense of the size of platform work in the EU is necessary given the 
range of available estimates, even if we cannot be completely certain. Overall, the 
research team is best persuaded by the more modest estimates for the prevalence of 
platform work. One high-quality study from the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (2019) notes that the most reliable estimates suggest 
employment from platform work60 ranges from 1% to 3% of total employment.  
In particular, the research team considers the most recent and reliable data on platform 
work in Europe to be that of the COLLEEM II project (Brancati et al., 2019). This study 
looked at 16 European countries, and found that 1.4% of the population aged between 
16 and 74 years are platform workers as a main job. The percentage of the population 
who had ever performed platform work ranged from under 6% in Czechia, to 18% in 
Spain, and averaged 11% for all surveyed countries.  
As the study points out, however, this measure is far too broad. Those who simply tried 
out platform work, or do so very rarely, are less relevant from a policy perspective. 
Thus, excluding those who do platform work less than once a month, 9% of the adult 
population are platform workers. COLLEEM II data sub-divides this group into ‘sporadic’, 
‘marginal’, ‘secondary’, and ‘main’ based on a combination of how many hours worked 
weekly (less than 10 hours, 10 to 19 hours, or more than 20 hours) and contribution to 
income (less than 25%, 25 to 50%, over 50%). Those performing platform work as a 
main job ranges from 0.6% in Finland to 2.7% in the Netherlands and the average for all 
countries is 1.4%. 
Table 3: Platform worker prevalence estimate as percentage of population 16-74 years 
Country Sporadic 
(%) 
Marginal 
(%) 
Secondary 
(%) 
Main 
(%) 
Netherlands 2.8 3.4 5.1 2.7 
Spain 4.1 4.7 6.7 2.6 
Ireland 2.6 3.2 5.2 2.0 
UK 2.0 3.5 5.7 1.6 
Portugal 4.2 3.7 3.9 1.5 
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Germany 3.2 3.4 4.2 1.5 
Romania 2.2 3.4 3.5 1.4 
Hungary 1.7 1.4 2.2 1.4 
Lithuania 3.8 3.6 2.7 1.2 
Croatia 3.3 2.8 3.5 1.1 
Sweden 3.0 2.6 3.7 0.9 
Italy 1.5 2.5 3.9 0.9 
France 1.5 2.6 2.8 0.9 
Slovakia 1.2 2.2 1.8 0.9 
Czechia 1.5 1.6 1.9 0.9 
Finland 3.1 1.4 1.8 0.6 
Total 2.4 3.1 4.1 1.4 
Source: COLLEEM II survey data (Brancati et al., 2019) 
Note: the total is for the available 16 countries. While no comparable estimates are available for the remaining 
Member States, Norway and Iceland, the data on available countries is assumed to be fairly representative for 
the EU, as a variety of regions, industrial relations systems, and government traditions are covered.  
 
The employment status of platform workers is a highly relevant additional consideration 
for policymakers, and COLLEEM survey data gives some indication of this. The COLLEEM 
survey identified 10 types of tasks commonly associated with platform work, and 
respondents were asked to indicate which they perform, as well as to select one of four 
options for employment status: employee, self-employed, side gig as self-employed, or 
not employed. However, the employment status was not specifically asked about in 
relation to platform work, but generally. Previous research has found that many platform 
workers are employees in standard employment, but self-employed when conducting 
platform work, so this distinction is relevant (Eurofound, 2018). 
Overall, 75.7% of platform workers claim to be employees while 7.6% claim to be self-
employed, but this includes very occasional platform workers. The self-reporting of 
employment status is generally to be taken with great caution because survey definitions 
and the manner of posing questions can differ. Table 4 shows self-described employment 
status only for those performing platform work as a main or secondary occupation (not 
sporadic), showing the type of task by COLLEEM’s 10 possibilities (far left column). 
Looking at these results, those doing online micro-tasks (e.g. clickwork) and on-location 
services (e.g. home repair or cleaning) were most likely to identify as self-employed. 
Those providing online professional services (e.g. accounting, legal, or project 
management) and transportation and delivery services, were most likely to identify as 
employees. On-location services are most strongly associated with having a side gig as 
self-employed, while platform workers providing online clerical and data-entry tasks, and 
transportation and delivery services, are most likely to claim being not employed.  
Table 4: Self-reported employment status by platform work type 
Type of platform 
work tasks 
Employees 
(%) 
Self-
employed 
(%) 
Side gig 
as self-
employed 
(%) 
Not 
employed 
(%) 
Observ-
ations 
(#) 
Online clerical and 
data-entry tasks 37.5 13.5 37.2 11.8 862 
Online creative and 
multimedia work 38.7 13.6 40.5 7.3 640 
Online professional 
services 42.3 9.9 42.2 5.7 571 
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Online sales and 
marketing support work 38.4 10.2 41.6 9.8 559 
Online writing and 
translation work 37.8 10.9 40.9 10.4 546 
Online micro tasks 38 15.5 36 10.5 465 
Online software 
development and 
technology work 39.5 11.8 41.4 7.9 385 
Interactive services 40.2 12 40.1 7.7 327 
Transportation and 
delivery services 39.7 9.6 39.5 11.2 319 
On-location services 31.6 14.5 45.6 8.3 271 
Source: COLLEEM (Pesole et al., 2018) 
Note: this Table only shows self-described employment status of platform workers, excluding ‘very occasional’ 
platform workers. 
 
Furthermore, COLLEEM finds that most platform workers do multiple forms of platform 
work and use more than one platform. The most common tasks platform workers 
perform are online clerical and data-entry tasks, while the largest proportion of platform 
workers (including sporadic activity) provide online professional services. This contrasts 
with some earlier findings. For example, De Groen and Maseli (2016) estimated that in 
2015, two-thirds of EU platform workers were Uber drivers. Possible explanations are 
that the methodologies are not comparable, and that online forms of platform work have 
grown in relative prevalence. 
Online software development and technology work, and transportation and delivery 
services, are much more likely to be performed by men, while translation and on-
location services are more likely to be performed by women. The prevalence of most 
services does not vary significantly between countries, though some differentiation is 
notable. Slovakia and Croatia are associated with platform work requiring a low or 
medium level of education, while the Netherlands is associated with tasks requiring 
specialised training (e.g. software development or interactive services such as teaching 
or consultation). 
Overall, COLLEEM II data suggests the following about the prevalence of 
platform work in Europe: 
1. 11% of adults have gained income from platform work at some time; 
2. 3.1% of adults do platform work at least 10 to 19 hours/week or receive 
between 25% and 50% of their income from platform work; 
3. 1.4% of adults do platform work at least 20 hours/week or receive at least 
50% of their income from platform work; 
4. for individual Member States, this figure ranges from 0.9% to 2.7%; 
5. the most common forms of platform work are online; 
6. the prevalence of different types of platform work across different countries is 
mostly the same; 
7. those performing platform work as a primary or secondary occupation are less 
likely to be employees than those performing platform work sporadically; 
8. employment status of platform workers remains very ambivalent from existing 
data, and/or to the platform workers themselves. 
 
What is the trajectory of platform work? 
Even less data exist on the outlook for platform work, namely whether it will grow or 
contract. Aloisi notes, ‘[…] many online platforms are still in their business “infancy”, and 
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experts genuinely do not know how they will develop.’ (2018). Overall it remains 
to be seen whether certain forms of platform work will continue to grow, stagnate, or 
disappear as technology advances.  
However, some quantitative research points to continued growth. Huws et al. (2019) 
found that between 2016 and 2019, platform work effectively doubled in the UK, 
based on proportion of adults carrying out platform work at least weekly.61 For the five 
largest English language online labour platforms, representing at least 70% of the 
market by traffic, the Online Labour Index shows roughly a 30% increase in tasks posted 
between July 2016 and July 2019 (Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 2018). Based on a PwC 
analysis of collaborative economy62 platforms, even starker growth (by revenue) is 
visible from 2013 to 2016, as shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Revenues and transaction values facilitated by collaborative economy platforms 
in Europe 
 
Source: Vaughan and Daverio (2016: p. 14). 
Most experts consulted over the course of this study agree that platform work is here to 
stay in one form or another, and will probably grow.63 One trend with more clear growth 
potential is algorithmic management, contained in the ‘black box of intermediation’, 
which platforms have continued to develop and refine. Algorithmic management seems 
to be spreading beyond the platform economy, which means that even if platform work 
(as it currently exists) does not continue to grow, the lessons learned may continue to 
be relevant. 
Most experts consulted also indicated that online forms of platform work have much 
more room for growth. For example, demand for micro-tasks boomed when companies 
started using human input to train artificial intelligence (AI) (Schmidt, 2019). Car 
companies are increasingly relying on online platform work to train their software and 
creatively solve problems. This trend may not continue indefinitely, however. The need 
for humans performing simple and repetitive micro-tasks may become increasingly 
obsolete as AI, and machine learning in particular, continues to improve.  
Some experts perceive that personal transportation and food delivery services are 
beginning to plateau. Many cities seem to have an oversupply of these platform workers 
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relative to demand, as illustrated by protests over lack of work and reduced pay per 
task. However, other forms of on-location work probably have more room to grow. For 
example, caretaking and cleaning may grow in prominence, especially as the population 
ages. 
Another question concerns the economic sustainability of certain types of platform work. 
After Uber’s highly-anticipated initial public offering in May 2019, many publications 
question whether it will ever become profitable (Horan, 2017; The Economist, 2019). 
One day in the indeterminate future, autonomous vehicles may well displace (platform) 
work in the personal transport sector. Individual platform companies will certainly rise, 
fall, merge and change, but charting the future course of platform work remains mostly 
speculation. 
Overall, available data and expert opinion suggest the following outlook for 
platform work in Europe: 
 platform workers are growing in number and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future; 
o demand for many services offered via platform work (e.g. training AI and 
certain on-location services) is growing; 
o certain services offered via platform work may not have as much growth 
potential or may be more vulnerable to technological changes (e.g. 
automation);  
 certain characteristics of platform work are becoming more common in the 
economy at large (e.g. non-standard employment, algorithmic management, 
rating systems for people). 
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4. CHALLENGES FOR PLATFORM WORKERS 
This section maps the challenges related to the working and employment 
conditions of platform work. It builds on an extensive review of the academic and grey 
literature and on the fieldwork conducted for the study (stakeholder interviews, focus 
groups and a survey completed by national experts). National experts were asked to 
indicate what challenges emerge in their country, specifying how prevalent these 
challenges are, how they are expected to develop over time, and what types of platform 
work are affected. Caution is needed when interpreting the responses of the national 
experts on the expected evolution of the challenges because, in the absence of other 
sources, these are mainly based on their personal views. National experts also 
accounted for national developments, which are dealt with in section 5. Other 
stakeholders were consulted to provide insights from an EU-level perspective or to 
represent the views of an interest group. The inputs provided by the experts and 
stakeholders are confronted with the literature, which serves as the baseline for this 
Section. Relevant results from the fieldwork are highlighted where appropriate. 
4.1 Framework 
To perform this mapping of challenges in a structured yet comprehensive way, we use a 
job quality framework based on the Work, Employment and Social Relations 
(WES) model put forward by Lamberts et al. (2016). This gathers a wide range of 
indicators capturing working and employment conditions and helps structure the 
discussion on the working and employment conditions facing platform workers.  
Job quality is a multidisciplinary, multidimensional concept that is generally understood 
as ‘the extent to which a job has work and employment-related factors that foster 
beneficial outcomes for the employee, particularly psychological well-being, physical 
well-being and positive attitudes such as job satisfaction’ (Holman, 2013). Because of 
the broadness of the concept, there is no single definition of job quality. Instead, 
multiple indicators have been identified that contribute to its measurement. The job 
quality concept used by Eurofound considers seven indices derived from the European 
Working Conditions Survey: physical environment, social environment, work intensity, 
working time quality, skills and discretion, prospects, and earnings (Eurofound, 2017b). 
The OECD’s framework considers the worker’s situation as well as the labour market. It 
includes three dimensions: earnings quality, working environment quality, and labour 
market security (e.g. risk of job loss, benefits generosity and coverage) (Cazes et al., 
2015). The International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) and Eurostat jointly developed a quality of employment 
framework with seven dimensions: safety and ethics, income and benefits, working time 
and work-life balance, security and social protection, social dialogue, skills development 
and training, motivation and employment-related relationships. Finally, the European 
Trade Union Institute (ETUI) created the widely used ETUI Job Quality Index using six 
job features to compile one job quality score: wages, non-standard forms of work, 
working time, working conditions and job security, skill and career development, and 
collective interest representation (Leschke and Finn, 2016; Leschke et al., 2012). 
The WES model organises the multitude of possible indicators describing the job quality 
of platform work. Twenty-one indicators from the selection suggested by Eurofound 
(2017b) are categorised into three broad dimensions that encompass all relevant, 
objective job features needed to measure job quality at the worker level (Lamberts et 
al., 2016). These three dimensions capture the bulk of the job quality literature: work, 
employment, and social relations (Lamberts et al., 2016). The work dimension reflects 
the organisation of specific tasks and the environment where a worker performs labour. 
The employment dimension relates to those job characteristics that are mostly fixed 
within formal employment agreements and interfere directly with workers’ private lives, 
for example, wages, working time or training. The social relations dimension links 
social relations and interactions, social dialogue and representation at work through 
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formal and informal channels. The WES model allows us to consider tasks as well as 
jobs.  
Table 5 shows the WES model and its main indicators and demonstrates how the 
conceptualisation of different definitions overlap with those in other commonly used 
frameworks.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of the WES model with other job quality frameworks and their 
definitions and indicators 
WES model  
(Lamberts et al., 
2016) 
Work organisation 
Task autonomy  
Autonomous teamwork 
Task complexity 
Speed pressure 
Emotional demands 
Repetitive tasks 
Risks (ambient, bio-
chemical, 
musculoskeletal) 
Employment 
conditions 
Permanent contract 
Full-time work 
Wage, additional fees 
Atypical working hours  
Working time flexibility  
Planning autonomy  
Career opportunities  
Training 
Social relations 
Participation  
Representation  
Supportive 
management  
Social support    
Adverse social 
behaviour 
Eurofound  
(2017b) 
Physical environment 
Work intensity 
Skills and discretion 
Working time quality  
Prospects 
Earnings 
Social environment 
Holman  
(2013) 
Work organisation Wages and payment 
systems 
Security and flexibility 
Skills and development 
Engagement 
Green  
(2006) 
Intrinsic job quality Earnings 
Prospects 
Working time quality 
- 
ETUI Job Quality 
Index 
Working conditions 
Job security  
Wages 
Non-standard forms of 
work 
Working time 
Skill and career 
development 
Collective interest 
representation 
OECD Job Quality 
Framework 
Working environment 
quality (level of job 
strain) 
Earnings quality (level 
and distribution across 
workforce) 
- 
ILO, UNECE and 
Eurostat Quality 
of Employment 
Framework  
- Safety and ethics 
Income and benefits 
Working time and work-
life balance 
Skills development and 
training 
Security of 
employment and 
social protection  
Social dialogue  
Employment-
related 
relationships and 
work motivation 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
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Box 1: The Fairwork Framework: a job quality framework tailored to platform work 
Graham et al. (2019) have developed a job quality framework specific to platform work called the 
Fairwork Framework. This framework helps to assess decent work standards in platform work by 
means of a scoring system with basis and advanced points, leading to a total score on ten per 
platform. Academics, policymakers and trade unions jointly defined five principles for fair platform 
work:  
 
 Fair pay: the platform pays the local minimum wage (basis); pay is high enough to also 
cover costs (advanced) 
 Fair conditions: task-specific risks are mitigated (basis); the platform is actively improving 
working conditions and workers’ health and safety (advanced) 
 Fair contracts: the platform’s terms and conditions are transparent, concise and available 
for workers (basis); and preferably also genuinely reflect the nature of the employment 
relationship(advanced) 
 Fair management: the platform has a documented process for decisions affecting its 
workers through which workers can be heard, consulted and informed (basis); the 
platform additionally provides evidence of equity and/or informed consent for data 
collection (advanced) 
 Fair representation: freedom of association and worker voice mechanisms (basis); which is 
completed with a recognised collective body that can undertake collective representation 
and bargaining (advanced) 
 
The five principles of the Fairwork Framework are covered by the WES model: fair conditions are 
included in the work dimension; fair pay and fair contracts are part of the employment dimension; 
fair management and fair representation are taken up in the social relations dimension.  
 
Besides these broad frameworks, academic studies have put forward job quality models 
that focus on a subset of indicators and define the relationships and interactions between 
them. The job demands – job control model developed by Karasek (1979) distinguishes 
two types of job quality determinants, and focuses on the interaction between the 
‘demands’ a worker faces and the available mechanisms to cope with them, or ‘controls’. 
An example of a ‘job demand’ is working with tight deadlines; an example of a ‘job 
control’ is having a high level of autonomy. The Karasek (1979) model only accounts for 
the ‘work’ dimension. The extended job demands-control-support model and the 
validated job demands-resources model were later introduced to account for a wider 
range of indicators. These revised models also include indicators for employment 
conditions and social relations. Other models that have been developed in the discipline 
of psychology include the effort-reward imbalance model and the high-performance 
works systems. Sociologists have introduced the ‘socio-technique’ that focuses on the 
organisational level and suggests self-organising teams as a way to foster job quality. In 
the medical literature, the focus is on occupational safety and health. Other theories, 
such as the dual labour market theory, consider larger converging or diverging 
tendencies of groups of workers, or take a perspective of management (human 
relations) or consider it from a collective bargaining perspective (industrial democracy). 
Table 6: Overview of job quality models developed in different fields 
 Work Employment Social relations 
Job demands-control (JD-C) X   
Job demands-control-support (JD-C-S) X  X 
Job demands-resources (JD-R) X X X 
Effort-reward imbalance X (X)  
High Performance Works Systems 
(HPWS) 
X X (X) 
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Socio-technique X  (X) 
Occupational safety and health (OSH) (X)   
Dual labour market  X  
Human relations X  X 
Industrial democracy (X) (X) X 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Because the WES model captures most of the aspects put forward in traditional job 
quality models, as well as in frameworks developed with specific focus on platform work, 
this model seems the best fit to provide a complete overview of all the relevant aspects 
of work in the platform economy. It offers an elaborated overview of objective indicators 
composing job quality, without predefining the relations between indicators. This allows 
us to address indicators individually, while combining and adding other aspects specific 
to platform work. Table 7 shows the adjusted WES model that guides our research. The 
use of technology and algorithms is covered under each dimension. 
Table 7: Adjusted WES model 
Work dimension Employment 
dimension 
Social relations 
dimension 
Other indicators 
Autonomy in the 
allocation of tasks 
Employment status Representation Undeclared work 
Autonomy in work 
organisation  
Determination of the 
employer 
Participation in 
decision-making 
Cross-border work 
Surveillance, direction 
and performance 
appraisal 
Contracts Supportive 
management and 
social support 
Data protection 
Task complexity Social protection Adverse behaviour 
and equal treatment 
 
Work intensity and 
speed pressure 
Earnings  
Emotional demands Working time 
Physical environment Career opportunities 
 Training and skills 
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on Lamberts et al. (2016). 
 
Where possible, the study highlights whether a challenge is specific to platform work, or 
to the use of algorithms, or whether it is part of a larger issue. In the WES model, 
challenges specific to platform work are likely to be found under the work dimension and 
to a lesser extent the social relations dimension, while challenges identified under the 
employment dimension are typically broader and go beyond platform work. However, it 
appears that the employment dimension has received most attention in the debate and 
literature, precisely because it captures those aspects that interfere directly with 
workers’ private lives. Given that platform work is mainly performed as a secondary 
activity that comes on top of another job or activity (see Pesole et al., 2018), it likely 
has a significant impact on work-life balance. This issue is also a major point of 
discussion with other non-standard forms of work (Eurofound, 2017a). In addition, 
because platform workers generally use their own equipment to perform the tasks at 
hand (for example, riders use their own bicycle and smartphone), platform work is 
almost automatically set in the private sphere. 
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Note, however, that any examination of the challenges related to platform work is 
complicated by the high level of heterogeneity in the types of platform work, platforms, 
and platform workers. In addition, because the WES model considers a wide variety of 
job quality indicators across these types of platform work, it is very difficult to formulate 
clear-cut conclusions for some of the challenges described. For that reason, the analysis 
below is highly nuanced (although these nuances are necessarily abstracted in the 
summary tables at the end of each part). Three points are considered in these summary 
tables: the importance of the challenge (high, medium, low, or none), the 
specificity of the challenge (challenge specific to platform work, common for non-
standard work, or found in the wider labour market), and the affected types of 
platform work (all, on-location versus online, low- versus high-skilled, client-, 
platform- or worker-determined). The section for each indicator gives examples of which 
platform work types are affected. Similarly, comparisons between platform work and 
other forms of non-standard work are drawn in the text.  
How the importance of the challenge is categorised is much more complicated: it 
accounts for the literature and fieldwork (notably the expert questionnaires and 
interviews), the legal and socio-economic interpretation64 of a challenge, the extent to 
which an issue is discussed and by which actors, the extent to which a challenge is 
specific to platform work or not, the extent to which a challenge affects all or some types 
of platform work, and so on. While such details and nuances are described in the 
analysis, the summary tables combine all this information into a single ‘score’. To label a 
challenge ‘high’, we considered whether it was identified in the literature and the 
fieldwork as a ‘major’ challenge that moreover is specific to platform work and affects all 
or most platform work types. The only exceptions are employment status and 
representation, which, while highly relevant, are not specific to platform work. 
Challenges that emerge from the literature and fieldwork as ‘major’ but that are not 
specific to platform work, or only affect a few platform work types, are labelled 
‘medium’. Classified as ‘low’ are those ‘minor’ challenges that arise among other non-
standard forms of work or in the labour market more generally, and that have been 
raised in the literature or by the experts consulted for this study. These challenges are 
typically especially relevant for one or a few types of platform work. In addition, some of 
these challenges do arise in real life but are not seen as problematic by platform 
workers, social partners, policymakers or other actors, atypical working times, for 
example. Challenges with the label ‘none’ refer to those issue that may arise, though 
only in a very few, specific cases affecting some individuals. For example, having to deal 
with difficult clients is more likely to be a challenge with on-location work, but it does not 
mean all platform workers engaged in this type of work experience emotional demands. 
For some individuals, however, this may be the case. This issue has not been raised by 
the consulted experts and there is little evidence beyond anecdotal reports available in 
the literature. Although the available evidence is discussed, it is deemed insufficient to 
justify a different categorisation. 
The following sections describe the work, employment and social relations dimensions of 
platform work and their related challenges. These analyses are primarily based on a 
literature review and completed with data gathered through fieldwork. The identified 
challenges have also been validated in an expert workshop. 
4.2 The work dimension 
The work dimension of the WES model combines the elements that are usually 
distinguished by other job quality models: job content, working conditions and work 
organisation. Combining these aspects into a single dimension is useful because these 
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several instance where socio-economic experts flagged as issue as ‘major’ whereas the legal experts did not 
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to provide in the summary tables. 
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characteristics are often interrelated. The physical and psychological risks (traditionally 
seen as working conditions) a worker encounters are not independent of the performed 
task (job content) and the work organisation.  
This section presents the platform work state of affairs on task allocation, autonomy in 
work organisation, surveillance, direction and performance appraisal, task complexity, 
work intensity, speed pressure, emotional demands and physical environment. The use 
of technology, apps and algorithms has an impact on all elements of the work 
dimension. Within the WES model, the work dimension is the most affected dimension in 
this regard.  
 Autonomy in the allocation of tasks 4.2.1
The allocation of tasks, or the division of work, among workers, is one of the most 
discussed issues related to working conditions. Along with the idea of ‘being your own 
boss’, having the autonomy and flexibility to determine when to work, what tasks to do 
and how to execute them has been identified as a key factor that motivates workers to 
engage in platform work (Ivanova et al., 2018; Pesole et al., 2018). Freedom in the 
selection and execution of tasks is very important to platform workers (Berg, 2016; De 
Groen and Maselli, 2016). Having autonomy in the allocation of tasks is shown to be 
beneficial for job quality (Karasek, 1979).  
Compared to other forms of work, platform workers have a rather high level of 
autonomy in the allocation of tasks (Eurofound, 2018; Pesole et al., 2018). However, 
the allocation strategy used to divide tasks among the platform workers depends on the 
type of work and the organisation of the platform (ibid.). Three task allocation strategies 
can be distinguished, depending on who makes the selection (Eurofound, 2018): (i) 
tasks are allocated by the platform (i.e. the platform matches client and worker - 
‘platform-determined’ work;), (ii) tasks are allocated by the client (i.e. the client 
selects a worker - ‘client-determined’ work), and (iii) tasks are allocated by the 
workers (i.e. the worker chooses their tasks - ‘worker-determined’ work). The allocation 
of tasks is linked to the matching process, which is usually based on an offer or a 
contest, though the latter is much less prevalent (Eurofound, 2018). In addition, 
platforms can move between allocation strategies over the course of their development. 
The change can be to the advantage or detriment of worker autonomy. Cleaning 
platform Helpling, for example, allowed its workers to have a fixed group of clients; 
hence these platform workers have more control over task allocation. 
In principle, all three allocation strategies can be found across all types of platform work. 
In practice, however, platform-determined work seems to be more prevalent in low-
skilled on-location or online work, such as food delivery and click-work. Food delivery 
riders and ‘taxi’ drivers typically receive task offers allocated by an algorithm, which they 
can accept or decline. Although the option to decline tasks suggests relatively high 
worker autonomy, it is important to take the precise platform mechanics into account. 
For example, platforms differ as to which information is made available about the actual 
task, and when. On most transportation platforms, riders only receive information about 
the location of the client after accepting a task, limiting the capacity of the worker to 
make an informed decision about the task acceptance (information asymmetry) (Lee et 
al., 2015; Rosenblat and Stark, 2015; Rosenblat and Stark, 2016). In addition, the 
platform worker’s autonomy in task allocation is harmed by systems imposing penalties 
for declining tasks or stipulating a minimum number of obliged acceptances. Platforms 
such as Uber and Lyft suspend drivers from the system if they cancel (possibly 
unprofitable) trips too often (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016). The algorithm, ratings and 
rewards systems thus undermine the formal autonomy of the platform worker regarding 
the decision to work or not. 
In client-determined work, the client selects a platform worker to do the task. This 
can be based on a contest or competition between the workers, or a review of the offers 
or profiles of the platform workers. In the latter case, platform workers are strongly 
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dependent on the ratings or reviews received by previous clients. Platform workers 
without any ratings typically find it difficult to get work. Platforms are aware of this issue 
and some have developed strategies to assist their workers. Examples include 
background checks, a rating based on the completeness of their profile, a verification 
that the worker is a real person who has had an intake interview with the platform, and 
links to the worker’s profile on social media. These methods are used to create trust 
(Schreieck et al., 2018). There are also differences between platforms as to whether 
they impose penalties on platform workers who deny a task. Platforms such as ListMinut 
or Hilfr allow workers a lot of autonomy to decide what tasks they accept. They 
encourage platform workers to accept the allocated task, but do not penalise them for 
declining (interviews with platform representatives). In other cases, platform workers 
may feel pressured to accept a task to avoid a penalty or bad review. Finally, even in 
client-determined platform work, platforms have significant power to control market 
entry and to guide their clients’ choices. 
Worker-determined platform work is associated with the highest allocation 
autonomy. Here, clients post a task on the platform and the workers can select the ones 
they prefer. In such cases, however, the platform workers’ profile and online reputation, 
as well as the availability of tasks, also determine which tasks a worker can actually 
access (Martin et al., 2016). Factors such as income insecurity may also lead platform 
workers to accept any task posted, thereby restricting their autonomy in practice. 
Although allocation autonomy in platform work can be higher than in regular jobs, there 
are several explanations as to why it could be more limited in practice.  
 Autonomy in work organisation 4.2.2
Work organisation is defined as the organisation of the work to be performed with regard 
to the order, method and tempo of the tasks (Szekér et al., 2017).65 This definition 
largely coincides with the concept of discretion or ‘decision latitude’ put forward by 
Eurofound (2017d). The concept of autonomy in work organisation correlates strongly 
with the legal subordination ‘test’, which is crucial in determining the employment status 
of a platform worker. A higher level of autonomy at the task level is associated with 
higher levels of job quality because this can compensate for a high workload (job 
demands) (Karasek, 1979). According to the job demands – job control model, the 
amount of control and discretion a worker has moderates the effect of job demands on 
psychological pressure. As a result, the psychosocial well-being of employees can be 
improved by offering them a higher level of control and discretion without changing job 
demands (Clays et al., 2007; Karasek Jr, 1979).  
Autonomy regarding the work organisation, next to the flexibility to choose specific tasks 
and when to work, are among the main motivations for workers to engage in the 
platform economy (Yordanova, 2015; Berg, 2016; De Groen and Maselli, 2016; 
Temper, 2017). While employees in regular companies usually receive tasks, instructions 
and feedback from a supervisor, and may not have any contact with the company’s 
clients, platform workers receive tasks via the platform, but instructions and feedback 
stem directly from the client. This may cause confusion and reduce workers’ autonomy. 
Once a task is allocated, platform workers’ autonomy regarding the work organisation 
varies according to the type of work, and the design and organisation of the 
platform. In relation to the type of work, the highest autonomy in work organisation 
comes with online platform work based on differentiated skill use, similar to employees 
in such jobs, examples of which include graphic designers and IT specialists. (Leimeister 
et al., 2016; Pesole et al., 2018). Leimeister et al. (2016) describe how tasks requiring 
specialised skills performed online feature more intensive interactions between the 
platform worker and client. Whether an IT specialist works as an employee in a company 
or uses a platform, the process leading from the task description to the final delivery is 
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similar in both cases. To be able to perform the task, the worker needs to be entrusted 
with a reasonable degree of task autonomy. A similar logic applies to on-location tasks 
using differentiated skills, which tend to be complex and require the worker to have 
some degree of autonomy in determining how to approach the task. The opposite applies 
to low-skilled online and on-location work. Platform workers engaged in online 
micro-tasks, such as household services working at the client’s location, and 
transportation services involving passenger transportation or food delivery, have a lower 
degree of autonomy in the work organisation (Eurofound, 2018; Pesole et al., 2018). 
Sundararajan (2016) explains that organisational autonomy is lower in these cases 
because the structure of the working relationships is more hierarchical. This implies that 
instructions do not allow for changes in the completion, and that workers are closely 
supervised.  
Note, however, that there can be large differences between platforms intermediating the 
same type of work, depending on how platforms are organised. For example, are tasks 
fully predefined by the platform or can clients make their own proposition? 
Nothwithstanding this, it does particularly appear that those platforms intermediating 
work based on undifferentiated skills, regardless of whether they are online or on-
location, tend towards largely predefined tasks. This also reduces the platform worker’s 
autonomy in determining the method, order and speed. 
 Surveillance, direction and performance appraisal 4.2.3
During the execution of the work, the platform and/or client monitors the platform 
worker. The level of control the platform or client can impose has a strong impact on a 
worker’s autonomy and well-being. In platform work, surveillance, direction and 
performance appraisal techniques greatly rely on the use of technology, apps and 
algorithms. Surveillance implies the monitoring of platform workers, allowing the 
platform to interfere in the work process by providing direction and guidelines. 
Performance appraisal is understood as an evaluation of the provided work, feedback 
and ratings. The use of technology in such processes is a particular feature of 
platform work, though in ICT-based mobile work, technology-based monitoring 
instruments may be used to compensate for the employer’s loss of control (Eurofound, 
2018b). Given that very little is known about how algorithms work (the ‘black box’ in the 
conceptualisation), these processes are poorly understood, but nevertheless have a huge 
impact on platform workers. For that reason, this challenge is deemed of high 
importance. 
The surveillance, direction and performance appraisal that take place in regular 
employment relationships between an employer and employee are more scattered in 
platform work. The triangular relationship between platform worker, platform and client, 
which in some cases can include additional parties, implies that others may exercise 
surveillance and direction vis-à-vis the worker. Platform workers might be monitored, 
receive direction, evaluations or even penalties from the platform (or its algorithm), the 
client or both (Eurofound, 2018; Rosenblat and Stark, 2015).  
The literature flags up a number of challenges from identifying at least five managerial 
control systems (Waters and Woodcock, 2017): surveillance; automatic evaluations; 
automated decisions; automated messaging systems; and digital choice architecture. 
These mechanisms are often related. Surveillance of the labour process, for example by 
tracking, is often done by platforms intermediating transport services. It provides 
platforms with detailed information on the location of the driver, their speed and general 
work pace. Rosenblat and Stark (2016), for example, explain how Uber monitors the 
trips of its workers based on GPS data (a geotracking system). Ivanova et al. (2018) find 
similar cases for Deliveroo and Foodora. Tracking is used by platforms intermediating 
online work as well. AMT allows clients to specify that platform workers must be 
‘Mechanical Turk Masters’, which implies that platform workers allow online monitoring 
of their work (see Figure 6). Some platform workers are in favour of this type of 
tracking, as it provides them with proof in case of conflicts (Wood et al., 2019). The 
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existence and nature of such tracking mechanisms is indicative of the amount of control 
a platform can exercise over its platform workers. It has, in fact, been used in court 
cases to assess whether there is a link of subordination between a platform worker and a 
platform (see infra). 
Figure 6: Example of AMT 'Mechanical Turk Masters' 
 
Source: screenshot provided by German expert consulted during fieldwork. 
 
Surveillance creates large amounts of data that platforms can use for automatic 
evaluations of platform workers (Mohlmann and Zalmanson, 2017). If drivers or riders 
fail to complete a delivery during their shift, they typically face penalties, such as the 
strike system implemented by Uber. These evaluations might be at the basis of 
automated decisions, such as task allocation systems, and data-driven automated 
messaging systems influencing workers’ behaviour through reminders and pop-ups 
(Gillespie, 2018; Van Doorn, 2017). Choices and behaviour of workers and clients are 
led by the general design of the platform, creating a digital choice architecture of which, 
for example, unwanted alternatives are filtered out (Sunstein, 2015). Ivanova et al. 
(2018) present examples of direction mechanisms used by Foodora and Deliveroo in 
Germany.  
First, these platforms exercise control via automated messages based on what is 
estimated normal behaviour for a rider (Mohlmann and Zalmanson, 2017). Using GPS 
data and data received through the app when the rider indicates what step of the 
delivery they are on (i.e. accept task, arrived at restaurant, collected meal, arrived at 
client), the platform generates personalised estimates as to how long it will take to 
complete a task. Riders receive an automated message such as ‘contact the dispatcher’ 
or ‘log in again’ whenever irregularities are observed. Although riders are closely 
monitored, these platform workers ‘perceive the automated notifications as less 
controlling than a human supervisor’ (Ivanova et al., 2018: p. 13).  
Second, food delivery riders are incentivised through financial rewards to guarantee 
that there are sufficient riders during busy shifts or to encourage them to complete 
orders more quickly.  
Third, deriving data from their personal statistics, the platforms adapt the selection of 
possible shifts riders are able to access when choosing their working times. There is 
high internal competition for popular shifts, so underperforming platform workers have 
fewer chances to book shifts on their preferred hours. The financial rewards and the way 
platforms shape workers’ weekly schedules are ways to nudge workers towards 
behaviour that is considered desirable. Such mechanisms undermine the autonomy and 
flexibility platforms claim to offer, especially for platform workers who depend on the 
income gained through platform work (Ivanova et al., 2018; Lehdonvirta, 2018). 
Whether a platform worker can refuse shifts or disregard previously agreed to shifts 
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without facing penalties is an indication of the degree of subordination and managerial 
control.  
Fourth, the platforms’ control systems create information asymmetries between the 
platform worker, client and platform, limiting the actual decision latitude of these 
workers (see supra). The lack of transparency regarding the algorithms used for 
allocation and monitoring raises questions about the fairness of these mechanisms 
(Ivanova et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2015).  
Traditionally, performance appraisal forms part of the human resources management 
activities organised by the employer in regular employment relationships. Performance 
appraisal serves to justify workers’ rewards, as well as different levels of rewards within 
and between companies, and to define required developments for a worker to perform in 
the future (Dransfield, 2000). An appraisal usually starts with a clarification on the 
evaluation criteria considered to accurately measure past performances. In the context 
of platform work, however, rating systems are typically used to evaluate workers’ 
performance. Platform workers receive feedback from clients, who can either rate the 
entire transaction or part(s) of it (Van Doorn, 2017). Ratings can take different formats, 
depending on the platform (e.g. an option to provide text or only a score). These ratings 
or evaluations feed into a platform worker’s online profile and determine their 
reputation. Rating systems are often one-sided: clients can rate platform workers but 
not vice versa. In the case of Uber, however, drivers and riders can rate each other 
(two-sided reviews).  
Rating, review or reputation systems are poorly understood and often intransparent. But 
they have a major impact on platform workers because they affect their future work 
opportunities on the platform (Aloisi, 2015; Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat and Stark, 
2015; De Groen et al., 2018a; Wood et al., 2019). And they are common in platform 
work. Wood et al. (2019) describe rating systems as the most effective tool for 
algorithmic control. On some platforms only the profiles of platform workers with the 
highest scores are presented, making it difficult for those with low or no ratings to find 
work. On others, for example Fiverr, all profiles are shown. Many platforms, including 
Hilfr and Helpling, allow clients to search for platform workers based on ratings. Other 
platforms, such as Uber, prohibit workers with a rating below a certain threshold to 
work. These dynamics put significant pressure on platform workers to get good ratings 
(Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat and Stark, 2015; De Stefano, 2017; Wood et al., 2019), 
which causes stress and raises the emotional demands of the work (Aloisi, 2015). 
Platform workers have indicated that ratings are sometimes arbitrary, unfair or biased, 
yet there are few options for recourse (ibid.).  
Ratings are linked to a specific platform and workers cannot usually take their online 
reputation with them when transferring between platforms. However, research on 
transferable online reputation systems is growing, and arguments both for and 
against the transferability of ratings have been put forward. Arguments against 
transferability include those that platform workers should have the right to be forgotten 
or that they may struggle to get rid of ratings they consider unfair or incorrect, and that 
some types of platform work have little compatibility – for instance, what value does an 
excellent profile as an Uber driver signify for a platform worker who wants to work as a 
cleaner? (Lenaerts, 2018). On the other hand, the transferability of ratings may help 
overcome the monopoly power of platforms, make it easier to work with multiple 
platforms, and gives workers more control (ibid.). To this end, some new initiatives 
support ratings transferability. Deemly, for example, is a platform that allows platform 
workers to create an online profile combining reviews from different platforms that can 
be shared via a digital link. Such initiatives could be further explored. 
 Task complexity 4.2.4
Task complexity is defined as the degree to which a worker is required to meet high 
quality standards, solve problems independently, and learn new things in order to fulfil a 
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task. In the job demands – job control model of Karasek (1979), task complexity is 
understood as a job demand. How task complexity contributes to job quality depends on 
the interactions with other job characteristics, such as autonomy. More job demands 
lead to more stressful situations and negative job outcomes, but high levels of job 
demands combined with an increase in job controls, such as autonomy, can lift these 
jobs into active jobs with more positive outcomes (Karasek, 1979).  
In the context of platform work, task complexity varies according to the nature of the 
work: is a task a routine task, a complex task, or a creative task (Rouse, 2010)? 
Note that all three of these types are found online and offline. Routine tasks can be 
found in transportation and household services, for example food delivery, and in low-
skilled online work, for example clickwork where a worker tags images. Routine tasks 
require limited prior knowledge (Alkhatib et al., 2017). Pesole et al. (2018) report that 
platform workers engaged in routine tasks are the least likely to learn new things (Pesole 
et al., 2018). However, online micro-task workers report learning new things more often 
than workers using an undifferentiated skill set in on-location platform work (Pesole et 
al., 2018). The complexity of routine tasks is low.  
Complex tasks, for example online content creation, reviewing and testing products or 
applications, and participating in user surveys, require more effort. Creative tasks are 
considered to have the highest complexity level, as the work is profession-based and 
implies that workers have differentiated skills or are specialised in the area, and that 
such tasks require workers to learn new things regularly (Pesole et al., 2018). Both 
types of tasks include professional online or on-location work (e.g. IT specialists). These 
platform workers find themselves significantly more often in stressful situations related 
to their tasks (Pesole et al., 2018). 
As the complexity of the task itself does not appear to be much affected by the use of 
technology or algorithms, task complexity is not discussed as a challenge in the 
literature on platform work, nor has it been identified as such by any of the experts and 
stakeholders consulted for this study.  
 Work intensity and speed pressure 4.2.5
Work intensity is an indicator combining the amount of work and the work pace. This 
indicator refers to ‘the effort and strain associated with carrying out the work’ 
(Eurofound, 2018). High levels of work intensity are associated with negative job quality 
outcomes, such as burnout, stress and sleeping problems (Boekhorst et al., 2017; 
Cottini and Lucifora, 2010; Maslach et al., 2009). Platform workers engaged in on-
location and online work based on undifferentiated skills report higher levels of work 
intensity due to the competition between workers and their replaceability. Examples 
include food delivery and passenger transportation, which are low-skilled tasks. A 
platform worker participating in the French focus group emphasised how he felt that he 
could easily be replaced. 
Speed pressure is a related concept that gives an indication of the degree to which a 
worker has to cope with tight deadlines, automatic speed, direct control or quantitative 
production norms, whether they are dependent on external factors or colleagues to be 
able to finish a task, and whether sufficient time is foreseen to complete a task (Szekér 
et al., 2017). Speed pressure, as well as repetitive work, increases the probability of 
suffering from mental health issues, such as stress, anxiety and sleeping problems, and 
from physical health issues such as trembling hands (Cottini and Lucifora, 2010; EU-
OSHA, 2017). In platform work, speed pressure is determined by two factors: deadlines 
posed by the client or platform, and having to combine multiple tasks and working on 
different platforms at the same time and sometimes in combination with regular 
employment (EU-OSHA, 2017; Pesole et al., 2018). The highly competitive environment 
of platform work and its income insecurity have major consequences: platform workers 
are likely to take on as many tasks as possible and work with tight deadlines, which 
leads to an increased work pace or skipping breaks which in turn augments the risk of 
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injuries (Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017). This is particularly the case with micro-tasks, 
which are known for their repetitive nature and low remuneration (EU-OSHA, 2017). 
Platform workers in food delivery have mentioned that they are entitled to only very 
short breaks and that some of them do not manage to take breaks at all while working 
(Eurofound, 2018).  
The threat of replaceability causes stress among platform workers engaged in low-skilled 
on-location or online work. Huws et al. (Huws et al., 2017) document how the threat of 
replaceability leads to an increased work intensity among Uber drivers, with drivers 
working at a rapid pace without taking breaks. This is also explained by the on-demand 
nature of platform work, which requires platform workers to compete in a large pool of 
others locally or globally, while the availability of work is uncertain and often limited. 
When tasks do appear, they dictate short deadlines, which can be stressful (EU-OSHA, 
2017; Huws et al., 2016; Maselli et al., 2016). Speed pressure can also be problematic 
for platform workers in transportation services. This depends on the organisation of the 
platform, however, and in particular on its payment and evaluation system. For example, 
platform workers earning a high hourly wage will be less likely to accept a 
disproportional number of tasks in a limited period, compared with workers who are paid 
per task (Lehdonvirta, 2018). This may also apply to household services, even though 
Pesole et al. (2018) find that these workers are the least likely to face tight deadlines. 
Professional online workers, who do mostly creative, profession-based tasks that are 
rarely repetitive, are also often required to meet regular tight deadlines and may have to 
win tasks through online competition (Pesole et al., 2018). The need to constantly 
compete to have sufficient work causes stress. Nevertheless, these platform workers 
tend to have a different perception of this situation. Those engaging in online contests 
are aware of the insecurity that this type of work entails, and tend to approach it as a 
way to build up a portfolio and only participate in contests when they have sufficient 
time to do so (Eurofound, 2018). 
Both work intensity and speed pressure can be high for platform workers, and is likely to 
be aggravated by further increases in the competition between workers for tasks and 
between platforms for clients. Tasks requesting undifferentiated skills, high work 
intensity and speed pressure may provide reasons for workers to stop doing platform 
work, and some workers state that they only accept these conditions because the work 
is temporary (Eurofound, 2018; Lenaerts, 2018). There are substantial negative effects 
on job quality (Lamberts et al., 2016), especially when the work itself is repetitive, not 
set in a well-structured organisation, and without the necessary support, such as 
obligatory rest periods or specialised materials. This holds for platform work and other 
types of irregular employment, for example casual work, homeworking and temporary 
agency work (Vereycken and Lamberts, 2018).  
 Emotional demands 4.2.6
Emotional demands are an indicator of the emotional pressure workers feel during the 
execution of tasks, including dealing with direct demands from clients, or having to hide 
your feelings (Eurofound, 2017b). Personal contacts have been proven to influence the 
psychological well-being of workers (Boekhorst et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2011). 
Emotionally demanding jobs have a lower overall job quality, bringing, for example, 
higher risk of sleep problems, low general and physical heath, and low mental well-being 
(Szekér et al., 2017). Jobs that involve dealing with and supporting people have been 
found to be especially emotionally demanding, for example those in in commerce and 
hospitality, healthcare, and the education sector (Eurofound, 2017b). 
In platform work, emotional pressure can be two-sided. Platform workers are hired 
for individual tasks that are not usually emotionally demanding. Not all platform workers 
have direct contact with clients, for example those in contest-based online work. 
However, because of the fierce competition between workers, constant monitoring of the 
work and online evaluations that are available to all users of the platform, platform 
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workers are required to be flexible, friendly, and customer-oriented regardless of the 
type of work they do. The application of rating systems requires platform workers to 
have a service mentality, making these jobs far more emotionally demanding than their 
counterparts outside the platform economy (Lee et al., 2015; Raval and Dourish, 2016). 
Lee et al. (2015) also emphasise that, in the context of ride-sharing, clients tend to 
underestimate the importance and impact of their ratings on the worker. In this way, a 
‘platform job’ is broader than the tasks paid for, as it also involves constant customer 
care and public relations. The same accounts for household service and professional 
workers facing an imbalanced power relationship, in which they have to meet and please 
the client directly and sometimes work under their direct supervision. This is not 
necessarily specific to platform work, but rather depends on other circumstances, such 
as the type of contract or the task at hand. A parallel can be seen with casual workers, 
for example, those who have no guarantees to have a job the next day or week, and aim 
to keep their employer satisfied in the hope of receiving a stable contract (Vereycken 
and Lamberts, 2018). Similar tendencies are found among temporary agency workers 
(ibid.). 
Platform workers’ dependence on the client for payment and good ratings causes stress. 
While this applies to any type of platform work, it is especially the case for online and 
on-location workers with differentiated skills who are trying to sell their expertise and 
portfolio to potential clients. Although some platforms allow workers to negotiate with 
clients on the specificities of the task, and to have a final say in whether they accept a 
task or not, in many cases the client plays a large role in the allocation of the work. 
Schmidt (2017) finds that creative online workers especially are in a vulnerable position, 
as their work is more loosely defined and often vaguely described. This requires social 
skills to maintain the relationship with the client, notably when payment depends on the 
approval and acceptance of work by the client, and where evaluation by the client is a 
crucial factor for future work (ibid.). Similar issues arise for portfolio work, where 
freelancers simultaneously work for a variety of clients and depend on good customer 
relations for future work (Vereycken and Lamberts, 2018). In the context of platform 
work, the lack of support from direct colleagues increases the risks related to high 
emotional demands compared to regular employees (EU-OSHA, 2017; Pesole et al., 
2018). That being said, not all platform workers report this as an issue (Eurofound, 
2018).  
As a final point, being in emotionally disturbing situations is often discussed along with 
emotional demands (Eurofound, 2017b). In this regard, the moderation of harmful or 
violent online content – which occurs in some forms of online platform work – warrants 
attention. Exposure to emotionally damaging images is known to have a considerable 
impact on workers’ well-being and mental health (Lamberts et al., 2016). When this type 
of content is encountered in official instances, the workers involved usually receive 
extensive psychological counselling. Platform workers, however, may perform this type 
of work without appropriate psychological and social support and in a solitary situation, 
which increases its negative impact (Solon, 2017; Taylor et al., 2017).  
 Physical environment 4.2.7
The physical environment in which work is set refers to the exposure to ergonomic, 
ambient and biochemical risks, the material required and acquired, and other 
physical occupational health and safety risks (Eurofound, 2015). These indicators have a 
direct impact on job quality outcomes such as the physical or psychological health of 
workers. OSH is a priority for EU policymakers, and the improvement of working 
conditions to protect workers’ health and safety is enshrined in Article 153 of the TFEU.  
The physical environment and health and safety of platform work have been discussed 
extensively, both in the literature and in public and policy debates. National experts 
consulted for this study also identified health and safety as an important challenge for 
platform work in the survey, and most of the focus group discussions also emphasised 
it. Note, however, that the focus has largely been on mental and physical health and 
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accidents at work, and there is no evidence on occupational diseases in relation to 
platform work. Most attention regarding health and safety issues is paid to on-location 
platform work carried out at the client’s premises or in public spaces (e.g. 
transportation, household or professional services). Far less attention has been devoted 
to the health and safety risks of online work. 
For most tasks carried out by platform workers, the related risks are comparable to 
those for regular employees doing similar tasks. On-location workers such as drivers will 
face traffic and ergonomic risks, bikers have the increased risk of deadly traffic 
accidents, cleaners are exposed to chemical substances and experience ergonomically 
straining situations. Online workers face risks related to long working hours on 
computers, such as visual fatigue and musculoskeletal problems. In the case of platform 
work, however, protective occupational health and safety regulations are not necessarily 
guaranteed and are hard to regulate (Tran and Sokas, 2017). Platform workers are 
responsible for their own health and safety, which includes the provision of protective 
equipment and the materials and tools needed to perform the task (Huws, 2016; 
Eurofound, 2018).  
However, several studies find that platform workers are not always able to assess the 
health and safety risks related to a task or are unaware of and uninformed about 
potential risks, and receive limited or no training on health and safety (Huws, 
2016; Pesole et al., 2018; Eurofound, 2018). This is problematic, considering that 
platform workers are, on average, younger and identified as being subject to a higher 
risk of occupational accidents and injuries (Huws, 2016; Tran and Sokas, 2017). Another 
issue is that platform workers do not necessarily do this type of work regularly, and thus 
may be less experienced with the task, and frequently switch between activities. In this 
sense, there are similarities with temporary agency workers, who also face higher risks 
than employees in similar jobs (Benavides et al., 2006; Howard, 2017; Tran and Sokas, 
2017; Wilde, 2016). In addition, competition between platform workers may encourage 
them to accept tasks for which they do not have the right equipment or have no 
experience or, or continue to take on when sick (EU-OSHA, 2017; Pesole et al., 2018). A 
related issue that was raised in the focus groups is that platform workers are generally 
paid by task and not by hour. This may lead workers to work long hours and to work as 
fast as they can, which forces them to take risks such as crossing the street on a red 
light. Working long hours and combining multiple jobs can also cause stress and fatigue 
(Cottini and Lucifora, 2010).  
Previous research and the fieldwork conducted for the study confirm that many platform 
workers are unaware of or unconcerned by health and safety risks. Exceptions include 
on-location platform workers such as food delivery riders and worker-initiated and 
client-determined moderately skilled platform workers (EU-OSHA, 2017; Pesole et 
al., 2018; De Groen and Kilhoffer, 2019). Food delivery riders indicate concerns about 
traffic accidents and having insurance (EU-OSHA, 2017; Pesole et al., 2018). One food 
delivery rider participating in a focus group for France, for example, highlighted the 
importance of accident insurance, noting that this was necessary because delivery riders 
feel pressured to take risks, and indeed knew colleagues that had had grave accidents as 
a result of doing so. This platform worker argued that the eligibility criteria of the 
insurance should be fit for purpose; preconditions such as having paid social security 
contributions for at least one year exclude workers with no or limited labour market 
experience. 
Some platforms offer protective gear or equipment to their workers, either for 
rent or free of charge. Some food delivery platforms, for example, offer bikes, helmets, 
backpacks and jackets.66 Other platforms leave this up to the worker. Deliveroo 
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riders, for example, use their own bikes and are responsible for their maintenance, 
whereas riders working for Takeaway can use a bike provided by the platform. Some of 
the experts and stakeholders consulted argued that the materials or equipment provided 
by platforms might not suffice to fully protect workers. On the other hand, when 
platform workers have to provide their own equipment, there is the risk that they might 
try to save costs and, therefore, do not foresee the cost of high-quality tools or the exact 
materials required for a specific task. Platform workers who can set their own price can 
account for the costs of the equipment and materials needed to perform the task 
(Eurofound, 2018). Platform workers who cannot do so indicate that this makes it 
difficult to make a living out of platform work and are forced to (temporarily) quit when 
their equipment or material breaks down, finding, for example, that they are unable to 
pay for bike repairs (ibid.). 
Experts at focus groups in Estonia and France mentioned that the responsibility for 
health and safety measures usually falls on the employer. With platforms refusing to 
take on this role, or registering the workers as self-employed, this responsibility falls on 
the platform workers. Experts emphasised that platforms do not always provide the 
necessary incentive to their workers to prevent accidents, and that in general preventive 
measures are being overlooked. In the Estonian focus group, the issue of insurance was 
discussed at length. Estonia is a small country without large international insurance 
companies, and providing specific insurance for platform workers is too expensive for 
local insurance companies. A further complication is that insurance firms only allow 
employers to insure workers, but platforms are not necessarily employers, and neither 
do insurance products typically cover temporary, short-term assignments. 
 In short: challenges related to the work dimension 4.2.8
Of the three dimensions distinguished in the WES model, the work dimension is most 
strongly affected by technology or algorithms. These may radically reshape how work is 
allocated, organised, monitored and performed. In this regard, however, it is important 
to distinguish between completely new tasks that have been made possible through 
platforms, such as online micro-tasks, and those that existed before. In the latter case, 
the working conditions may not differ much from those in more traditional work 
environments, depending on the platform. The related physical and psychological risks 
are not necessarily very different, but rather are aggravated in the context of platform 
work. This can be attributed to the non-conventional work environment, the absence of 
an organisational structure, and the use of algorithmic management. Responsibility for 
health and safety often falls upon the platform workers themselves, who in addition use 
their own materials and equipment. 
In this area, the allocation and organisation of work as well as surveillance, direction and 
performance appraisal, and the physical environment, emerge as the main challenges. 
Platform workers performing low-skilled on-location tasks face higher physical risks, 
while high-skilled work is associated with higher levels of autonomy and complexity and, 
for online work, with risks linked to excessive screen time. Whereas typically the 
employer is responsible for health and safety provision and providing the necessary 
equipment and materials, this is left to the platform worker, who executes tasks outside 
a conventional workplace. For these reasons, this challenge is labelled high and specific 
to platform work. Depending on the platform, platforms, clients or workers may allocate 
tasks and can determine the method, order and speed in which work should be done. 
Many platform workers are not ‘their own boss’, but instead fully depend on the tasks 
allocated to them, which they execute as instructed by the platform or client. This is 
problematic, especially with regard to the allocation of tasks, and is moreover an issue 
specific to platform work. For these reasons, this challenge is categorised as high. 
Autonomy in work organisation is a medium challenge, as it is linked to the complexity 
of the task at hand. Those performing more complex tasks will (necessarily) have more 
autonomy. The use of technology, apps and algorithms in surveillance, direction and 
performance appraisals is unique to platform work. This may, however, present major 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
65 
challenges as platform workers are monitored continuously and receive online ratings or 
reviews that they often cannot counter. Such ratings nevertheless have a substantial 
impact on platform workers’ future work opportunities. This challenge is also specific to 
platform work and categorised as high, notably as very little is known about the 
underlying algorithms platforms use (the ‘black box’), which complicates any 
intervention by policymakers and other actors, such as inspectorates. Task complexity 
and emotional demands are not considered challenges. Although some platform workers 
do need to manage relationships with clients, challenges related to emotional demands 
appear to arise in individual cases rather than on a wider scale. Work intensity and 
speed pressure are minor issues that pertain in particular to some types of platform 
work.  
The expected evolution of these challenges is generally unclear because this depends on 
the types of platform work and which platforms will grow and the extent to which 
competition between platform workers will become more intense. This, however, also 
depends on the national and EU-level responses introduced. These are handled in 
subsequent sections. 
Table 8: Summary table of challenges related to the work dimension 
Indicator Importance 
of 
challenge  
(high, 
medium, 
low, none) 
Specificity of 
challenge  
(specific to platform 
work, common for 
non-standard work, 
general labour 
market) 
(Most) Affected types of 
platform work  
(all types, online vs. on-location 
work, low- vs. high-skilled, 
client-, platform- or worker-
determined) 
Autonomy in 
the allocation of 
tasks 
High Specific to platform 
work 
All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform- or client-determined 
work 
- low-skilled work 
Autonomy in 
work 
organisation 
Medium 
 
General labour market All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- low-skilled platform work 
Surveillance, 
direction and 
performance 
appraisal 
High Specific to platform 
work 
All types, however: 
- algorithmic surveillance and 
direction most prevalent with low-
skilled platform work  
- rating systems are universal 
Task complexity None General labour market Low-skilled platform work 
Work intensity 
and speed 
pressure 
Low 
 
General labour market All types, but especially problematic 
for: 
- low-skilled platform work 
Emotional 
demands 
None 
 
General labour market On-location platform work where 
there is direct (face-to-face) contact 
with clients 
Physical 
environment 
High Specific to platform 
work 
All types, but especially problematic 
for: 
- on-location platform work 
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the literature consulted and the fieldwork performed in this study. 
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Figure 7: Stylised representation of work challenges for different types of platform work 
 
Note: a higher score (= more on the outside of the spider chart) indicates a better situation regarding job 
quality. However, keep in mind that a final job quality score would be defined by the combination of and 
balance between multiple job characteristics. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Figure 8: Stylised representation of work challenges for different types of platform work 
 
Note: a higher score (= more on the outside of the spider chart) indicates a better situation regarding 
job quality. However, keep in mind that a final job quality score would be defined by the combination of 
and balance between multiple job characteristics. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
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4.3 The employment dimension 
The employment dimension encompasses aspects relating to the formal context in 
which a platform worker performs tasks. This includes the legal employment status, 
contract, social protection, and the composition of a worker’s earnings, among other 
topics. Next to these legal aspects, the employment dimension also discusses work-
related issues that directly affect a platform worker’s personal life, such as working time, 
training or career opportunities. In relation to platform work, the determination of the 
employer and the termination of the relationship with the platform also have to be 
considered. The use of technology, apps or algorithms has implications for the 
employment dimension, though to a lesser extent than in the work dimension. Ratings 
and rankings, for example, may severely affect the earnings potential of platform 
workers. This is discussed in more detail below. 
 Employment status 4.3.1
The employment status or labour market status indicates the status of a person as either 
working in the framework of an employment relationship (employee) or working on their 
own behalf and for their own account (self-employed).67 It refers non-exhaustively to the 
contractual aspect of employment in terms of the autonomy and the authority that 
workers have in their jobs, the duration and number of working hours, incorporating 
economic risk (European Commission, 2019). The distinction between the categories of 
self-employed and employee is generally based on subordination, whereas the concept 
of economic dependency is often used as a criterion for intermediate categories, such as 
dependent self-employed. 
The employment status of platform workers is one of the most discussed topics in the 
public and policy debates on the platform economy in Europe, both at the Member State 
and EU levels. This interest is mirrored in both the academic and grey literature, with a 
large number of articles discussing the issue. There is a consensus in the literature and 
among the surveyed experts and stakeholders that the uncertainty on the employment 
status of platform workers is a pressing issue that is expected to remain stable or 
increase, as platform work gains in importance. In fact, based on available 
literature and expert inputs, the employment status of platform workers appears to be 
the most important challenge that needs to be addressed (Garben, 2019). This focus 
on the employment status follows from the notion that it determines, to a large extent, 
what rights and obligations workers have, for example concerning labour protection, 
social protection or taxation.68 This applies to both individual and collective rights.  
In the EU, platform workers typically do not have a separate status and, therefore, have 
to be classified under one of the employment statuses recognised in the country. This 
has proven difficult for a number of reasons. First, platform work is characterised by 
complex employment relationships that involve multiple parties (i.e. platform, 
client and potential additional actors, such as restaurants for food delivery riders) 
(Eurofound, 2018; Lenaerts et al., 2018). Platforms typically argue that they play the 
role of intermediary, matching supply and demand for specific services. Although such 
clauses are generally legally not enforceable, platforms often indicate explicitly in their 
terms and conditions that they are not the employers of the workers using the 
platform, often without specifying the employment status of the platform worker or by 
classifying them as self-employed. There are exceptions, for example platforms offering 
employee contracts or other types of contracts. But these are limited. 
Another important complication as regards the employment status of platform workers is 
that it is difficult to apply the principles laid down in labour law or case law to 
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distinguish employees from the self-employed in the context of platform work. Platform 
work is blurring the boundaries between ‘employee’ and ‘self-employed’, which 
complicates the classification of workers into statuses and can lead to 
misclassifications.69 In general, the self-employed do not have the same labour rights 
as employees. As explained in detail below, in some countries labour rights that are 
typically attributed to employees are extended to individuals who find themselves in the 
grey area between being self-employed or an employee, for example the French El 
Khomri Law, which grants the right to vocational training to self-employed platform 
workers. Some experts consulted for this study have indicated that it should be 
examined as to whether classification issues in platform work are part of a larger trend 
that is also found in other cases, and whether the uncertainty about the legal status is 
deliberately used to decrease labour costs or push responsibilities from one party to the 
other.  
A related issue is that under certain circumstances, platform work may not be 
considered an economic activity, for example because of the low number of hours 
worked or the low income generated.70 In such cases, platform workers do not 
necessarily have access to social protection through their platform work activities. 
However, this is mitigated by the fact that most platform workers have a main activity 
besides platform work through which workers have access to social protection (EU-
OSHA, 2017; ILO, 2016; Eurofound, 2018a; Pesole et al., 2018). Nevertheless, this does 
mean that those who depend the most on platform work – i.e. those who do not have a 
main activity – are covered the least (see infra). 
Against this background, platform workers are generally considered self-employed or 
independent contractors. Whereas this may certainly reflect the real employment 
relationship for some platform workers, for example on-location or online workers with 
differentiated skills providing expert services, others may find themselves in a grey zone 
(Eurofound, 2018). Platform workers doing low-skilled on-location tasks (e.g. 
transportation or household services) or who are active on platforms that exercise 
considerable control over the work allocation and work organisation, set the transaction 
price and have extensive surveillance and control mechanisms, are most likely to be 
misclassified. Furthermore, platforms such as Foodora who are active in several 
countries seem to adapt to the national legal and regulatory framework by, for example, 
only working with self-employed workers in one country while offering multiple options 
elsewhere. For these reasons, bogus self-employment is a much-discussed challenge for 
platform work. It was one of the main topics covered in the Slovenian focus group, for 
example.  
Although, as indicated above, challenges related to workers’ employment status are 
among the most salient issues, they are not, however, specific to platform work. In 
contrast, the increased flexibility and workers’ autonomy, but also the facilitated forms 
of (extensive) control, made possible through digitalisation and technological change, 
have blurred the boundaries between different employment statuses more generally (De 
Groen et al., 2017a). Also, different types of employment relationships are found in 
other non-standard forms of work, and determining workers’ employment status is not 
always straightforward (Vereycken and Lamberts, 2018). Given the current challenges, 
some platforms are believed to veer towards deliberate misclassification of platform 
workers. Indeed, this was suggested by one of the consulted experts in an interview. In 
many ways, platform work is seen as a test case, highlighting how changes in the world 
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of work put pressure on the existing regulatory and legal frameworks. For that reason, 
many have called for an update of national labour law (ibid). As will become clear, some 
countries have either attempted to regulate the conditions of the platform work indirectly 
by defining the status of platform work or by expanding the personal scope of national 
legislation. Portugal is one example. 
 Determination of the employer in platform work 4.3.2
Alongside the discussion on the employment status of platform workers, the role of the 
platform has been subject to debate. Platforms generally claim to be intermediaries, 
connecting workers to clients, or even tech start-ups, and often explicitly refute the 
role of employer in their terms and conditions (Kilhoffer et al., 2017). In several 
countries, for example Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Sweden and the UK, it has been debated whether Uber should be categorised as a taxi 
service or as another type of organisation. If classed as service providers themselves (as 
opposed to mere information society intermediary), the risk for platforms of being 
classified as ‘employer’ increases (while not being certain, and depending on the exact 
nature of their relationship with the platform workers). The unclear status of platforms 
has been identified as a major challenge by the experts and stakeholders consulted for 
this study as well as the literature. This issue is likely to become more severe as the 
platform economy continues its development. In most of the countries, platform 
businesses are not recognised as a separate business sector and/or represented in a 
separate employers’ representative body. This issue is hardly discussed for other types 
of work; it is specific to platform work and hence categorised as a challenge of ‘high’ 
importance in this study. 
The determination of the employer in platform work relationships is difficult for a 
number of reasons. The lack of available data on platform work and the high level of 
heterogeneity in the types of platform work and in the relationships between platforms, 
platform workers and clients all complicate the analysis of whether platform workers are 
employees with platforms as their employers. As for the employment status of platform 
workers, it is difficult to generalise conclusions about the role of the platform because of 
this heterogeneity, and a case-by-case assessment is needed. Related to this issue, the 
status of platforms is not legally defined, nor is the concept of employer in most EU 
Member States.  
Where there is a legal definition, it tends to be linked to the concept of an employee or 
to the employment relationship (as explained by several of the experts consulted). In 
Slovakia, for example, an employer is a legal or natural person who employs at least one 
natural person in a labour-law relationship, and, if so stipulated by a special regulation, 
also in similar labour relations. The determination of whether a platform is an 
employer is thus intertwined with the question of whether a platform worker is 
an employee. In Germany, the concept of employer is primarily derived from that of 
employee. According to German case law, an employer is someone who employs at least 
one employee. Despite the link between the determination of the employer in platform 
work and the employment status of platform workers, the latter has received 
significantly more attention than the former, probably because of the strong connection 
to working conditions and social protection. Or, in other words, for platform workers it 
may be more important to understand whether they are employees or not than to 
identify their employer. 
The determination of the employer in platform work relationships can present a 
challenge in any type of platform work, similar to the difficulties in determining the 
status of workers. However, the issue is mostly discussed for on-location platform work, 
notably transportation services, where there is doubt over the status of platform 
workers and on which the debate on bogus self-employment has centred. This 
topic has been somewhat less discussed for other types of on-location platform work, for 
example household or professional services, but could also be pertinent there. It has 
received even less attention for online workers. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity on the 
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employer in platform work is problematic because it creates confusion as to who workers 
can receive orders from, or contact when faced with an issue, and in general leaves 
platform workers in the dark about their own status and contracts.  
To overcome these issues, Prassl and Risak (2016) suggest a functional concept of 
employer could be adopted, and identify five main functions that employers have: (i) 
inception and termination of the employment relationship, (ii) receiving labour and its 
fruits, (iii) providing work and pay, (iv) managing the enterprise-internal market, and 
(v) managing the enterprise-external market. Prassl and Risak (2016) explain that the 
contractual identification of an employer could be replaced by a functional 
conceptualisation that assesses whether the platform exercises the five functions. Taking 
Uber as an example, the authors find that although the platform’s terms and conditions 
explicitly refute the role of employer, Uber does carry out the five functions mentioned 
above. 
 Contracts: type of employment contract, contractual information provision and 4.3.3
termination of the employment contract 
Along with the challenges to determine the employment status of platform workers and 
the employer, contracts have been much discussed in platform work. The employment 
contract lays out the employment relationship between an employer and an employee, 
making explicit the subordination of the employee to the employer’s command or control 
(Eurofound, 2018). Contracts stipulate the duration of the relationship (e.g. permanent 
or temporary), working time (e.g. full-time or part-time) and other aspects. 
Traditionally, employment contracts were open-ended and full-time. Non-standard 
contracts do not conform to this traditional form, but rather include part-time, fixed-
term, temporary, casual and seasonal work (Broughton et al., 2010). Non-standard 
contracts are common for non-standard forms of employment. Examples are zero-hour 
contracts, non-written contracts and voucher-based work.  
Except for those platform workers who are genuinely self-employed, platform workers 
are often confronted with non-standard contracts. Most of them do not receive a formal 
contract but are instead referred to the terms and conditions stipulated by the platform, 
which workers have to accept. These terms and conditions, however, are often 
ambiguous. They may, for example, identify platform workers as self-employed and 
simultaneously have elements that are at odds with self-employment. AMT’s terms and 
conditions, for example, state that there is no legal relationship between the platform 
worker and the platform, but that platform workers are not allowed to sub-contract 
tasks. Prassl (Prassl, 2013) refers to this as ‘the contractual denial of employee or 
worker status’ and explains that platform workers are often expected to sign 
documentation that sets their status as self-employed. In addition, it has been noted 
that platforms change their terms and conditions without notice to the platform workers, 
or even with retroactive impact.71 The terms and conditions may also have clauses that 
are not legally enforceable. This all runs against the principle of fair contracts, which 
have to be transparent, concise and available to workers, and reflect the genuine nature 
of the employment relationship (Graham et al., 2019). This issue applies in particular for 
platforms who exercise a lot of control over their workers.  
Furthermore, platform workers typically have no protection against the termination 
of their relationship with the platform (Berg, 2016). Platforms can end relationships 
with platform workers by deactivating their account, often without giving workers prior 
notice or information as to why this decision was made. On some platforms, including 
Uber, dismissal is linked to performance; workers whose ratings are too low are no 
longer allowed to work through the platform. Platform workers are not protected when a 
platform ceases its activities, for example in case of insolvency (i.e. collective dismissal 
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of platform workers). This issue has been flagged in the literature and by the experts 
consulted in the study. On this note, it has to be recalled that platform workers usually 
bring their own equipment, which they have bought, and that some of them need 
specific licences in order to work. Uber drivers, for example, need a taxi licence in 
Ireland. Some platform workers thus run up significant costs to be able to perform 
platform work activities, but are not protected against termination of their relationship 
with the platform, that is, the equivalent of ‘dismissal’ in an employment relationship. 
Another issue that requires attention is that according to the Transparent and 
predictable working conditions (TPWC) Directive, workers have the right to be 
informed about their working conditions, which should occur in a timely manner 
and in written format to which workers have easy access. In practice, platform workers 
may not receive much information when starting work. They are usually referred to a 
webpage, which may not be detailed or clear (note that the TPWC Directive does allow 
the provision of information by electronic means). Conditions such as the start or end 
date of the relationship or working times may not be explicit or very detailed. Platform 
workers typically acknowledge receipt of this information by ticking a box on the 
platform’s website that states they accept the platform’s terms and conditions.  
 Social protection 4.3.4
Social protection is understood as the coverage of risks and needs associated with 
unemployment, sickness and healthcare, old age, invalidity, parental responsibilities, 
loss of a spouse or parent, housing, and social exclusion. The social protection coverage 
of platform workers has received quite a lot of attention in the literature and debate, 
along with the challenges related to the workers’ status. This social protection challenge 
has received significant attention from policymakers, social partners and other actors as 
well, not only in relation to platform work but also in the context of non-standard work 
more generally.  
The literature and the experts consulted in this project have suggested that platform 
workers tend to have less access to social protection (De Stefano, 2016; ILO, 
2016; Berg et al., 2018; OECD, 2018). This is attributed to the classification of platform 
workers as self-employed, their short work contracts, or even the fact that some 
platform work is not considered an economic activity (‘not work’) (ibid.).  
Workers’ access to social protection is partially linked to their employment status in the 
labour market (Forde et al., 2017). Social protection systems, however, were designed 
at a time when the traditional employment relationship with one employer and one 
employee was the norm and are hence tailored towards the model of a single, stable, 
full-time employment relationship (OECD, 2018). Other forms of work, in particular non-
standard forms of work and self-employment, may not fit into these schemes so easily. 
As a result, these individuals are generally less protected and often responsible for their 
own insurance. Several experts consulted for this study have, therefore, pointed out that 
the challenge is not necessarily to improve the social protection of platform workers but 
rather to improve social protection of the self-employed and non-standard 
workers in general. This challenge is, therefore, clearly not specific to platform work 
and is associated with the challenge of the unclear employment status and work 
relationships in platform work.  
Platform workers, being classified as self-employed, are typically less protected than 
employees in the EU (both statutory and effective access), though they may have access 
to non-contributory and some contributory social benefits. In terms of effective access, 
the self-employed face issues with eligibility conditions, for example under-insurance due 
to low minimum required incomes, short duration of benefits, waiting periods or 
possibilities for opt-out exemptions. In some countries, the self-employed are covered 
by the same social security scheme as employees, though not necessarily for all 
branches (e.g. Austria, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden) (ESIP, 2019). 
Other countries have separate schemes for the self-employed (mandatory or voluntary), 
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granting access to some or all branches. One expert, however, rightfully pointed out that 
platform workers often do not register as self-employed, which implies that in practice 
they are not covered at all through their platform work. 
Most platform workers have a main activity besides platform work, through which they 
have access to social protection (EU-OSHA, 2017; ILO, 2016; Eurofound, 2018a; Pesole 
et al., 2018). ILO (2016) argues that this indicates an inverse relationship between a 
platform worker’s dependence on platform work and their social protection coverage: 
those who depend the most on platform work are covered the least. Those 
platform workers without labour market activities besides platform work face higher 
occupational risks, as this lack of social protection may encourage workers to continue 
working when sick (EU-OSHA, 2017b). In addition, there is the constant psychological 
burden for workers of ‘not falling sick’ because they do not have access to societal 
protection (EU-OSHA, 2017b). This is especially problematic as this group of platform 
workers is the most vulnerable. This group is likely to have lower labour market 
participation overall or combine platform work with other forms of non-standard work. 
These platform workers may not fully realise the consequences of not having access to 
social security, nor be aware of their rights and obligations. With platform work 
becoming more popular, experts believe that the number of platform workers whose 
only source of income is platform work will grow, thus aggravating this challenge. 
In this context, access to social protection and who pays social security contributions are 
concerns that have been raised by platform workers, social partners, policymakers and 
academic experts, though these challenges are part of a broader issue affecting the self-
employed and those in non-standard forms of work. Platforms seem less concerned 
about this issue, arguing that platform workers as self-employed should take on their 
responsibilities. On top of the issues described above, policymakers and social partners 
have noted that platform work may contribute to the underfunding of social security 
schemes or to shifting the burden of funding social protections from the employer and 
worker to only the worker (consulted experts and stakeholders). In the French focus 
group, there was a debate about whether or not platforms could or should contribute to 
social protection. While a representative of a smaller platform argued that platforms’ 
business model is not suited to this and that they do not make enough revenue to 
contribute, especially in the case of smaller platforms, other participants referred to 
platforms’ responsibilities in this area. Some platform workers indicate that they are 
worried about social security (accident insurance in particular), while others are less 
worried because they can fall back on an outside activity (Eurofound, 2018). The focus 
group discussion in the Netherlands, for example, showed that platform workers are 
most concerned about their earnings and would rather opt for higher remuneration and 
less social protection than vice versa.  
 Earnings: price-setting, wages and additional fees 4.3.5
The (additional) income that can be earned is one of the main reasons why platform 
workers engage in this type of activity. The potential earnings and payment 
conditions are, therefore, key elements that platform workers consider when deciding 
which platforms to offer their services upon (Eurofound, 2018). Earnings, moreover, are 
part of almost every job quality index (Eurofound, 2017b). Paid work provides people 
with the means for material needs and decent living conditions, as well as the possibility 
for personal development and a place in society. The level of remuneration influences 
the impact of work on the living standards of the worker and is formed by a core wage 
that can be increased by additional fees.72  
In addition to the level of pay, other features concerning platform work warrant further 
review: the speed and periodicity of payments, wage setting and negotiations, fees 
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withheld by the platform, tips received from clients, costs related to platform tasks, 
unpaid time, surge pricing and similar issues have been discussed in the literature and 
were raised by experts, stakeholders and platform workers consulted in the study. 
Issues related to earnings in platform work have been identified as a challenge that 
affects all types of platform work, but particularly those workers who cannot set their 
own prices (mostly those engaged in low-skilled online or on-location work). These 
issues are expected to remain stable or grow in the future, as flagged by the surveyed 
national experts. Concerns about earnings and payment conditions in platform work 
have been voiced by trade unions and platform workers in particular (Daugareilh et al., 
2019; Huws et al., 2019). Other actors seem less concerned about earnings, typically 
arguing that platform work is merely a secondary source of income.  
To gain further insight into the challenges related to earnings in platform work, the level 
of remuneration is examined first. A recent survey by Pesole et al. (2018) finds that 
for 40% of platform workers the share of income obtained through platform work is less 
than 25% of their total income; and for 30% the share of income gained from platform 
work falls between 25% and 50% of the total income.73 This means that for 30% of 
platform workers the income obtained through platform work makes up more than 50% 
of their total income. A significant group of platform workers thus strongly depends on 
the income gained through platform work.74 Platform workers typically do not have 
access to additional fees (such as additional pay for night work). 
These results corroborate previous surveys and studies, though reliance on platform 
income appeared to differ significantly across countries (Berg, 2016; Huws et al., 2016; 
Ilsøe and Madsen, 2018). A study by Smith (2016) concludes that lower income earners 
are more likely to do platform work and that 56% of platform workers state that the 
income from platform work is essential to them. The experts and stakeholders consulted 
for this project have emphasised that special attention needs to be paid to the group of 
platform workers who depend on this income. Several experts have indicated that 
this group is likely to grow as the platform economy proliferates. In general, however, 
there is only scarce evidence about what platform workers earn. This was pointed out by 
several of the consulted experts (Bulgaria, Greece, and Estonia). In France, however, 
platforms have to report what they pay to workers. 
Most platform workers do not earn sufficient income through their platform work 
activities to make a living (Eurofound, 2018). Low pay is an initial factor that may cause 
this issue, and for several reasons: platform workers are paid by task rather than by 
hour; work is broken down into small tasks (piecework); there is high competition 
among platform workers with not always enough tasks offered; platform work may 
not fall under minimum wage settings;75 and platform workers may lack bargaining 
power (Eurofound, 2018; ETUI, 2018). That platform workers are paid by task rather 
than by hour was flagged as a major challenge in the French focus group. It was noted 
that this may lead platform workers to take unnecessary risks in an attempt to maximise 
the number of tasks performed per hour. Remuneration for online micro-work in 
particular is reported to be extremely low, sometimes just a few cents per task done 
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(Berg et al., 2018). Larger-scale tasks, performed online or on-location, generally have 
high remuneration because they often require specific skills at market prices (Eurofound, 
2018). As a result, platform workers could be earning well below the national or sectoral 
minimum wage (mentioned by experts from Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia 
and Spain). Some platform workers depend on the tips they receive. 
Sometimes platform workers have to pay a fee to the platform.76 Some platforms 
charge a fee upon registration, but it seems more common for a fee to be charged on 
each transaction (a certain share or a fixed amount) (Leimeister et al., 2016). This is 
remarkable, given the ILO standards on charging fees to workers for intermediation. ILO 
Conventions 96 and 181 pertain to employment agencies. Both explicitly contain articles 
stating that such agencies or intermediaries cannot charge any fees or costs to workers 
(Lenaerts et al., 2017). When asked about these fees, which can be 10% per 
transaction, some workers indicate that they find them too high in comparison with the 
services that the platform offers (De Groen et al., 2018a; Lenaerts, 2018), especially 
when the income gained per transaction is relatively low. 
Platform workers are typically expected to cover costs associated with platform 
work, such as gas, insurance and other costs, and to bring their own materials and 
equipment. These costs have to be covered by the income earned through platform 
activities. Workers who are able to set their own prices take these costs into account 
when determining the price (Lenaerts, 2018). This issue was pointed out in the 
literature. It was also brought up in interviews with trade unions, workers and other 
stakeholders, discussed during focus groups and suggested by a few national experts in 
their questionnaires, for example in Belgium and Italy.  
Box 2: Price setting in platform work 
With regard to earnings in the platform economy, an issue that warrants further attention is 
price setting: are platform workers able to set their own price, or does this fall on the platform 
or client? On those platforms where the platform or client allocates the work, have significant 
control over the organisation of work, and exercise surveillance and direction upon the worker, 
platform workers in general cannot set their own prices. On the platforms where the platform 
worker can decide on the work allocation and work organisation, and there is less surveillance 
and direction, workers typically can determine their own prices.  
Importantly, the first type of platform is common among low-skilled on-location and online 
platform work (notably performing transportation services), and particularly the group of 
workers engaged in low-skilled on-location work receives significant attention in (Western) 
Europe. It is this group for which there is most doubt about the nature of the employment 
relationship with the platform (are these workers self-employed or in fact working in 
subordination to the platform?). The notion that these platform workers cannot set their own 
prices could be interpreted as another sign that these platform workers may not be self-
employed, as the self-employed typically can set their own prices. It also raises the question as 
to what extent these workers can bargain for the price.  
The second group of platforms allow workers to set their own price more frequently, for 
example platforms intermediating on-location work based on (moderately) differentiated skills 
such as household or professional services or intermediating online work requesting 
differentiated skills. Remuneration per task is significantly higher for these workers, as they can 
account for their skills and time, but also for fees paid to the platform and costs incurred with 
regard to materials and equipment needed to do the work.  
When platforms set prices, this can take many forms, such as a fixed amount per task (with 
potential top-ups for working during specific times or performance incentives), standard or 
                                           
76
 There has been some discussion on this especially in relation to temporary agency work, as temporary work 
agencies are not allowed to charge such fees to their workers but rather ask clients to pay (Lenaerts et al., 
2018). According to Article 7 of the ILO Convention 181 which applies to private employment agencies, private 
employment agencies shall not charge directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs to workers. 
ILO Convention 96, on fee-charging employment agencies – abolishes “fee-charging employment agencies 
conducted with a view to profit”. 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
75 
minimum prices for a specific task (e.g. graphic design or in contest-based work) (Eurofound, 
2018). Workers on such platforms additionally face changes in earnings due to changes in the 
prices set by the platforms, the ratings received, next to other factors such as fluctuations in the 
hours worked, and over which platform workers often have no control. Many platforms use 
dynamic pricing schemes (De Groen and Maselli, 2016; Eurofound, 2018). Uber and Lyft, for 
example, have a system of ‘surge pricing’ that encourages workers to be available during peak 
hours; Deliveroo and Foodora have similar schemes to stimulate bikers to work during busy 
lunch and dinner shifts. There has been some discussion on dynamic pricing and workers have 
been trying to game the system. 
Regarding workers’ sense of being fairly paid, professional online workers agree that they 
receive fair pay for their work more so than non-professional online workers and on-location 
workers in transportation and household services (Pesole et al. 2018). This can potentially be 
attributed to the question of whether there is competition between platform workers on prices 
or on the quality of the tasks delivered. An interesting example here is the Danish cleaning 
platform Hilfr, whose workers can be covered by a collective agreement that sets a minimum 
wage per task. Workers can decide for themselves whether they take part in this collective 
agreement, but the platform encourages this to guarantee fair wages (interview with platform 
representative). 
 
In addition to low remuneration, the lack of income security is a significant stressor 
for platform workers. The financial security of workers is strongly related to their 
dependence on platform work. Workers with a stable job outside the platform economy 
have higher income security than those who rely on their platform earnings. Some 
workers face insecurity as regards the number of hours they can work through the 
platform, which may result in low earnings and limited income security (pointed out by a 
Romanian expert and discussed in the section on working time). The frequent changes in 
the prices set by the platforms and in the platforms’ business models contribute to this 
income uncertainty. 
Along with the level of remuneration, platform workers also face issues related to non-
payment and unpaid time. Platform workers are often eager to receive their payment 
soon after completing the task. Typically, the payment runs from the client to the 
platform worker through the platform. Platforms can withhold (part of) the payment in 
case of a complaint or poor rating by the client. Platform workers may have few 
opportunities for recourse in such cases. Platform workers additionally spend time on the 
platform for which they are not paid, for example, waiting time and time spent looking 
for new tasks (Berg, 2016; Eurofound, 2018). Similar issues have been noted for other 
types of non-standard work as well. Casual work, for example, is characterised by 
limited and occasional working hours, resulting in income insecurity and low wages 
(Eurofound, 2018a). 
 Working time  4.3.6
One of the features that makes platform work attractive for workers is the flexibility 
platform work offers. Workers have the flexibility to decide whether they want to 
work or not and to work at the times that best suit them, allowing workers to 
ensure that the work fits into their schedule. This flexibility provides workers with 
autonomy that they may not have in other jobs and is therefore one of the main reasons 
to engage in platform work (Berg, 2016; Pesole et al., 2018). Most platform workers 
combine platform work with another job or care tasks and may find it difficult to 
work during regular hours or at fixed times. Many workers need this flexibility to ensure 
that platform work fits into their schedule. Other workers choose platform work because 
they prefer to work from home or because they consider it paid leisure time (Berg, 
2016). Some workers even do platform tasks during their main paid job (Berg, 2016). 
What the different motivations to engage in platform work have in common is that 
workers want to work when it suits them (Pesole et al., 2018). 
Research on platform workers’ working times suggests that most do not work regularly 
on platforms and do it as a part-time activity (Balaram et al., 2017; Brawley and Pury, 
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2016; Daugareilh et al., 2019). According to Pesole et al. (2018), platform workers have 
low labour market participation degrees. Over 40% of the workers surveyed work less 
than 10 hours per week through platforms. 75% of them works less than 30 hours per 
week through platforms (ibid.). Other studies have attained similar findings. Combining 
the hours of platform and regular work, around 30% of platform workers work less than 
10 hours per week in total, and over 50% of the workers work less than 30 hours per 
week (Pesole et al., 2018). This suggests that platform work may very well be a second 
job, but one that is potentially combined with other forms of precarious work, 
leaving workers in a difficult position.77 Next to this group, there is a small but significant 
group of platform workers (>5%) that report working over 60 hours per week on 
platforms (Pesole et al., 2018). These workers are fully dependent on platform work.  
The challenges with regard to working times in platform work are manifold. In 
practice, the flexibility in being able to determine whether, when and how long to work 
may be much more limited than expected, and platform workers are confronted with 
unstable working hours as these are largely dictated by demand. Working time 
challenges could pertain to all forms of platform work but seem particularly relevant for 
on-location workers and for those active on platforms determined by the client or the 
platforms themselves. Workers involved in worker-initiated platform work report 
experiencing less problems with working time flexibility demanded by the platform and 
higher levels of planning autonomy (i.e. being able to control working times, work 
schedule and when to take breaks or leave). 
Depending on the type of work, various elements push platform workers to longer 
working hours. For online workers, for example, the large competition pushes down 
wages, creating the need for longer working hours to earn a certain amount (ILO, 2016). 
The same accounts for platform workers in transportation, where earnings fluctuate 
depending on the supply and demand of drivers (Chen et al., 2015; De Groen and 
Maselli, 2016; Horton and Zeckhauser, 2010; Wilde, 2016). Jiang et al. (2015) further 
describe how platform workers are sometimes unable to stop working, even though they 
have achieved their preferred number of working hours, because of an unpredictable 
overload of work and the pressure to remain available. On the other hand, some 
platforms, for example Uber, allow workers to announce the last task of their ‘shift’, to 
match them up with a client whose location is close to or on the worker’s way home. The 
long and unpredictable working hours in platform work raise platform workers’ 
probability of suffering from mental health problems (Cottini and Lucifora, 2010).  
While a small group of platform workers works a (very) high number of hours, many 
workers indicate they would like to work more (Berg et al., 2018; Eurofound, 
2018).  Platform workers on food delivery platforms who have to register for ‘shifts’ have 
especially claimed that the algorithm distributes shifts rather unequally among the 
workers, with some workers getting a lot of hours and others very few, without any 
explanation as to why this is the case (Eurofound, 2018; Lenaerts, 2018). To receive 
sufficient paid tasks, many platform workers indicate having to be on standby and 
reachable at all times (Berg et al., 2018; Eurofound, 2018). On the same note, what 
platform workers in food delivery spend to travel to the meet-up points where they wait 
for tasks to come in is typically not remunerated (ibid). This implies that many workers 
report long working hours and that not all time spent on the platform is paid time. 
This issue was mentioned explicitly in the focus group held in Slovenia. The 
interconnectedness of low pay and long working hours was seen as a challenge by the 
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Slovenian focus group participants: low pay forces platform workers to work very long 
hours to obtain a sustainable income. 
From a legal point of view, it remains an open question as to whether the time online 
waiting for a task is also considered working time, as is the case for other forms of work, 
for example hospital staff available on call. Related to this, being classified as self-
employed, platform workers run the risk of not being covered by national legislation and 
regulation on working time if this is only applicable to employees (e.g. paid public 
holidays, minimum resting time). The need to be constantly available affects workers’ 
work-life balance, hampering workers’ ability to schedule or enjoy their leisure time 
(European Commission, 2015; Huws, 2016; Martin et al., 2016; Smith and Leberstein, 
2015). Schörpf et al. (2017) finds that platform workers worry that temporary 
unavailability will cause job loss and damage their online reputation, affecting future 
opportunities. 
Platform workers’ autonomy over choosing when to work could be limited by several 
characteristics of the platform. Most importantly, platforms need to guarantee the 
availability of workers for clients, especially in the case of on-location work or for 
those types of work where the platform or client selects a worker (platform- or client-
determined work) (Eurofound, 2018). Some platforms, therefore, impose a minimum 
number of hours for workers to be active on the platform, which sometimes have to 
be fulfilled during specific time slots. Workers who are less active are requested by 
the platform to explain why or even removed from the platform if this inactivity persists. 
Other platforms steer workers towards the most convenient working hours through 
bonus systems such as surge pricing on passenger transportation platforms or 
increased prices per ride on food delivery platforms, or because a lack of demand 
means that there is little or no money to earn at other times (Smith and Leberstein, 
2015). Lehdonvirta (2018) reports that a lack of available work is not necessarily only 
due to a lack of demand, but also depends on how platforms allocate work (e.g. 
maximum earnings and competition). 
On-location workers in particular indicate less autonomy over whether, when and how 
much to work, compared to online workers (Pesole et al., 2018). There are plenty of 
examples of food delivery riders who prefer other working hours but are motivated to be 
available for work and to work evenings and weekends because there are fewer tasks at 
other times (Eurofound, 2018). For these platform workers, the flexibility of working 
time loses its meaning, and this issue is aggravated for workers who depend on the 
income gained through platform work (Berg, 2016; Lehdonvirta, 2018; Standing, 
2015). Non-professional online workers, such as clickworkers, are perceived to have the 
highest degree of autonomy (Pesole et al., 2018). This is confirmed by Lehdonvirta 
(2018), based on interviews with platform representatives and workers of three 
platforms intermediating online tasks. Lehdonvirta (2018) finds that workers are 
formally free to set their own working times and generally could determine when and 
how much they work and how to divide their time across tasks. Structural constraints 
such as the availability of work and workers’ dependency on the income gained, 
however, do matter. Workers who depend on their platform work income reported being 
on call continuously. 
Since the business model of platforms is to fulfil ad hoc requests of clients, platform 
work is typically associated with atypical working hours (e.g. working at night, during 
weekends and on holidays), unstable and unpredictable work schedules (e.g. 
working during different hours every day or week), and a high demand of availability 
and flexibility towards the platform (Forde et al., 2017). All these features can be 
problematic from a job quality perspective (Széker et al., 2017). As regards the atypical 
working times, however, platform workers usually do not find this problematic and most 
workers are satisfied with their work-life balance (Eurofound, 2018). These observations 
from the literature were confirmed in the fieldwork conducted for this study, for example 
in expert interviews and the focus group in the Netherlands. It could be explored to see 
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what the added value of the TPWC Directive would bring as regards the predictability of 
work schedules (see infra).  
Regarding working times, there are parallels between platform work and other 
non-standard forms of work. Workers in casual jobs, for example, report combining 
multiple jobs at the same time, which leads to long working hours and has a negative 
impact on their work-life balance (Eurofound, 2017a). Workers in portfolio work and in 
ICT-based mobile work are also faced with excessively long working hours, irregular and 
atypical working hours and the blurring of boundaries between work and private life 
(ibid.). The self-employed may face similar issues because of competition and income 
security. 
 Career opportunities 4.3.7
Career opportunities refer to workers’ perceptions of whether they can make a career 
of their work or use it to advance other career paths (Eurofound, 2017b). Career 
opportunities are generally not considered a challenge in the context of platform work. 
Most platform workers consider platform work as a secondary job, a means to 
supplement their main income rather than a long-term commitment or a viable or 
desirable career path (Eurofound, 2018). Neither does platform work generally offer 
many opportunities for career progression. Other new forms of work, such as interim 
management, casual work, voucher-based work and portfolio work have also been 
associated with limited career opportunities. Platform workers, however, do not always 
see this lack of career opportunities as a downside or reason not to engage in 
platform work, as they might for other forms of work. Career opportunities are not 
identified as an issue in the literature, nor by the experts consulted in the study. This 
may change in the future if platform work continues to grow and attract more workers 
who are willing to do it as a main job. 
However, there are differences depending on the type of platform work. Workers 
performing low-skilled repetitive tasks assigned to them by the platform or client, 
regardless of whether these are set online or on-location, seem in particular to have no 
or limited opportunities for career progression. In contrast, platform workers able to 
select their tasks and set their own prices have more opportunities to use platform work 
as a means to build up a portfolio or clientele. This holds for professional work based on 
differentiated skills carried out on-location and online work. 
For platform workers engaged in particular in activities using undifferentiated skills, 
platform work does not appear to offer interesting or viable career prospects. Because of 
the nature of their tasks, these workers generally cannot develop their skills or learn 
new things. For this reason, the simple fact of working on the platform, for example 
during a period of unemployment or while studying, is seen as the only added value in 
the search for other work (Eurofound, 2018). In a series of interviews, some of these 
platform workers indicated that they kept secret the fact that they do this type of work, 
and do not consider mentioning it on their CV or to potential employers (ibid.). This point 
was raised in the literature and underscored by Latvian and Norwegian experts consulted 
for this study, for example.  
Workers engaged in high-skilled platform work activities, on-location or online, can use 
platform work to try out an activity, learn new skills or improve existing skills, build a 
portfolio, or develop their clientele (Eurofound, 2018). For workers who particularly want 
to start a business, some types of platform work may serve as a stepping stone. An 
interesting case to mention in this regard is the Belgian legal framework, which allows 
platform workers to earn up to a certain amount (EUR 6 130 per year in 2019) through 
officially registered platforms, without the obligation to register as self-employed and 
without having to pay taxes or social security contributions (Lenaerts, 2018). When 
platform workers earn more than this amount, they are obliged to register as self-
employed. One of the motivations behind this framework is to encourage 
entrepreneurship by allowing workers to try out an activity or launch their own 
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business without having to go through all the administrative or formal steps involved 
beforehand. Lenaerts (2018) finds that some workers do use platform work as a 
springboard to starting their own business. Next to these cases, platform work could also 
be a stepping stone for the unemployed, who can enter into the labour market through 
platform work, or for example for newcomers in the country without employment, as 
mentioned in the Danish focus group.  
When platform workers are unable to select the tasks they would like to do and are 
instead assigned a task by the platform or client, they cannot pick those tasks that 
would be most beneficial for them in terms of skills development or career opportunities 
(Eurofound, 2018). This is different for those active on platforms where the work is 
worker-initiated. These workers are more likely to see platform work as a facilitator for a 
career change or to develop new skills they can benefit from in future jobs (ibid.). Online 
specialist workers, such as graphic designers, find that the contest work on platforms 
enriches their portfolio, and hopefully helps them find a more stable job (Eurofound, 
2018). 
 Training and skills 4.3.8
Platform work is sometimes described as a way to effectively match skills with tasks, 
with platforms taking up the roles of intermediaries (Eurofound, 2018). Most platform 
workers, however, are over-qualified for the type of work they perform through online 
platforms and indicate that there are few opportunities to learn or develop skills (Kässi 
and Lehdonvirta, 2018; Larke et al., 2019).78 Workers engaged in low-skilled platform 
work, online or on-location in particular report a mismatch between the skills workers 
need and the skills they have, which may lead to lower commitment and job satisfaction 
(Okay-Somerville and Scholarios, 2013). In contrast, those involved in activities 
requiring differentiated skills, on-location or online, generally use a wider set of skills 
and have more opportunities for skill development (Eurofound, 2018). For platform 
workers engaged in activities with undifferentiated skill needs, platform work instead 
appears to mainly serve as a second source of income, which is not necessarily related 
to their main activity and does not present learning opportunities (ibid.). These 
observations were confirmed in the fieldwork for this study. 
The skills that workers apply during platform work activities depend fully on the 
specific task the worker does. Kässi and Lehdonvirta (2018) identify six skills groups 
that are common in platform work: software development and technology; creative and 
multimedia; clerical and data entry; writing and translation; sales and marketing 
support; and professional services. Besides the skills required for performing the actual 
tasks, platform workers also develop skills related to the use of the platform, such as 
navigating on the platform and language skills, and knowledge related to participating in 
the labour market as a self-employed worker, including building a reputation, client 
retention, and completing tax returns (Larke et al., 2019). 
With regard to skills, it is important to point out that not all platforms verify the 
qualifications or skills workers have. On many platforms, anyone could register and claim 
to be able to execute the work. This is potentially problematic for on-location work, when 
the task can lead to dangerous situations if not performed well (e.g. electricity work). 
Platform workers themselves have put forward this issue (Lenaerts, 2018). Other 
platforms have basic or more advanced application procedures, which involve interviews 
or requiring workers to provide a CV or certificates showing they can execute a task. 
Mechanisms to identify and select candidate platform workers again provide an 
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 Platform workers participating in the focus group discussion held in Denmark stated that platform work in 
their country is concentrated in those sectors that require unskilled work, rather than in sectors such as  
manufacturing where there necessarily has to be a stronger link between worker and employer and where 
more skilled workers are needed with longer training. This is an interesting observation, which appears to hold 
for several countries. 
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indication of the extent to which a platform exercises control over a platform worker. 
Overall, however, the recruitment and qualification processes and procedures used by 
platforms are not really considered a challenge in the literature or by the experts and 
stakeholders consulted. 
Training opportunities appear to be very limited in the platform economy. 
Workers are seen as ‘self-investing units of human capital’ that bear the responsibility to 
arrange training and ensure their skills remain relevant (Larke et al., 2019). This holds 
especially for the self-employed. Although the experts consulted in this study 
emphasised that from a legal point of view there are no impediments to platform 
workers accessing training, in practice there are several issues that may hamper their 
participation. 
As platform workers are constantly competing against each other, the individual 
investment in training is costly. In an interview, a union representative described this 
issue, saying: ‘We cannot expect an Uber driver to take two weeks with no income to go 
on a training course. So how can we ensure that there is a universal access to and 
affordability of re- and upskilling?’ As re- and upskilling of workers is imperative to their 
employability, the trade union representative underlined the need for universal access to 
and affordability of training (interview with trade union representative). The issue that 
training may be too costly for individual workers was also put forward by several 
national experts, including in Ireland and Italy.  
Platforms, however, are generally not eager to provide training for their platform 
workers, arguing that this may complicate their role as intermediaries and lead to a re-
classification of their employment relationship into an employer-employee relationship.79 
Training organised or paid for by the platform is rare. The training that is provided 
often focuses on two topics: (i) the use of the platform; and (ii) basic safety provisions 
(De Groen et al., 2018a; EU-OSHA, 2017). This information is usually made available on 
the platform’s website. Cleaning platform Hilfr, for example, offers no professional 
training but does offer several guides for workers on how to clean. In an interview, the 
platform explains that ‘we try to find an alignment of expectations between the ones 
buying the cleaning and the ones doing it. But when people book via our page, they 
know that they don’t get a professional cleaner’ (interview with platform representative). 
Other platforms, especially those intermediating on-location work, follow similar 
approaches. There are exceptions, though. The platforms Heetch and Frizbiz, for 
example, collaborate with external organisations and training centres to provide training 
for their workers (Eurofound, 2018).  
The provision of training - or lack thereof - is an indication of a company’s 
investment in its workers, offering opportunities to grow in their position or expand 
their career options (Lamberts et al., 2016). A lack of training opportunities has been 
noted for types of non-standard forms of work, such as voucher-based work, portfolio 
work and casual work (Eurofound, 2017a). Temporary agency workers legally have 
similar access to training as employees but may find it difficult to get access any. To 
overcome this issue, social partners have put in place several bipartite training funds. 
Such efforts are currently not present in the context of platform work. 
Although there is a mismatch between the skills acquired by platform workers and those 
required to execute the tasks, and access to training for platform workers is very limited, 
this topic has received little attention from most stakeholders, with the exception of 
trade unions. As a result, it seems unlikely that there will be major changes in this area 
in the near future. Several experts have noted that the lack of access to training is part 
of a larger issue in their country, as few training opportunities are available in the labour 
market in general.  
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 That being said, a national expert consulted as part of this study noted that in Norway, even within those 
platforms that hire workers as employees, provision of training is very low. 
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 In short: challenges related to the employment dimension 4.3.9
As the employment dimension of the WES model focuses on aspects related to the 
formal context in which a worker performs tasks, several of the issues discussed above 
are not specific to platform work but are common for non-standard forms of work or for 
those who are self-employed. Nevertheless, a number of these challenges are intensified 
in the context of platform work. This can be attributed to the use of algorithms, the 
flexible nature of the work in terms of time and space, and the complex relationships 
between the multiple parties involved. This is shown in Table 9, Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
The key challenge that needs to be addressed in this area is the employment status of 
platform workers, and it is this issue that appears to dominate the current debate on 
platform work. For that reason, this challenge is labelled ‘high’ in this study. Social 
protection has been identified as a linked challenge too, though related issues emerge 
for other non-standard forms of work and the self-employed more generally. This is a 
‘medium’ challenge, as the statutory and effective access to social protection are not 
fully linked to employment status and the former does not necessarily pose major issues 
from a legal point of view. Concerns have been raised over other challenges, such as the 
determination of the employer and contractual issues, but these are somewhat less 
discussed in the literature. Nevertheless, both issues arise for platform work specifically 
and were flagged by consulted experts and stakeholders as major challenges. Both are 
therefore classified as challenges of high importance in this study.  
More specifically, platform workers typically do not have a separate employment status 
and are commonly classified as self-employed, as per the platform’s terms and 
conditions, which tend to be ambiguous. This may lead to misclassifications and cause 
confusion about workers’ access to social protection and uncertainty about their 
obligations and rights. Platform workers do not always receive a formal contract and 
may not be protected from unfair (individual or collective) ‘dismissal’ without prior 
notice. Although the legal discussion on the employment status has focused on the 
dichotomy between employee and self-employed, many platform workers find 
themselves in other groups in practice (e.g. occasional work). These issues are relevant 
for all types of platform work but are most pronounced in cases where the platform 
exercises significant control over the allocation and organisation of work and uses 
extensive surveillance mechanisms. The literature and consulted experts confirm that 
especially low-skilled on-location and online work is characterised by such platforms. 
Career opportunities are not generally considered a challenge to platform work. Platform 
work does not emerge as a viable career path, nor does it offer many opportunities for 
career development outside of platform work. Platform workers appear to have little or 
no access to training opportunities, which is seen as an issue notably by trade unions. 
Many platform workers are overqualified or wrongly qualified for their tasks. For both 
career opportunities and training and skills, however, there are considerable differences 
between platform workers using differentiated or undifferentiated skills in their work. For 
the first group, there are a lot more opportunities to apply or develop their skills and to 
use platform work as a springboard. Similarly, workers, especially those workers who 
are able to choose their own tasks and set their own prices, can benefit from these 
opportunities (typically workers with differentiated skills can use platform work to build 
up a portfolio and establish their own clientele). 
The platform workers themselves are concerned about earnings and working-time 
issues, much more so than about training or career development opportunities. With 
regard to working times, platform workers indicate that they struggle to get enough 
hours of work to earn sufficient income; or that may be pushed to work long hours or be 
available for typically unpaid (standby) work. Having to work atypical hours is not seen 
as a concern. Platform workers are usually satisfied with their work-life balance. As for 
earnings, the main complication is that platform workers are paid by task rather than by 
hour, and that those who depend on the income obtained through platform work are 
especially at risk. 
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As was the case for the work dimension, it is very difficult to indicate the expected 
evolution of the challenges, as this has not been discussed much in the literature, and 
experts’ views do not necessarily align. The evolution, moreover, hinges on the types of 
platform work and platforms that will develop most strongly. It also depends on the 
responses introduced. Some challenges are connected. For example, there is a link 
between employment status and social protection. The expected development of a 
certain challenge thus depends on what is happening in other areas. 
Table 9: Summary table of challenges related to the employment dimension 
Indicator Importance 
of 
challenge  
(high, 
medium, 
low, none) 
Specificity of the 
challenge  
(specific to platform 
work, common for 
non-standard work, 
general labour 
market) 
(Most) Affected types of 
platform work  
(all types, online vs. on-
location work, low- vs. high-
skilled, client-, platform- or 
worker-determined) 
Employment 
status 
High Common for non-
standard work 
All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform workers with little 
autonomy who are under strong 
surveillance and direction by the 
platform and depend on platform 
work (typically low-skilled on-
location platform work) 
Determination 
of employer 
High 
 
Specific to platform work All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform workers with little 
autonomy who are under strong 
surveillance and direction by the 
platform and depend on platform 
work (typically those in low-skilled 
platform work) 
Contracts High Specific to platform work All types, though dependent on 
the specific practices of the 
platform 
Social 
protection 
Medium Common for non-
standard work 
All types, though dependent on 
the platform worker’s employment 
status 
Earnings Medium 
 
Common for non-
standard work 
All types, but especially 
problematic for: 
- platform workers who cannot set 
their own prices 
Working time Medium 
 
Common for non-
standard work 
All types, but especially 
problematic for: 
- platform workers active on 
platforms where the platform or 
client set times (mostly on-
location work, e.g. delivery riders 
with ‘shifts’, cleaners need to be 
available when the client is home) 
Career 
opportunities 
None Common for non-
standard work 
Low-skilled platform work 
Training and 
skills 
Low Common for non-
standard work 
For training: all types 
For skills: low-skilled platform 
work 
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the literature consulted and the fieldwork performed in this study. 
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Figure 9: Stylised representation of employment challenges for different types of 
platform work 
 
Note: a higher score (= more on the outside of the spider chart) indicates a better situation regarding 
job quality. However, keep in mind that a final job quality score would be defined by the combination of 
and balance between multiple job characteristics. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Figure 10: Stylised representation of employment challenges for different types of 
platform work 
 
Note: a higher score (= more on the outside of the spider chart) indicates a better situation regarding job 
quality. However, keep in mind that a final job quality score would be defined by the combination of and 
balance between multiple job characteristics. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
employment status
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4.4 The social relations dimension 
Social relations, the third dimension of the adjusted WES model, includes social 
interactions and social dialogue, both through formal institutions, such as a works 
council, a union delegation or a prevention committee, and through informal channels, 
such as staff meetings and contacts with the management (Lamberts et al., 2016). Over 
the past years, this dimension has received increasing attention, as academic work has 
underlined the importance of social relations for the well-being of workers (Bakker 
and Demerouti, 2017). Social support has been acknowledged as an important ‘job 
resource’ that can help achieve work-related goals, encourage personal growth and 
compensate for ‘job demands’ (ibid.). Yet social interactions can be demanding for 
workers, for example when having to deal with difficult clients. This section reviews 
social relations in platform work, with a focus on representation, participation in 
decision-making, interactions with management, colleagues or clients, and the 
occurrence of adverse behaviour and unequal treatment. The use of technology, apps 
and algorithms is changing several aspects of the social relations dimension. Algorithms 
and rating systems take over some of the functions traditionally performed by (direct) 
supervisors, which further complicates the ambiguous relationships between platform, 
client and platform worker. The solitary nature of platform work and the high anonymity 
and turnover further imply that platform workers generally have little or no contact with 
colleagues or the platform, which leaves platform workers with little support. This issue 
and related topics are covered below. 
 Representation 4.4.1
Representation refers to whether workers collectively can have a say on aspects of 
the organisation (formally or informally) (Lamberts et al., 2016). For the purpose of 
this study, we focus on representation by a trade union, works council, health and safety 
delegate or similar institutes, at the level of the platform or as platform workers. 
Alternative forms of organisation are discussed in the following section.  
Representation and unionisation in particular are key to strengthening workers’ labour 
situation and ensuring fair working and employment conditions (Lamberts et al., 2016; 
ETUC, 2017). Yet unionisation rates are declining globally and the representation of non-
standard workers is very weak (Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018). This may stem 
from the increased flexibility and fragmentation of work and the workforce, which makes 
it hard to identify, organise and represent workers in non-standard forms of work such 
as casual work, platform work and employee sharing (Lenaerts et al., 2018). 
Of the four topics discussed under the social relations dimension, representation of 
platform workers is the one that has received by far the most attention in the literature 
and in public and policy debates across Europe. This topic has been identified as a 
major challenge for platform workers, not only in the literature but also by the experts 
and stakeholders consulted in this study (notably social partners and policymakers) and 
the issue was discussed at length in several focus groups (Denmark, Estonia, France, 
and Spain). Research shows that most platform workers are not organised or 
represented, nor are they covered by collective agreements (Kilhoffer et al., 
2017; ETUC, 2017; Eurofound, 2018; Vandaele, 2017; Lenaerts et al., 2018). 
Several reasons may explain these observations. First, only a few platform workers are 
formally recognised as employees by the platform and have an employment contract. 
Instead, most platform workers are considered independent contractors or self-
employed. In some countries, there are legal barriers such as anti-cartel laws targeting 
anti-competitive behaviour (e.g. organising to agree prices or negotiate conditions; 
Prassl, 2018). Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas (2018) and Prassl (2018), however, 
explain that organised activity by platform workers who are independent contractors 
with a view to collectively bargain over wages or employment and working conditions 
could also be considered anticompetitive behaviour. Some countries have legislation to 
prevent the self-employed joining unions, irrespective of anticompetitive behaviour and 
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despite ILO Convention 87 (e.g. Bulgaria, Poland); while in other countries, the self-
employed do not have the specific right to join trade unions (e.g. Hungary, Romania).80 
Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas (2018) further report that platform workers who are 
independent contractors generally cannot exercise the right to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining. Those platform workers who are formally recognised as 
employees may not be aware of their collective rights as workers. They may 
underestimate these rights because they see platform work as a side occupation, 
possibly temporary. This includes the right to association and the right to industrial 
action. Some platform workers may think of themselves as self-employed and have no 
interest in being represented by a trade union or worker-led initiative (Lenaerts et al., 
2018). 
Box 3: Platform work, collective bargaining and EU competition law 
Under EU competition law, any agreement between undertakings or decisions by associations of 
undertakings are considered as an illicit cartel when they prevent, restrict or distort free trade 
and fair competition. This applies when such agreements aim at, for instance, price fixing or 
market sharing which is considered to be to the detriment of consumers. As they are entities 
conducting economic activities, the self-employed are undertakings, and hence fall within the 
remit of EU competition rules.  
EU competition law does not, however, prohibit workers or even the self-employed from forming 
associations as such, a right which is also enshrined in international labour legislation. The key 
question is to what extent representative bodies of workers and those of the self-employed can 
conclude (‘collective’) agreements concerning their working conditions (including pay) and social 
protection and whether such agreements are compatible with EU competition legislation.   
In its landmark case C-67/96, Albany, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) made 
an important exception to the application of competition law, thereby establishing that when 
such principle comes into contradiction with social policy and labour law objectives aimed at 
protecting workers and the working conditions, such prohibition does not apply, thus recognising 
that collective agreements for employees fall outside the scope of competition law. The 
conditions are twofold: the agreement must be concluded between management and labour and 
aimed at improving the working conditions of the workers. 
In another case, C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie, the CJEU addressed the compatibility with 
competition law of a collective agreement negotiated by a labour union but on behalf of both 
employees and self-employed. The CJEU ruled in that particular case the self-employed were in 
fact ‘false self-employed’ even if in practice they may be classified as self-employed by the 
contractual parties or even by national legislation. The ruling has particular relevance for 
platform work, allowing to treat bogus self-employed platform workers as if they were workers. 
They can form associations to represent themselves and conclude collective agreements with 
the employing platforms to improve their working conditions and social protection.  
However, the collective bargaining capacity of associations of self-employed platform workers 
may still be affected by the EU antitrust legislation. Since self-employed are considered as 
undertakings, agreements they or their representative bodies are concluding with other 
undertakings such as the platforms, covering for instance their minimum fee rates or 
supplementary pension schemes, may be considered as limiting free trade and competition and 
a breach of competition legislation. Collective agreements that are not interfering with the 
competition acquis, such as on matters dealing with obligatory information provision, data 
protection and rating systems seem, however, perfectly possible.  
An in-depth assessment as it relates to EU competition law and collective bargaining in relation 
to platform workers is provided under Reflection Paper 1. 
 
These issues can be attributed to the following barriers, which to a large extent follow 
from the nature of platform work (Kilhoffer et al., 2017; Johnston and Land-
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Kazlauskas, 2018; Vandaele, 2018). Platform work is solitary by nature, characterised by 
high turnover rates, has a strong online component, and is executed by workers who are 
anonymous, geographically spread, in constant competition with each other and are 
active on multiple platforms (ETUC, 2017). Some platform workers are fully online. In 
addition, platforms often refute the role of employer and are not represented in business 
organisations, leaving the workers, workers’ organisations and policymakers with no 
counterparty to negotiate with (Vandaele, 2018). The legal classification of platform 
workers as self-employed or independent workers may prevent them from organising, 
as a joined discussion on terms and conditions by self-employed workers would be 
considered as ‘price setting’ and is against competition law (Johnston and Land-
Kazlauskas, 2018). This point is corroborated by multiple national experts in Austria, 
Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
and Poland.  
Although trade unions have taken up the issue, the relatively small importance of 
platform work in the economy and the active resistance to collective bargaining by some 
platforms (e.g. Uber) have hampered their efforts (Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 
2018). Industry-wide collective agreements seem well-suited for platform work, given 
the geographical dispersion of workers, the high turnover and workers’ tendency to be 
simultaneously active on multiple platforms, as well as the rapidly changing market with 
many start-ups and constantly changing business models (Johnston and Land-
Kazlauskas, 2018). 
Although the representation challenge affects all platform workers regardless of the 
type of platform work, on-location work in particular has received attention in this 
area, as these platform workers are easiest to identify and organise as a group. 
Furthermore, this type of platform work, especially where it relies on undifferentiated 
skills or on-location work such as transportation services, appears to be linked to the 
highest levels of uncertainty about the workers’ status, and has the lowest scores on a 
number of job quality indicators related to working conditions, such as autonomy. While 
platform workers engaged in low-skilled online work face similar challenges and their 
institutional bargaining power is the lowest, this type has received less attention 
(Daugareilh et al., 2019). The expected evolution of the challenges related to 
representation is difficult to assess; platform work continues to develop and several 
related issues, such as platform workers’ employment status, are yet to be settled. On 
the other hand, as is discussed below, there are a number of top-down and bottom-up 
initiatives in this area through which progress towards organisation or representation of 
platform workers is made, for example via trade union initiatives, establishment of a 
works council, and conclusion of collective agreement with specific platforms. 
 Participation in decision-making 4.4.2
Participation in decision-making refers to the degree to which workers are involved in 
decision-making related to their work and tasks (Lamberts et al., 2016). This includes 
being consulted before objectives are set for the work to be done, having the 
ability to influence decisions that are important for one’s work, and being involved 
in the improvement of the work organisation or the work processes of the 
organisation. This conceptualisation coincides with the indicator for ‘organisational 
participation’ put forward by Eurofound (Eurofound, 2017b). Decision-making with 
regard to the acceptance, method, speed and order of executing tasks are excluded 
here; these are covered in the sections on autonomy in the allocation of task and the 
work organisation under the work dimension. 
There is only scarce evidence about the extent to which platform workers can participate 
in decision-making. This evidence, moreover, is generally based on interviews with 
platform workers and platform owners (Eurofound, 2018). The available evidence, 
however, suggests that platform workers have limited or no opportunities to 
participate in decision-making and are not informed or consulted on business 
performance and decisions (ibid.). This applies in particular to workers’ ability to 
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influence decisions and their involvement in the improvement of work organisation or 
processes. This can likely be explained by the lack of an organisational structure and 
of (in)formal bodies or channels through which workers are consulted or 
represented. There are plenty of examples of platforms changing their business model or 
terms and conditions without informing or consulting workers beforehand, yet with 
profound implications for the workers involved. On several occasions, platforms have 
faced a backlash from their workers. Platform workers on Deliveroo, for example, have 
protested against the change from being paid per hour to being paid per delivery in a 
number of EU Member States, albeit to limited effect (Lenaerts, 2018).  
The extent to which platform workers are consulted before the objectives of the task to 
be performed are set depends on the specific platform. Workers performing low-skilled 
tasks, both on-location and online, are more likely to have no say in determining the 
objectives of the task, which are set by the platform or client. Platform workers 
performing mid- to high-skilled tasks (online and on-location), however, can often 
discuss the task with the client and set the objectives together, for example a handyman 
determining the feasibility of a specific task or approach. Contest-based online work 
may, however, limit workers’ ability to negotiate the objectives. Having limited or no 
participation in decision-making is problematic because it weakens workers’ position and 
their engagement. Ensuring participation in decision-making is important for platform 
workers as well as platforms. 
Worker-owned platform cooperatives, where platform workers themselves own and 
manage the platform, are an interesting example of what participation in decision-
making could look like. Sutton (2016) defines platform cooperatives as ‘digital platforms 
that are designed to provide a service or sell a product and that are collectively owned 
and governed by those who depend on and participate in it’. Cooperatives enable 
workers to gain control and be involved in the platform’s decision-making structure 
(Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018). Both the literature and the experts consulted in 
this study have suggested cooperatives as an alternative to the platform economy 
model, which is characterised by large companies with significant market power. Scholz 
(2016), a prime advocate of such cooperatives, has argued that platforms owned and 
managed by workers can more easily ensure fair working conditions, including decent 
pay and income security, access to social protection, and protection against arbitrary 
behaviour (e.g. disciplining or firing) or excessive surveillance (e.g. tracking). 
Box 4: Platform cooperatives: comparing TaskRabbit with Loconomics 
TaskRabbit and Loconomics, a platform cooperative, are both platforms that intermediate low-
skilled on-location tasks, use comparable technology, have existed for quite some years and with 
headquarters located in the same area. Sander et al. (2018) report that workers using TaskRabbit 
are not formally involved in decision-making and present multiple examples to support their claim: 
unilateral changes to the rate of commission and to the allocation system were introduced by 
TaskRabbit without consulting workers. One example was suggesting three workers to clients 
based on their availability and pay rate rather than having an open auction in which all workers 
could compete. In all these cases, TaskRabbit faced a significant backlash from workers (ibid.). 
Turning to Loconomics, Sander et al. (2018) explain that platform workers vote on the platform’s 
policies and can run and vote for the board of directors. All platform workers have one vote. Only 
workers who have completed 25 tasks are eligible to run to join the board if they have not already 
served for more than two terms. The platform is found to be more transparent and has established 
stronger interpersonal relationships than TaskRabbit. Sander et al. (2018) indicate that these 
features contribute to worker satisfaction.  
While several examples of worker-owned platform cooperatives exist in the US,81 the 
phenomenon is still in its early stages in the EU. Nevertheless, interest in platform 
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cooperatives is clearly growing. In the focus group debate held in the Netherlands, 
cooperatives, or similar types of organisational forms, were suggested as a way of 
overcoming unfair competition and market dominance. The feasibility of this idea was 
questioned, given that platforms require very high investments in technology before 
becoming profitable. While making profit is not necessarily a target for cooperatives, 
sufficient funding has to be raised to make the platform sustainable (Scholz, 2016). The 
focus group held in Spain exposed a very real problem in competition between platforms 
and cooperatives: the venture capital behind big platforms means they can and usually 
do operate at a loss, making it hard for cooperatives to compete. 
 Supportive management and social support 4.4.3
Social support in the workplace is understood as the support provided by management 
and colleagues (Lamberts et al. 2016). This includes receiving help and support in the 
execution of tasks and receiving feedback from the supervisor and colleagues when 
needed and being well guided and respected by the supervisor (Eurofound, 2017b). 
Social support at work is key. According to the Karasek (1979) job demands-resources 
model, social support is an important resource that enables workers to cope with the 
demands of the work and serves as a buffer for negative work outcomes such as stress 
and burnout (Demerouti et al., 2001).  
In the context of platform work, social support is very low. For a number of reasons, 
platform workers generally do not know or meet their colleagues and/or 
supervisors, including: tasks that are allocated by an algorithm and executed by an 
individual worker in isolation; the use of rating systems to manage performance and 
provide feedback;82 the unclear roles of the client, platform, and platform worker that 
make it difficult to determine who is the supervisor (if there is one); and a flexible 
workforce characterised by high turnover rates. The issues are aggravated for online 
platform workers, who are typically anonymous and geographically spread. Platform 
workers in low-skilled on-location or online platform work face additional challenges in 
that they are often dependent on the platform, have generally less autonomy and 
participate less in decision-making.  
Although a lack of social support may lead to professional isolation and a higher 
prevalence of stress or burnout (EU-OSHA, 2017), there is hardly any evidence on this 
issue in the context of platform work. Also, in this case, available evidence is mostly 
derived from interviews. Whereas some workers indicate the lack of help and support by 
the management and colleagues as a downside of platform work, others regard it as a 
confirmation of their independence and autonomous work. However, when platform 
workers are faced with difficulties or conflicts, the lack of contact with the platform is 
mentioned by workers as a concern (Eurofound, 2018). This is especially problematic 
when a platform worker runs into an issue with the platform itself. Perhaps as a 
compensation for this, workers join on social media to exchange tips and advice (EU-
OSHA, 2017), or reach out to unions or launch bottom-up initiatives (see infra). 
 Adverse social behaviour and equal treatment 4.4.4
A final topic to be discussed in the social relations dimension is adverse social behaviour 
and the equal treatment of platform workers. Adverse behaviour refers to asocial 
behaviour of colleagues, supervisors or others that workers come into contact with 
during their work. It includes verbal abuse, physical violence, unwanted sexual attention, 
harassment, bullying, threats or humiliation (Eurofound, 2015). Equal treatment, as 
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 However, rating systems are known to be a possible source of stress and rather than empowering workers 
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defined by the European Commission (European Parliament, 2017), implies that ‘all 
people, and in the context of the workplace all workers, have the right to receive the 
same treatment, and will not be discriminated against on the basis of criteria such as 
gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. 
Even though European and national legislation have indicated several grounds on which 
discrimination is prohibited, notably in the employment area, identifying discrimination in 
practice is difficult.83  
Both adverse social behaviour and discrimination at work have been linked to various 
negative impacts on the worker, for example impaired mental and physical health, 
absence from work, increased intentions to leave a job, and a higher turnover (Cottini 
and Lucifora, 2010). In platform work, the ambiguous employment relationship between 
the worker and platform, and the question of liability in the case of possible 
discrimination, thwart the identification process. This makes it hard to assess the 
prevalence of discrimination in platform work. The same observation applies to adverse 
behaviour.  
Yet there is some literature and anecdotal evidence on discrimination and adverse social 
behaviour in platform work. Both have been identified as potential challenges facing 
workers.84 Compared to other forms of work, adverse behaviour and discrimination may 
be more prevalent in platform work, as these workers are younger and many are from 
minority backgrounds, and moreover may be less aware of how to address these issues. 
The use of algorithms, reputation systems and online profiles to select a platform 
worker matter in this context, as they may lead to an uneven distribution of tasks 
among workers (Leimester et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2017). This point was raised in 
the focus group discussion in Denmark, in which a stakeholder described rating systems 
as subjective and in need of standardisation. The stakeholder also indicated that any 
biases existing in the ‘real world’ could be aggravated if platforms allow selection on 
these features (e.g. based on looks by making pictures available). Socioeconomic, 
gender and racial discrimination are thus noted on various platforms, depending 
on the type of service and users, and the platform design (Edelman et al., 2017; Kas et 
al., 2019; Schor and Attwood-Charles, 2017).  
Thebault-Spieker et al. (2017), for example, demonstrate how the socioeconomic status 
affects task selection on Uber and TaskRabbit. Renan Barzilay and Ben-David (2016) 
document that women’s average hourly rates on platform work are about one third lower 
than men’s, after controlling for feedback score, experience, hours of work, occupational 
category, and educational attainment. Platform workers who depend on rating systems 
are more vulnerable to discrimination than those whose work is allocated through an 
impersonal mechanism, where the client cannot choose a worker based on their profile 
or previous work. On platforms providing additional features on workers’ gender or place 
of residence, earning differences are noted (Berg et al., 2018). A platform representative 
indicated that they act robustly against discrimination when it is noticed, but that it is 
difficult to objectify in a situation where a client chooses a worker (interview with 
representative). Other platform representatives have made similar statements 
(Eurofound, 2018; Lenaerts, 2018). At the same time, platform work can help reduce 
discrimination by offering opportunities to those who may face discrimination in the 
traditional labour market, for example young workers, long-term unemployed, or 
individuals with certain disabilities or health conditions; see Berg, 2016; Pesole et al., 
2018).  
Platform workers have also indicated adverse social behaviour of clients as a 
concern (Eurofound, 2018). This includes cases such as refusal to pay for a task 
performed and leaving (dishonest) negative reviews that affect a worker’s online 
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e.g. potential clients being refused by Airbnb hosts. These papers, however, are not considered here. 
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reputation (information gathered from literature, including De Stefano, 2016; Eurofound, 
2018, confirmed by fieldwork). Adverse behaviour by clients has been reported by 
platform workers in particular on platforms where the client or platform selects a 
worker (client- or platform-determined allocation). Clients choosing a platform worker 
can rely on online reputation data, ratings or profiles, but most of the workers do not 
receive any information about the client and cannot assess their reliability, 
respectfulness or communication habits. Adverse behaviour by clients was also flagged 
in the French focus group, where platform workers were victimised because of issues 
between the client and the worker over conditions that the latter cannot control or 
choose, for example blaming the delivery rider for a wrong order prepared by the 
restaurant. In this regard, it is also important to point out that some workers face 
adverse behaviour by others involved in the platform work relationship. Food delivery 
riders, for example, may also face adverse behaviour from restaurant owners, which is 
very difficult for them to address (Eurofound, 2018). Workers performing on-location 
tasks are particularly vulnerable to adverse behaviour, especially when performing low-
skilled tasks where platform or client have a lot of influence over the allocation 
and execution of the work. 
Platform workers anonymously performing tasks with little or no interaction with the 
client are less vulnerable to adverse social behaviour and discrimination (De Stefano, 
2016). Workers carrying out online platform work, where there is less interaction and 
more anonymity, are expected to have a lower risk of being confronted with adverse 
behaviour or discrimination (ibid.). Anonymity could help eliminate negative social 
experiences, though the impersonal character of platform work relies on personal 
information to build trust between worker and client (Ert et al., 2016). Irani (2015) 
further states that anonymity may lower accountability between platform workers and 
clients. 
Nevertheless, adverse social behaviour and discrimination in platform work are not 
necessarily related to its specific context. The most common grounds of discrimination in 
platform work, such as gender, age, and ethnicity, are similar to those in the traditional 
labour market. 
 In short: challenges related to social relations  4.4.5
Although social relations at work are imperative to the well-being of workers, social 
interactions and dialogue take a different form in platform work, often to the detriment 
of the workers involved. The use of technology or algorithms, as well as the nature and 
the organisation of the work, complicate social relations in platform work. Platform 
workers have few opportunities to get in contact with the platform, client or other 
platform workers. Platform workers are typically not represented, have no opportunities 
to participate in decision-making, and lack supportive management and social support. 
Some are faced with discrimination and adverse behaviour by clients. Especially in those 
cases, or when faced with difficulties or conflicts, platform workers lack a decent 
organisational structure and social contacts to fall back on. Most of these challenges are 
not specific to platform work but are also found for other forms of non-standard work or 
faced by the self-employed. Yet, as explained above, some issues are aggravated in the 
context of platform work because of the unclear employment status of the workers, the 
use of technology or the virtual nature of interactions. 
Representation has received the most attention of the social relations challenges, and 
has been identified in the literature and the fieldwork as the major challenge. To some 
extent at least, this can be attributed to the initiatives and efforts of unions and workers 
in this area (see infra). Participation in decision-making has not been raised as a 
challenge in the literature but is limited overall. The lack of social support and supportive 
management, similarly, have been discussed but are not really seen as problematic. 
Despite the mostly anecdotal evidence, discrimination and adverse social behaviour are 
identified as important challenges that need to be addressed (‘medium’ because of their 
incidence in specific cases). 
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These issues may occur for any type of platform work, but appear most problematic for 
the most vulnerable platform workers, in other words those engaged in low-skilled on-
location or online work, those using platforms where the allocation and organisation of 
work are determined by the platform or client, and those with little work experience or 
weaker socio-economic or labour market positions. While some of the challenges have 
been discussed to a much larger extent for on-location than for online platform work, 
this does not imply that these issues are more relevant or more significant for the 
former. Some challenges are simply more visible for on-location workers, for example 
representation. In other cases, the challenge affects a particular group of workers more. 
This is highlighted in each section, as well as in the summary table and figures below. 
Returning to the expected evolution, there is little evidence from the literature and 
fieldwork that provides conclusive answers to this question. In addition, data about the 
national and European responses and tools available are key to determining a 
challenge’s expected development. 
Table 10: Summary table of challenges related to the social relations dimension 
Indicator Importance 
of 
challenge  
(high, 
medium, 
low, none) 
Specificity of the 
challenge  
(specific to platform 
work, common for 
non-standard work, 
general labour 
market) 
(Most) Affected types of 
platform work  
(all types, online vs. on-
location work, low- vs. high-
skilled, client-, platform- or 
worker-determined) 
Representation High Common for non-
standard work 
All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform workers with higher 
risks of being misclassified as 
regards their employment status 
(mostly low-skilled, on-location, 
platform-determined work) and 
those who cannot set their own 
price 
Participation in 
decision-making 
Low 
 
Common for non-
standard work 
All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform workers with little 
autonomy, who depend on 
platform and are most strongly 
affected by unilateral changes 
Supportive 
management and 
social support 
Low Common for non-
standard work 
All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform workers engaged in 
online work 
Adverse social 
behaviour  
and equal 
treatment 
Medium General labour market All types, though most problematic 
for: 
- platform workers in on-location 
work 
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the literature consulted and the fieldwork performed in this study. 
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Figure 11: Stylised representation of social relations challenges for different types of 
platform work 
 
Note: a higher score (= more on the outside of the spider chart) indicates a better situation regarding 
job quality. However, keep in mind that a final job quality score would be defined by the combination of 
and balance between multiple job characteristics. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Figure 12: Stylised representation of social relations challenges for different types of 
platform work 
 
Note: a higher score (= more on the outside of the spider chart) indicates a better situation 
regarding job quality. However, keep in mind that a final job quality score would be defined by the 
combination of and balance between multiple job characteristics. 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
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4.5 Other challenges 
 Undeclared work 4.5.1
Undeclared work is commonly understood as ‘any paid activities that are lawful as 
regards their nature, but not declared to public authorities, taking into account the 
differences in the regulatory systems of the EU Member States’ (European Commission, 
2014). This can take many forms, such as fully or partially undeclared work (overtime 
paid cash in hand, or under-declared work), undeclared ‘self-employed’ or ‘own account’ 
work, or bogus self-employment. Undeclared work implies non-compliance with labour, 
social security or taxation legislation or regulations in the country, and it distorts fair 
competition. In the past years, the fight against undeclared work has received much 
attention from policymakers, as evidenced by the launch of the European Platform to 
enhance cooperation in tackling undeclared work,85 which activities will be transferred to 
the new European Labour Authority (ELA) as of 1 August 2021.86  
Non-standard forms of work, including platform work, have been discussed in relation to 
undeclared and under-declared work as a means to legalising undeclared work. Casual 
work (e.g. intermittent or on-call), can help regulate informal and flexible employment 
relationships and diminish undeclared work (Eurofound, 2018b). Another well-known 
example is voucher-based work. It has been suggested that platform work has a similar 
effect: by making it possible to engage in platform work activities and turn small jobs 
into a profession, platform work can bring some of these activities into the regular 
economy (Lenaerts et al., 2018). Experts from Bulgaria and Spain consulted in the study 
corroborated this point. Others, however, have warned that platform work may have the 
opposite effect. Platform work may simply become part of this phenomenon, especially 
in countries that have a large informal economy typified by undeclared work (as noted 
by experts from Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and 
Slovenia). Indeed, many of the sectors in which undeclared work is prevalent, such as 
cleaning, repair work or babysitting, coincide with those where platform work is 
concentrated (European Commission, 2014). Similarly, there is overlap in the social 
strata that is overrepresented in platform work and undeclared work. Finally, the 
flexibility in the contractual relationships, the fragmentation of work into very small 
tasks, the isolated nature of the work and the global nature of platforms, which are all 
characterising platform work, are features common in undeclared work. Whereas 
undeclared workers used to advertise their services by posting notes in a local 
supermarket, workers can use platforms as a digitalised means to find clients for 
undeclared work. It is likely that platform workers do not declare the additional income, 
especially when the burden of reporting is fully on them. As a result, it could very well be 
the case that platform work exacerbates undeclared work in the EU. 
Against this background, undeclared platform work has been identified as an issue 
in the literature, policy and public debates, and by national experts consulted for this 
study.87 Most experts, however, have pointed to the lack of data and strong 
empirical evidence on the prevalence of (undeclared) platform work. This issue 
was discussed at length in the focus group discussion held in Estonia. With the exception 
of estimates mostly based on surveys, currently only limited data are available on the 
actual coverage and extent of platform work. This is due to the absence of a common 
definition, the high level of heterogeneity, and the lack of systematic reporting on 
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 Decision (EU) 2016/344 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on establishing a 
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 Some experts indicated that undeclared work in the platform economy is not regarded nor discussed as an 
issue in their country (e.g. Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK).  
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platforms, platform workers, and platform work in official national market statistics 
(indicated in interviews with Eurofound and EU-OSHA representatives). The lack of data 
is pressing, especially in the case of online work, and undeclared work may be 
particularly prevalent. 
In this regard, the role that platforms could play in reducing undeclared work has 
been noted in the literature and fieldwork. Platforms already collect data on transactions, 
clients and workers, and are consequently ideally placed to formalise work by sharing 
data with the government. Platforms’ management structures can be set up to facilitate 
this (interview with EU-OSHA representative). In some Member States, platforms are 
already obliged to report on their payments to platform workers (see Section 5 for 
further details). For these reasons, undeclared work is labelled a ‘medium’ challenge in 
Table 12 below.  
 Cross-border work 4.5.2
The digital nature of platform work increases the opportunities for workers to get in 
contact with platforms and clients on a global scale and hence facilitates cross-border 
work. The free movement of workers is among the key principles laid down in the acquis 
of the European Union. It is one of the four economic freedoms of the European Single 
Market. The free movement of workers implies that individuals can move freely for work 
reasons from one EU Member State to another, without being subject to discrimination 
with regard to their working and employment conditions on grounds of their nationality. 
The freedom to establish and provide services is another key dimension to consider in 
the context of platform work. It guarantees the mobility of businesses and professionals 
within the EU.  
Cross-border platform work can take on a range of different forms, which are all 
considered in this study: a platform worker performing work in their home country but 
where the client, platform or both are located in another EU or third country,88 a 
platform worker moving to another country to do platform work,89 or a platform worker 
carrying out platform work activities simultaneously in different countries and/or for 
different platforms or end users who are located in different countries. In each of these 
situations, the cross-border aspect further raises the complexity in already complicated 
work relationships that involve multiple parties and rely on the use of digital 
technologies and algorithms. Furthermore, there are only limited data available on the 
prevalence of cross-border platform work. This adds to the complexity, and a lack of 
efficient information-sharing between countries could further contribute to the incidence 
of fraud, abuses, deprivation of rights, or undeclared work. It has, additionally, been 
established that many platform workers are active on multiple platforms (consecutively 
or simultaneously) and that platforms tend to be active in multiple countries at the same 
time (Pesole et al., 2018). Pesole et al. (2018) argue that the global nature of platform 
work may lead to national task specialisation based on the available work force and the 
national labour market linked, for example, to differences in the educational system, 
national languages or legislation.  
Cross-border work poses challenges regarding the application of EU law on 
freedom of movement - with uncertainty as to which EU rules (movement of workers 
or of services) are at stake, which is a corollary to the employment status issue (see 
4.3.1). Cross-border work may also present challenges concerning the choice of 
jurisdiction and determination of applicable law, as well as social security coordination. 
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This relates both to the application and enforcement of the rules and to dispute 
resolution. 
Cross-border work performed by platform workers with the status of ‘workers’, as 
defined in EU law, falls under the EU legislation concerned with the ‘free movement of 
workers’. Platform workers who are employed by the platform or by the end user are 
undoubtedly covered by legislation on the latter. For those workers who are engaged in 
platform work in their home country for a platform and/or client located in another (EU 
or third) country under an employment contract, both parties will in principle agree what 
national (labour) law is applicable to their employment contract while having to respect 
the mandatory rules from Rome I Regulation. In practice, however, platform workers 
have a very weak negotiation position and often work without a contract, as has been 
reported by national experts under the study. Specific EU legislation90 determines the 
law that is applicable to contractual obligations, such as the law applicable to a cross-
border employment contract. The legislation contains certain limitations to the freedom 
of the contracting parties when the worker is working from or in an EU country.91 For 
self-employed platform workers different rules apply in cross-border situations as they 
fall under the scope of the EU legislation regarding the free movement of services.  
EU legislation on social security coordination may apply to platform workers who are 
engaged by the platform and carrying out cross-border work or multiple (consecutive or 
simultaneous) tasks in different countries. In this regard, the ‘place where the work is 
executed’ determines in principle what national social security legislation applies. The 
same logic applies to cases when a platform worker moves to another Member State to 
perform platform work. The situation of a platform worker simultaneously working in 
different Member States is more complex, because it depends on the status of this 
platform worker in each of the countries and on what share of these activities is 
performed where. This can be very difficult to determine, again leaving platform workers 
in a grey area. 
On a final note, the relationship between cross-border work and undeclared work in the 
context of the platform economy should also be looked at. The obstacles to tackling 
undeclared work in cross-border situations, which have been duly identified by the 
European Platform to enhance cooperation in tackling undeclared work,92 are equally 
relevant in the context of platform work. Risks of non-compliance may even be higher in 
the case of cross-border activity that is facilitated by platforms, especially when it 
concerns on-line platform work. 
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applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), (OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6–16) 
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 According to Art. 8 of Rome I Regulation the governing principle to employment contracts is the freedom of 
choice, subject to two sets of limitations: 1) non-derogable provisions of law of the Member State that would 
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mandatory provisions of the Member States where the platform worker habitually performs work would be 
applicable at the very least. 
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 Data protection 4.5.3
Data protection is a relatively new topic in relation to the future of work that started to 
attract attention when the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)93 became 
applicable in May 2018. The GDPR relates to the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. It lays 
down fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons concerning data protection. In 
this study and in line with the GDPR, personal data is understood as any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, which is a natural person who can 
be (directly or indirectly) identified in particular by reference to an identifier such as their 
name, location data, or other physical, psychological, economic or social factors. 
Data protection is particularly relevant in the context of platform work and the related 
challenges are obvious. Platforms rely heavily on the processing of personal data, 
including behavioural data of their clients and workers, to enable (semi-)automated 
decision-making, known as algorithmic management (De Stefano, 2018; Mateescu and 
Nguyen, 2019). Algorithmic management is a diverse set of technological tools and 
techniques to remotely manage workforces (De Stefano, 2018). It is a system where 
algorithms rather than humans decide how business operations should be performed, 
with the app as the main management tool (Ivanova et al., 2018). Many actors in the 
platform economy are among the most prominent developers and users of algorithmic 
management. To this end, platforms not only ask clients and platform workers to provide 
personal data such as their name, age, gender, skills, bank account details, telephone 
number, email address, and home address, but also collect a vast amount of data 
themselves.  
First, platforms exert continuous monitoring through massive data collection of client 
and platform workers’ behaviour, which may be fed into automated performance reports 
and work allocation decisions. For example, food delivery riders’ and drivers’ movements 
are tracked using GPS data. Platform workers’ actual working time (duration of time 
logged on), break habits, speed of performance and aggregated income are tracked 
through digital apps. However, few platform workers are fully aware of which data 
platforms actually collect these data, or how they can access these data. Platforms may 
also be unwilling to share this information. In the UK, for example, Uber drivers have 
sought legal action, claiming that the platform refused to give them access to the 
personal data it holds on them. In practice, it often remains unclear whether platform 
workers can take their data with them, for example their ratings or profile, when moving 
from one platform to the next. 
Rating and review systems are another component of algorithmic management that 
result in a ranking of individual platform workers (as discussed above). Such systems 
are incredibly important, because the assignment of the next task by the algorithm is 
often directly linked to the ratings and reviews they receive (platform-determined 
platform work). In addition, low scores or a performance below the algorithm’s 
standards can lead to a lower ranking in the pick-order for new assignments and in some 
cases even to the temporary or permanent exclusion (‘deactivation’ or delisting) of the 
platform worker from the platform. Still, there is very little knowledge about how these 
rating and review schemes actually work, how they feed into the algorithms that decide 
on the allocation of work or are linked to the pay per task. 
Last, algorithmic management is characterised by a growing use of ‘nudges’ and 
penalties to incentivise worker behaviour. For example, an Uber driver may receive 
notifications to travel to an area with a higher passenger demand without the certainty 
of an effective assignment. Similarly, the Uber app shows at all times how much money 
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of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
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the driver has made, accompanied by a graphic of an engine gauge with a needle that 
comes tantalisingly close to, but is still short of, the euro sign (Scheiber, 2017).  
All of these processes, however, rely on data collection, processing and analysis. Data 
gathering by platforms is done through complex computational processes, which are 
intransparent (part of the ‘black box’ in the platform work conceptualisation). The 
subsequent enormous data flow and constant digital monitoring allows for a deep 
intrusiveness in the lives of platform workers which is in no way comparable with 
traditional working relationships. The decisions made on the basis of these data flows 
are mostly implemented in (semi-)automated processes, with minimal or even no human 
involvement. In a way, it dehumanises decisions that affect workers negatively and 
allows the platform to hide behind the argument that it did not make any decisions: the 
algorithm did. Platform workers may have little or no opportunity for recourse against 
this. The far-reaching intrusiveness in terms of access to personal data, digital 
monitoring and the resulting power and control that platforms can exercise over their 
platform workers also has implications for the employment status classification: does 
extensive data collection, digital monitoring and automated evaluations of performance 
management signal some sort of subordination or direction, as the latter is a key 
criterion to determining the status of workers in accordance with the prevailing EU 
legislation and CJEU case law (Ingrao, 2018)? 
The national experts consulted in this study are generally aware of the challenge, though 
many of them point out that data protection has not received much attention in their 
country as other challenges have been deemed more pressing. Likewise, the literature 
on data protection in platform work is still emerging. Nevertheless, for almost all 
countries studied, experts flag data protection as a challenge for future 
consideration. One of the experts even described it as a ‘new frontier in the area of 
digital platforms’. Data protection in platform work is a rising concern among 
policymakers, social partners, platform workers and clients, and therefore seen as a 
‘medium’ challenge that affects all types of platform work.  
 In short: challenges related to the other indicators  4.5.4
Table 11: Summary table of challenges related to undeclared work, cross-border 
platform work and data protection 
Indicator Importance 
of 
challenge  
(high, 
medium, 
low, none) 
Specificity of the 
challenge  
(specific to platform 
work, common for 
non-standard work, 
general labour 
market) 
(Most) Affected types of 
platform work  
(all types, online vs. on-
location work, low- vs. high-
skilled, client-, platform- or 
worker-determined) 
Undeclared work Medium Common for non-
standard work 
All types 
 
Cross-border 
work 
Medium 
 
General labour market All types, though probability of 
platform work being cross-border 
work is likely higher for online 
than for on-location work 
Data protection Medium Specific to platform 
work 
All types 
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the literature consulted and the fieldwork performed in this study. 
4.6 Summary of the challenges for platform work 
The final section of the challenges analysis concludes with a summary table and figure 
that feed into the gap analysis. Details of how these conclusions were obtained can be 
found in the preceding sections. Table 12 shows how important the challenges identified 
using the adjusted WES model are, displaying challenges of high importance in red, 
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medium importance in orange, low importance in yellow and no importance in green. 
Figure 13 does not indicate how important specific challenges are, but rather how 
specific they are to platform work: specific to platform work, common among non-
standard forms of work, or existing in the general labour market. 
As is clear from Table 12, especially in the work and the employment dimensions, 
multiple challenges of medium to high importance have been identified. In the work 
dimension, those challenges identified as highly important are specific to platform work: 
allocation of tasks; surveillance, direction and performance appraisal; and physical 
environment. In addition, these challenges are strongly driven by the use of technology 
and algorithms. The challenges linked to autonomy in work organisation are rather 
related to the specific platform, whereas the task complexity, emotional demands, and 
the work intensity and speed pressure are linked to the specific task. Hence, these are 
only seen as minor challenges or no challenges at all. Turning to the work dimension, 
several of the challenges listed are related to the unclear employment status of platform 
workers (directly or indirectly). This also means that most of the challenges under the 
employment dimension are not specific to platform work but arise in non-standard forms 
of work more generally. The use of technology and algorithms in platform work has a 
much smaller impact on this dimension. With regard to the social relations dimension, 
there is quite an overlap in the challenges facing platform work and other forms of non-
standard work or self-employment. The other indicators are not part of the original WES 
model and also appear to be strongly driven by the use of technology and algorithms. 
Some of these challenges are specific to platform work, while others are not (see Figure 
13). 
Table 12: Summary table of the challenges facing platform work (by level of importance) 
Adjusted WES model: Challenges for platform work 
Work dimension Employment 
dimension 
Social relations 
dimension 
Other indicators 
Autonomy in the 
allocation of tasks 
Employment status Representation Undeclared work 
Autonomy in work 
organisation 
Determination of the 
employer 
Participation in 
decision-making 
Cross-border work 
Surveillance, direction 
and performance 
appraisal 
Contracts (incl. type, 
termination, 
contractual 
information provision) 
Supportive 
management and 
social support 
Data protection 
Task complexity Social protection Adverse behaviour 
and equal treatment 
 
Work intensity and 
speed pressure 
Earnings (incl. wages, 
fees, price setting) 
 
Emotional demands Working time 
Physical environment Career opportunities 
 Training and skills 
Note: Lowest concern challenges are green, followed by yellow, orange, and the highest concern in red. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on the literature consulted and the fieldwork performed in this study. 
Figure 13: Summary chart of the challenges facing platform work (by level of specificity) 
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Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the literature consulted and the fieldwork performed in this study. 
5. NATIONAL TOOLS AND RESPONSES TO PLATFORM WORK CHALLENGES 
This section explores national tools and responses to platform work challenges based on 
questionnaires distributed to socio-economic and legal experts in the EU28, Norway and 
Iceland, as well as fieldwork (expert interviews and focus groups) and literature 
review.94 
Some existing literature examines national responses to the challenges of platform work. 
Lenaerts et al. (2017) overviewed eight European countries, finding that different 
countries had either explicit, implicit, or no strategies/responses on platform work. At 
that time, the surveyed countries of Denmark, France and Germany had the most 
comprehensive responses to platform work, including the angles of taxation, social 
security, labour status, and competition. In many cases, legislators were found to take a 
rather passive waiting approach to platform work. De Groen et al. (2017) found that 
government responses to platform work tended to be narrow in scope, reactive, and 
concentrated on minimising ‘side effects’ of platform work, often based on concerns 
raised by incumbents (e.g. taxi industries). 
As platform work has grown since its inception relative to the total workforce, so too 
have a variety of national responses and attitudes. National governments have a 
range of priorities in regard to platform work. The different types and intensities of 
responses can be partially explained by a number of factors, such as different traditions 
of government and industrial relations, and differing frequencies and varieties of 
platform work. 
5.1 Conceptual/theoretical framework 
National socio-economic and legal experts catalogued tools and responses to platform 
work relevant to working conditions and social protection. 
‘Responses’ refer to targeted measures that emerged after platform work, 
specifically to cope with associated challenges. Examples of responses include 
court cases on the employment status of platform workers, dedicated legislation for 
platform workers, and the formation of works councils for platform workers. 
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However, existing measures can also be important to consider. Put another way, in the 
absence of dedicated policy frameworks for platform work, existing or default legal 
frameworks play a large role. Thus, we also discuss tools. 
‘Tools’ are existing or new measures that can be used to address challenges 
associated with platform work but were not designed specifically to do so. 
Examples of tools at national level include legislation or case law concerning bogus self-
employment, or sectoral collective agreements that apply to platform workers. Because 
national tools could conceivably incorporate so much (such as general labour law across 
30 countries), this section focuses on responses. We only discuss national level tools 
when identified by socio-economic and legal experts as especially important. 
To allow ordered classification and description of collected data, and contribute to 
analysis and cross-country comparison, responses were organised by categories (1) 
legislation, (2) case law), (3) actions of public administrators or inspectorates, (4) 
collective agreements (5) platform worker actions, (6) platform actions, and (7) other. 
Legislation: Legislation is understood as laws formalising policies by setting out 
standards, procedures, and principles. These may include royal decrees, bills, orders, 
amendments, and so on. Generally, EU Member States are competent to legislate issues 
of working conditions and social protection, while the EU provides broad policy 
framework. A law is the result of a legislative process; it is binding, and a breach of law 
can lead to penalisation or prosecution. 
Case law: Case law is defined as law as established by judicial decisions in cases. 
Thematic areas of relevance to platform work may include employment status and 
corresponding rights, competition law, licensing requirements, taxation, or data 
protection. At national level, relevant cases might include labour courts, or other courts 
at the national or sub-national levels. 
Actions of public administrators or inspectorates: Administrators and inspectorates 
may be actively involved in enforcing relevant law on platforms and platform workers. 
These might include public employment services, social security bodies and inspection 
services producing instructions, awareness raising, or issuing declarations. 
Collective agreements and social partner initiatives: Collective agreements are bi- 
or tripartite agreements that are negotiated between the social partners (and, in the 
latter case, the government). Collective bargaining is the dialogue process by which 
collective agreements can be reached.  
Actions by platforms: These include any type of initiative, plan, goal, guideline or 
target set out by platforms. Examples might include publishing green or white papers, 
making statements on sectoral or company practices, or opening up structured dialogue 
with platform workers. Other relevant responses include self-regulation, such as offering 
expanded insurance coverage without being legally required to do so. 
Actions by platform workers: Platform workers have directly responded to their 
challenges, even independently of social partners. Because of the differences between 
platform workers and traditional employees, it is also important to consider ‘new forms 
of organisation’ and ‘union-like’ groups (Kilhoffer et al., 2017; Lenaerts et al., 2017). 
Relevant responses may include strikes or other collective actions, forming collectives, or 
innovative efforts to organise and collectively bargain. 
Other: This category captures any other developments that do not fit into the previous 
categories. Examples may include government policies, government-initiated information 
gathering or consultations, or media debates. ‘Policies’ may be considered a form of ‘soft 
law’ without the potential to be enforced (as opposed to legislation, which is ‘hard law’). 
Policies are understood as any type of action, plans, goals, guidelines or targets set out 
by a governing body. At the national level, policies might be discussed in ad hoc 
committees and issued in green or white papers. 
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For readability, and because many responses involve multiple actors and similar themes 
(e.g. dialogue between platform workers, platforms, and social partners), national tools 
and responses are discussed in three parts: top-down; bottom-up; and other. 
5.2 Mapping of national tools and responses 
In total, national experts catalogued 177 responses across the EU28, Norway and 
Iceland, excluding tools considered very general, for example general labour law (see 
Figure 14). This number should be understood very cautiously, as it is not always easy 
to decide when a tool is relevant enough to include, Moreover, it often proved difficult to 
find and verify responses that were initiated but abandoned, or simply pending. 
Figure 14: National responses summary 
 
Source: own elaboration from data gathered in national surveys  
Note: this graphic only shows the count of significant identified responses. It is mostly indicative of the 
relative amount of ‘activity’ of various stakeholders regarding working conditions and social protection of 
platform workers across countries. It does not indicate the intensity or effectiveness of the responses. 
5.3 Top-down responses and tools 
Top-down responses and tools cover legislation, case law, and administrator and 
inspectorate actions. These can be considered the ‘hardest’ or most binding measures. 
 Legislation 5.3.1
Working conditions and social protection of platform workers do not generally constitute 
the direct material scope of national statutory legislation.  
France is the sole country that has enacted national legislation with a view to improving 
the labour and social rights of platform workers. The law specifically targets self-
employed platform workers.95 
In Italy, regional legislation in Piedmont and Lazio directly addresses the working 
conditions and social protection of platform workers (Iudicone and Faioli, 2019). The 
Lazio legislation96 is particularly interesting as it aims to improve the labour and social 
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 LOI n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la 
sécurisation des parcours professionnels (1), also known as Loi El Khomri [El Khomri Law]  
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 Regione Lazio, Legge Regionale 12 aprile 2019, n. 4 “Disposizioni per la tutela e la sicurezza dei lavoratori 
digitali” 
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rights of all platform workers irrespective of their employment status (IRES, 2019). This 
includes minimum protection for all ‘digital workers’ including protection in the event of 
accidents at work, safety training, liability and accident insurance, and certain social 
protections. The law also reiterates regional prohibition of compensation per task. 
In almost all countries where platform work has emerged, recent national legislation has 
indirectly tried to regulate working conditions and social protection of platform workers: 
either through defining the employment status of the platform workers, such as in 
Portugal (albeit only for one specific business sector),97 by extending the personal scope 
of application of national labour and social protection law traditionally applicable to 
employees,98 by regulating the working conditions and social protection for persons in  
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 Lei n.º 45/2018 Regime jurídico da atividade de transporte individual e remunerado de passageiros em 
veículos descaracterizados a partir de plataforma eletrónica [Legal regime of individual transport activity and 
paid passengers in unregistered vehicles from electronic platforms] (Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 154 
10.08.2018, p. 3972-3980) 
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 E.g. Estonia (Perehüvitiste seadus [Family Benefits Act] § 33, 1.01.2017) and Denmark (Lov om ændring af 
lov om arbejdsløshedsforsikring m.v. [Act amending the Unemployment Insurance Act, etc.] 1670, 
26.12.2017). 
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non-standard employment,99 or by strengthening the rights and protection of the self-
employed.100 
Several countries have taken legislative 
action in dimensions related to 
platform work, but often for very 
different considerations than the 
working conditions or social protection 
of platform workers. For example, 
Denmark, Czechia, Hungary, and 
others enacted legislation to regulate a 
specific business market (especially 
those in which platforms are directly 
competing with incumbents) with a 
view to ensuring fair competition. 
Belgium, France, Italy, Slovakia and 
others passed, amended, or considered 
legislation on revenues or income 
generated by platforms or by platform 
workers. 
Overall, few instances of dedicated 
legislative responses on platform work 
were found. This reflects that most 
countries have preferred to adapt 
platform work to the existing legislative 
framework rather than introduce new 
dedicated legislation. 
Uber versus national legislators  
For national legislation concerning 
platform work, countries frequently 
adopted recent legislation with a view 
to regulating the passenger or 
personal transport services 
sectors.101 It is interesting to note that 
in almost all countries where Uber is 
currently active,102 the national 
legislator has changed the legislation 
concerned with the personal transport 
services in recent years, and most that have not yet done so are in the course of 
adopting new legislation. This reveals the impact that the occurrence and gradual 
expansion of digital platform business have had on the personal transport services sector 
across the EU.  
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 E.g. Germany (Das Sechste Buch Sozialgesetzbuch – Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung " [The Sixth Book of 
Social Security - Statutory Pension Insurance] BGBl. I S. 2387, 11.12.2018. – see especially Section 2 
Sentence 1 No. 9), Spain (Ley 20/2007, de 11 de julio, del Estatuto del trabajo autónomo [Law 20/2007, of 
July 11, on the Statute of autonomous work], BOE-A-2007-13409, 11.07.2018) 
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 E.g. Lithuania (Lietuvos Respublikos valstybinio socialinio draudimo įstatymas [Law of the Republic of 
Lithuania on State Social Insurance] I-1336, 12.02.2019). 
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 Experts from DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, LV, PT, and SK report to have recent (amendments to the) 
‘personal transport services’ legislation already enforced whereas in CZ, PL, RO, SI proposals for legislation are 
being discussed in parliament. In PL, new legislation is currently being prepared and expected to be adopted in 
autumn 2019. In RO, a draft law was proposed in 2018 but ultimately rejected by the parliament. 
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 According to UBER.com, in June 2019 UBER is active in cities of the following 21 countries: AT, BE, CZ, DE, 
DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, IR, IT, LT, NL, NO, PT, PL, SE, SK, and RO.  
Box 5: Licensing requirements for drivers 
Estonia was apparently the first country to amend 
its Public Transport Act. In 2011 it created a 
common licensing and quality vetting for ride-
sharing platform business and traditional taxi 
companies. 
In 2015 Spain introduced a cap on the number of 
vehicles allowed to operate in the transportation of 
passengers without technically being taxis.  
In 2018 Greece adopted legislation aiming to 
prevent the presence of ‘Uber-like ride-sharing 
apps’ and obliging platforms that operate mobile 
apps to conclude three-year contracts with taxi 
owners. The legislation introduces heavy fines for 
licensed taxi drivers, as well as for private vehicle 
owners, who fail to abide by the rules.  
Slovakia adopted new legislation, in force as of 1 
April 2019, introducing a wider definition for 
‘dispatching services’. These traditionally constitute 
an essential characteristic of the personal 
transportation business by bringing digital 
communication into its ambit. Platforms are not 
considered taxi companies but dispatchers. The 
new legislation abolished several requirements that 
were previously applied to the taxi business, such 
as the requirements to prove financial reliability, to 
have a proficiency test or to have a taximeter at all 
times.  
In Croatia the licensing procedure was simplified 
in 2018, and mandatory tests for drivers for the 
area where they are operating were abolished. 
Lithuania created a new framework for ‘ride-
sharing type services’. This was accomplished 
through amendments to the Road Transport Code, 
which came into force in January 2017. 
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The legislation concerned primarily aims 
to ensure fair competition between the 
(traditional) taxi business sector and the 
personal transport services organised by 
digital platforms. The legislation is most 
often initiated by the national parliament 
or equivalent, although legislation 
adopted by lower authorities such as city 
councils has also been reported.103  
National legislators have used two 
approaches to try to create a level 
playing field. The first approach is 
enforcing existing standards and 
requirements to platforms and  
their drivers, which were already 
applicable to the traditional taxi 
businesses. In some instances this made 
it more challenging for the platforms to 
maintain their business models, and led 
to a reduction or a complete withdrawal 
of their businesses.104 The  
second approach is to loosen industry 
standards and requirements that 
existed prior to digital platforms. While 
the strategies are very different, both 
can be utilised simultaneously in a 
piecemeal fashion. 
Most countries seem to have aimed to 
enforce a licensing obligation on 
behalf of the drivers/individual ‘service 
providers’ (platform workers).105 These 
are enacted with a view to applying 
similar (professional and/or other) requirements applicable throughout the personal 
transport services sector. They particularly aim to create a level playing field between 
the traditional taxi businesses and the new entrants using platforms to provide their 
services. For example, taxi licences or permits may represent a significant annual 
expense, and taxi companies and drivers have fiercely protested against unlicensed 
competition. 
In some countries (e.g. Hungary and Slovakia) the licensing requirement is 
complemented by a registration obligation for the (companies that own) platforms or 
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 In some countries (e.g. Czechia, Hungary) Uber services are rather limited to one or a limited number of 
urban areas. Regional and local authorities of urban areas and larger cities are consequently the first levels of 
administration who are confronted with the occurrence and gradual expansion of the ride-sharing apps and 
digital platforms. 
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 In Sweden about 80 court rulings of the general criminal courts of first and second instance concerned 
UberPop, which was found in breach of competition and transportation legislation and as a consequence 
banned from operating. In Denmark the parliament adopted a new Taxi Act in 2017 which also led to a 
withdrawal of Uber. 
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 Apart from the countries mentioned FR (2018), FI (2018), LV (2107) also reported on recent legislation. 
The draft proposal for law in SI, which envisages to supplement the Road Transport Act aims to deregulate the 
taxi services sector and hence licensing obligation, implying that, if adopted, a new type of work(er) could 
emerge without having a formal status as employee or self-employed. PL also reports on upcoming legislation 
in the area of personal transport services to be adopted in 2019. In RO, proposals for new legislation were 
debated in parliament at the end of 2018 but not yet adopted.  
Box 6: The Lazio region's platform work law 
Under the legislation passed in Lazio, platforms 
would be required to: 
 Provide insurance for work accidents and 
professional diseases, and damages to 
third parties, to be paid by the company 
 Apply the standard minimum daily pay 
using the national collective bargaining 
agreements signed by the most 
representative unions as reference; piece 
rate work is forbidden 
 Inform the workers on the place of work, 
tasks, pay rate, risks concerning work 
execution, access to protective 
equipment, functioning of the rating 
system, and its effect on the employment 
relationship 
 Ensure health and safety at work, provide 
training and the obligation to provide 
health and safety equipment, and cover 
the maintenance costs for this equipment 
 Ensure a transparent and non-
discriminatory intermediation and rating 
algorithm, the portability thereof, and to 
ensure an impartial verification procedure 
of the system upon request of the worker. 
Moreover, a regional website for the registry of 
the workforce and the employers compliant with 
the abovementioned provisions has been created, 
along with a regional committee in charge of 
drafting a Charter of Rights for digital workers. 
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digital apps, or by a requirement to have a ‘permanent establishment’ (Meszmann, 
2018).  
The legislation on personal transportation services adopted by Member States does not 
generally aim at regulating the employment status of the individual platform workers, 
nor is it aimed at working conditions or social protection. One exception is found in 
Portugal, where Law 45/2018106 entered into force in the course of 2019. The law, which 
only applies to the transport sector, obliges platforms to use ‘operators’ as 
intermediaries between the platform and the drivers. These operators107 are ‘legal 
persons’ or companies, which facilitate the transport services to the customers booking 
their journeys on the platform. According to the law, individual drivers cannot conclude a 
contract directly with the platforms and must instead be contracted by these 
intermediate operators. The law furthermore introduces the presumption that there is an 
employment contract between the driver and the operator, and explicitly states that the 
presumption prevails even in cases when the specific contract is named differently.108 
The law introduces additional material provisions on working conditions, such as limited 
working hours. Furthermore, Uber drivers, as employees, are covered by general labour 
and social protection legislation. 
Dedicated legislation on working conditions and social protection for platform 
workers  
Very few national legislators have directly tackled the area of working conditions and 
social protection that exclusively address platform workers by means of statutory law. 
However, in addition to Portugal’s 2018 law on drivers in the personal transport sector, a 
few other responses are noteworthy. 
In Italy several proposals of law were discussed in Parliament in 2018 and more recently 
in spring 2019, which all aimed at better protection of (platform) workers mainly in the 
food delivery sector. The now-adopted legislation109 aims to establish the employment 
status of food delivery riders who work through digital platforms. The law affords riders 
better protection by ensuring a guaranteed minimum wage and the right to paid holidays 
and sick leave, which are all labour rights that are applied to employees in general.110 
The Portuguese and Italian national legislation referred to above concern the specific 
business sectors of personal transport services and food delivery services. They remain 
limited to the working conditions and social protection of workers in these specific 
sectors and are not oriented to all types of platform work and platform workers. More 
comprehensive legislation is in force in France and Italy. 
The French parliament adopted the Loi El Khomri [El Khomri Law] in 2016111 to target 
certain self-employed platform workers. Platform workers affected by this law are 
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 Lei n.º 45/2018 Regime jurídico da atividade de transporte individual e remunerado de passageiros em 
veículos descaracterizados a partir de plataforma eletrónica [Legal regime of individual transport activity and 
paid passengers in unregistered vehicles from electronic platforms] (Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 154 
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in vehicle characterised by an electronic platform]. 
108
 One relevant question is whether a driver who establishes a one-person undertaking and through the latter 
is concluding a contract with the platform could be considered as an employee of the platform. This creative 
circumvention of the legislation may beget further discussions. 
109
 L. 2 novembre 2019, n. 128, Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 3 settembre 2019, 
n. 101, recante disposizioni urgenti per la tutela del lavoro e per la risoluzione di crisi aziendali 
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 The original draft legislation also prohibited pay ‘per task’ or ‘per delivery’, but this was not included in the 
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 Loi n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la 
sécurisation des parcours professionnels [Law on work, modernising social dialogue and securing career paths] 
(2016-1088, 8.08.2016) 
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defined as independent workers112 in an economically113 and technically dependent114 
relationship with an online platform.115 The law highlights the ‘social responsibility’ of 
such platforms to provide platform workers with access to insurance for work accidents 
and professional diseases, training and continued education. It also establishes the right 
to start or join trade unions, and the right to take collective action for these self-
employed platform workers. In addition, the law contains provisions concerned with 
taxation of income received by self-employed platform workers.  
By introducing the El Khomri Law, the French legislature has directly tackled the hybrid 
employment status of certain platform workers116 across all business sectors, explicitly 
clarifying what labour and social rights self-employed platform workers are entitled to. In 
so doing, the legislator has found a unique mechanism ensuring some labour and social 
rights for particularly vulnerable self-employed platform workers who are not employees, 
and consequently are not protected by much labour legislation on working conditions 
and social protection (Daugareilh et al., 2019). 
The Italian region of Lazio adopted regional legislation on 20 March 2019.117 This aims to 
regulate remuneration, health and safety, and social protection of all types of platform 
work regardless of the employment status of the workers (IRES, 2019). It is the most 
comprehensive legislation on platform work in force in the 30 countries covered 
by the present study. The law covers many working conditions and social protection 
challenges that platform workers face. In spite of its novel approach in covering the 
working conditions and social protection rights of all platform workers throughout all 
market sectors, the Lazio regional legislation is exceedingly broad, and according to the 
Italian legal expert consulted, likely to be challenged on the grounds of its 
constitutionality. 
Employment status: the critical issue in a majority of countries 
As discussed in Section 4, one of the most (if not the most) critical challenges concerns 
the employment status of platform workers. Platform work has profoundly challenged 
the traditional dichotomy between employee and self-employed in practice, and also 
before national courts. In general, platforms engage their workers as self-employed for 
economic reasons. When platforms enter markets with prevailing practices based on 
employment relationships, they circumvent national legislation on working conditions, 
social protection and other requirements and standards, thereby reducing their costs and 
creating a competitive advantage. 
EU Member States differ widely in their national definitions of employees and 
self-employed. Often concepts such as ‘employee’ or ‘self-employed’ are not explicitly 
defined in national labour and social protection legislation. From our survey among the 
country experts, none of the countries, with the exception of Portugal, has adopted 
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 The term used throughout the legislation is travailleur indépendant – literally independent worker, but 
generally meaning self-employed person or independent contractor. 
113
 See Art. L. 7342-1 through 7342-6. “[Contributions] shall be borne by the platform when the self-employed 
person has completed the platform, during of the calendar year under which the contribution and contribution 
were paid, a turnover equal to or greater than 13% of the annual ceiling for social security” (2016-1088, 
8.08.2016) 
114
 Art. L. 7342-1: “When the platform determines the characteristics of the service provided or the good sold 
and fixes its price, it has, with respect to the workers concerned, a social responsibility that is exercised under 
the conditions provided for in this Chapter” (2016-1088, 8.08.2016) 
115
 See Code général des impôts [General tax code], which defines “The company, regardless of its place of 
establishment, which as platform operator remotely connects, electronically, people for the sale of a property, 
the provision of a service or the exchange or sharing of a good or service […]” (Article 242 bis, modified by LOI 
n°2018-898 du 23 octobre 2018 - art. 10 (V)) 
116
 See above qualifications for technical and economic dependency. For example, platform workers benefiting 
from these portions of the El Khomri Law cannot set their own prices. 
117
 Giunta Regionale: deliberazione N.308 NORME PER LA TUTELA E LA SICUREZZA DEI LAVORATORI DIGITALI 
[Rules for the safety and protection of digital workers] (2018 n.40, 20.03.2019) 
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specific legislation determining the employment status of platform workers. Portugal did 
so for platform workers in the personal transport services sector, and in this case, there 
is a legal presumption that select platform workers are employees based in legislation.118 
In all countries, the labour and social protection legislation leaves the discretionary 
power to interpret specific cases on employment status to the judiciary, and 
national courts base their rulings on the facts and concrete relationship between the 
employer/commissioning company, and the particular platform worker.  
In many countries, the notion of ‘subordination’ is critical to determine an employment 
relationship. For example, in its recent draft legislation covering the digital economy,119 
the Italian region of Piedmont aimed to codify the criteria that the Italian courts applied 
in their case law when determining the employment status of platform workers (IRES, 
2019). The notion is specifically relevant for platform work and has been further detailed 
in the legislation itself. Platform work is performed in subordination when: 1) the work is 
requested by a third party; 2) the platform worker uses their own means and tools; and 
3) the platform established or influences the conditions and remuneration 
through a digital platform. This is not dissimilar to the previously discussed criteria of 
the El Khomri Law, which requires certain platform workers to receive additional 
protections. At the same time, the legislation clarifies some criteria that are/were often 
viewed as indicative or decisive of self-employment in court. The legislation specifies 
that the mere fact that the working time of a platform worker has not been defined in 
advance, or that a worker is free to accept (or decline) a single task, does not in itself 
constitute self-employment. The legislation also determines that algorithms are 
subjected to an experimental phase and to a consultation right for the trade unions 
about the implementation of the algorithm, whereas rating mechanisms based on the 
performance of the platform workers shall be banned.120 
Some countries have taken different legislative action to clarify the employment status 
of platform workers and/or to address the consequences of doubtful or wrong 
classifications. In a number of countries, a third category of ‘workers’ exists in 
national legislation besides the categories of employed and self-employed. In Bulgaria, a 
third category of workers exists under the concept of ‘contractors’ who have recently 
become part of the personal scope of general social insurance legislation, in addition to 
employees and self-employed. In Spain the concept of ‘economically dependent 
autonomous work’ serves as the intermediate category between employee and self-
employed. Germany has ‘employee-like’ workers, ‘mini-jobbers’, and so on. These third 
categories often have mixed protection levels in terms of their working conditions and 
social protection, which usually implies greater protection than self-employed, but less 
protection than employees. In the countries concerned, platform workers can be 
classified as an in-between category of workers. 
Clearly Member States show a great deal of diversity in handling criteria to distinguish 
employees, self-employed, and any intermediate statuses. However, certain factors are 
applicable in most EU jurisdictions to help determine if a platform worker is an employee 
or self-employed. 
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 The rebuttable presumption is a concept that most often originates from case law and is less prevalent in 
legislation. Note that EU-OSHA (2017) found that the rebuttable presumption of self-employment does not 
necessarily produce concrete benefits for platform workers or remove legal uncertainties. 
119
 Regione Piemonte, Proposta di Legge Regionale 27 giugno 2018, n. 306 “Disposizioni in materia di lavoro 
mediante piattaforme digitali” 
120
 The regional legislation also abolishes the concept of ‘quasi-subordinate work’, which was introduced by the 
Jobs Act. 
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Table 13: Overview of factors indicating whether a platform worker is employee or self-
employed 
Factor 
Elements indicating employee 
status 
Elements indicating self-
employed status 
Agreement 
 Fixed remuneration 
 Guaranteed remuneration in case 
of illness, holiday, etc. 
 Expenses refunded 
 Non-competition or exclusivity 
clause 
 Training clause 
 Payment after invoice 
 Payment per performance 
 No guaranteed remuneration (i.e. 
when no services performed) 
 Costs/expenses borne by the 
service provider 
 Commitment to attain a certain 
result regarding agreed work 
Work 
organisation 
 Precise and detailed description of 
tasks and the way they are to be 
performed 
 Working materials and equipment 
provided by the platform 
 Exclusivity 
 Presenting oneself as a part of the 
platform towards third parties 
 Work organised freely 
 Workplace freely chosen 
 Own working materials and 
equipment 
 Possibility of recruiting own staff 
to perform agreed services 
 Possibility of having a replacement 
perform the work 
 Possibility of working for several 
companies/platforms 
 Extensive liability 
Working time 
organisation 
 Working hours imposed by the 
platform (check-in and -out 
obligations; daily timesheets) 
 Holiday period (number and 
timing) imposed 
 Obligation to justify absences 
 Working hours chosen by the 
service provider 
 Holiday period (number and 
timing) freely chosen by the 
service provider 
Possibility of 
exercising 
hierarchical 
supervision 
 Possibility of precise and detailed 
instructions by the platform 
 Possibility of supervision of the 
performance of the work and of 
compliance; reporting duties 
during performance or afterwards 
 Internal disciplinary sanctions and 
control by hierarchical superior 
 Only general directives of an 
economic nature are given by the 
platform/client 
 Reporting only afterwards on the 
results 
 Responsibility and decision-
making power with respect to 
financial means 
 Personal and considerable 
investment in the company and 
participation in the profits and 
losses of the company 
Source: adapted from EU-OSHA’s (2017) presentation of overview from Nerinckx (2016). 
 
The designation of employment status has a number of practical consequences. Of 
particular interest is national legislation on social protection of the self-employed. 
The scope and protection levels of the self-employed are generally lower than 
employees, though protection legislation of the self-employed varies to a large extent in 
the Member States. Meanwhile, most platform workers are classified as self-employed in 
practice (Eurofound, 2018). Changes to national legislation on the social protection of 
the self-employed can therefore have direct consequences for platform workers.121 
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 See also discussion of a relevant EU instrument: Council Recommendation on access to social protection for 
workers and the self-employed, political agreement; 15394/18 of 10.12.2018. 
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In Denmark, a revision of the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2018 determined that all 
sorts of income from labour, and hence 
also self-employed income, is to be 
considered income that is taken into 
account for the determination and 
calculation of unemployment benefits. 
The income that self-employed 
platform workers earn will hence be 
taken into account for the purposes of 
their unemployment benefit.  
Several countries report recent 
legislative changes and amendments to 
national labour or social protection 
legislation, which were already in 
force, with a view to expanding the 
personal scope of their application to 
(new) non-standard forms of 
employment. Recent legislation in 
Estonia122 has been adopted to extend 
the personal scope of the Health 
Insurance Act to persons working 
under these civil law contracts, which 
are usually contracts of very short 
volume or duration. In several cases 
this extension is formulated by 
including employee-like persons into 
the personal coverage scope, as was 
the case in Austria regarding legislation 
on equal treatment of temporary 
agency workers.123,124 Similar occurred 
in Germany for ‘homeworkers’,125,126 
and Denmark127 and Lithuania128 for 
income gained through self-employed 
activities. These legislative actions 
were often not necessarily introduced 
for platform workers exclusively, but to cover broader groups of workers in non-standard 
employment. 
Apart from broadening the personal scope of legislation to incorporate non-standard 
forms of work and/or platform work, other mechanisms are being introduced in national 
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 RT I, 30.06.2015, 1 amending the Estonian Health Insurance Fund Act 
123
 BGBl. Nr. 196/1988, Arbeitskräfteüberlassungsgesetz [Act on Temporary Agency Work] § 2 
124
 The introduction of ‘employee like persons’ in addition to the employees themselves (irrespective of the 
latter’s specific term that is being used under national legislation) in the ambit of the personal scope of 
legislation seems primarily used under the national non-discrimination legislation in matters of employment, 
which in itself has already a broader scope deriving from European Legislation. The latter also encompasses 
access to self-employment.  
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 See Glossary. 
126
 Heimarbeitsgesetz in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer 804-1, veröffentlichten 
bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel 4g des Gesetzes vom 18. Dezember 2018 (BGBl. I S. 2651) 
geändert worden ist. 
127
 Ammendment Act no 1670 26/12/2017, Lov om ændring af lov om arbejdsløshedsforsikring m.v. [Act on 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits] 
128
 Lietuvos Respublikos valstybinio socialinio draudimo įstatymas [Law of the Republic of Lithuania on State 
Social Insurance Law No I-1336 of the Republic of Lithuania on State Social Insurance 
Box 7: Belgium's special tax categories 
Belgium introduced a special taxation regime 
‘Programmawet’ [Program Law] on 1 July 2016. It 
applies to income natural persons receive when 
providing services through an electronic platform, 
on the condition that the customer is a natural 
person not acting in a professional capacity, and 
the payment is made by a registered digital 
platform. When the gross income received is below 
a predefined ceiling, a special (lower) tax rate 
applies. Platforms are required to register and to 
report annually on the amount that they have paid 
to the individual service providers to the tax 
administration.  
In 2018 a new taxation regime ‘Loi De Croo’ was 
launched for income from occasional services 
provided between ‘citizens’ outside any professional 
relationship. Natural persons can receive payments 
for services outside of any professional relationship 
such as small-scale maintenance works at home, 
household help, small-scale IT support services, 
etc. Occasional services can also be provided 
through the mediation of registered digital 
platforms.  
The income from occasional work is treated under a 
special taxation regime and free from taxes and 
social security contributions up to a maximum 
ceiling of €6,000 per year or €500 per month. 
When the income exceeds the annual ceiling, the 
provider is obliged to register as self-employed and 
the income will be treated as professional income. 
Lenaerts (2018) finds that whereas most workers 
simply stop working when they reach the maximum 
amount, others use it as a springboard to launch 
their own business.  
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legislation which aim to correctly establish the employment status of platform workers. 
These mechanisms are often aimed at avoiding possible abuse and bogus self-
employment. In addition to the Portuguese example of the legal presumption of 
employee status for selected platform workers, others can be observed. One such 
example is in Malta, where secondary legislation was introduced enabling a 
reclassification of persons who have concluded a self-employed contract.129  
As an additional consequence of their self-employment, few platform workers 
are covered by collective agreements.130 A 2017 Act in Ireland altered this. The 
Competition (Amendment) Act,131 which defines and uses the concepts of ‘false self-
employed worker’ and ‘fully dependent self-employed worker’, allows such individuals to 
join trade unions and take part in collective bargaining and agreements. The law does 
not address platform workers in particular but establishes the right to association and 
collective bargaining to certain self-employed individuals, including some self-employed 
platform workers. Such collective rights were also introduced by the French El Khomri 
Law of 2016 for platform workers who are in an economically and technically dependent 
relationship with a digital platform. 
Reporting and taxation for platforms and platform workers 
Some country experts have reported recently adopted legislation which aims to better 
control platform operations, and/or income generated by platform work. These generally 
intend to address several challenges at once, including reducing administrative burden 
for workers, preventing tax evasion, and fighting undeclared work. These pieces of 
legislation do not necessarily apply just to platform workers. 
In France, a new law adopted in late 2018, and effective from 1 January 2020, obliges 
platforms to report the remuneration they have paid to each platform worker to the tax 
administration.132 Estonia adopted the Simplified Business Income Taxation Act, which 
entered into force at the beginning of 2018, and applies to the persons who deliver 
services or offer goods to other natural persons. The income received is subject to a 
more favourable taxation rate. The service providers making use of the simplified 
business account do not have to register as self-employed (‘entrepreneurs’).133 At the 
same time, a new register had already been initiated by the tax authorities in 2014, 
where all different categories of workers need to register: employees, workers under 
civil law contracts, service providers using the simplified business account, and the self-
employed (entrepreneurs). At the beginning of 2018, Slovakia adopted new tax 
legislation obliging platforms providing personal transport services and accommodation 
services to report earned income.134 In Romania, legislative proposals were debated in 
late 2018 in Parliament that obliged ride-sharing platforms to report on the number of 
rides to the fiscal authorities.135  
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 S.L.452.108, see http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/downloaddocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid= 
11844&l=1 
130
 Further discussed under the heading Collective agreements. 
131
 Competition (Amendment) Act 2017 (Act 12 of 2017) Part 2B 
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 Platforms previously did not have to verify the identity of the platform workers. See LOI n° 2018-898 du 23 
octobre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la fraude (1), available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037518803&categorieLien=id.  
133
 Ettevõtlustulu lihtsustatud maksustamise seadus [Simplified Business Income Taxation Act], available at 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/522122017001/consolide 
134
 The Amendment to the Act No. 595/2003 (Income Tax Act), available at https://www.mfsr.sk/en/taxes-
customs-accounting/direct-taxes/income-tax/legislation-force/income-tax-act/  
135
 From expert and stakeholder interviews, see Annex I: Synopsis Report of consultations. 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
111 
Non-discrimination, equal treatment, and platform work 
Many country experts report recent amendments to their national non-discrimination 
legislation in the field of employment,136 ensuring equal treatment and protection from 
the six grounds of discrimination established in the assessed EU equal treatment 
legislation.137 None of the legislative initiatives were aimed at platform workers 
particularly, but through extension of the personal scope of the legislation concerned, 
such as the inclusion of intermediate employment statuses (e.g. employee-like in 
Germany and Austria), platform workers may have come within their ambit. In cases 
such as Germany, non-discrimination labour laws are rather unique, insofar as they 
equally impact workers (including platform workers) regardless of employment status 
(De Groen et al., 2018a). 
Intermediate conclusions on national legislation 
In recent years, national legislators have been increasingly active in the area of 
platform work. The business sectors concerned are those in which digital platforms first 
entered national markets about a decade ago and have been most powerful and 
persistent in gaining parts of the local market shares, often to the detriment of the 
incumbents. Most national legislation has been adopted in the sector of the personal 
transport services and to a lesser extent in the sector of the delivery services.  
National legislation has primarily aimed to ensure fair competition in these 
specific market segments. In this regard, two main approaches seem to be deregulating 
the traditional business sectors, or explicitly applying existing standards and 
requirements to the new (platform) entrants. Both could theoretically lead to a level 
playing field, and thus have consequences on working conditions and social protection of 
platform workers, but results have varied.138 Where countries such as Sweden, Belgium, 
Slovakia, and Denmark have essentially banned or driven out platforms in particular 
sectors, in most others platform businesses are growing steadily, often to the detriment 
of their more traditional competitors.  
Existing research found that national legislators have been reactive where platform work 
is concerned (Lenaerts et al., 2017), but we observe a tendency towards more 
proactive approaches. For example, several countries display creative approaches to 
the issue of tax reporting and collection, which is a significant priority of central 
governments. 
National legislation specific to platform work remains very rare. Nevertheless, 
while several new or revised pieces of legislation do not target platform workers, they 
still impact them. These legal tools may reduce the disparity between self-
employed and employees in social protection coverage or labour law 
protections. In this respect, these tools broadly address ‘new’ forms of non-standard 
employment, including platform work. 
 Case law 5.3.2
Experts for sixteen of the thirty surveyed countries report national case law concerning 
platforms. Furthermore, it appears that there is a significant rise in court cases in recent 
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 AT, BG, CZ, DK, EL, IE, LT, NL, NO, and PL. 
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 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16–22); Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ L 180, 
19.7.2000, p. 22–26); Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters 
of employment and occupation (recast) (OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 23–36) 
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 As mentioned above, platforms have entered markets with prevailing practices based on employment 
relationships. By relying on labour from self-employed individuals, they circumvent national legislation on 
working conditions, social protection and other requirements and standards, thereby reducing their costs and 
creating a competitive advantage. 
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years, and that many decisions on crucial cases are pending and/or are under appeal as 
of summer 2019.  
Court cases have primarily been reported in the two business sectors that are most 
relevant for the platform economy in terms of their initial occurrence and volume of 
business in the Member States: personal transport services139 and food delivery 
services.140 Some national court cases also concern accommodation services and other 
business sectors such as plumbing.141 
Most often national courts were called upon to decide in matters related to competition 
law in specific business sectors. However, as could be expected given the binary 
divide between employees and self-employed in many national legislations, national 
judges have regularly ruled in cases that concern the determination of the 
employment status of a particular (group of) platform worker(s), sometimes with 
contradictory outcomes in and between countries. 
Uber in national courts 
National judges have assessed whether digital platform businesses are to be classified as 
a ‘taxi’ service, implying thereby that the requirements and standards applied to the 
sector have to be adhered to by the platforms. Belgian, Bulgarian, Danish, Finnish, 
Dutch, Slovak, Swedish and UK competent courts ruled in such cases, and most often 
classified the platform as a taxi service. In Sweden alone, more than 80 cases have been 
ruled since 2015, and the criminal courts of first and second instance in Stockholm and 
Gothenburg unanimously ruled that UberPop provides personal transport services, and 
hence that their drivers require a professional licence to operate. In Sweden and 
elsewhere, such rulings correspond with Uber’s decision to suspend its UberPop services 
in most European countries. 
Local courts in Brussels, Belgium142 took a similar position until very recently, which 
(would have) led to a ban of ride-sharing services provided by UberPop, and potentially 
UberX, unless local personal transport sector legislation143 was observed. In the Brussels 
region, different legislation exists between taxi services and services to ‘car rental with 
driver’, such as limousine services.144 Taxi drivers must have a taxi licence, which is 
quite expensive. They must further have specific insurance and ensure regular technical 
examinations of the cars. Regulations on ‘car rental with driver’ services are much less 
stringent. Court decisions in 2015 and in 2016 ruled that the services provided by 
UberPop and UberX were illegal, which implied in practice that the ride-sharing drivers 
had to respect the local requirement for taxi drivers and/or for renting a car with driver 
services. As a consequence, UberPop terminated its services because these drivers lack 
professional licences, but maintained its UberX services, as the latter requires drivers to 
possess the special driver’s licence required by the local transport regulation for rental of 
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 Court cases concerned with Uber were reported for AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, FI, FR, NL, PL, SE, SK, and the 
UK – 13/30 surveyed countries. 
140
 Court cases concerning Deliveroo or other food delivery services were reported for BE, DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, 
and the UK. 
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 Mr G Smith v Pimlico Plumbers and Mr C Mullins: 2374916/2011. In this case, a person working for a 
plumbing company claimed he was to be considered as an employee (‘worker’ in the UK definition) and entitled 
to unpaid holiday pay all employees are entitled to, and that he was not a self-employed as he was classified 
by the plumbing firm. Courts of first and second instance, as well as Supreme Court, applied the established 
tests of employment status, confirming he was an employee (or ‘worker’ in the UK definition). 
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 Uber is mainly active in the Brussels region, in some cities in Wallonia and in the city of Leuven in Flanders, 
but not yet in other urban areas such as in Antwerp and Ghent.  
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 The regulation of personal transportation services is a regional competence in Belgium. The Brussels region 
legislates by means of ordinances.  
144
 This includes personal transport services that provide a car and a driver, and concern rides that last longer 
than three hours, and exceed certain distances. Similar distinctions are present elsewhere in Europe, such as 
Austria. 
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a car with driver services.145 These judgments were confirmed by a new court case at 
the beginning of January 2019. However, a recent ruling of the same Brussels court 
decided differently in the second half of January 2019.146 The case concerned only UberX 
services, and the court ruled that Uber is not infringing the local transport legislation and 
can continue its services without their drivers having to obtain a taxi driver’s licence. By 
this ruling, UberX was not considered to be a transport service, but an 
intermediary in the transport sector,147 whereas the drivers themselves were 
considered as providers of the services concerned. It remains to be seen what the court 
of appeal will rule, as the case is likely to be further pursued by the local taxi industry.  
The courts of first (May 2018) and second (December 2018) instance of Bratislava, 
Slovakia, also effectively banned Uber on similar grounds to the Swedish and Belgian 
judges, determining that Uber drivers need to have a professional licence. However, a 
recent piece of legislation entered into force in April 2019 that classified digital platforms 
as dispatching services rather than taxi services (Reuters, 2019). In effect, this removed 
most of the requirements for drivers that previously were applied, and it is likely that 
Uber will restart its operations soon.  
A few indicative national court rulings deal with employment status of the 
platform drivers in the personal transport sector. UK judges have thus far 
consistently148 qualified Uber drivers as workers149 (in the UK meaning of the term) in 
spite of the platform classifying them as self-employed. In France, the Court of Appeal in 
Paris150 also ruled in January 2019 that even if Uber’s platform worker was registered as 
self-employed, it appears from the facts that there is a link of subordination with the 
platform. The Court considered that the platform worker is not free to choose his clients 
and to organise his activity, which is under the full control of the platform, and also that 
the platform has the power to impose penalties and to terminate the contract.  
Whereas UK and French judges often consider platform drivers not to be self-employed, 
Belgian judges seem to hold a different opinion. In the recent case concerning the 
classification of UberX as a taxi service or as a ‘car rental with driver’ in late January 
2019, the Brussels court was also asked about the employment status of the ride-
sharing drivers.151 The court concluded that there was no relationship of subordination 
between UberX and the drivers, as the latter can chose freely where and when they 
work, how long they work and which rides they accept or refuse. The judge furthermore 
argued that the drivers always have their own car (even if leased) and that the drivers 
are free to work elsewhere whenever they prefer. Thus, this latest Belgian judgment 
considers UberX drivers to be self-employed.  
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 The LVC licence or licence for the rental of a car with driver. 
146
 Orb., 16 januari 2019, AR A/18/02920, see https://www.socialweb.be/Socialweb/NL/ 
publichome/html/free/articles/3063152 
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 Interesting in this regard: one of the arguments put forward to become considered as the special type of 
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 Court of Appeal Paris, Pole 6, chambre 2, 10 January 2019, case RG 18/08357, see 
https://www.doctrine.fr/d/CA/Paris/2017/C27AD99FFA3292FB31B1D  
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 A/18/02920, Tribunal de l’enterprise francophone de Bruxelles 
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The discretionary power of national judges in determining employment status 
As pointed out, national labour and social protection legislation usually applies the 
mutually exclusive concepts of employees and self-employed, sometimes complemented 
by a third or intermediate category. The employment status determines different 
protection levels concerning working conditions and social protection. National legislation 
in Member States defines the status of employee or employment contract in varying 
ways and uses criteria such as the subordination dimension. National courts are 
ultimately called upon to determine whether there is subordination or not for particular 
cases, which may lead to a reclassification when a platform worker has been wrongly 
classified as self-employed. 
Beyond Uber and similar platforms, the determination of the employment status of food 
delivery platform workers has also been subject to plenty of court cases in a number of 
countries. In late 2018, the Cour de Cassation of France (the highest judicial power in 
the country) confirmed that even if a worker of Take Eat Easy, a platform organising 
food delivery services and riders, is classified as self-employed by the platform, they are 
still an employee due to factual evidence of subordination.152 The Court considered in 
this specific case that the link of subordination is established by two factual elements: 
the right for the platform to impose penalties and the existence of a geotracking system. 
In Italy there have been similar court cases concerned with the employment status of 
food delivery riders in recent years. In May 2018, the Employment Tribunal of Turin 
rejected a claim from six riders of the platform Foodora to be reclassified as 
employees.153 The six riders were hired by the Italian branch of Foodora under a 
‘coordinated and continuous collaboration’ contract (which in Italy is a subcategory of 
self-employment). The contract expired at the end of November 2016 and was not 
renewed by the platform. The group of workers filed an employment claim demanding: 
(i) wage differentials according to either the national collective agreement for logistics or 
that of the service sector; (ii) job reinstatement after unlawful termination; (iii) 
compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the infringement of privacy; and (iv) 
actions for damages for breach of safety and health regulations. They also alleged they 
were dismissed as a form of retaliation against their decision to lead or take part in a 
collective demonstration against the shift in the payment system from an hourly based 
to per-delivery model, which had been announced in October 2016.  
The Tribunal stated that the workers concerned were free to decide when to work by 
accepting or refusing a particular call, and even to disregard previously agreed shifts. In 
the judge’s opinion, this constitutes ‘in itself, a decisive factor when it comes to 
excluding the workers’ subjection to the managerial and organisational power of the 
employer, as it is evident that, if [the platform] cannot request work, then it cannot 
exercise its commanding power’. The examination performed by the judge was limited to 
a merely formalistic analysis: ‘there was no obligation on the side of the workers to offer 
their services and no obligation for the company to provide further work’. The judge 
considered the existence of managerial and disciplinary prerogatives, ‘once workers are 
in a shift, after communicating their availability’, but concluded they were not to be 
reclassified as employees, in spite of the allocation of shifts, the specification of 
locations, the repeated follow-up phone calls, the remote monitoring, and the internal 
ranking of the best performers.154 
In its recent judgement in February 2019, the Appeal Tribunal in Turin155 did not uphold 
the earlier judgment. The court stated that the workers' personal performance was 
organised by the platform in accordance with the prevailing labour legislation extending 
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labour protection to collaborators who are not genuinely autonomous.156 The workers 
were further subject to organisation by the platform, even if only in terms of working 
time and place. On this basis, the court ruled that the former Foodora riders had to be 
paid in accordance with the national collective bargaining agreement for the logistics and 
freight transport sector, but that they could not rely on the provisions related to unfair 
dismissal. In short, workers of the digital platform are technically considered as a 
subcategory of self-employed, but because of the extension of the personal scope of 
labour legislation, they can still rely on some labour law protection, provided that they 
are a subject to coordination and organisation by the platform.  
The Milan Tribunal ruled in September 2018157 in a similar way to the Turin Tribunal, 
stating that the claimant was not obliged to observe a fixed work schedule imposed by 
the platform, so he was not permanently included in the business organisation. In 
addition, the claimant used his own vehicle for deliveries and did not receive a fixed and 
predetermined monthly payment, but a variable amount, depending on the quantity and 
type of deliveries made month by month and therefore based not on the time worked, 
but on the results achieved. Considering these elements of fact, the judge considered 
that no symptomatic signs of sufficient and unambiguous subordination were found. 
Contradictory rulings have also occurred regarding the employment status of 
food delivery couriers in the Netherlands and Spain. Whereas the Court of Amsterdam 
ruled mid 2018158 that a delivery rider of Deliveroo was not an employee, the same 
Court concluded differently in a 2019 case.159 The latter case was brought forward by 
trade unions and considered the relationship between the food delivery riders and 
Deliveroo as an employment relationship. Thus, the collective bargaining agreement for 
professional goods transport by road had to be applied retroactively.  
In 2018 and 2019, seven cases were brought before Spanish courts concerning the 
determination of the employment status of food delivery riders using the platforms 
Deliveroo, Take Eat Easy and Glovo. In four instances160 the court classified the riders of 
Glovo, Deliveroo, and Take Eat Easy as employees, whereas in three others,161 the 
courts concluded that there was no employment relationship for the Glovo riders, and 
that they had to be considered self-employed.  
The reasoning varied despite similar factual circumstances. Each of the four cases that 
determined the rider is an employee found that a subordinate relationship existed 
between the platform worker and platform. This was based on control through the 
application used, location systems, possibility of dismissals, concept of ‘workdays’ and 
planning annual leave, and using equipment given by the company. The Madrid court 
decided in January 2019162 that a Glovo rider is not an employee but an economically 
dependent self-employed person.163 The judge reached this assessment because the 
rider is not obliged to perform a minimum number of hours work per week, is free to 
accept the service, has full control over the way they want to provide the service, 
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assumes the risk, and is the owner of the vehicle. Another case tried before the Oviedo 
court in February 2019164 also considered a Glovo rider as economically dependent self-
employed, stating, among other arguments, that the rider was completely free to 
collaborate with other platforms.  
A number of cases concerning platform workers’ employment status remain 
pending. In the UK, for example, cases related to the collective bargaining rights of 
food delivery riders at Deliveroo went to the Central Arbitration Committee in November 
2017, and subsequently to the High Court in December 2018. Both confirmed the riders 
were self-employed and therefore did not qualify for collective bargaining rights. The 
riders’ union has appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal (Webber, 2018). In 
Sweden, a recent 2019 case pending before the Administrative Court of Appeal concerns 
the local umbrella organisations of platform workers and the extent to which they, as 
employers, are liable for administrative sanctions in instances of breach of health and 
safety legislation when working at the premises of customers.  
Intermediate conclusions on national case law 
In countries where large platforms have emerged and operated, numerous court cases 
and rulings have occurred in recent years. Many court cases concern competition law 
issues165 in the personal transport sector, which is also subject to the highest volume of 
legislative initiatives. Most court cases concerned with the personal transport services 
considered whether the service provided by Uber amounts to taxi services, or something 
else with lower standards and requirements.  
Many cases have also ruled on the employment status of platform workers, particularly 
for food delivery couriers. On employment status, many courts examined similar 
evidence and reached different conclusions. This demonstrates that the 
employment status of platform workers differs significantly across business sectors in 
the countries concerned, but also between similar business sectors across the EU. 
Platform workers active in similar business sectors are employees in some countries and 
self-employed in others, even if they provide identical services for the same platform. 
Because of the contradictory rulings and the fact that some platforms offer different 
‘types of contracts’, platform workers can even be classified in different ways when 
working in the same country on the same platform. To some extent contradictory rulings 
reflect differing arguments raised in court, but also the discretionary power of 
labour judges, who have different judicial philosophies and differently assess 
facts on a case-by-case basis. Still, in most instances court rulings are still subject to 
further appeal before the highest courts, which may reverse the rulings concerned. 
Consequently, the final determination of the employment status of a platform 
worker remains uncertain at present. This is mainly because national courts rely on 
the facts of particular cases as the basis for their interpretation and consider and 
differently emphasise multiple criteria, for example the autonomy of the platform 
worker, who bears costs associated with work, or economic or technical dependence.  
 Administrators and inspectorates 5.3.3
Administrators and inspectorates are essential to the enforcement of social and labour 
legislation. The European Parliament has urged Member States to fully implement and 
enforce relevant legislation on platform work, including by investing in labour inspections 
(EU-OSHA, 2017). 
However, there are notable legal and practical difficulties with this approach. For 
example, some platform work can take place online in any location. This would require 
competent authorities to perform OSH inspections in the platform worker’s home, which 
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is frequently the place of work. In a number of countries, labour inspectorates do not 
inspect workers’ homes, even if the worker is an employee. For example, the Swedish 
labour inspectorate does not inspect employees’ homes in cases of teleworking, though 
the employer has the same responsibilities as if the work were conducted at a ‘normal’ 
workplace. The Danish Working Environment Authority and Finnish labour inspection 
authority can inspect teleworking activities in homes, but do so very rarely (EU-OSHA, 
2017). 
Nevertheless, there have been targeted responses to platform worker challenges from 
government administrators and inspectorates. Most inspections have been limited to on-
location platform work taking place in public spaces, notably food delivery services and 
taxi-like services. Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK and Sweden have been particularly 
active in this regard. 
In some cases, inspectorates and administrators have assessed platforms for potential 
labour law violations and decided whether platform work can contribute to social 
benefits. Interestingly, administrative and inspectorate bodies can sometimes stand in to 
make decisions on whether platform workers are employees, whereas in most countries, 
employment status is determined through case law. This occurred in Denmark with a 
decision of the Skatterådet [Danish Tax Council], which held that craftsmen offering 
their services through a ‘craftsmen platform’ are to be regarded as self-employed, not 
employees of the platform (Skatterådet, 2018). Also in Denmark, the Center for Klager 
om Arbejdsløshedsforsikring [Centre for Complaints on Unemployment Insurance] 
offered guidance that drivers offering illegal transportation services through Uber cannot 
use these working hours to access unemployment benefits (Center for Klager om 
Arbejdsløshedsforsikring i Styrelsen for Arbejdsmarked og Rekruttering, 2016). Lastly, 
the Danish Tax Council created a pilot project testing automatic reporting to Danish tax 
authorities (SKAT) from five platforms. A respective announcement notes concern that 
platforms are not obliged to report user revenues to SKAT, and therefore it is crucial that 
such data become available (Skatteforvaltningen, 2018). 
In Spain, labour inspectorates 
challenged the legality of a 
‘temporary work agency’ (Factoo) 
and ‘cooperative’ for self-employed 
workers (EsLife) (Gutiérrez, 2017; 
Moreira, 2015). Factoo offered 
certain billing services to many types 
of self-employed, including platform 
workers. However, it was found to be 
helping members avoid social 
security contribution obligations, and 
thus forced to close. EsLife promoted 
itself as a cooperative, but 
essentially functioned as a platform 
intermediating cleaning tasks 
(similarly to platforms like Helpling). 
EsLife was also forced to close after 
labour inspectors could not verify 
that cleaners using the platform 
were paying social security 
contributions.  
A few instances demonstrate 
administrative decisions on the safe 
working conditions of delivery riders. 
For example, the Arbetsmiljöverket [Swedish Work Environment Authority] determined 
that delivery riders were entitled to winter tyres as a safety measure. Initially Foodora 
refused, arguing that the couriers were acting in a private capacity and using their own 
Box 8: Denmark's collective agreements for 
platform work 
In 2018, the Danish platform Hilfr, which 
intermediates cleaning services, concluded a 
collective agreement with the trade union 3f. It is 
often considered the first collective agreement for 
platform workers. 
The collective agreement is very broad, covering 
minimum wage, pension contribution, holiday and 
sick pay, and a ‘welfare supplement’ (velfærdstillæg). 
Hilfr considered the collective agreement important in 
an effort to be socially responsible, as well as to 
distinguish themselves from other platforms. 
Later in the year, the interpretation platform Voocali 
concluded a collective agreement with its freelancers, 
who can work on-location or remotely via 
videoconferencing software. 
The agreement was concluded between The Union of 
Commercial and Clerical Employees, HK Privat and 
Voocali. It particularly covers fees, account 
suspension, pension, payment, ratings, and 
transparency of platform decision-making. 
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bicycles. At first, Foodora agreed to cover an amount of SEK 450 (approximately EUR 
41.68), which would cover around half the cost of winter tyres. The Swedish Work 
Environment Authority was dissatisfied with this response and threatened Foodora with a 
fine, after which Foodora agreed that platform workers active a certain number of hours 
per week would have winter tyres fitted at no expense to the rider (Transport Arbetaren, 
2019).  
In France, inspectorates and audit services for social ministries have been especially 
active on multiple issues concerning platform workers, and their responses were not 
limited to platform work delivered on-location. For example, in May 2016 the Inspection 
générale des affaires sociales (IGAS) [General inspectorate of social affairs] released 36 
recommendations on collaborative platforms, labour and social protection. These are 
divided into seven sections: 1) regulation and organisation of new forms of activity; 2) 
knowledge and information; 3) legal security of platforms, contributors and new 
practices; 4) developing platform wage and securing [career] paths; 5) rebalance the 
bargaining power of collaborative workers and limit economic dependence; 6) smooth 
and modernise the paths to social protection; and 7) improve and intensify 
[inspectorate] control (Amar and Viossat, 2016). These IGAS recommendations are 
broad and ambitious, and may be considered precursors to other French responses, such 
as dedicated platform law.  
5.4 Bottom-up tools and responses 
This section discusses responses from platforms, platform workers, and social partners. 
In many instances, two or three of these groups were active in a single response. 
Bottom-up tools and responses may be considered ‘softer’ than top-down, though 
collective agreements can be thoroughly embedded in formal national regulatory 
frameworks. 
 Collective agreements 5.4.1
Existing literature finds very few collective agreements in the platform economy 
(Kilhoffer et al., 2017). In part, this is because the personal scope of collective 
agreements is typically limited to employees. From a competition law perspective, self-
employed are considered ‘undertakings’. In principle, anti-cartel provisions prohibit 
undertakings from collective action and price setting, as this would violate EU anti-cartel 
regulation, prohibitions on price setting, and distort free competition.166  
In practice, however, many self-employed platform workers work in economic 
dependency and/or under some sort of authority exercised by the platform. For this 
reason, collective agreements may be an appropriate measure to ensure adequate 
working conditions, social protection, and so on. (De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018). 
Kilhoffer et al. (2017) found that when collective bargaining occurs in the platform 
economy, it usually takes place at firm level. Newer research highlights that in some 
situations, sector-level agreements can apply to platforms and platform workers 
(Lenaerts et al., 2018), who may not have taken part in the bargaining process. Even 
so, sectoral agreements can be considered well-suited for the platform economy, given 
characteristics such as the geographical dispersion of workers, the high turnover among 
workers and the tendency of workers to be simultaneously active on multiple platforms, 
as well as the rapidly changing market with many start-ups and continuously changing 
business models (Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018).  
Both sectoral and platform-specific collective agreements were found in literature and 
the national surveys for the study. 
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A few countries have taken measures to ensure that certain self-employed can 
participate in collective agreements. As noted, Irish167 and French168 legislation allows 
collective bargaining for some self-employed workers, including certain platform 
workers. Other countries seem to be moving in the same direction. For example, in 
2017, the Norwegian sharing-economy committee stated that ‘service providers in the 
sharing economy who do not set selling prices directly and have to comply with prices 
set by the platform that is used, should have the opportunity to negotiate collective 
agreements with platform operators even if these cannot be deemed to be employers’ 
(Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018). The Norwegian expert consulted for this study 
suggests that this could be a way to address the power asymmetry between platforms 
and their workers. 
Additionally, eight formal collective agreements for platform workers were identified 
from the national surveys. They have been conducted directly between platform workers 
and platforms, and also with the intervention or assistance of trade unions, or facilitation 
of national governments (e.g. Denmark). However, more seem to be pending or under 
discussion (e.g. Austria and Norway169).  
Overall, collective agreements were mostly found for on-location platform workers, and 
specifically for food delivery couriers. Five of the eight collective agreements highlighted 
by national experts’ surveys concern food delivery or couriers, either applying to a sector 
or specific platform. These findings confirm theory found in the literature: on-location 
platform workers are more organised because they have fewer barriers to organisation, 
and may have clearer shared grievances compelling them to collective action (Kilhoffer 
et al., 2017). As previously discussed, on-location lower-skilled platform work also has 
unique OSH challenges, which can spur workers and trade unions into action. 
Sectoral collective agreements apply to all workers active in a given sector (e.g. 
logistics, transportation). Sectoral collective agreements can apply to platform workers, 
depending on factors including whether only employees are subject to collective 
bargaining. At times these agreements have been struck with platform workers in mind 
or represented. For Italy, it seems clear that platform workers were taken into account 
for the negotiations of the collective agreement,170 as the relevant national collective 
bargaining agreement lifted the ban on ‘on-call work’ within the sector, including workers 
delivering goods with bikes or motorbikes. 
In other cases, sectoral agreements apply to platform workers, though they were 
concluded with little or no explicit attention paid to platform workers. For example, 
cleaning platforms such as BOOK A TIGER and Helpling, and their platform workers, are 
subject to sectoral agreements in Germany negotiated by IG BAU (De Groen et al., 
2018a). While platforms offering cleaning services must abide by the agreements, no 
evidence suggests the platforms take part in negotiations. In other instances, courts 
have ruled that existing collective agreements apply to platform workers. In 2019, the 
Dutch trade union FNV sued Deliveroo, arguing the platform falls within the scope of the 
collective bargaining agreement for professional goods transport by road.171 The court 
confirmed that Deliveroo is obliged to respect the collective bargaining agreement, 
although Deliveroo riders in the Netherlands are self-employed. 
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Platform-specific collective agreements apply to workers in a given platform. Two 
platform-specific collective agreements took place in Denmark. One agreement covers 
Hilfr, which intermediates cleaning services (UNI Europa, 2018). The second covers an 
interpretation platform called Voocali, where intermediation can take place on-location or 
via digital means (e.g. teleconference) (Fagbevægelsens Hovedorganisation, 2018; 
Voocalicom and HK Privat, 2018). In Sweden, one collective agreement applies to the 
umbrella companies’ sector. Another collective agreement was struck between the Bzzt 
platform (offering personal transport) and the Swedish Transport Workers Union. By this 
agreement, platform workers on Bzzt are subject to the transportation sector’s collective 
agreement and thus work under the same terms and conditions as other taxi drivers 
covered by this contract (Jesnes et al., 2019). 
However, collective agreements for platform workers are not exclusive to the Nordic 
countries. In Spain, the non-profit association Asoriders, supported by the trade union 
UGT, concluded a collective agreement with Deliveroo setting minimum rates of pay, 
daily/weekly rest periods, holiday and annual leave, and so on. (Asoriders, 2018). In 
2018 in Italy the municipality of Bologna promoted a Charter of Fundamental Rights for 
Platform Work, which was signed by trade unions, delivery riders’ autonomous 
representatives and some platforms operating in the city of Bologna. This forms a 
binding statement of principles on platform work that signatories must abide by 
(Comune di Bologna, 2018). 
 Platform worker organisation 5.4.2
Limited bargaining power in platform workers’ organisation is a frequent point that 
appears in the literature and came up in several focus groups. In many national 
contexts, if self-employed platform workers were to agree to a minimum wage, this may 
be in violation of competition law forbidding cartels. Because platform workers may not 
be able to organise and bargain in the same manner as employees, they form smaller or 
less formal collective structures more often. 
Platform worker organisations have sprung up, usually through a mixture of self-
organisation and organisational assistance from social partners or platforms. 
Platform workers have developed forms of peer learning via off-platform channels, for 
example by congregating on social networking sites or mailing lists to exchange advice 
(Lehdonvirta et al., forthcoming). Additionally, self-organisational efforts result in 
spontaneous actions. Strikes, protests, flash mobs or sit-ins have occurred in over a 
dozen surveyed countries. Among the more common grievances are remuneration and 
lack of voice. In some cases, platform workers sought to change many facets of their 
work at once (e.g. working conditions, employment status, organisational rights), while 
still other actions protested other specific issues, such as rating or evaluation systems 
perceived as unfair. Platform workers delivering food via bicycle or motorbike often 
demonstrated against unsafe working conditions and demanded that platforms provide 
additional safety equipment or weather-appropriate gear, for example. One series of 
protests in Dublin, Ireland highlighted widespread harassment and violent attacks by 
street gangs, perceived to be targeting platform workers of Brazilian origin (Hilliard, 
2019). 
In some cases, platform workers have organised into cooperatives or collectives 
(Vandaele, 2017). In other cases, cooperatives themselves act as platforms, aiming to 
offer similar benefits as for-profit platforms (effective intermediation of supply and 
demand for services) while being democratically run by the platform workers 
themselves. In other cases, collectives or cooperatives bring together platform workers 
for advocacy. For example, the Koeriers Kollektief [Courier’s Collective] in Belgium was 
founded when Deliveroo purchased another food delivery platform, Take Eat Easy, in 
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July 2016. The cooperative’s Facebook page organises and disseminates information on 
courier demonstrations around Europe.172   
Another interesting example often discussed in the literature is the cooperative SMart. 
Originally providing services for French artists, SMart expanded to Belgium173 and 
entered into negotiations with Deliveroo. By May 2016, Deliveroo platform workers could 
opt for self-employment, or sign an employment contract with SMart. SMart employees, 
working via the Deliveroo app, paid SMart 6.5% of their income and received safety 
training, accident insurance, liability insurance, reimbursement for biking gear and 
cellular usage, a minimum shift duration, and additional benefits (Lenaerts and Kilhoffer, 
2017). However, this arrangement ultimately ceased when Deliveroo changed its 
remuneration system and work allocation algorithms. The transition began in October 
2017 and concluded in January 2018, affecting nearly 4 000 Deliveroo couriers 
registered with SMart. Deliveroo claimed they would explore options to provide workers 
with access to insurance, and the changes would increase workers’ pay and flexibility. 
SMart has criticised Deliveroo for cutting costs at the expense of workers’ well-being, 
and blamed the Belgian government for succumbing to lobbying from platforms (De 
Standaard, 2017). 
In Austria, platform workers for Foodora have formed a works council with the support of 
the trade union Vida, which was formed from the merger of three transport and service 
unions in 2006 (De Groen et al., 2018b). Under Austrian law, only employees can take 
part in a works council. For this reason, only the minority of Austrian Foodora riders with 
an employment contract can formally take part in the works council. The works council 
negotiates with Foodora over certain benefits such as bike repair, as well as wages. 
To illustrate trade union involvement, German trade unions including the NGG and FAU 
have helped Deliveroo couriers establish works councils, and pushed forward dialogue 
between platform workers and platforms (FAU, 2016; Knieps, 2018). 
Platforms are also involved in organising workers, as in the UK, where Uber set up 
driver panels under the UberENGAGE scheme (Onita, 2018; Uber, 2019). This is 
overseen by an independent review board of senior figures from outside Uber. However, 
few additional details are available as of summer 2019. In the Netherlands, Deliveroo set 
up a rider forum: a body formed of platform workers that participates in decision-making 
(Deliveroo, 2019). 
While most platform worker organisation concerns on-location platforms, a particularly 
innovative development addressing online platform work comes from IG Metall, 
the largest industrial trade union in Europe, which launched a project in early 2016 to 
organise online platform workers. This helped lead to Fair Crowd Work, which is a type 
of watchdog organisation run in collaboration with Austrian and Swedish trade unions. 
Fair Crowd Work collects information about platforms and produces a rating system 
based on the platforms’ terms and conditions and worker reviews. Additionally, Fair 
Crowd Work informs platform workers about their legal rights in accessible language, 
and lists trade unions they can join. In December 2016, IG Metall joined other trade 
unions from the US and Europe to assist Munich-based platform Testbirds in drafting the 
Frankfurt Declaration (Fair Crowd Work, 2016). The Frankfurt Declaration states a 
number of prerequisites for fair platform work, such as minimum income, the ability to 
achieve self-sufficiency with 35-40 hours of work per week, an affordable means to 
healthcare, and rights to organise and take part in collective agreements. (Fair Crowd 
Work, 2017). 
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 Platform actions 5.4.3
The identified actions mostly consist of efforts of on-location lower-skilled platforms 
(such as Uber, Deliveroo, and Foodora), apparently to address criticisms of their 
practices and challenges faced by platform workers. 
In several cases, platforms have joined employers’ unions or banded together 
with other platforms for information sharing, mutual representation or lobbying. Such 
establishments have occurred in Czechia with the Česká asociace sdílené ekonomiky 
[Czech Sharing Economy Association] (ČASE), Ireland with ‘Sharing Economy Ireland’, 
Italy with Gig-Imprese [Gig-Companies], and others. In Austria and Slovakia, Uber has 
joined the national employers association (De Groen et al., 2018b; Akguc et al., 2018) 
as required by national law. This represents a more formal induction of platforms into 
traditional industrial relations structures. However, it should be noted that Uber’s role as 
employer is for technological and administrative positions in these countries – not as 
employer of the platform workers who drive the cars. 
A number of responses may be considered self-regulation efforts. One common 
theme is addressing the lack of social protection that platform workers experience. In 
the UK, for example, both Uber and Deliveroo took action to set up insurance schemes 
for platform workers. Uber partners with AXA to cover platform workers’ maternity 
leave, sick leave, and other benefits.174 However, in practice, the rights and entitlements 
of Uber workers vary greatly between countries. Deliveroo’s initiative aimed to provide 
platform workers with accident insurance, which seems to address the frequent 
criticisms of platform worker safety.  
In some interesting examples, on-location platforms have changed how they 
operate in response to potential legal challenges on the employment status of its 
platform workers. For example, one cleaning platform in the Netherlands initially fixed its 
workers’ hourly cleaning prices. After the platform became aware of a potential legal 
challenge, it changed its model to allow platform workers to set their own hourly 
prices.175 Similarly, several food delivery platforms initially distributed branded shirts and 
jackets for workers to wear on the job. Upon learning that wearing a uniform would be 
viewed as evidence of an employment relationship in court, most platforms adapted to 
requiring platform workers to wear their own clothing.176 These changes highlight the 
tension between platforms’ desire to offer a consistent service and maintain a brand 
image, without the tools of a traditional employer. 
Other platforms have changed how they intermediate services in response to 
feedback from platform workers and clients. For example, a popular ‘handyman’ or 
home improvement platform in Germany significantly changed its structure over time. 
Initially the platform developed a bad reputation and was known as a ‘junk platform’, 
where few qualified workers were active, clients posted their suggested (and unrealistic) 
prices, and workers competed on price in a race to the bottom. The platform changed its 
intermediation so that clients posted tasks and platform workers bid at their own chosen 
price. These changes have brought more qualified workers back to the platform, but the 
platform still suffers somewhat from a poor reputation among German professionals (De 
Groen and Kilhoffer, 2019). 
Two ‘handyman’ or home improvement platforms in France, Frizbiz and Heetch, offer 
ongoing training for platform workers. These platforms cooperate with a large home 
improvement and gardening retailer, Leroy Merlin. In doing so, the platforms are able to 
provide training opportunities online and on-location to their platform workers (WEC-
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 See https://www.uber.com/be/en/drive/insurance/, though it is not immediately clear which parties are 
responsible for paying for the insurance.  
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 From focus group discussion. 
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 From expert interviews. 
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Europe and UNI Europa, 2018). This represents a very rare case where platforms offer 
training for career development, rather than no or simply on-the-job safety training. 
Uber has begun to cover tuition for online higher education programmes for drivers who 
have completed 3 000 trips and achieved other milestones.177 
Eight platforms in Germany, Sweden and Austria, with the assistance of social partners, 
have started a particularly interesting self-regulation effort collectively known as the 
German Crowdsourcing Association. This voluntarily abides by the Crowdsourcing 
Code of Conduct. If platform workers feel their platforms have violated their pledge, 
they can bring their dispute to an ombudsman office, which is composed of platform 
representatives, platform worker representatives, and a labour judge serving as neutral 
arbiter. In many cases, the Ombuds Office has handled disputes related to non-payment 
for services rendered. The Ombuds Office has solved most of its disputes by consensus 
(IG Metall, 2019). 
In several focus groups, platform representatives suggested they would be interested in 
providing more benefits to platform workers, for example insurance or training options. 
Platforms consider good work benefits important to attract and retain platform workers, 
particularly in sectors where several platforms compete. However, providing benefits 
to platform workers often entails legal risk. In a number of countries, providing 
social protection and other services to platform workers could be held as indicative of an 
employment relationship in court cases assessing bogus self-employment claims. For 
this reason, platforms’ representatives have argued that they should provide fewer 
benefits to platform workers for fear of reclassification as employers. 
In a few cases, platforms have responded to worker demands and organisation 
with deference, or perhaps even punitive action. In Austria, the formation of a 
works council seemed to coincide with one food delivery platform removing certain 
workers’ privileges, such as a meeting place to relax and repair bikes (De Groen et al., 
2018b). The platform disputes this characterisation, saying it stopped renting a space for 
workers as part of general cost-saving measures. 
Lastly, platforms have responded to court challenges and legislation by simply 
leaving a market. This is best exemplified by Uber ceasing its operations entirely in 
given countries or localities (e.g. Catalonia). Uber has also stopped offering UberPop 
services in most of Europe. Unlike UberBlack and UberX, UberPop allows people without 
professional licences to work. While popular in the United States, UberPop has faced 
many more legal challenges in Europe. By selectively offering its services, Uber has been 
able to stay active in more countries in spite of restrictions. 
5.5 Other tools and responses 
By and large, the ‘other’ tools and responses amount to information gathering and 
sharing by various stakeholders. For example, several countries established committees 
or panels on platform work. Governments (Norway, Czechia, Germany, etc.) and social 
partners commissioned research or organised conferences on the platform economy as 
well.178 
Governments have also taken action to address broader concerns, but in some cases 
explicitly included platform work. For example, Luxembourg’s Third Industrial Revolution 
Strategy deals broadly with changes in the ‘world of work’ in the digital age, which 
includes the possibility of new platform work regulation (Ministère de l’Économie et al., 
2016). Similarly, Denmark set up the Disruption Council, which addressed the future of 
work, including platform work, especially in relation to undeclared work (Danish 
Ministry of Employment, 2019). The Estonian Parliament established the Foresight 
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sources including informal interviews with stakeholders. 
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Centre to analyse trends in the future of work, including platform work (Estonian 
Parliament, 2019). Similarly, the German government has published the Weißbuch 
[White book] and other policy papers on the future of work, which includes substantial 
discussion on the platform economy (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2016). 
In some cases, tools may address challenges for platform workers in a roundabout way. 
For example, in Austria employees are entitled to a Dienstzettel [written statement] in 
lieu of an employment contract, which may help address ambiguous or intransparent 
terms and conditions.179 The written notice must contain the most important contents of 
the contact and may not contain any substantial disadvantage to the worker. However, 
the written notice is merely informative and not legally binding, and only applies to 
employees (and thus a small minority of Austrian platform workers) (De Groen et al., 
2018b).  
Most platform workers are largely responsible for their own health and safety on the job, 
but in some cases existing tools can apply. In Germany, many platform workers on 
‘handyman’ platforms are self-employed. Both professionals (members of a trade 
association) and amateurs offer services such as painting, metalwork, and roofing. 
However, the professionals must abide by OSH regulations mandated by their respective 
trade association (De Groen and Kilhoffer, 2019). 
Lastly, a few experts noted that their countries (e.g. Austria and Belgium) have had 
ongoing media debates about platform work. These do not necessarily correspond 
to specific responses or challenges but reflect media and public attention paid to 
platform work developments. Media debates on platform work tend to flare up when 
significant court cases are decided, or public demonstrations occur.  
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 This is a transposition of the Written Statement Directive: Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 
on an employer's obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment 
relationship. 
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6. INSTRUMENTS AND ACTIONS AT EU LEVEL 
The analysis presented in previous sections is based on extensive literature review, 
responses to questionnaires distributed to national experts taking part in the study, and 
feedback received from the focus groups and validation workshop. 
Sections 4 and 5 deal with the national socio-economic contexts and legal frameworks. 
Section 4 maps the challenges platform work and platform workers are confronted with 
across the EU, Norway and Iceland, with a focus on working conditions and social 
protection, and Section 5 focuses on the responses that have been or are being 
formulated in the Member States to tackle the specific challenges related to platform 
work.  
This section concerns the EU level and in particular existing EU legislation and CJEU 
case law which is affecting the working conditions and social protection of platform 
workers.  
In consultation with the European Commission, a list of EU legal instruments was 
selected for the analysis. The main aim was to verify whether these instruments provide 
adequate responses at EU level for the challenges resulting from the platform work 
practices as presented in Section 4. The legislation concerned was most often adopted at 
times when platform work did not yet pose a challenge and when it was not specifically 
incorporated into its ambit.180 The analysis examines whether this EU legislation 
nevertheless has direct relevance for the working conditions and social protection of 
platform workers, and whether the protection provided is sufficient and/or adequate.  
Working conditions and social protection are policy fields that are part of the shared 
competences between the EU and the Member States. EU action and hence EU legislative 
action is bound by the existence of a clear legal basis in the Treaties and governed by 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In many aspects of employment and 
social protection the EU has used its legislative competence by means of directives. For 
the purposes of this study, these directives could be seen as responses at EU level in 
areas of employment and social protection that are complementary to the responses 
provided by Member States as presented in Section 5.  
Some preliminary remarks are to be highlighted in this regard. A list of EU labour and 
social protection legislation containing 21 individual legal instruments was established as 
the basis of the analysis, thereby excluding some other EU legal instruments in 
the labour and social policy field.181,182 The analysis does not elaborate on other 
EU legislation that may have relevance for platform work.183 However, due to their 
importance and relevance for the matters analysed for this study, the new P2B 
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 Two of the selected pieces of legislation have recently been adopted and entered into force on 1 August 
2019: Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent 
and predictable working conditions in the European Union (OJ L186/105 11.07.2019); Directive (EU) 
2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and 
carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU. The Directive on Transparent and Predictable working 
conditions explicitly refers to platform work in its introductory part. 
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 This is particularly the case as regards the Occupational Health and Safety acquis, which has only been 
analysed in this study to a limited extent. Examples are: Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures 
to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers (OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 1–8); Directive 
2009/104/EC concerning the minimum safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by 
workers at work (OJ L 260, 3.10.2009, p. 5–19). 
182
 Not covered, for instance, are the autonomous framework agreements concluded by the EU Social partners 
such as the Framework Agreement on work-related stress of 08.10.2004 and the Framework Agreement on 
harassment and violence at work of 27.04.2007. 
183
 EU legislation and CJEU case law on free movement of workers, social security coordination or free 
movement of services has relevance for the study insofar as it concerns cross-border platform work but does 
not form part of this Section.  
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Regulation of 20 June 2019184 and the GDPR185 have also been looked at here, albeit at a 
more general level.  
Table 14 lists the legal instruments agreed with the Commission to form the basis of the 
legal analysis presented in this section.  
Table 14: List of relevant EU legislation in the area of working conditions and social 
protection 
 
The selected EU legal instruments can be thematically grouped as follows: 
(1) directives concerning non-standard forms of work 
(2) directives concerning health and safety at work 
(3) directives concerning individual labour rights 
(4) directives concerning collective labour rights 
(5) directives concerning work-life balance 
(6) recommendation concerning social protection 
(7) directives on equal treatment. 
  
Section 6.1 provides the main analysis of the selected EU legal instruments, while in 
Section 6.2 some of the other EU-level are considered to a lesser extent. 
6.1 Analysis of relevant EU legislation 
 EU labour and social protection legislation 6.1.1
Apart from exceptions such as the provisions concerning ‘equal pay for equal work 
between men and women’, which are part of the EU Treaties,186 EU legislative action in 
employment and social protection has only gradually been adopted over the years, 
mainly for reasons relating to the lack of a legal basis. One of the first areas in which 
legislative action was taken by the EU was the coordination of social security for mobile 
workers. This was logical because the aim to remove barriers to the free movement of 
workers is one of the cornerstones of the EU internal market. Other pieces of EU 
legislation related to the free movement of workers quickly followed, but EU legislative 
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 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and the Council on promoting fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation services (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57–79) 
185
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p.1) 
186
 The provisions concerning equal treatment between men and women in terms of ‘pay’ have been part of the 
original texts of the first Treaties establishing the European Communities in 1957 and have since remained in 
the texts of the subsequent Treaties until today.  
EU legislative instruments on working conditions, social protection and equal treatment
1 Directive 97/81/EC on part-time work (Framework Agreement) (OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 9–14) 1 Part-time Work Directive
2 Directive 99/70/EC on fixed-term work (Framework Agreement) (OJ L 175, 10.7.1999, p. 43–48) 2 Fixed-term Work Directive
3 Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9–14) 3 Temporary Agency Work  Directive
4 Directive 91/383/EEC on health and safety of workers with fixed-duration employment relationship or a fixed-term relationship (OJ L 206/19 of 29.07.1991) 4 Health and safety for fixed-term work Directive
5 Directive 92/85/EEC on safety and health at work for pregnant workers (OJ L 348/1 of 28.11.1992) 5 Pregnant Workers Directive
6 Directive 91/533/EEC 'Written statement' (OJ L 288, 18.10.1991, p. 32) (repealed but still legal effect until 01.08.2022) 6 Written Statement Directive
7 Directive (EU) 2019/ 1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union (OJ L186/105 11.07.2019) 7 Transparent and predictable working conditions Directive
8 Directive 2003/88/EC on working time (OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9–19) 8 Working time Directive
9 Directive 2002/14/EC establishing the general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community (OJ L 080 , 23.03.2002, p. 29) 9 Information and consultation Directive
10 Directive 2008/94/EC on the protection of employees in the event of insolvency of the employer (OJ L 283, 28.10.2008, p. 36–42) 10 Insolvency Directive
11 Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies (OJ L 225, 12.8.1998 p.16-21) 11 Collective Redundancies Directive
12 Directive 2009/38/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council (OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28–44) 12 European Works Council Directive
13 Directive 2010/18/EU on parental leave (Framework Agreement) (OJ L 68, 18.3.2010, p. 13–20) ( repealed but still legal effect until 01.08.2022) 13 Parental Leave Directive
14 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers repealing DIR 2010/18/EU (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79–93) 14 Work-life Balance Directive
15 Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (OJ C 387, 15.11.2019, p. 1–8) 15 Recommendation on access to social protection
16 Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16–22) 16 Employment Directive
17 Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment on grounds of race and ethnicity (OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22–26) 17 Race Directive
18 Directive 2006/54/EC on gender equality in employment (OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 23–36) 18 Gender equality in employment Directive
19 Directive 2004/113/EC on gender equality in goods and services (OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, p. 37–43) 19 Gender equality in access to goods and services Directive
20 Directive 2010/41/EU on gender equality of self-employed (OJ L 180, 15.7.2010, p. 1–6) 20 Gender equality of self-employed Directive
21 Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (OJ L 6, 10.1.1979, p. 24–25) 21 Gender equality in social security Directive
EU legislation - work-life balance: 
EU legislation - social protection
EU legislation - various aspects of anti-discrimination: 
Reference title usedEU legislation  - non-standard work: 
EU legislation  - health and safety 
EU legislation -  individual labour rights: 
EU legislation - collective labour rights: 
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action in the field of employment and social protection remained rather limited or 
concerned with certain cross-cutting issues, such as equal treatment between men and 
women in these policy domains. With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, 
and later the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and especially the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the 
competences of the EU in the policy fields concerned were gradually expanded and 
legislative procedures simplified.187 This allowed for more legislative action by the EU, 
although even today these are still conditioned by the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles, which are characteristic of the functioning of the EU. 
All but one of the EU legal instruments under analysis are directives, which implies that 
they are binding for the Member States in achieving the goals that have been set in the 
directives concerned and this within a timeframe that is established therein. Member 
States have some discretion in deciding how they are transposing the 
provisions of the directives in their national legislative and administrative 
frameworks, provided that the objectives are achieved. They usually enter into force on 
the date when Member States are being notified or on the 20th day after their 
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union as specified in the directives 
concerned. Directives are consequently not directly applicable in the Member States in 
the sense that they attribute rights to individual citizens as regulations do. The latter are 
binding in all their elements, and provisions contained in regulations are directly 
applicable.  
The listed EU directives concern the employment area more than social 
protection. This may reflect the fact that the EU has more room for manoeuvre to 
initiate actions where employment matters are concerned than it does in the field of 
social protection.188 The scope and objectives of the directives, however, are very 
different.  
The EU directives concerned with non-standard forms of work aim to ensure equal 
treatment between workers under atypical forms of employment with those 
who are engaged under permanent or open-ended full-time employment 
contracts when working conditions are concerned.  Some of the directives regulate 
specific material aspects of the working conditions and initiate minimum 
requirements that employers must respect. Examples include the new TPWC Directive 
(repealing the Written Statement Directive), the Working Time Directive and the 
different directives concerned with health and safety. The EU directives concerning 
collective labour rights oblige employers not only to inform their personnel about the 
economic situation and employment forecasts in the company and in cases of insolvency 
or collective redundancies, they also initiate structured consultation with the employees. 
The European Works Council Directive targets companies with activities in more than 
one Member State and equally requires companies to inform and organise structured 
consultation with the workforce, particularly on transnational issues. Finally, a set of EU 
non-discrimination directives is ensuring equal treatment on different grounds of 
discrimination in the employment area, but also in areas such as social security and 
access to goods and services. 
The few selected directives that concern social protection mainly ensure equal 
treatment of persons on different grounds of discrimination in the social security field. 
The Pregnant Workers Directive and the new Work-life Balance Directive (repealing the 
Parental Leave Directive) are the only ones that focus on specific social protection 
schemes (both are closely linked with the employment situation). Different non-standard 
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 For EU employment and social policy legislative actions still special legislative procedures apply as opposed 
to the standard, more simplified ordinary legislative procedure and qualified majority voting.  
188
 In terms of the coordination of employment and social policies of Member States, the TFEU also makes a 
difference when it states that the EU shall coordinate employment policies and define guidelines thereto, 
whereas for social policies, the EU may take initiatives to coordinate.  
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work directives also cover social protection.189 Most relevant in this regard, however, is 
the Council Recommendation on access to social protection, which aims to ensure 
effective access to six branches of social security for both workers (employees) and self-
employed.  
Personal scope of the directives 
Terms and concepts used in the directives 
When determining their personal scope of application, the listed EU directives use 
very different terms and concepts, for example: ‘workers’, ‘employees’, ‘self-
employed persons’, ‘working population’ or ‘self-employed workers’ (see Section 3).  
The EU directives on collective labour rights typically use the term ‘employee’ or refer to 
the employer when defining their personal scope of application.190 
The non-discrimination directives, which concern employment, access to self-
employment and social security matters, often define their personal scope more widely 
and refer to ‘all persons’ or to the ‘working population’. They sometimes explicitly 
mention self-employed persons as being part of the personal scope.191 They nevertheless 
have a specific objective in that they aim to ensure that individuals are treated equally 
and are not being discriminated against on some specific discrimination grounds referred 
to in Article 19 TFEU.192  
Most of the EU labour law directives, however, use the term ‘worker’. They explicitly 
state that they concern workers (or in the eventual case ‘employees’) who have ‘an 
employment contract’ or ‘employment relationship’ (e.g. the TPWC Directive, the 
Work-life Balance Directive, the Part-time Work Directive, the Fixed-term Work 
Directive, the Written Statement Directive) or refer to a ‘worker under national 
employment law’ (e.g. the Temporary Work Agency Directive, the Parental Leave 
Directive). By doing so these directives refer to workers (employees) who have an 
employment relationship or contract. Most recent directives, such as the TPWC 
Directive and the Work-life Balance Directive, explicitly refer to the CJEU case law that 
needs to be considered or taken into account while determining the personal scope of 
application of the directives concerned (see infra). 
The EU directives typically do not define the concepts of ‘worker’ or ‘employee’ they are 
using. Most explicitly refer to national legislation, collective agreements and 
practices when establishing the personal scope of application. By doing so, the EU 
legislator leaves the power of interpretation of the concepts of ‘employees’ and ‘workers’ 
to the Member States’ legislative power, social partners’ agreements and practices. The 
personal scope of the EU directives is consequently filled in by national definitions of 
these concepts.  
There are, however, some exceptions which do not explicitly refer to national 
legislation or practices, including the Working Time Directive, the Health and safety 
for fixed-term work Directive, the Pregnant Workers Directive, the Collective 
Redundancies Directive and the European Works Council Directive. The concepts of 
‘employees’ or ‘workers’ seem in these instances to have their own EU-wide meaning. 
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 The Directives on Fixed-term Work and Part-Time Work have a broad understanding of ‘employment 
conditions’, which also covers some social protection aspects. 
190
 The Written Statement Directive, which in fact does not contain a definition of its personal scope of 
application, equally refers to ‘employees’. 
191
 Article 3 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC; Article 3 of Council Directive 2000/43/EC; Article 6 of Directive 
2006/54/EC; Article 2 of Directive 2010/41/EU; Article 2 of Directive 79/7/EEC 
192
 Article 19 TFEU installs the legal basis for EU action in view of combating discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation and requires unanimity in the Council.   
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Table 15: Personal Scope as defined in EU legislation  
 
 
EU labour law and social protection law
1 Part-time Work Directive Part-time worker who has employment contract or in employment relationship as defined by national law, collective agreement or practice YES employees
2 Fixed-term Work Directive Fixed-term worker who has employment contract or in employment relationship as defined by national law, collective agreement or practice YES employees
3 Temporary Agency Work  Directive Worker under national employment law YES employees
4 Health and safety for fixed-term work Directive
Employment relationships governed by a fixed-duration of contract concluded by an employer and a worker AND temporary employment relationships between a temporary employment business which is the 
employer and the worker, where the latter is assigned to work for and under the control of an undertaking or establishment making use of his services
NO employees
5 Pregnant Workers Directive Pregant workers and workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeading NO employees / women
6 Written Statement Directive Paid employee having a contract or an employment relationship defined by the law in force of the Member State and/or governed by the law in force in the Member State YES employees
7 Transparent and predictable working conditions Directive
Every worker in the EU who has an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements or practice in force in each Member State with consideration to the case law of he 
CJEU
YES employees
8 Working Time Directive No definition of personal scope; implicit reference to 'worker' NO employees
9 Information and consultation Directive Employee who is protected as an employee under national employment law; also reference to employer YES employees
10 Insolvency Directive Employee - employer YES employees
11 Collective Redundancies Directive Workers who have been dismissed by an employer NO employees
12 European Works Council Directive Employees NO employees
13 Parental Leave Directive All  workers, men and women, who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements and/or practice in force in each Member State YES
employees / women 
and men
14 Work-life Balance Directive
All  workers, men and women, who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined by the law, collective agreements and/or practice in force in each Member State, taking into account the case 
law of the CJEU
YES
employees / women 
and men
15 Social protection Recommendation
All workers and self-employed in Member States; includes a definition of worker: a natural person who for a certain period of time performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for 
remuneration  
NO
employees and self-
employed
16 Employment Directive All persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies' NO
employees and self-
employed
17 Race Directive All persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies' NO
employees and self-
employed
18 Gender equality in employment Directive
Various concepts and definitions: pay : workers; occupational social security schemes : 'member of the working population, including self-employed persons; access to employment and self-employement : 
employees and self-employed; employment and working conditions: employees
YES
employees and self-
employed
19 Gender equality in access to goods and services Directive All persons who provide goods and services, which are available to the public, … NO
women and men 
who are not 
20 Gender equality for self-employment Directive Self-employed workers, namely all  persons pursuing a gainful activity for their own account, under the condition ladi down by national law YES
self-employed (and 
spouses)
21 Gender equality in social security Directive
Working population - including self-employed persons, workers and self-employed persons whose activity is interrupted by i l lness, accident or involuntray unemployment and persons seeking employment - and to 
retired or invalid workers and self-employed persons
NO
employees and self-
employed
EU legislation - various aspects of anti-discrimination: 
EU legislation  - Health and safety 
EU legislation -  individual labour rights: 
EU legislation - collective labour rights: 
EU legislation - work-life balance: 
EU legislation - social protection
EU legislative instruments Personal scope (as defined in the legal instrument)
Reference to 
national 
legislation?
Personal 
Scope: 
classification
EU legislation  - non-standard work: 
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The CJEU has over the years developed the concept of ‘worker’ in both instances, for 
example with directives that refer to national legislation for the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘worker’ and those that do not. The CJEU has given an EU-wide 
interpretation to the concept of ‘worker’, thereby limiting the discretionary power of 
Member States in those cases where EU legislation is referring to national interpretation 
by Member States.193 
The most recent EU legislation, such as the TPWC Directive and the Work-life Balance 
Directive, explicitly refer to the CJEU case law when defining their personal 
scope. The former, at least in the proposal made by the European Commission, even 
contained a definition of ‘worker’ as a natural person who for a certain period of 
time performs services for and under the direction of another person in return 
for remuneration. The same definition was used in the Commission’s proposal for a 
Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed 
but not withheld in the final text that was adopted on 8 November 2019.194 
It seems that criteria developed by CJEU case law to determine the status of a ‘worker’ 
in the meaning of EU legislation are gradually becoming incorporated in the legislative 
proposals and new EU legislation. Recital 8 of the TPWC Directive is in itself not legally 
binding, but clarifies that the concept of worker includes domestic workers, temporary 
agency workers, on-demand workers, intermittent workers, voucher-based workers and 
platform workers, provided that those workers fulfil the criteria as set out by the CJEU to 
qualify as a ‘worker’ for the purpose of EU law. The new Recommendation on access to 
social protection equally refers in its Recital 11 to new types of employment, such as on 
demand work, voucher-based work and platform work. 
Concept of worker versus self-employed 
Leaving (some) discretionary power to Member States implies that the concepts 
established at EU level may have different interpretations across the EU because 
Member States use different national concepts and definitions. However, as pointed out, 
the CJEU has through its extensive case law taken a clear position in many instances and 
ensured a common EU-wide interpretation of the concepts laid down in some of the 
EU directives. By doing so the CJEU has counterbalanced the discretionary power of the 
Member States which was vested in the EU legislation. 
The national concepts of ‘worker’ or ‘employee’ differ between the Member States.195,196 
Many countries do not have a legal concept of ‘worker’ or ‘employee’ defined in national 
civil, labour or social security law. They may instead often contain a definition of an 
employment relationship or contract. Different definitions may even exist under national 
labour and social security legislation.197 National courts have extensively contributed to 
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 E.g. CJEU, 17 November 2016, case C-216/15, Betriebsrat der Ruhrlandklinik, para. 32; See also N. 
Kountouris, “The concept of ‘Worker’ in European Labour Law: fragmentation, autonomy and scope”, ILJ 2018, 
192-225. 
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 Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-
employed (OJ C 387, 15.11.2019, p. 1–8) 
195
 B. Waas and G. Van Voss, Restatement of labour law in Europe (Vol 1): the concept of employee” Hart 
Publishing 2017, 880 p. 
196
 In the UK the concept of ‘worker’ is different from the concept of ‘employee’. ‘Worker’ is referring to 
persons who perform services personally (although they may subcontract) for another party in return for a 
reward and there is no client or customer relation with that other party. In general, ‘employees’ enjoy wider 
protection than ‘workers’ in terms of coverage of labour law and protection. 
197
 In Austria social security legislation defines the concept of employee as a person who is performing work in 
personal and economic dependence in return for remuneration but labour legislation does not contain the 
concept of an employee and is instead referring to the concept of an employment contract. The payment of 
remuneration is as such not a necessary criterion for the determination of an employment contract under local 
labour legislation.  
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defining the national concept of worker (employee)198 in many of the countries under 
examination.   
Whereas remuneration is not always considered to be an essential criterion determining 
the existence of an employment contract in Member States, the authority or control 
exercised by the employer consistently is. This subordination or direction, which is 
also considered by the CJEU, has led to numerous interpretations by national courts. 
This subordination dimension is sometimes also perceived from the employee’s 
perspective by using the criterion of personal and economic dependency or by 
defining that the services must be performed as ‘dependent work’.199 
The concept of ‘self-employed’ is not defined in the legislation of many of the Member 
States. It is often treated as a residual category comprising all those who do not qualify 
as employees under national labour legislation. Some Member States have a legal 
definition of self-employed or use similar concepts such as ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘autonomous’ 
or ‘independent’ workers.200  
The in-between or third categories used by Member States include ‘employee-like 
persons’,201 ‘workers’,202 ‘economically dependent self-employed persons’,203 ‘employer-
coordinated collaborators’,204 ‘freelancers’,205 ‘dependent contractors’206 or ‘contractors 
under a civil contract’.207 In the Member States concerned, these workers have a sort of 
hybrid status and enjoy some of the same labour or social security protection that 
‘standard’ workers or employees are entitled to. Some Member States have established 
other mechanisms - very often under tax legislation - that allow natural persons to 
perform services outside their usual professional businesses, such as the ‘special 
business account’ in Estonia or the ‘free receivers’ in Denmark.208  
As pointed out above, the personal scope of the relevant EU directives in force mostly 
hinges on national legislation, practice or collective agreements defining the concept of 
‘worker’, ‘employee’, ‘employment contract’ or ‘employment relationship’. The CJEU has, 
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however, cautiously steered these scoping provisions to push towards EU-wide 
convergence in the interpretation of the concept of ‘worker’ as used in the directives. 
The CJEU has not introduced an autonomous EU definition of the concept of worker in 
these instances, but in cases where Member States are applying rules that are likely to 
jeopardise the objectives of a directive, and hence deprive it of its effectiveness, it209 has 
decided in favour of such an autonomous EU worker concept, thereby overruling 
the national interpretation and provisions.  
For those directives that are not referring to national law for the interpretation of the 
worker concept established therein, the CJEU went further and progressively 
developed and consolidated a European concept of ‘worker’ through its case 
law. This was first initiated when interpreting Article 45 TFEU on the free movement of 
workers. In its rulings the CJEU confirmed explicitly that the term ‘worker’ in Article 45 
TFEU may not be interpreted differently according to the law of each Member State, but 
that the term ‘worker’ has an autonomous EU meaning.210 
The EU worker concept and employment relationship under article 45 TFEU is 
characterised by the following features: a person performs services of some economic 
value, for and under the direction or supervision of another person and in return 
for a remuneration, while the activities performed must be effective and genuine.211 
The nature of the legal relationship is immaterial to the application of the EU concept of 
worker, which also includes workers in public administration212 and persons who work 
only a few hours or who are paid very low remuneration,213 provided that the activities 
are effective and genuine. The CJEU, however, excluded activities that are performed on 
a very small scale, and which are to be regarded as marginal or ancillary.214 Interesting 
to note in this regard is that the CJEU did not include the (economic or other) 
dependency criterion in its definition of the concept of worker as it did in its case law 
concerned with the collective rights of workers in the context of EU competition 
legislation.215 The CJEU ruled that a service provider (or self-employed person) cannot 
be considered as an undertaking ‘if he does not determine independently his own 
conduct on the market, but is entirely dependent on his principal, because he does not 
bear any of the financial or commercial risks arising out of the latter’s activity 
and operates as an auxiliary within the principal’s undertaking’.216 This 
consideration focuses on the dependence of a worker on his principal, rather than on the 
test of control and subordination.217 The CJEU considered such service providers as false 
self-employed who are in a similar position as workers and should be treated equally 
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when accessing collective rights aimed at the protection of working conditions of 
workers.  
The more recent 2019 directives, such as the TPWC Directive and the Work-life Balance 
Directive, which apply to ‘workers’ and which refer to national legislation for the 
interpretation of the concept, are now also explicitly referring to the relevant case law of 
the CJEU. The interpretation that was given by the CJEU to the concept of ‘worker’ has 
now become fully incorporated into EU legislation. 
The EU concept of worker under Article 45 TFEU reveals the traditional binary divide 
between subordinated employment on the one hand and autonomous or 
independent employment on the other. This strict mutually exclusive approach of only 
two categories is prevalent in international and European labour and social protection 
law, but also in the labour and social protection legislation of many Member States. 
However, as elaborated above, in several countries, a third category of ‘workers’ exists 
besides the categories of employees and self-employed.218 These third categories often 
enjoy some of the same labour and social protection that ‘standard workers’ or 
employees are entitled to in the Member States. 
Most of the EU labour law directives do not apply to the self-employed. As already 
mentioned, the non-discrimination directives and the Council Recommendation on access 
to social protection, however, concern both traditional categories or labour market 
statuses:219 workers (or employees) and self-employed.220 
Two directives under examination allow Member States to exclude casual work from their 
scope of application. The Part-time Work Directive allows Member States or social 
partners from Member States to exclude casual work entirely or partly from the scope of 
application. Part-time workers who work on a casual basis can hence be treated 
differently than other part-time workers and full-time workers when working conditions 
are concerned. The Written Statement Directive, which is to be repealed following the 
adoption of the new TPWC Directive, equally allowed Member States to exclude from 
their scope of application employees who work less than one month and/or with a 
working week not exceeding eight hours as well as casual work and/or work of a specific 
nature. As a consequence, growing numbers of workers in non-standard work situations 
were explicitly excluded by Member States.    
The new TPWC Directive has, however, drastically limited the possibility for Member 
States to exclude workers in more precarious work situations. Member States can decide 
not to apply the Directive to ‘workers who have an employment relationship with 
predetermined and actual time worked equal to or less than three hours per week on 
average in a reference period of four consecutive weeks’ (Article 1(3)). The new 
Directive does not refer to ‘casual’ work any longer, nor does it refer to employment of 
very short duration. Moreover, in its Recital 11, the Directive specifies that when 
calculating the average of three hours per week of predetermined and actual work, all 
work actually worked has to be counted, including overtime and work that was not 
known or predetermined beforehand or mentioned in the contract.221 From the moment 
a worker crosses the threshold of three hours, the provisions of the Directive apply, 
regardless of the number of working hours that the worker works subsequently or the 
number of working hours provided for in the employment contract. Article 1(4) 
determines further that Article 1(3) will not apply to an employment relationship where 
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no guaranteed amount of paid work is predetermined before the employment starts. This 
means that workers who have no guaranteed working time or hours, such as zero-hour 
contracts and some on-demand contracts, are still covered by the provisions of the 
Directive regardless of the number of hours they actually work.222 
Relevance for platform work and platform workers 
The traditional binary divide between workers (employees) and self-employed that is 
prevalent in international, European and national labour and social protection legislation 
touches on the core issue of the employment status or labour market status of the 
platform workers: subordinated employment versus independent employment or 
contract work. Different levels of protection apply when working conditions and 
social protection of these two categories are concerned. 
The EU non-discrimination legislation and the Recommendation on access to social 
protection apply to both workers and self-employed, but the classification remains 
important as the material provisions are different for these two categories. The major 
bulk of the provisions in the EU non-discrimination legislation are still only applicable to 
workers. For instance, the provisions related to equal treatment on the basis of race or 
gender, regarding access to vocational training or representation at company level, do 
not apply to self-employed (platform workers). In terms of the Recommendation on 
access to social protection, Member States are encouraged to establish voluntary 
unemployment benefit schemes for self-employed (including platform workers), but not 
necessarily mandatory schemes as are envisaged for platform workers who have an 
employment contract. 
The EU legislation on working conditions and social protection generally applies 
only to workers (in the meaning of the EU legislation concerned) or employees. 
Platform workers who are classified as workers fall within their scope of application, 
while self-employed platform workers do not. Directives most often refer to national 
Member States for the interpretation of the concept of ‘employee’ or ‘worker’ in 
accordance with national law or practices. The CJEU has, however, developed an EU-
wide concept of ‘worker’, pointing to the three criteria which determine the status of 
worker (in the meaning of the EU directives).223 It has ruled in several cases that 
Member States cannot unlimitedly interpret the concept of worker enshrined in the EU 
legislation when the latter refers to national definitions, as this may jeopardise a 
coherent and consistent application of EU legislation throughout the EU. CJEU case law 
thus allows for a reclassification in cases of a wrong classification by Member States or 
by the contracting parties concerned, based on this European definition of ‘worker’. In 
some Member States national case law of the highest courts equally introduces the 
possibility of a reclassification of the employment status based on a national 
interpretation of own national legislation.224 National courts, when considering particular 
cases, will assess the facts of the actual employment relationship and 
consequently often have recourse to a double layer of reclassification grounds: a 
reclassification on the basis of national grounds, or on the basis of CJEU case law (and 
since recently, on the basis of EU directives). 
This is highly relevant for platform workers. Section 4 revealed that the employment 
classification of platform workers in Member States is posing one of the biggest 
challenges throughout the EU. Section 5 demonstrated that Member States have varying 
approaches that result in different classifications of identical platform workers across the 
EU. But neither is the classification of platform workers always coherent within Member 
States, as can be deducted from the some of their extensive recent national case law. 
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Court rulings have resulted in different outcomes of almost identical factual 
circumstances and ‘relationships’ between the platform and the platform worker. 
When assessing the employment status of a platform worker, national judges should 
consider the facts and concrete relationship between the platform worker and the 
platform (or other entity), which could in its turn be classified as the ‘employer’. 
Performing services of an economic and genuine nature in return for a payment and 
under the ‘direction’ of the platform are typically the main criteria against which a 
specific case is assessed to become classified as a worker (employee) or not. The 
subordination ‘test’ is usually a case of weighing different factors, such as the obligation 
to provide work and to perform an assignment, the determination of the working time 
and of the workplace, the inclusion of the platform worker into the operational 
organisation of the platform business, the subjection to personal or material (including 
indirect) directives, supervision and control, the obligation to report, the use of the 
company equipment, and so on. They all represent ‘indexes’ or ‘criteria’ that in the 
platform work practice are often challenged. Platform workers in reality often have 
greater flexibility and freedom to choose than in more traditional employment 
relationships, as they may often decide whether or not to accept a particular task and 
when they actually work, whereas platforms often shift certain responsibilities towards 
the platform worker, such as the use of own equipment or vehicles. However, especially 
for platform workers of performing lower-skilled tasks, once a task is accepted, there is 
no longer much flexibility. Determining exactly how the task is to be fulfilled, for 
example the route an Uber driver must take, and the corresponding control and 
monitoring, is so dense that it may not be outweighed by the flexibility on when and 
where to work, and consequently may also impact the assessment of the employment 
status. 
The ‘subordination’ or ‘direction’ dimension has been subject to many national court 
cases, sometimes with very inventive arguments put forward by the platforms, which 
attempt to demonstrate the alleged independence of the platform workers, and often 
change their business practices in a seemingly continuous effort to avoid the potential 
(re)classification of platform workers as employees by national authorities and judges. 
Platforms often try to present themselves as pure online information services, 
intermediating between the platform worker and the ultimate customer, whereas in 
reality the provided services often go much further than mere online matchmaking 
between the platform worker and the customer. Of particular interest in this regard is 
the use of the digital work allocation and tracking mechanisms. A platform’s apps are 
often the core mechanism of the work organisation throughout the entire job cycle and 
determine job announcements and applications; identification and selection of candidate 
platform workers; allocation of work to a selected platform worker and rejection of other 
candidate platform workers; monitoring of the work while being performed; and 
evaluation of the work performance, sometimes with direct feedback of ultimate clients. 
Assessing the existence of an employment relationship through the subordination test 
becomes even more complicated in cases when platform work is ultimately delivered to a 
company or when this end user could also be considered as having an employment 
relationship with the platform worker. The platform or digital app intermediates or 
facilitates between the firm that has requested a particular job and the platform worker 
while the work or tasks are being performed under the direction or supervision of this 
requesting company. Crowdwork is a type of platform work characterised by the 
outsourcing of usually small or repetitive tasks by companies to often large groups of 
workers through the use of digital platforms.225 The requesting company defines the 
scope of the work, timeline for delivery and price, and often exercises some sort of 
supervision during the work performance or upon completion - all indices that may point 
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to the existence of an employment relationship. The subordination test for these specific 
types of platform work is even more complex, as both the platform and the end user 
firm may jointly exercise or share the prerogatives that employers have in an 
employment relationship. Platform workers deliver their services for and under the 
direction of some sort of co-employing entity that is based on a contractual or de facto 
arrangement between the platform and the end user or requesting firm. The employer’s 
traditional attributes in determining the scope of the work, performance, timeline and 
price in combination with the direction and supervision throughout all stages of the task 
allocation and delivery are jointly exercised by the platform and the end user. In this 
regard platform work practices are challenging the single employer concept that is 
characteristic of the traditional labour law approach.   
In many countries, criteria other than the subordination dimension have been and are 
increasingly being considered by national legislation and courts with a view to determine 
the existence of an employment contract. The economic dependency of the platform 
worker is often regarded an important additional indicator. Platforms often operate in 
highly competitive and rapidly changing markets, which in practice seem to result in 
dominant market positions of very few players, and hence limited work opportunities for 
platform workers. The unilateral determination of work allocation, working methods and 
payments by the platform, the absence or very limited alternatives for work 
opportunities, and the unequal economic and bargaining power seem to become more 
and more relevant when considering the labour market status of a platform worker. New 
criteria have also occurred, such as the commercial or financial risk sharing, the price 
setting and the social perception. Platform workers, when personally providing their 
services, often do so without any commercial or business risk, which is characteristic of 
any undertaking and of genuine self-employment. They execute tasks that have been   
sold commercially to customers without any involvement in the determination of the 
selling prices, or in the establishment of their own remuneration. Prices for the services 
rendered are often predetermined by the platform or by fixed parameters established by 
the online web application.  
While a national interpretation of the concept of worker acknowledges the prime 
responsibility of Member States in labour legislation, it also leads to different coverage 
across Member States. An identical platform worker may be considered as a worker in 
country X but not in country Y. EU labour legislation may thus be differently applied to 
identical factual relationships between platforms and platform workers across the EU. 
The inclusion of the dependency dimension into an EU-wide concept of worker applicable 
to the working conditions may be a step forward, similar to the approach taken in the 
anticartel acquis in matters of collective bargaining. It could reduce differences in 
implementation by Member States while increasing the protection of many platform 
workers who may not necessarily work ‘in subordination’ but who are dependent 
(economically and/or technically) on the platforms and do not share any commercial or 
financial risk.   
In reality, and in spite of some attempts in Member States to classify (some) platform 
workers as employees, even by legislative means (e.g. Portugal226), it occurs that 
platform workers are often being classified as self-employed in Member States, and/or 
that national courts are ruling that these platform workers are self-employed, based on 
the factual relationship between the platform and the platform worker. The immediate 
consequence of this is that these platform workers fall outside the scope of the EU labour 
legislation. Neither the provisions of the non-standard work directives, nor the other EU 
legal instruments, such as the Working Time Directive or the Health and safety for fixed-
term work Directive, the new TPWC Directive, and the Work-life Balance Directive, apply 
in such instances. Self-employed platform workers who may be highly dependent on the 
platforms, and/or may work in precarious situations and/or with low payment rates, 
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appear to be affected the most and lack even minimum protection in terms of their 
working conditions and social protection.  
Material scope of the directives 
EU labour legislation has over the past years regulated only limited aspects of 
employment and working conditions, leaving Member States (and in some instances 
social partners) mainly responsible for legislating national labour provisions. For that 
reason, EU directives have primarily addressed dimensions of employment that have an 
EU-wide relevance, scale or impact. The European Works Council Directive applicable to 
large community-scale ‘undertakings’ and the other collective labour law directives are 
clear examples of this approach. Material provisions concerning employment 
relationships and working conditions, regarding which EU directives have been issued, 
were relatively limited. The obligatory written information provision on the essential 
aspects of the employment contract, minimum requirements related to working time and 
rest periods, information on health and safety aspects of an employment contract and 
the protection of pregnant workers, are some examples where the EU directives have 
directly intervened with the practices at the workplace. EU non-standard work 
directives227 do not regulate working conditions themselves, but they do aim to ensure 
equal treatment in the application of nationally applied working conditions between 
employees who have non-standard forms of employment contracts and their colleagues 
who have a standard open-ended employment contract on a permanent or full-time 
basis.  
However, 2019 seemed to mark a significant step forward in the protection of the 
working conditions of workers in an increasingly diversified labour market characterised 
by the rise of various types of employment relationships that deviate from the standard 
form(s) of work in full-time employment on a permanent basis. The TPWC Directive and 
the Work-life Balance Directive, both adopted just before summer 2019, improve some 
working conditions for workers that were already subject to EU legislation. More 
importantly, they are both instrumental in clarifying the personal scope of EU labour 
legislation and at the same time introduce some new minimum rights and requirements 
to be adhered to in the workplace. Member States have until 1 August 2022 to transpose 
these directives in their national legislation and administrative practices.  
In what follows we have tried to group the selected EU legislation into five main 
categories: (1) equal treatment between non-standard work and standard work; (2) 
working conditions; (3) collective labour rights; (4) social protection; and (5) non-
discrimination legislation. Under the working conditions category, we deal consecutively 
with (a) obligatory information provision, (b) working time and rest periods, (c) health 
and safety for fixed-term contracts, (d) health and safety for pregnant workers, and (e) 
protection against dismissal.   
Equal treatment between non-standard forms of work and standard work 
Material scope 
The three EU Directives concerned with non-standard work concern part-time work,228 
fixed-term work229 and temporary agency work,230 all three atypical forms of work that 
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occurred in increasingly diversifying national labour markets in the 1980s and 1990s. 
They all envisage equal treatment in the area of working conditions between 
workers (employees) employed under an atypical employment contract and 
comparable workers (employees) engaged under a ‘standard’ employment contract 
(either full-time,231 permanent,232 or directly employed by the user undertaking,233 
depending on the directive at stake). Non-standard workers should not be treated less 
favourably than comparable full-time workers in permanent contracts solely because 
they have a non-standard employment contract, unless such a different treatment is 
justified on objective grounds. Platform workers who are part-time workers and/or 
workers under a fixed-term employment contract should be treated equally as full-time 
workers or those who have a permanent contract. Likewise, platform workers working 
for a temporary work agency at a user undertaking should be treated equally as workers 
who are directly hired and employed by that user undertaking. 
Part-time worker is defined by the Part-time Work Directive as a worker234 whose 
normal hours of work, calculated on a weekly basis or on average over a period of 
employment of up to one year, are less than the normal hours of work of a comparable 
full-time worker. The Directive at the same time allows Member States, after consulting 
with the social partners, to exclude for objective reasons casual work from the scope of 
application. The refusal by employees to transfer from a full-time to a part-time 
employment or vice versa cannot be a reason for termination of the employment 
contract, and employers are encouraged to give due consideration when their employees 
request a change from part-time to full-time or vice versa. Employers are also being 
encouraged to promptly inform their staff on the availability of part-time and full-time 
positions, and to facilitate career mobility for part-time workers within the enterprise as 
well as to make vocational training accessible for part-time workers. 
To a great extent, fixed-term employment contracts resemble the relationships 
platform workers have with the platform. A fixed-term work contract is defined by the 
Fixed-term Work Directive as an employment contract or relationship, the end of which 
is determined by an objective condition such as reaching a specific date, completing a 
specific task or the occurrence of a specific event. The Directive aims to ensure equal 
treatment between fixed-term workers and comparable permanent workers in the 
company where working conditions are concerned. Member states are called upon to 
ensure that there is no abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term work 
contracts. Fixed-term workers have the right to be informed about vacancies in the 
company. Employers are also encouraged to facilitate access to appropriate training 
opportunities, career development and occupational mobility. Member States are also 
required to take measures to prevent successive assignments which are designed to 
circumvent the provisions of the Directive. 
A temporary agency worker is defined by the Temporary Agency Work Directive as a 
worker with a contract of employment or an employment relationship with a temporary-
                                                                                                                                   
230
 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary 
agency work (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9–14) 
231
 Art 3(2) of the Framework Agreement established by Directive 97/91/EC defines a comparable full-time 
worker as a full-time worker in the same establishment having the same type of employment contract or 
relationship, who is engaged in the same or a similar work/occupation, due regard being given to other 
considerations which may include seniority and qualifications/skills.  
232
 Art 3(2) of the Framework Agreement established by Directive 1999/70/EC defines a comparable 
permanent worker as a worker with an employment contract or relationship of indefinite duration, in the same 
establishment, engaged in the same or a similar work/occupation, due regard being given to 
qualifications/skills. 
233
 Art 5(1) of Directive 2008/104/EC determines that the basic working and employment conditions of the 
temporary agency worker must be those that apply if the temporary agency worker would have been directly 
recruited by the user undertaking to occupy the same job. 
234
 The Directive uses the term ’employee’ in the definition of a part-time worker in its Article 3 (1).  
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
139 
work agency with a view to being assigned to a user undertaking to work temporarily 
under the latter’s supervision and direction. The triangular relationship of this 
arrangement resembles to a great extent platform work practices (platform - platform 
worker – end user). The Temporary Agency Work Directive ensures equal treatment 
regarding the basic employment conditions between a temporary agency worker and the 
workers who are directly hired and employed by the user undertaking where the 
temporary agency worker is placed. The Directive defines the basic working and 
employment conditions as those related to the duration of working time, overtime, 
breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays and public holidays as well as pay. Rules on 
the protection of pregnant women and young mothers and on protection of children and 
young people that are in force at the user undertaking, as well as provisions combating 
discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnic origin, religion, disabilities, age or sexual 
orientation, have to be equally applied to temporary agency workers. The Directive, 
however, allows Member States and social partners to derogate from the equal 
treatment provisions generally (Article 5(3)) and in particular circumstances (Article 5(2) 
and Article 5(4)). 
Furthermore, temporary agency workers shall be informed of any vacant posts in the 
user undertaking to give them the same opportunity to find permanent employment as 
other workers in that undertaking. At the same time, these workers must be given 
access to the collective facilities, for example, childcare facilities or transport services, in 
the user undertaking under the same conditions as workers employed directly by the 
undertaking. The Directive also envisages the promotion of dialogue between the social 
partners with a view to promote access to training for the temporary agency workers at 
both the temporary work agency and at the user undertaking. The Directive contains 
provisions which aim to facilitate the employment of the temporary agency worker by 
the user undertaking, such as the prohibition of agreements that may prevent the 
conclusion of an employment contract upon completion of the assignment between the 
user undertaking and the worker concerned, and prohibiting the temporary agencies 
from charging the worker fees for their services, and also when the worker is employed 
by the user undertaking upon completion of the assignment.  
Member States are obliged to take measures to prevent abuse and in particular to 
prevent successive assignments that are designed to circumvent the provisions of the 
Directive.  
Relevance for platform work(ers) 
As has been highlighted, self-employed platform workers fall outside the scope of the 
non-standard work directives that apply only to ‘workers’ in the meaning of the EU 
directives. National classifications of platform workers as self-employed, in legislation or 
in practice, may be subject to a reclassification based on EU and/or national case law in 
situations where the platform worker is providing genuine services of an economic 
character to another person, for and under the direction of the latter and in return for a 
remuneration. The assessment is based on the facts and characteristics of the effective 
relationship between the platform and the platform worker. 
Part-time vs Full-time 
Platform workers often work few, atypical or irregular hours during a given reference 
period. Their work schedules may vary over time, with busy periods and periods during 
which almost no work is performed. Platform workers typically prefer to determine their 
own working time and number of hours, when and for how long they will actually work. 
In practice, platform work is often expressed, not in working time or hours, but in terms 
of specific tasks such as ‘food parcel drops’ or ‘taxi journeys’, and the related 
remuneration paid on the basis of the tasks performed irrespective of the time spent by 
the platform worker. Platform workers are often also engaged in open-ended zero-hour 
contracts, with no firm commitment on the side of the platform that there will be work, 
but equally no commitment on the side of the platform worker that work offered has to 
be performed. When assessing the large variety of possibilities, platform work can be 
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shaped in practice, and there may be situations in which a platform worker may in 
reality work more hours than a comparable full-time worker in comparable business 
situations.    
This reveals that the more traditional distinction between full-time and part-time 
work is a poor fit for platform work. Platform workers often work in businesses or 
business sectors where no comparable full-time work exists, making a comparison 
between a part-time platform worker and a full-time comparator difficult. It is exactly 
this comparison with a full-time worker employed in the same company, with the same 
type of employment contract and with the same type of work, that is determining the 
concept of part-time work. In the absence of a full-time comparator, it will be hard to 
maintain that a platform worker is effectively a part-time worker.  
The Directive foresees this situation and provides for an indirect solution in case there is 
no full-time comparator in the same establishment with the same or a similar job. Clause 
3(2) states that in the absence of a full-time comparator in the same establishment, the 
comparison shall be made by reference to the applicable collective agreement, or where 
there is no applicable collective agreement, in accordance with national law, collective 
agreements or practice. However, this fallback option allowing for a wider reference 
frame may also be of limited use in practice as the type of job the platform worker is 
doing may not exist in the traditional economy, or may not have been the subject of any 
collective agreement or legislation.  
Moreover, the possibility for Member States to exclude casual work wholly or partly from 
the scope of application of the Part-time Work Directive may disproportionately affect 
platform work, as many platform activities or services could in practice be considered as 
casual activities, and hence be qualified as ancillary or marginal. Also, when justified by 
objective reasons, Member States can make access to particular employment conditions 
subject to periods of services, time worked or earnings qualification. These measures, 
however, need to be reviewed regularly to ensure that the principle of non-discrimination 
of part-time workers is upheld. This possibility also appears to disadvantage platform 
work, especially when it comes to very fragmented tasks, small-scale activities or low-
volume work delivered over longer reference periods.  
The additional protection provided by the Part-time Work Directive, for example the 
protection against unfair dismissal solely on grounds of ‘part-time work’, is in theory 
very relevant for platform workers, because they often have little protection in practice 
when a platform suspends their account. It would be useful for platform workers if 
employers, and therefore platforms, were encouraged to  consider their requests to work 
‘more’ or ‘less’, in a similar way that requests for changes between full-time and part-
time and vice versa are contained in the Directive. However, the employers (or 
platforms) are not obliged to agree with the requests for a change in the organisation of 
working time, and in practice most platform workers decide for themselves the number 
of hours that they want to work.   
In short, provided a platform worker is not genuinely self-employed, they may become 
qualified as a part-time worker in instances where the platform or employer employs 
full-time workers for the same job and hence has employment contracts based on a full- 
time organisation of work as defined under national legislation. In reality, however, 
many platform workers will find they have no recourse to the Directive because their 
employment relationship does not fit the concepts of ‘worker’ or ‘part-time work’. This 
may also be because they have been (wholly or partly) excluded from the scope of 
application by national authorities who consider platform work as casual work or have 
taken measures to make accessible particular employment conditions subject to periods 
of service, time worked or earnings qualifications. Even if the platform work is 
considered part-time work, unequal treatment is still possible on objective grounds and 
in some cases the platform work activities are substantially different from what is 
considered under national law as employment performed by a worker. 
Fixed-term  
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A fixed-term employment contract presupposes an ‘ending date’ by determining a 
reference point in time. It does so either explicitly (by stipulating a termination date or 
the date of an event) or implicitly (by referring to the date of the completion of a specific 
task). In practice, platform workers are often engaged in open-ended type contracts with 
no specific end date, without a guaranteed workload or any pre-established organisation 
of working time. As a consequence, platform work also challenges the definition of fixed-
term work as provided by the Fixed-term Work Directive, such as an employment 
contract or relationship where the end is established by objective conditions such as 
reaching a specific date, completing a specific task, or the occurrence of a specific event.  
Platform work is often task oriented and less governed by working hours. Platform 
workers are often not obliged to work a certain number of tasks (or hours) and decide 
on their own organisation of work. The tasks are often very fragmented and small scale 
and platform workers can sometimes work simultaneously for different platforms. In 
some instances the individual tasks could be considered the subject of one particular 
fixed-term contract. Platform workers have in practice a sort of open-ended ‘framework’ 
contract without any firm commitment from either the platform to assign tasks or from 
the worker to accept the job, and each of the tasks or assignments would then be the 
subject of one specific fixed-term contract. The assignment and performance of 
subsequent tasks could in such cases be considered as consecutive fixed-term contracts. 
This would, however, imply that the individual tasks would at least have a certain 
volume in terms of workload or time spent. One of the challenges identified in the study 
is exactly the continuous fragmentation of work into very small pieces. The unit of 
reference or measurement, which in the traditional labour law context is often based on 
the ‘working hour’ or on piecework of a certain size, has been further challenged by 
platform work through its fundamental reorientation to ‘tasks’ and piecework of a very 
fragmented nature, such as in cases of online clickwork or crowdsourcing. 
Fixed-term workers cannot be treated less favourably than comparable permanent 
workers. A platform worker engaged on a temporary basis may be qualified as a fixed-
term worker enjoying equal treatment in terms of the employment conditions with the 
permanent workers. But, as is the case for part-time work, the comparable permanent 
workers may not exist in the company and/or for the same type of job. In practice, the 
platform may only have open-ended type of contracts with all platform workers (such as 
zero-hour contracts), which more closely resemble the concept of permanent contracts. 
In such instances, the platform worker may not have any recourse to the provisions of 
the Directive, as contracts for indefinite periods do not fall within its scope. When there 
is no comparable permanent worker in the same company, the Directive mentions that 
the comparison shall be made by reference to the applicable collective agreement or, 
where there is none, in accordance with national law, collective agreement or practice.  
Unlike under the Part-time Work Directive, Member States cannot exclude casual work 
from the scope of application of the Fixed-term Work Directive, nor can they exclude 
fixed-term work contracts with a maximum duration of six months.235  
Some of the provisions contained in the Fixed-term Work Directive have particular 
relevance for platform work, such as the measures Member States must take to prevent 
abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or 
relationships (Clause 5). Where Member States have not taken legal measures to 
prevent abuse, they have to introduce at least one of the measures listed in the 
Directive, such as determining the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term 
contracts, the maximum number of renewals, or the objective reasons justifying the 
renewals of successive contracts. The Member States must also determine under what 
conditions fixed-term contracts will be regarded as ‘successive’ and will be deemed to be 
‘contracts of indefinite duration’. Platform work contracts that are based on the 
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performance of particular tasks may hence benefit from such provisions conducive to the 
equal treatment between fixed-term platform workers and permanent workers, when 
employment conditions are concerned, provided of course there are permanent workers 
employed. 
The Directive encourages employers to facilitate training, career development and 
occupational mobility for the fixed-term workers, as well as the right of fixed-term 
workers to be informed about the vacancies in the company to ensure that they have the 
same opportunities as other workers to secure permanent positions. 
Temporary Agency Work 
Platform work and temporary agency work are both characterised by a similar triangular 
relationship. In platform work the three actors concern the platform (using a digital 
application), the platform worker and the client (end user, consumer, and customer). In 
temporary agency work, a worker is placed by a temporary work agency at a user 
undertaking. The worker is employed by the temporary work agency but assigned to the 
user undertaking where they work under the latter’s supervision.  
In platform work the end user is very often not an undertaking employing workers, 
but a private client or consumer. The Temporary Agency Work Directive does not apply 
to situations where the end user is a private customer or natural person who is not 
engaged in economic activities (and under whose supervision and direction the 
temporary agency worker is actually working while formally being employed by the 
Temporary Agency). The Temporary Agency Work Directive applies in the specific 
context of two potential employers (the temporary work agency and the user 
undertaking) and ensures equal treatment of the temporary agency worker with the 
workers employed by the undertaking to which (the platform) worker is temporarily 
assigned. Platform work is often ultimately (through the platform or directly) delivered to 
consumers and/or clients without any connection or prospect of establishing an 
employment relationship with the platform worker. In such instances the Temporary 
Agency Work Directive has little relevance in view of protecting platform workers.  
However, there are some specific types of platform work where the end user is a 
company and/or could be considered as a possible employer of the platform 
worker. When end users define the assignment, determine the price, exercise 
supervision and evaluate the performance during and upon completion of the 
assignment, there may be an employment relationship between the end user and the 
platform worker. Depending on the scope of services provided by the platform business, 
the employer’s function may also be ‘divided’ or ‘shared’ between the platform and the 
end user. The platform business and customer jointly define the assignment, determine 
the price and control work progress and performance of the platform worker, and can 
both be considered as employers. In such instances a comparison with temporary 
agency work becomes relevant.236 Crowdwork (or crowdsourcing) is such a type of 
platform work, because requesting firms use digital apps to allocate piecework to large 
groups of platform workers who provide their often very small-scale jobs online directly 
to the end-user firm. The work is allocated, directed, supervised, paid and evaluated by 
the end-user firm through the digital platform, which acts as a mere online intermediary 
or as a facilitating entity that is also entrusted with task allocation, work supervision, 
evaluation and/or payment of the services. Various modalities exist in practice when it 
comes to the sharing or division of these employers’ prerogatives between the platform 
business and the end-user firm, but both ultimately depend on the inputs and work of 
the platform workers from which their respective businesses generate profit. For this 
specific type of platform work, it has been argued by academics and research institutions 
that platform businesses could be considered as temporary work agencies, platform 
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workers as temporary agency workers and the end user/company as user 
undertakings237 in the meaning of the Temporary Agency Work Directive.238 However, 
also in these cases, the subordination test will have to be applied to the factual 
circumstances and relationships between the platform and the worker on the one hand 
and between the latter and the user firm on the other, in order to conclude that there is 
an employment relationship.239 
Be this as it may, the Directive ensures equal treatment between the temporary agency 
worker and the own workers at the user undertaking, but only in what regards the basic 
working and employment conditions. The Directive defines the basic conditions as 
those that relate to the duration of the working time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, 
night work, (public) holidays and pay, and is consequently not covering all working 
conditions throughout. The basic working conditions covered are relevant for all non-
standard forms of employment and not in particular for platform work. The equal 
treatment provisions contained in the Directive apply only during the period of the 
assignment and not in between different assignments. This may cause interpretation 
difficulties when platform work is very fragmented, irregular or spread over time. The 
Directive furthermore leaves the possibility open to derogate from the equality principle 
by Member States and does not require that temporary work agencies (or the 
‘platforms’) have to be registered.  
On the other hand, the Directive contains some provisions that are of interest when 
platform work is considered. These include the potential for application to platform work 
performed for and under the direction of the platform and the end-user firm as discussed 
above, the recognition of temporary work agencies (and hence possibly the platforms) 
as employers, and the more flexible concept of the comparable worker,240 with a view to 
applying the equal treatment provisions, the explicit non-discrimination provisions on all 
grounds contained in Article 19 TFEU, and the obligation of Member States to take 
measures that prevent successive assignments designed to circumvent the Directive. 
Workers have furthermore the right to be informed about job vacancies at the user 
undertakings, while access to training at both the temporary work agency and the user 
undertakings are to be promoted.  
Interim conclusions – non-standard work directives 
In theory, the non-standard work directives have some relevance for platform work. In 
practice, however, this is very limited, and applies only when platform workers are 
classified as (subordinate) workers and not as self-employed. Even where platform 
workers are classified as workers, the application of the directives may not be possible. 
Comparable full-time or permanent workers as defined in the respective directives may 
be absent in real platform practices, and the wider comparison with existing collective 
agreements, national law or practices may be of limited practical relevance because 
these may not exist and/or are difficult to serve as a reference for the comparison. 
Concepts such as part-time versus full-time and fixed-term work do not appear to 
entirely cover platform work practices, which often resemble open-ended (framework) 
contracts with no explicitly agreed permanent character and no obligation to 
allocate/accept work. They are also often task oriented and not concerned with the 
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organisation of hours of work. Moreover, Member States can under certain conditions 
exclude casual work from the Part-time Work Directive, which is of particular relevance 
for small-scale platform work. There are also many possibilities for Member States to 
derogate and apply different arrangements under the Temporary Agency Work Directive.  
However, some of the provisions of the directives, should they be applicable to platform 
work, appear to be very meaningful in guaranteeing minimum levels of protection for 
platform workers. The prohibition of unfair dismissals on the sole basis of the platform 
work activity’s scale or working time, the possibility to increase and decrease working 
hours without the risk of being dismissed, the prevention of abusive practices of 
successive fixed-term contracts, access to training opportunities and career mobility, and 
the right to be informed when vacancies occur, are all covered.  
The Temporary Agency Work Directive can potentially be applied to specific types of 
platform practices, for example in cases where platforms and end users are 
undertakings, and/or can be qualified as employers, such as in crowdwork. However, 
this interpretation has only limited practical relevance and does not cover situations in 
which the end user is a private natural person or consumer.   
 Working conditions 6.1.2
Obligatory information provision on the essential aspects of the employment relationship 
Material scope 
The new Transparent and predictable working conditions (TPWC) Directive of 20 June 
2019 entered into force at the end of July 2019.241 The Directive is repealing the Written 
Statement Directive, which will still have legal effect until the transposition period of the 
new Directive (three years) has been completed.242  
First, the Directive limits the possibility for Member States to exclude from its scope of 
application small-scale or casual work, defined as referring to situations where the 
predetermined and actual working time is equal or less than an average of three hours 
per week in a reference period of four consecutive weeks (Article 1(3)). It also ensures 
that this derogation cannot apply to employment relationships where no guaranteed 
amount of paid work is determined before the employment starts (Article 3(2)). 
The Directive also lays down the minimum rights of workers in terms of the 
information employers are obliged to provide to the individual workers in 
writing, be it on paper or in electronic form, but with proof of transmission and/or 
receipt (Article 3).243 The information concerns the essential aspects of the 
employment relationship and should for the most part be provided by the employer 
between the first day of work and the seventh calendar day (Article 5(1)): the 
place of work (or the principle that a worker is employed at various places or is free to 
determine their place of work) and registered place of business; description of the work 
or nature of the work or function; the commencement date; the end date when 
applicable, as in fixed-term contracts; the duration and conditions of probationary 
period; and the remuneration, frequency and method of payment. In cases of entirely 
or mostly predictable work patterns, the employer has to inform the worker about the 
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length of a standard working day or week, arrangements for overtime and related 
remuneration, and any arrangements for shift changes. When the work pattern is 
entirely or mostly unpredictable, the employer must inform the worker of (1) the 
principle that the work schedule is variable, the number of guaranteed paid hours and 
the remuneration for the work performed in addition to those guaranteed hours, (2) the 
reference hours and days within which the worker may be required to work, and (3) the 
minimum notice period to which the worker is entitled before the start of the assignment 
and, where applicable, the deadline for the cancellation that the employer has to respect 
when cancelling an assignment (Articles 4 and 5). Member States that allow employers 
to cancel an assignment without compensation have to ensure that in case of a late 
cancellation (after a specified reasonable deadline), the worker is entitled to a 
compensation (Article 10(3)). 
For some other types of information on the essential aspects of the employment 
relationship, the employer has one month to inform the worker (counted as from the 
first working day), such as the information on the identity of the user undertaking in 
case of temporary work, the available training opportunities, the applicable notice 
periods and procedures, the right to paid leave, the existing collective agreements or 
identity of the responsible bodies, and the identity of the social security institutions 
which receive the social contributions that are connected with the employment 
relationship, and any other social security protection provided by the employer (Articles 
4 and 5).  
The Directive also determines that in the case of any modification or change related 
to the essential aspects of the employment relationship, the employer is obliged to 
inform the worker in writing at the earliest opportunity, and at the latest on the day it 
takes effect.244 This requirement also applies when a worker is sent to another Member 
State or third country (Article 6). 
When workers are required by their employers to work in another Member State or 
third country (i.e. a country other than the one where they habitually work) for longer 
than four consecutive weeks, employers must provide in writing some additional 
information for them prior to their departure: the country or countries where the work is 
to be performed as well as the duration of the work assignment; the currency in which 
the remuneration will be paid; the benefits in cash and in kind the worker will be entitled 
to during the work assignment; and the conditions of repatriation when this is provided 
for. Posted workers shall furthermore also be informed about the remuneration they are 
entitled to in accordance with the applicable legislation of the hosting state, the 
allowances specific to the posting and the arrangements for reimbursing expenditures on 
travel, boarding and lodging, and the relevant references to the single national website 
of the hosting state.245  
The Directive furthermore lays down some minimum requirements that directly 
affect the working conditions of workers:246 maximum duration of any probationary 
period; the right to parallel employment; provisions related to a minimum predictability 
of work; complementary provisions related to on-demand work; provisions concerned 
with the transition to other forms of employment; and rules on mandatory training. The 
Directive determines that collective agreements concluded in accordance with national 
legislation can apply different working conditions than those that are contained in the 
Directive. In this regard Directive 2019/1152 goes a step further than the Written 
Statement Directive, which did not cover working conditions and whose scope was 
limited to the obligatory written information provision. 
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Directive 2019/1152 determines that when probationary periods are envisaged under 
national legislation or practice, the probationary period shall not exceed six months 
(Article 8(1)). Member States may in exceptional cases apply longer probationary 
periods when justified by the nature of the employment or in the interest of the worker 
(Article 8(3)). In situations of fixed-term employment, the probationary periods must be 
proportionate to the expected duration of the contract and nature of work, but in the 
case of a renewal of a fixed-term contract, no new probationary period can be applied 
(Article 8(2)).  
Employers cannot prohibit their workers from taking up other employment, outside 
the work schedule with that employer, and they cannot subject a worker to adverse 
treatment when doing so (Article 9(1)).247 
Workers who have worked for at least six months with the same employer may request 
from their employer a form of employment with more predictable and secure 
working conditions where available, and are entitled to receive a reasoned written 
reply (Article 12(1)).248 Employers are obliged to give a reasoned written reply within 
one month of the request (Article 12(2)).249 
In cases when an employer is required by law to provide training to a worker in view 
of carrying out the work for which they are employed, the training has to be provided to 
the worker free of any cost, and the training time shall be counted as working time, and, 
where possible, take place during the working hours (Article 13). 
Of particular interest are the provisions of the Directive concerning situations where the 
work pattern of a worker is entirely or mostly unpredictable. In such a situation, 
the worker shall not be required to work unless two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the work 
takes place within predetermined reference hours and days, and (2) the worker is 
informed by their employer of a work assignment within a reasonable notice period 
established in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practice (Article 
10(1)). A worker has the right to refuse a work assignment when one of the conditions is 
not fulfilled, without adverse consequences (Article 10(2)). When Member States allow 
an employer to cancel a work assignment without compensation for the worker, they are 
obliged to take measures to ensure that compensation is paid when the employer 
cancels a work assignment that was previously agreed between the employer and the 
worker after a reasonable deadline (Article 10(3)). 
The Directive also aims to prevent abusive practices concerning on-demand or similar 
employment contracts, such as zero-hour contracts, when the employer has the 
flexibility to call a worker to work as and when needed, as they are particularly 
unpredictable for the worker.250 Member States which allow the use of such contracts are 
required to take one or more measures such as (a) limitations on the use and duration 
of on-demand or similar contracts, (b) a rebuttable presumption of the existence of an 
employment contract with a minimum amount of paid hours based on the average hours 
worked during a given period and (c) other equivalent measures that ensure effective 
prevention of abusive practices (Article 11).251 Member States are consequently allowed 
to choose from the measures proposed but can also opt to implement all mentioned 
types of measures. 
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Relevance for platform work 
The TPWC Directive 2019/1152 is undoubtedly a major improvement for the 
employment protection of workers in both standard and non-standard forms of 
employment, including for platforms workers who have an employment relationship. It 
also contains provisions that are of specific relevance for platform workers. 
First, as has been set out above, the Directive clarifies the EU concept of ‘worker’ to 
which it applies by explicitly referring to CJEU case law, by mentioning that platform 
workers are workers when the criteria set by the CJEU rulings are met,252 by restricting 
the possibility for Member States to exclude workers in various precarious non-standard 
forms of employment to those workers who actually work on average less than three 
hours a week253 and by expressly including workers who have no guaranteed working 
time, such as those working on zero-hour contracts and some on-demand workers.254 
When Member States allow on-demand or similar contracts, the Directive equally 
requires them to implement measures in order to prevent abusive practices. Only the 
(genuinely) self-employed fall outside the remit of the Directive.  
Second, the Directive’s material provisions have direct relevance for the employment 
relationship between employers and workers. Employers are obliged to inform their 
workers in writing about an enlarged list of essential aspects of the 
employment relationship in relatively short but reasonable timelines, which is 
generally limited to the first week of employment. The Directive also directly regulates 
some other working conditions relevant for workers who are increasingly employed 
by flexible and atypical forms of employment, and which have not yet been subject to 
previous EU legislation. Some of these provisions are highly relevant for platform work. 
The information obligation vested with employers covers an expansive list of aspects 
that are relevant for all workers, but some that are particularly relevant for workers in 
non-standard work situations and also for platform workers. 
While a documented and timely information provision on the core aspects of an 
employment relationship is relevant for all types of workers, it is particularly meaningful 
for platform work as contracts are often not concluded and/or the information that is 
provided to platform workers is often partial or incomplete: description of the work, 
remuneration, place of work, periods of notice, probationary periods, paid leave, and 
social protection. Enforcing the Directive on platform employers will definitely contribute 
to clearer and more secure employment relationships in the platform economy. 
Of particular relevance is the obligation vested with the employers when work is 
entirely or mainly unpredictable. In such cases the platform has to inform the 
platform worker that the work schedule is variable, but also about the number of 
guaranteed paid hours and the remuneration for the work that is performed in 
addition to these guaranteed hours, the reference hours and days within which the 
worker may be required to work, the minimum notice period the worker is entitled to 
before the start of an assignment and, where applicable, the deadline for cancellation 
the employer has to respect. The worker has the right to refuse an assignment when 
the assignment takes place outside the agreed predetermined reference hours or days, 
or when the platform did not respect the reasonable notice period for informing the 
platform worker about the work assignment as established in national law and practices 
(Article 10(1)). The platform worker has the right to compensation when the platform 
cancels a previously agreed assignment after a specified reasonable deadline set by the 
Member States in accordance with national legislation and practice (Article 10(3)).  
                                           
252
 Recital 8, Directive 2019/1152 
253
 Article 1 (3) and Recital 11, Directive 2019/1152 
254
 Recital 12, Directive 2019/1152 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
148 
Working for two or more platforms simultaneously is common practice for some types of 
platform workers. The Directive requires Member States to ensure that employers 
cannot prohibit parallel employment and that they regulate the conditions under which 
employers can restrict parallel employment for objective grounds, such as incompatibility 
with the work for their own platform. 
The provisions relating to the prevention of abusive practices concerning on-demand 
or similar employment contracts are also of high importance for platform workers. In 
practice, platforms often organise their businesses in such a way that the platforms have 
the highest flexibility and can call platform workers to work for a particular work 
assignment as and when they (or the algorithm) deem fit. Platform work practices 
operate often as on-demand contracts. Work is hence in practice very unpredictable. The 
Directive obliges Member States to take measures but leaves room for Member State-
specific approaches. The limitation of the use and duration (or use of successive on-
demand contracts similar to that which governs fixed-term contracts) is a possible 
national legislative action. The introduction of the rebuttable presumption of the 
existence of an employment contract will undoubtedly have clear consequences as more 
platform workers would be included within the remit of the Directive, leaving the burden 
of proof of the opposite on the platforms. Article 18 ensures protection to platform 
workers from dismissal or its equivalent, on the grounds that they have exercised the 
rights provided for in this Directive. In particular the wording ‘its equivalent’ could 
indeed benefit those platform workers whose accounts have been deactivated or 
suspended, or it could potentially cover those situations where the platform does not 
provide assignments any more to the platform worker, on the grounds that they have 
exercised the rights provided for in this Directive. For example, a platform worker could 
in theory refuse a task by the platform on the grounds that it did not respect the agreed 
predetermined reference hours or days (Article 10(1)(a)). If this results in the platform 
deactivating or suspending the account of the platform worker (or simply stopping 
providing assignments), the platform worker is protected by Article 18.255 Platform 
workers may request the platform to provide duly substantiated grounds for the 
dismissal or the equivalent measures, and the platform is obliged to do so in writing 
(Article 18(2)). The Directive, however, does not specify the time by which the employer 
has to provide that information. Of significant importance is provision which determines 
that the burden of proof in court cases related to dismissals is vested with the employer 
(the platform), who has to prove that the termination was based on other grounds than 
those relating to the rights of the workers as protected under the Directive (Article 
18(3)). 
However, the Directive does not cover all dimensions or aspects characterising the 
working conditions or employment protection of platform work, nor the information 
obligation on the side of employers.  
Some working conditions or dimensions which are particularly relevant for platform work 
have not been included in the list of essential aspects of the employment relationship the 
employer is bound to provide in writing, including information on: the existence of 
potentially harmful tasks or environment; the use of equipment, vehicles and tools that 
are necessary to conduct work assignments; the protection in case of work accidents 
and occupational diseases; the collection and processing of personal data and data 
concerning the work performance; the use of electronic surveillance mechanisms; on the 
evaluation and rating mechanisms; possibilities to challenge automated company 
decisions that affect the work of the platform worker; conditions governing the 
termination or suspension of the contract; (internal and/or external) mechanisms for 
complaint handling, mediation or dispute resolution; procedures for advance notification 
in cases of suspension or termination; procedures other than those related to formal 
dismissals and the corresponding notice periods (mentioned under Article 4.2(j)) when 
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the employer is in breach of the contract, such as in cases of non-payments of particular 
tasks; on representation rights; rights to conclude collective agreements; and the clients 
and customers. Most of these enumerated aspects are of key concern to platform 
workers and a timely information obligation on these matters could be considered in the 
future.   
Whereas the Directive introduces minimum requirements that affect some working 
conditions of workers, including platform workers who will qualify as workers, some of 
the material provisions may not be entirely fit for platform work while some other 
dimensions or aspects that are particularly relevant for platform work are not included. 
The procedure concerning the termination of the employment relationship, as well as the 
related notice periods, are mentioned as being part of the essential aspects of the 
employment relationship. The employer is obliged to provide written information about 
these procedures to the individual worker within a month after the start of the 
employment contract. Article 4.2(j) refers to procedures in situations where the 
employment is terminated and may hence be restrictedly interpreted as referring to 
situations where the employment relationship is formally ended by either of the parties 
or in agreement. No reference is made to ‘equivalents’ as is the case in Article 18, which 
concerns the protection in case of dismissals. The information obligation on procedures 
for situations where work is being (temporarily) suspended or where the work allocation 
is reduced or put on hold - all characteristic of platform work - appears not be covered. 
The obligation to include in the procedure a list of grounds on which basis the 
employment contract can be terminated is also not covered. 
Whereas Article 18 provides protection in case of a dismissal or its equivalent, it may not 
entirely cover all sorts of situations in which a platform worker is prevented from 
working while technically not being ‘dismissed’. Is a reduction or a temporary suspension 
of work or task allocation, while keeping the account operational, considered as the 
equivalent of a dismissal? Article 18 does not mention a deadline by which the employer 
has to inform the worker on the grounds for dismissal, unlike the case for the obligation 
to provide information in writing on the essential aspects of the employment relationship 
(one week or one month from the first day of work), in cases of any change to these 
essential aspects (at the latest on the day that the change is taking effect) and in cases 
where the worker with more than six months’ service has requested a form of 
employment with more predictable and secure working conditions (one month as from 
the date of request). 
The Directive requires Member States to ensure access to effective and impartial 
dispute-resolution mechanisms and the right to redress in case of infringements of the 
workers’ rights but does not include this into the list of essential aspects under the 
information obligation. Overall, the emphasis is put more on formal dispute settlement 
arrangements and litigation, and less so on more preventive but less costly mechanisms 
to resolve potential conflict, such as the obligation to have internal complaint-handling 
mechanisms and mediation. This may be of particular relevance for platform work 
because some of the reported reasons for disputes are not that complex (such as a non-
payment of a particular assignment or task, or refusal to activate an account), or they 
may be the consequence of automated decisions.  
Working time and rest periods 
Material scope  
As pointed out, the Working Time Directive256 does not contain a definition of ‘worker’, 
but the CJEU has repeatedly confirmed that the term ‘worker’ as it is used in the 
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Directive has an autonomous meaning specific to EU law.257 The Directive does not apply 
to the self-employed.258  
The Working Time Directive lays down some minimum requirements for the organisation 
of working time and defines concepts such as ‘working time’ and ‘rest periods’: working 
time is any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and 
carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with the national laws and/or practice 
(Article 2(1)); a rest period is any period which is not working time (Article 2(2)).  
The Directive contains several material provisions determining the rights of workers in 
relation to the organisation of the working time:  
 a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period (Article 
3) 
 a minimum of uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours per each seven-day period on 
top of the 11 hours’ daily rest per 24-hour period (Article 5) 
 a rest break in cases of working days that are longer than six hours, the duration 
and terms on which it is granted being established by collective agreements or in 
national legislation (Article 4) 
 a maximum of weekly working time as established by national collective 
agreements, administrative provision or legislation, where the average working 
time for each seven-day period, including overtime, may not exceed 48 hours 
(Article 6) 
 the right to paid annual leave of at least four weeks in accordance with national 
legislation and the prohibition to replace the paid annual leave by another 
allowance unless when the employment relationship is terminated (Article 7) 
 limitation of normal hours of night work to an average of eight hours in any 24-
hour period (Article 8).  
 
Collective agreements and national legislation of Member States can further determine 
the exact entitlement conditions related to the different rights of the workers, the 
specific duration of maximum weekly working time, rest periods, rest breaks and paid 
annual leave. Member States’ labour legislation concerned with the working-time 
organisation differs to a large extent in their national approaches.  
The Pregnant Workers Directive259 requires Member States to take necessary measures 
to ensure that workers who are pregnant or who have recently given birth are not 
obliged to perform night work.  
Relevance for platform work 
The organisation of working time is specifically relevant for platform workers who can 
often choose when they work and how much time they want to spend working. The 
effective working time platform workers perform can in some instances be very limited 
and/or fragmented and neither does it always follow logical patterns. But platform 
workers can equally in practice prefer to stay logged on or work for more hours than set 
as a maximum under the Working Time Directive.  
Working time registration is essential in this regard. Not all countries260 oblige employers 
to have a time-registration system at the workplace. In a recent judgment,261 the CJEU 
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held that not having such a time-registration system is contrary to EU law. The absence 
of a time-registration system leads to the impossibility of recording, in an objective and 
trustworthy way, how many hours and when exactly the employee has worked, and it 
makes it impossible to determine how much overtime the worker has effectively worked. 
The consequence of the judgment is that all employers should implement an objective, 
trustworthy and accessible time-registration system facilitating the registration of the 
daily working hours. The type of system may depend on the sector or the specificities of 
the company, and it can, for example, be a badging system or an app. For platform 
workers, the digital app they are using to connect (and stay connected) with the 
platform is potentially an adequate instrument to register working time.  
However, other questions arise where platform work is concerned. Is the time spent 
online at all times working time? Is the time that a platform worker is spending, when 
regularly logging in or when staying continuously connected to screen job offers, working 
time? How is it best to apply maximum (weekly) working time, on call or on duty time, 
rest breaks and rest periods for platform workers?  
In other words, the notion of working time is being challenged by platform work 
practices. The CJEU has consistently held that the determining factor for the 
classification of ‘working time’, within the meaning of the Working Time Directive, is the 
requirement that the worker is physically present at the place determined by the 
employer and that they are available to the employer to be able to provide the 
appropriate services immediately in case of need.262 In addition, the CJEU considers that 
the physical presence and availability of the worker at the place of work during the 
standby period, with a view to providing their professional services, must be regarded as 
carrying out his duties, even if the activity actually performed varies according to the 
circumstances.263 It is hard to predict how the CJEU would apply these principles to 
platform work. It may lead to cases where the platform workers’ working time would be 
much longer than the Directive’s thresholds.  
Another point of doubt relates to the application of the time limits which are set by the 
Directive and whether they apply per employment contract or per worker. One may 
assume that they apply per worker, as the main objective of the Directive under Article 1 
is to lay down minimum health and safety requirements for the organisation of working 
time, implicitly referring to the health and safety of a particular worker. Indeed, in its 
Interpretative Communication,264 the European Commission has indeed stated that the 
time limits apply per worker. This clarification is essential given the fact that platform 
workers may in practice work for different employers or platforms simultaneously or 
combine their platform work with their main occupation.  
Platform workers often remain connected to the platform while waiting and/or 
monitoring new incoming job calls or ‘offers’. This raises the question as to what extent 
this can be considered as standby time and, in the affirmative, as working time or not. 
The CJEU held that standby time, where the worker is required to be physically present 
at the place specified by the employer, must be regarded entirely as working time, 
irrespective of the fact that, during the periods of standby time, the person is not 
continuously carrying out any professional activity.265 However, if the standby time is 
characterised by the fact that workers are not obliged to remain waiting in a place 
designated by the employer (it is enough for them to be reachable at any time so that 
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they may be called upon at short notice to perform their professional tasks), it is not 
considered as working time. In that situation the workers are at the disposal of their 
employer, in that it must be possible to contact them, but they can manage their time 
with fewer constraints and pursue their own interests.266  
Platform workers’ standby time is usually spent at a location the platform worker 
chooses and is hence not specified as such by the platform, in spite of the fact that one 
could argue that the location is somehow determined as being in the vicinity of the place 
where the work is expected to be performed. Also, the question can be raised as to the 
obligation of the platform worker to respond to the assignments, and whether they really 
are on duty or not. The fact that platform workers are often in a position to decline an 
assignment may point to the contrary. If, however, platform workers are sanctioned 
when they have refused a particular assignment, they find themselves as if on duty.  
In a recent judgment, the CJEU held that in a case of firefighters who were on duty at 
their home but who had to respond to calls from the employer within eight minutes, the 
on-call time had to be considered as working time, as the eight minutes’ requirement 
significantly reduced the opportunities for the workers to perform other activities. The 
judgment is deviating from previous positions, which considered only standby time spent 
at the workplace as working time, and not the standby time at home, even when there 
was an obligation to respond to a call of duty within a short timeframe. The previous 
may also have repercussions in the light of the Working Time Directive’s provisions 
related to working time and rest periods, as the strict demarcation is becoming blurred 
where platform work is concerned. Platform workers who are on standby at home cannot 
be in such a situation for more than 48 hours a week, or more than 13 hours in a 24-
hour period, when the provisions of the Working Time Directive have to be respected 
(provided that the nuances brought by the recent judgment of the CJEU are present). If 
there is, however, no obligation to respond to a call, it will be much more difficult to 
maintain that the standby time at home is to be considered as working time (which is 
where the difficulty lies for platform work). 
The CJEU also ruled in cases where the worker did not have a fixed or habitual place of 
work. In such instances, the time spent by workers travelling each day between their 
homes and the premises of the first and the last customers designated by the employer 
constitutes working time.267 This ruling is of specific relevance for the platform riders and 
drivers, always, of course, on the condition that they are not genuine self-employed.  
Member States can derogate268 from some of the provisions of the Working Time 
Directive, because of the specific characteristics of the activity concerned, when the 
duration of working time is not measured and/or predetermined, or when the working 
time can be determined by the workers themselves. This is the case for most platform 
work practices. However, as affirmed by the European Commission in its Interpretative 
Communication, ‘there is no case-law yet on how the “autonomous worker” derogation 
could apply to workers in new forms of employment such as the digital platform 
economy […]’.269 Subsequently, it is still uncertain whether Member States can (and will) 
make use of this possibility to exclude platform work from the application of the Working 
Time Directive.  
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Health and safety for fixed-term employment contracts 
The Health and safety for fixed-term work Directive270 applies to temporary employment 
relationships directly concluded between the employer and the worker, or between a 
temporary work agency and the worker, when the latter is assigned to work for and 
under the direct control of a user undertaking. It aims to ensure equal treatment and the 
same levels of protection in matters of health and safety between the workers concerned 
and the other workers at the company or the user undertaking.  
Material scope  
Workers have the right to be informed, before they start working, about the job-specific 
risks they are facing and whether any specific occupational qualifications, skills or 
medical surveillance are required (Article 3). Workers have the right to receive 
sufficient training appropriate to the particular characteristics of the job, taking into 
account their qualifications and experience (Article 4). Member States can prohibit 
workers under fixed-term contracts being used for certain types of work that would be 
particularly dangerous to their safety or health and in particular for certain work that 
requires medical surveillance. Where Member States do not use this possibility, they 
have to ensure that the workers under fixed-term contracts are provided with 
appropriate special medical surveillance (Article 5). 
The Directive furthermore contains specific provisions that govern the triangular 
relationship between the worker, the temporary work agency and the user undertaking. 
These determine that the user undertaking has to inform the temporary work agency 
about the occupational qualifications required and the specific features of the job to be 
filled before the workers are assigned (Article 7), and that the user undertakings remain 
responsible for the health, hygiene and safety conditions governing performance of the 
work (Article 8). 
Relevance for platform work 
At first sight, the right to be informed about health and safety risks appears not to be 
more important for platform workers when compared to any other worker. The same 
applies to the right to receive sufficient training, which is specific to the job features 
under question. Platform workers, however, appear to be working in practice in less 
‘controlled’ environments and often work on their own with little or even no personal 
contact with colleagues and/or employer or person representing the latter. Platform 
workers are often working outside the traditional company environment and without 
access to information, training, or procedures on health and safety.  
The provisions of the Directive apply to workers under fixed-term contracts and to 
workers who are employed by temporary work agencies and seconded at user 
undertakings, revealing a triangular relationship which is characteristic of platform work 
as well. However, customers of platform work are usually natural persons or companies 
that receive and/or pay for the services rendered by the platform worker and cannot be 
considered as a user undertaking in the meaning of the Directive. The provisions are 
consequently of little relevance for platform workers.271 
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Health and safety of pregnant workers 
Material scope 
The Pregnant Workers Directive272 contains in its Annex I a non-exhaustive list of 
agents, processes or working conditions which may be harmful for workers exposed to 
them during their job activities if they are pregnant, have recently given birth or are 
breastfeeding. Employers are obliged to assess the nature, degree and duration of the 
exposure of the workers concerned, either directly or by means of protective and 
preventive services with a view to assessing the risks to their safety and health, and the 
possible effects on their pregnancy or breastfeeding (Article 4). Based on the risk 
assessment, the employer has to take appropriate measures and adjust the working 
conditions or working hours of the worker, move her to another job or grant her leave 
for the whole period necessary to protect her safety and health (Article 5). 
The Directive furthermore lists, in Annex II Section A and Section B respectively, the 
agents and working conditions that pregnant workers and breastfeeding workers must 
under no circumstances be exposed to. Employers who conduct a risk assessment which 
reveals a risk of exposure cannot oblige workers to perform the work concerned. 
The Directive also contains provisions relating to the prohibition of night work, the right 
to maternity leave for at least 14 weeks and the protection against dismissal for 
pregnant workers until the end of their maternity leave. These provisions are dealt with 
in other sections of this study. 
Relevance for platform work 
While the Directive certainly has relevance for platform workers who are pregnant or 
who have recently given birth, it is designed to apply in more traditional types of 
working environments and does not provide for solutions that fit platform work practices. 
Many challenges could arise, such as the application of a risk assessment when there is 
often no physical contact between the platform and the worker, of the temporary 
adjustment of the working conditions and/or working hours of the platform worker 
concerned, and of moving the worker to another job when there is a risk for her safety 
or health. Other enforcement challenges exist, such as the application of the lists of 
hazardous agents and working conditions pregnant workers or workers who have 
recently given birth may under no circumstances be exposed to, as well as the 
prohibition of night work to pregnant platform workers and the protection against 
dismissal of platform workers who are pregnant or have recently given birth. 
Protection against dismissal 
Material scope  
The protection against dismissal of workers in particular situations is ensured under 
different directives and applies in certain situations or when the worker is exercising 
rights that are protected under the respective directives. 
The Pregnant Workers Directive requires Member States to prohibit the dismissal of 
workers during the period from the beginning of the pregnancy to the end of the 
maternity leave, save in exceptional cases not connected with their condition, which are 
permitted under national legislation and/or practice and, where applicable, provided that 
the competent authority has given its consent (Article 10). The new Work-life Balance 
Directive equally requires from Member States that they prohibit dismissals of workers 
who have applied or have taken up their right to paternity leave, paternal leave or 
carer’s leave or who have asked for flexible working arrangements for caring purposes 
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(Article 12). The Directive ensures that the burden of proof remains with the employer273 
(Article 12(3)). The recent TPWC Directive requires Member States to take necessary 
measures to prohibit the dismissal or its equivalent on grounds that workers have 
exercised their rights provided for under the Directive and allocates the burden of proof 
of the opposite to the employers (Article 18). By establishing a general framework for 
informing and consulting employees, the Directive requires Member States to ensure 
adequate protection for the representatives of the workers (Article 7).  
Relevance for platform work 
The protection against any form of a temporary or permanent termination or closure of 
the account or ‘contract’ is of particular relevance to platform workers, irrespective of 
their employment status. Even at the pre-contracting stage, challenges occur in cases 
when applications to register or open an account at a platform may be declined or 
refused by the platform without adequate explanation or reasons. From a strict 
employment perspective this pre-contracting stage can be considered as the recruitment 
phase. This is currently not covered under the existing EU labour legislation, which is 
traditionally concerned with the employment period itself. During recruitment processes, 
employers have to respect the EU anti-discrimination legislation that ensures equal 
treatment on grounds of gender, disability and other protected grounds as referred to in 
Article 19 TFEU. The EU labour law directives, unlike the acquis on equal treatment, 
however, have no material provisions for job seekers and workers who are in search of 
new employment. But after registration or the start of the contract (of employment or of 
the provision of services, depending on the status of the platform worker), timely and 
adequate information provision on the grounds of the decision appears to be 
necessary for the variety of different modalities of contract ‘interruption’ or 
‘termination’ platform workers are confronted with: (temporary) suspension; reduction 
of work assignments; other restrictions imposed by the platform which affect their job 
prospects; account deletion; and termination of the contractual relationship. The non-
payment of a particular assignment or task may not necessarily imply a suspension or 
termination of the contract for a platform worker, but in practice such a refusal seems to 
give rise to many concerns for platform workers. The reasons for a decision not to pay 
for a particular service or job are often based on automated decisions without human 
involvement and/or may be related to the evaluation of the clients, but irrespective of 
this, decisions on non-payment could be treated in the same way as decisions related to 
the contract termination, that is, the provision of an advance notification and statement 
of the reasons for the payment refusal.  
The possibility of challenging the decisions related to the contract interruption (or 
non-payment) is of equal importance for platform workers, especially when these 
decisions are unilaterally applied in contexts where the relationships are exclusively 
virtual and based on automated decisions. This latter point highlights the need for proper 
and effective internal complaint-handling systems and alternative forms of out-
of-court dispute-resolution mechanisms such as external mediation services or 
mechanisms in which the social partners at company or sector level may take up a more 
prominent role in the resolving of particular disputes. Most of the current EU labour 
legislation addressing the protection of the rights of workers appears to emphasise the 
more formal judicial redress before courts as the way to resolve disputes, with only very 
limited attention paid to alternative ways. Platform workers are in practice less organised 
than standard workers. They work mostly in isolation and for powerful platforms. 
Gaining access to affordable, fast and effective dispute resolution systems for individual 
platform workers, irrespective of their labour market status, is a priority. The P2B 
Regulation seems to meet some of these aspirations. Providers of online intermediation 
services have the obligation to establish a free of charge internal complaint-handling 
system and to identify two or more impartial and independent mediators who can be 
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engaged for dispute settlement in case the matter is not resolved following the internal 
complaint-handling system (Article 11 to 14) (see infra).274 
 Collective labour rights 6.1.3
Information and consultation of collective labour force 
Material scope  
Directive 2002/14/EC275 sets minimum requirements for the right to information and 
consultation of workers276 in companies with more than 50 staff277 on matters which 
concern the entire business and its personnel, such as the recent and probable 
developments regarding the economic situation of the company, the employment 
situation (especially when there is a threat to the employment) and on decisions that 
may lead to substantial changes in the work organisation or contractual relations 
(Article 4(2)).  
The practical arrangements for the information and consultation processes, such as its 
timing, periodicity, level of interaction between the workers’ representatives and 
management, and exact scope and content, are to be defined by national legislation and 
industrial relations’ practices in the Member States. Information has to be provided at a 
time and in a way that is appropriate to enable workers’ representatives to conduct a 
study and to prepare for consultation, whereas consultation needs to be organised with 
the appropriate level of management and with the purpose of reaching an agreement in 
cases where managerial decisions may trigger substantial changes in the work 
organisation and/or contractual relations. The Directive furthermore determines that 
Member States have to ensure that the employees’ representatives are entitled to 
adequate protection and guarantees that they are able to properly perform their duties 
(Article 7). Member States have to ensure appropriate measures in the event of non-
compliance by the employers or workers’ representatives, such as administrative and 
judicial procedures to enable the enforcement of the obligations deriving from the 
Directive and shall provide for adequate and effective sanctions in case of infringements 
(Article 8).  
Directive 2009/38/EC278 regulates the procedures for informing and consulting 
employees279 and for the setting up of a European Works Council in undertakings or 
groups of undertakings that have EU-scale businesses. It is applicable to large 
companies with at least 1 000 employees in the Member States and at least 150 
employees in each of at least two Member States (Article 2.1(a)).280 The scope of the 
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information and consultation procedures concern specifically transnational issues 
(Article 1(3)) and these specific information and consultation procedures have to be 
implemented on top of the information and consultation procedures at the level of the 
individual undertaking(s) or establishment(s). The central management of the EU-scale 
undertaking or group of undertakings must conclude a written agreement with a special 
negotiating body on the details relating to the functioning, composition and resources of 
the European Works Council. Should no agreement be reached, subsidiary measures 
apply, which are determined in the Annex to the Directive. The measures define the 
scope of the content of the information and consultation procedures, including the 
economic and financial situation of the undertakings, employment forecasts, substantial 
changes concerning the organisation, introduction of new working methods or production 
processes and establishing the right of the European Works Council to meet at least once 
a year with the central management.  
Directive 98/59/EC281 determines that an employer considering collective 
redundancies has to inform the competent national authorities in writing (Article 3) and 
start consultations with the workers’ representatives with a view to reaching an 
agreement (Article 2(1)). Collective redundancies are defined in the Directive as 
dismissals effected by the employer for reasons that are not related to the individuals 
concerned. With a view to establishing a minimum number of dismissals in order to be 
considered as a collective redundancy, Member States can define the number of 
redundancies and choose between different minimum quotas, depending on a reference 
period during which the redundancies are taking effect: at least 10 dismissals (for 
companies with between 20 and 100 workers), at least 10% (for companies with 
between 100 and 300 workers) and at least 30 (in companies with more than 300 
workers), when the reference period is 30 days. When the reference period is 90 days 
the minimum is established at 20 dismissals, irrespective of the number of workers who 
are employed by the company (Article 1(a)). The Directive establishes the procedure for 
the consultation which shall, at least, cover ways and means of avoiding collective 
redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, and of mitigating the 
consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for 
redeploying or retraining workers made redundant (Article 2(2)). Employers need to 
provide the workers’ representatives in due course with the information about the 
reasons for the redundancies, the number of workers affected and the period during 
which the redundancies will come into effect, as well as on the method for calculating 
the redundancy payments. Workers’ representatives are entitled to make constructive 
proposals during the consultation, and only after the end of the consultation procedure 
can employers proceed with the collective redundancies.282 
Relevance for platform work 
The three directives on collective rights, which establish information and consultation 
obligations to be adhered to by employers, apply to company environments and 
employment relationships between employers and workers (employees). The self-
employed providing services to these companies are not part of their scope of 
application.  
The right to be informed and consulted on the business performance of the 
platforms, the employment forecasts including possible employment reduction 
and decisions that may affect the work organisation is, however, very relevant for all 
platform workers, including those with a self-employed status. Platform workers have 
also reported their concern at the lack of any information made available to them on the 
platforms’ business performance. They also pointed out that changes in the work 
organisation - often related to the algorithmic management through the use of digital 
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apps - happen regularly but without prior notification to, or any consultation with, the 
workers. Platform businesses seem to continuously adjust the work organisation in an 
attempt to improve efficiency, by minimising and often externalising the operational 
costs. Since contractual relationships in platform businesses are often very precarious, 
the provision of information and consultation appears to be even more important for 
platform workers than for those in more standard working environments.  
The typical ‘depersonalised’ employment relationship characterising platform work and 
often absent direct (personal) contact between the platform (its human management) 
and the platform worker appear to make systemic information and consultation 
processes harder to implement in practice. Platform workers often operate with little or 
no direct contact with their colleagues, which may hinder information exchange, 
collective action, selection of workers’ representatives and/or the establishment of 
workers’ organisations. Platform businesses have, however, functional digital 
applications which aim to ensure that the platform workers are - and remain - connected 
with the platform, and which serve as a means for exchanging information between the 
platform and the platform worker primarily for operational and management purposes. 
Expanding the functions of these digital applications to provide information to all workers 
collectively, and even to promote information exchange between the platform workers 
and facilitate consultation, should not be too complicated. The analysis of the challenges 
in Section 4, however, shows that some platforms are using their task allocation apps to 
increase internal competition between individual platform workers. The apps appear to 
be designed in a way that discourages or even prevents workers to take any collective 
initiative or action. 
Directive 2002/14/EC definitely has high relevance for platform workers who are 
employed by the platforms, but its provisions appear insufficiently, or not at all, adapted 
to the platform work’s digital business environment, making it relatively easy to 
circumvent these obligations. The Directive does not apply to self-employed (dependent) 
platform workers – although information on the economic situation, employment 
forecasts and changes in work organisation is equally important to them. 
Several platforms operate on an EU-wide scale, with undertaking(s) or establishments 
in more than one Member State. Their central management structures often differ from 
the management structures in the country where the platform worker is active, and even 
in the latter instances it is not always clear who is effectively in charge because of the 
more virtual relationship between the platform and the platform worker. In such 
instances, the European Works Council has relevance for the platform workers who are 
workers. Self-employed platform workers fall outside the scope of protection provided by 
Directive 2009/38/EC on the European Works Council, but they are also concerned by 
the matter.  
The existing Directive insufficiently protects the rights of platform workers where 
platform businesses are operating in different Member States in parallel and in highly 
competitive markets, and even globally. Platform workers should be kept informed 
through structured consultation on transnational issues which affect financial and 
employment forecasts, as well as on more work-related matters such as substantial 
changes in work organisation or introduction of new working methods. But this does not 
often happen, and the lack of representation of platform workers at company or sector 
level in platform businesses is critical here, as previously discussed. 
Platform businesses sometimes withdraw from markets as fast as they entered them, 
having operated locally for relatively short periods. Mergers and acquisitions of platform 
businesses, however, seem to occur more often.283 These constantly changing business 
                                           
283
 Examples are Take Eat Easy which was set up in Belgium in 2013 and left the market in 2017, Deliveroo 
who decided to withdraw from the German market mid-2019 after four years of operation, the acquisition by 
the Dutch Takeaway.com of Deliveroo Hero’s business in Germany in 2018, then in 2019 announced the 
merger between Takeaway.com and Just Eat in the UK. 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
159 
structures have far-reaching repercussions for the daily operations affecting platform 
workers. Adequate and timely information provision and proper consultation with 
platform workers’ representatives would certainly contribute to better protection of their 
rights.  
The right to be informed and consulted when platforms are considering collective 
dismissals is applicable when platform workers are effectively workers and not engaged 
as self-employed by the platform business. The Collective Redundancies Directive does 
not, however, apply to contracts which are concluded for limited periods or for specific 
tasks unless they take place prior to the date of expiry or of completion of the tasks 
(Article 1(2)). In practice, most platforms’ employment relationships appear to have 
many similarities with such fixed-term contracts, which may imply that the Directive 
does not apply in these instances and/or that there are ways to argue that the Directive 
is not applicable as the task and/or time period concerned have already been completed 
or will be completed with due payment for the services rendered. However, as 
elaborated in the section concerned with the Fixed-term Directive, platform workers’ 
contracts are often open-ended types of contracts (zero-hour contracts) that resemble 
more closely the concept of permanent contracts. This could bring them into the scope of 
the Collective Redundancies Directive. In practice, platform workers’ contracts are not 
always straightforward in relation to their terms of duration, as became clear from the 
research on the challenges in Section 4.  
Protection against collective redundancies is nevertheless of importance to platform 
work.284 The provisions of the Directive, however, do not appear to be entirely fit for the 
specificities characterising platform work practices: platform workers do not usually 
share a common physical workplace with the platform management and other platform 
worker colleagues. The contact with the platform and information provision is often 
limited to web-based applications with individual accounts and little or no commonly 
shared information between the workers. Platform workers within the same company or 
undertaking usually have limited mechanisms or tools for collective information 
gathering or sharing and are often prevented by the platforms or by the design of the 
digital apps from being structurally involved in possible consultation processes and from 
taking collective action. The representation of platform workers in platform businesses 
has been reported as one of the main challenges in Section 4. The absence of 
representatives of the platform workers inside the companies makes the application of 
the procedures for consultation, when collective redundancies are considered, not 
practicably possible. Enforcing the right to set up representative bodies for workers in 
platform business may help overcome this challenge. Digital web-based applications are 
currently most often used for the exclusive purpose of the work organisation and task 
allocation to individual platform workers, which is only in the interest of the platform 
business. One idea to promote information exchange and facilitate dialogue and 
consultation between the platform workers would be to extend the digital applications to 
have a two-way information exchange between the workers and the platforms.  
Protection against collective redundancies is of particular relevance in situations where 
platform businesses withdraw from business markets and cease their activities, decisions 
that are often taken drastically and unilaterally285 and which would by definition 
presuppose advanced notification of and consultation with their own workers.286 Such 
withdrawals and cessation of business activities often have far-reaching consequences 
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not only for their own workers but also for the self-employed who were engaged in the 
platform business activities. 
Insolvency of the employer 
Material scope 
Directive 2008/94/EC287 ensures that when employers are in a state of insolvency, 
claims of the employees that arise from their employment contracts or relationships 
against their employers, as well as their severance pay on the termination of the 
employment, are granted protection in accordance with national law. Member States are 
obliged to take measures to ensure that institutions will guarantee the payment of the 
outstanding claims. The Directive explicitly states that Member States cannot exclude 
part-time workers, fixed-term workers or temporary agency workers (Article 2(2)). 
Member States can extend the employee protection to other situations of insolvency, for 
instance in situations where the payments have de facto been stopped on a permanent 
basis (Article 2(4)). 
Relevance for platform work 
The Directive applies only to employees or workers (and not to the self-employed) but 
explicitly states that part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency workers are included in 
its remit, which makes the Directive particularly relevant for platform workers in non-
standard forms of employment.  
The Directive primarily aims to regulate the functioning of the guarantee institutions 
while ensuring the rights of employees for their claims arising from their employment 
contract to ultimately be paid. It applies in situations where the business has been 
subject to collective proceedings based on the insolvency of the employer, or when the 
business has already been closed down, at the very final stage of liquidation. Such a 
situation presupposes that the payments to the workers were terminated at some point 
when the business deteriorated. Without prejudice to the relevance and importance of 
the Directive for workers, including platform workers, protection against payment claims 
in general, but also in the preceding stages of business deterioration, appear to be of 
greater relevance. This seems to be specifically the case for platform workers whose 
contracts and payment conditions are often more variable than in standard forms of 
employment and who are often insufficiently or not at all organised or represented at the 
company level to tackle the payment claims. Section 4 indicates that platform workers 
are often confronted with situations where their services have not been paid for, and 
payment claims appear to be one of the main subjects of contestation in platform 
businesses in some countries.288  
Platforms are often operating in highly competitive business markets in which few 
players are active. There is a constant objective to optimise the operational costs by 
increasing productivity and efficiency with the ultimate aim of reducing the selling prices 
for the services that are provided and paid for by the (often private) consumers. The 
initial investment cost for entering the local markets and implementing the web-based 
technologies has to be recovered from usually low profit margins on the individual 
services that are provided. Scaling and volume appear to be the way to make the 
business profitable. The heavy competition implies relatively short life cycles for some 
platform businesses that terminate their activities after being in business for only a short 
while. Deteriorating business can lead to the insolvency of the employers which in turn 
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can affect the income security of platform workers. Some cases have been reported in 
our research on the national challenges.289 
Several uncertainties, and more importantly, some enforcement challenges, remain. 
How is the Directive to be made applicable in practice for platform work, as the platform 
workers are often working in isolation and without the support of a representative 
organisation that can take their claims to heart? Are the claims sufficiently recorded and 
submitted to the institution that is entrusted with guaranteeing the payment according 
to national legislation? How about the duration that is needed to pay out the guaranteed 
claims to the affected platform workers? 
The recently adopted Insolvency Directive (EU) 2019/1023290 complements Directive 
2008/94/EC in several ways. It requires Member States to ensure that companies in 
difficulty or in all likelihood facing insolvency have access to early warning tools that can 
detect circumstances that may lead to insolvency and which require urgent action. The 
Directive focuses on the early stages when companies are accumulating debt which may 
lead to a possible insolvency and to subsequent collective proceedings or liquidation as 
covered by Directive 2008/94/EC. Companies, as well as their workforce, should have 
access to relevant and up-to-date information on the availability of the early warning 
tools. Applying preventive restructuring frameworks may not affect the individual and 
collective rights of the workers. The Directive reconfirms the right to information of the 
workers’ representatives on information regarding the company’s activities and economic 
situation and regarding any preventive restructuring procedure which may affect the 
employment in the company, including the ability of workers to recover their wages and 
any future payments. The Directive also establishes the right to information and 
consultation of the workers’ representatives on the restructuring plans before they are 
adopted (Article 13).   
 Social protection 6.1.4
Access to social protection 
Material scope  
The Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-
employed291 clearly targets ‘both persons who are working in the framework of an 
employment relationship (workers) and persons working on their own behalf (self-
employed)’ (Article 7(b) on the definition of the labour market status), but also to people 
transitioning between either status or having both statuses as well as to persons whose 
work is interrupted by the occurrence of one of the risks covered by social protection 
(Article 3.1). Member States are recommended to provide access to adequate social 
protection to all workers and the self-employed and to establish minimum standards 
concerning the formal coverage, effective coverage, adequacy and 
transparency of some branches of social protection: (1) unemployment benefit 
schemes, (2) sickness and health care benefits, (3) maternity and paternity benefits, (4) 
invalidity benefits, (5) old age benefits and survivor’s benefits, and (6) benefits in 
respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases, ‘insofar they are provided in the 
Member State’. The latter qualification is interesting as it may imply that Member States 
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which do not have all mentioned social security schemes for workers and/or for the self-
employed should not necessarily introduce the schemes that are not yet in place as this 
is particularly relevant in the case of the self-employed. Social assistance and minimum 
income protection schemes are explicitly excluded from the scope. Workers and the self-
employed have a right to participate in listed social protection schemes and to adequate 
social protection but the Recommendation acknowledges that different rules may apply 
for workers and for the self-employed (Article 5). Member States are recommended to 
ensure access to adequate social protection regarding all enumerated social risks for ‘all 
workers on a mandatory basis, regardless of the type of employment relationship and to 
the self-employed at least on a voluntary basis and where appropriate on a mandatory 
basis’ (Article 8 on formal coverage).  
The Recommendation also contains provisions that aim to make the protection more 
effective, especially for the self-employed and workers in non-standard forms of 
employment. Specifically, the rules governing contributions and entitlements should not 
hinder the possibility of accruing and accessing benefits due to the type of employment 
relationship or of labour market status; and the differences in the rules governing the 
schemes between labour market statuses or types of employment relationships should 
be proportionate and reflect the specific situation of the beneficiaries (Article 9). 
Member States are furthermore recommended to ensure that the entitlements are 
preserved, accumulated and/or transferable across all types of employment and self-
employment statuses and across economic sectors, throughout the person’s career or 
during a certain reference period and between the different schemes within a given 
social protection branch (Article 10). Benefits that are paid upon the occurrence of a risk 
are to be provided in a manner that is timely, adequate, upholding a decent standard of 
living, and providing appropriate income replacement while preventing the beneficiaries 
from falling into poverty (Article 11). When determining the level of contributions, 
Member States are recommended to ensure that they are proportionate to the 
contribution capacity of the workers and the self-employed (Article 12).  
Relevance for platform work 
Recital 11 of the Recommendation considers the growing variety of employment 
relationships and refers to on-demand work, voucher-based work and platform work as 
examples of this diversity. The Recommendation notes that the national rules on 
contributions and entitlements to social protection schemes are still largely based on full-
time, open-ended employment contracts between a worker and single employer, while 
some non-standard forms of employment and some self-employed have insufficient 
access to social protection branches that are more closely related to the participation in 
the labour market (Recital 13).  
The Recommendation has some relevance for platform workers, though it is indirect and 
limited. Unlike the case for EU labour legislation, self-employed platform workers are 
included in the remit, as are platform workers who are working in the framework of non-
standard forms of employment. In spite of it being a Recommendation and of introducing 
only minimum standards, some provisions are of particular relevance for platform 
work. Member States are recommended to ensure that the self-employed have access 
to the listed social protection branches at least on a voluntary basis, and where 
appropriate on a mandatory basis. Addressing social protection of the self-employed is a 
key response in the overall context of platform work, which in practice is for a large part 
performed by those self-employed who fall outside of the scope of EU labour legislation. 
Provisions aiming at the preservation and transferability of the rights, and at reducing 
the importance of the minimum entitlement and qualifying conditions for social benefit 
entitlement, are often dependent on national social protection systems. This is because 
they have a significant impact on the effective access to social protection of self-
employed platform workers, and workers who have an employment relationship of a 
very short duration, or for a very specific and small task and/or who work for various 
platforms simultaneously. Adequate levels of benefits, which aim to ensure a decent 
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standard of living and to prevent poverty, as well as assessing the contributory capacity 
of the workers or self-employed when establishing the contribution levels, are principles 
that take into account the day-to-day precariousness many of the platform workers are 
confronted with in reality.  
The Recommendation has importance for platform work as one of the types of non-
standard employment as it calls on Member States to open up formal and effective 
access to social security branches for workers with atypical work assignments or 
schedules and professional careers. For self-employed platform workers, the 
Recommendation has a rather limited importance, as it concerns only statutory social 
security schemes and mandatory coverage has not been required. The Recommendation 
remains a softer instrument and does not have the same impact as the labour directives, 
leaving it up to the Member States to decide on possible actions in the field of social 
protection of the platform workers. 
Maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave and carers’ leave 
Material scope  
The Work-life Balance Directive 2019/1158,292 which entered into force on 1 August 
2019, lays down the minimum requirements related to parental leave, paternity leave 
and carers’ leave and to flexible work arrangements for workers who are parents or 
carers. Its main purpose is ‘to achieve equality between men and women with regard to 
labour market opportunities and treatment at work by facilitating the reconciliation of 
work and family life for workers who are parents or carers’. The new Directive replaces 
the older Parental Leave Directive293 which is repealed with effect from 2 August 2022. 
Member States have three years to transpose the provisions into their own national 
legislative and administrative frameworks. The new Directive strengthens the right to 
(paid) parental leave but also introduces new rights such as the (paid) paternal leave, 
the carer’s leave and the right to flexible working arrangements for caring purposes. The 
Directive applies to all workers and refers to CJEU case law when determining its 
personal scope (Article 2) while it also explicitly mentions that part-time work, fixed-
term work and temporary agency work are covered within its scope.294 Minimum 
requirements relating to maternity leave are governed by the (older) Pregnant Workers 
Directive 92/85/EEC295 but also by Directive 2006/54/EC on gender equality in 
employment and Directive 2010/41/EU on gender equality of the self-employed.  
Fathers, or equivalent second parents, have the right to paternity leave of ten 
working days on the occasion of the birth of their child. Member States can decide 
whether these days can be partly taken before or only after the birth or determine other 
more flexible take-up arrangements (Article 4(1)). During paternity leave workers are 
entitled to receive an allowance which equals at least the amount of the sickness 
allowance of the Member State concerned (Article 8(2)).296 Workers have furthermore 
the individual right to parental leave of four months, which has to be taken before the 
child reaches eight years297 and out of which two months are not transferable (Article 
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5).298,299 For the two non-transferable months workers are entitled to receive a payment 
or allowance that Member States have to establish300 (Article 8(3)). Member States are 
required to regulate the circumstances under which employers are allowed to postpone 
the granting of parental leave for a reasonable period of time on the grounds that the 
taking of parental leave at the time requested would seriously disrupt the good 
functioning of the employer (Article 5(5)).301 The Pregnant Workers Directive establishes 
the right of workers to a continuous period of maternity leave of 14 weeks allocated 
before and/or after confinement in accordance with national legislation and/or practice 
(Article 8). A similar provision is stipulated by Directive 2010/41/EU on gender equality 
of the self-employed, which states that Member States shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that female self-employed ‘workers’, as well as female spouses and 
life partners of the self-employed, are granted a sufficient maternity allowance enabling 
interruptions in their occupational activity owing to pregnancy or motherhood for at least 
14 weeks (Article 8(1)).302 
Workers are furthermore granted the right to carer’s leave of at least five working 
days per year and per worker (Article 6), while Member States have to ensure that 
workers can take time off from work on grounds of force majeure for urgent family 
reasons in cases where illness or accident makes the immediate presence of the worker 
indispensable (Article 7). Workers have furthermore the right to request flexible working 
arrangements for caring purposes (Article 9), defined as ‘the possibility to adjust their 
working patterns, including through the use of remote working arrangements, flexible 
working schedules or reduced working hours’ (Article 3). 
When workers return to their job after a period of leave, they are entitled to receive 
equivalent posts on terms and conditions that are no less favourable to them and to 
benefit from any improvement in the working conditions to which they would have been 
entitled had they not taken the leave (Article 10(2)). Member States have to ensure that 
workers who have applied or exercised their right to paternity, parental or carer’s leave, 
or to more flexible working arrangements for caring purposes, won’t be less favourably 
treated on the basis of these grounds (Article 11). Workers cannot be dismissed on the 
sole grounds of their having applied or exercised their rights under the Work-life Balance 
Directive (Article 12). 
Relevance for platform work 
Equal treatment between men and women in labour market opportunities, working 
conditions through the reconciliation of work and family life for working parents, and the 
social protection of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth, are all 
key objectives for modern labour market policies. The aim is to ensure gender equality 
and higher labour market participation of women, who in practice are most often the 
carers of sick children or relatives. The right to paid paternity leave and paid paternal 
leave, as well as the right to flexible working arrangements for caring purposes and the 
right to carer’s leave, are new and the related provisions need to be transposed by 
Member States in the coming three years. The provisions for time off from work for 
caring purposes address the growing need in European societies to organise informal 
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care. The Directive applies to platform workers, provided they are classified as workers 
and are not self-employed as set out before. 
Platform workers often have non-standard employment relationships with one or more 
platforms. As the right to parental leave (contrary to paternity leave) can still be made 
subject by Member States to a minimum qualifying period of maximum one year, issues 
may arise as to the application of the Directive to platform work when it is delivered in a 
fragmented way or on a very small scale. Other enforcement questions may occur, such 
as how to apply the possibility for platforms to postpone the granting of the parental 
leave for a reasonable period of time in cases where it would seriously disrupt the 
functioning of the business. Many other provisions contained in the Directive are difficult 
to apply in the context of platform work environments, for example the prohibition of 
dismissal when the platform worker has applied or exercised their rights, no less 
favourable treatment when the platform worker returns to their job, the right to more 
flexible working arrangements for caring purposes, the right to more flexible forms of 
parental leave, or the maintenance of rights that were acquired the moment the leave is 
exercised. 
Non-discrimination on grounds of gender, racial or ethnic origin, disability, age, religion 
or belief and sexual orientation 
Equal treatment on grounds of nationality of EU Member States is enshrined in the 
principles of the free movement of workers and the free movement of services, two of 
the cornerstones of the EU internal market. The EU non-discrimination legislation on 
other grounds than nationality is enshrined in the Treaties and in secondary legislation 
by means of directives. Article 157 TFEU requires Member States to ensure the principle 
of equal pay between male and female workers for equal work and work of equal value 
and provides the legal basis for the EU to adopt measures to ensure the application of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women in matters of 
employment. Article 19 TFEU provides the legal basis for the EU to take appropriate 
action to combat discrimination on the basis of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Both articles of the TFEU have been used as 
the basis for extensive EU legislation combating discrimination, which has been 
complemented over the years by considerable CJEU case law, often concerned with the 
personal scope of application of the respective directives. 
Six EU directives have been included in current legal analysis. Three of these directives 
aim to ensure equal treatment (on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age, sexual orientation and gender) in the employment field: access 
to employment, working conditions including remuneration and dismissals, vocational 
training and participation to workers’ representative organisations.303 They are 
nevertheless also relevant for the self-employed albeit in a more restrictive way, and 
often limited to ensure equal treatment regarding the access to self-employment. The 
three directives are hence predominantly concerned with employment relationships and 
situations in which workers can be subject to discriminatory approaches by the 
employers for reasons of their gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation throughout the employment cycle, that is, from the recruitment 
until the contract termination. The directives aim at prohibiting direct and indirect 
discrimination and establish important legal concepts such as the concept of 
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harassment304 and reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. The directives 
apply in the context of platform work, as recruitment, working conditions, payment and 
dismissals of platform workers should be non-discriminatory and platforms with whom 
they have an employment relationship are liable in the case of the opposite. Access to 
self-employment is equally covered by the directives and no discrimination can occur in 
that regard.  
Two other directives concerning equal treatment between men and women are relevant 
to platform workers, when self-employed305 and in matters of social security 
arrangements for both workers and self-employed.306 EU legislation on equal 
opportunities and equal treatment has advanced most on the gender dimension and to 
some extent on the race dimension. Of the four other main grounds for discrimination, it 
has focused on the employment area. 
The remaining Directive equally concerns gender equality but in a very different context: 
access to goods and services that are publicly available.307 The Directive specifically 
concerns the relationship between a provider of goods or services on the one hand and a 
consumer on the other. Such a relationship bears similarities to the triangular 
relationship characterising platform work. Discrimination can work both ways: on the 
side of the provider when providing services to consumers, but also vice versa as 
consumers can also use discriminatory approaches when selecting particular products or 
services. In the case of the former, the question arises as to whether it is the platform 
worker or the platform who is to be specifically considered as the provider and 
consequently who may be liable. Where liability has to be determined, there are 
repercussions for the employment or labour market status of the platform worker. 
Material scope  
Equal treatment in the employment area implies that there shall be no direct or indirect 
discrimination in: (a) conditions for access to employment, to self-employment or to 
occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch 
of activity and at all levels of the professional hierarchy including promotion; (b) access 
to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced 
vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience; (c) employment 
and working conditions, including dismissals and pay; (d) membership of, and 
involvement in, an organisation of workers or employers, or any organisation whose 
members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such 
organisations.308 Equal treatment in the employment field is ensured by separate 
directives for the six different grounds of discrimination: gender,309 racial and ethnic 
origin,310 religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation.311 Whereas the 
conditions governing access to employment (a) apply to both workers and the self-
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employed, the provisions concerning vocational training (b), working conditions (c) and 
membership of workers’ organisations (d) apply generally only to workers. As has been 
mentioned before, the CJEU stated that it would follow its case law on the free 
movement of workers when interpreting the concept of worker.312   
The Race Directive and directives concerned with equal treatment on grounds of gender 
cover a wider material scope than the employment area. The Race Directive also covers 
social protection, including social security and healthcare, social advantages, 
education and access to and supply of goods and services which are available 
to the public,313 whereas the Gender equality in employment Directive also includes 
occupational social security schemes and the Gender equality in social security 
Directive is concerned with statutory social security schemes314 for specific social risks: 
sickness, invalidity, old age, accidents at work and occupational diseases and 
unemployment.315  
Equal treatment when accessing goods and services is provided for under the Race 
Directive on grounds of racial or ethnic origin and it forms the subject of a separate 
directive on gender equality, which applies to all persons providing goods and services, 
which are available to the public in both the private and public sectors, and which are 
offered outside the area of private and family life.  
The Gender equality of self-employed Directive applies to the self-employed, or persons 
pursuing a gainful activity on their own account, under the conditions laid down by 
national law as well as their spouses or life partners when they habitually participate in 
the activities of the self-employed and perform the same or ancillary tasks.316 It is the 
Member States’ legislation that will define the status of self-employed and hence the 
scope of application of the Directive. The latter contains a rather broad definition of the 
principle of equal treatment by stipulating that it concerns ‘for instance’ the 
establishment of a self-employed activity (Article 4(1)). The Directive furthermore 
stipulates a right to sufficient maternity benefits for at least 14 weeks for self-employed 
females and female spouses or life partners of the self-employed. 
The equal treatment directives systematically cover both direct and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs when a person is treated less favourably than 
another, or has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the 
discrimination grounds. Indirect discrimination on the other hand occurs where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular 
gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or 
practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim 
are appropriate and necessary. 
Relevance for platform work 
There is currently only limited research being conducted on the subject of equal 
treatment in the context of platform work. Only the gender dimension has received any 
attention, predominantly by networks or bodies which are actively involved in gender 
research.317 The reports point to the likelihood of the existing horizontal and vertical 
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segregation of women in the labour market worsening and a greater polarisation 
between high- and low-skilled jobs occurring if no appropriate measures are taken, such 
as the active promotion of women in STEM/ICT-related education and jobs and a more 
equal take-up between women and men of caring responsibilities for relatives. Moreover, 
under present research, discrimination has not been reported by the national experts as 
a critical challenge. The fact that it is not considered an issue of primary concern may be 
because discrimination is not always visible or traceable in platform businesses, or 
because of a structured under-reporting of discriminatory cases, as suggested by the 
Report on gender equality and the collaborative economy for the European network of 
legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination.318 Platform workers often 
perform their services individually, at home or in atypical environments and not in 
standard work situations, without any form of social control by peers or representative 
bodies and with only online contact with the platform and/or with the customer, and 
these appear to be factors that may create environments in which discrimination may 
more easily remain unnoticed and hence under-reported. The economic dependency of 
the platform worker on the platform or on the income gained through the platforms may 
furthermore discourage reporting by victims who are often already in a precarious work 
situation. The typical triangular relationship characterising platform work and the often 
unclear relationships between the three actors may also blur liability and accountability 
lines where discrimination is concerned. Platform apps that allow direct evaluation by 
clients of the platform worker’s performance may also trigger discriminatory approaches 
with sometimes direct consequences for the platform worker’s job prospects in case they 
are being rated lower on discriminatory grounds. Discrimination may take other forms 
than those known about in more traditional business sectors and that occur digitally and 
only online. Cyber-harassment and violence target significantly more women than men. 
The flexibility of the work organisation - the freedom to choose whether to accept a job 
and decide when to perform it - is often used to argue that platform businesses are 
offering exactly those work opportunities for groups of persons who otherwise would not 
participate in the labour market. The reality may, however, be much more nuanced 
when one considers the often very low payment rates combined with the low job security 
and the high competition between platform workers who are working for the same 
platform. Women may be particularly affected, and out-of-real-life platform practices 
may imply that they have fewer opportunities to access work because of requirements, 
for example, to be reachable at all times or to work at inconvenient hours. This may 
further hamper the work-life balance of women who are still for the most part the main 
caregivers. But other categories of workers may also be subject to unequal treatment, 
especially when considering the very low pay and protection of platform jobs. Focus 
groups that were held under the present research pointed to the very fast-changing 
composition of the platform workers of a food delivery company, which at first mainly 
contracted students, but which is now being staffed primarily by foreign low-skilled 
workers.   
The equal treatment provisions concerned with the employment context apply to 
workers in general and hence also to platform workers who are classified as ‘workers’. 
Platforms which are employing platform workers have to ensure that there is no 
favourable treatment of certain categories of workers compared with others in a 
comparable situation on grounds of their gender, age, disability, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief or sexual orientation. These equal treatment provisions apply to the 
recruitment procedures but also to the working conditions and the remuneration of the 
platform workers, their access to vocational training and membership of representative 
organisations. Self-employed platform workers are covered by these equal treatment 
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provisions only with regard to conditions for access to self-employment and to 
occupation, and membership of an involvement in an organisation of employers.319  
What about in cases where platforms’ apps or its subscription or recruitment procedures 
treated certain platform workers more favourably than others by setting age conditions 
or requiring general ICT skills? Would the former be challenged under the Employment 
Directive as a direct discrimination on grounds of age and the latter under the Gender 
equality in employment Directive as an indirect discrimination of women, since women 
are significantly underrepresented in ICT-related education and jobs? What about the 
situation of self-employed platform workers? Directive 2010/41/EU ensures equal 
treatment on the basis of gender for the self-employed but it remains rather vague as to 
its material coverage by referring only to ‘for instance the setting up of a self-employed 
activity’ without referring to the actual execution of that self-employed activity.  
The directives which aim to ensure equal treatment in the employment area use various 
concepts that are based on more traditional employment contexts. Platform work and 
practices challenge these concepts because of specific features that characterise the 
different stages of the platform ‘employment cycle’, for example the initial ‘recruitment’, 
work allocation and work organisation, performance evaluation and contract termination. 
The question emerges as to how to apply non-discrimination legislation to platform work 
practices. Platform work ‘recruitment’ is often limited to purely online account 
registration with no human intervention. Discriminatory approaches may sneak in if 
account registration denials disfavour particular groups of persons on grounds of, for 
instance, age or disability. Such a denial could be considered as being covered under the 
directives and be prohibited, provided that there is an employment contract or 
relationship. A self-employed platform worker in such a situation does not have recourse 
to the directives concerned. Work allocation practices in platform work are atypical (on-
demand contracts, zero-hour contracts) and based on (semi)automated decision-making 
that often reflects the outcome of clients’ evaluations. Platform workers who have an 
employment relationship with the platforms can rely on the directives, but their concrete 
relevance can be questioned in such cases - an employer can hardly be forced to ensure 
that there is actual work for the platform worker concerned. Discriminatory approaches 
can, however, sneak in when performance evaluations are based on clients’ subjective 
opinions and are processed in these automated work allocation mechanisms. That the 
directives ensure equal treatment when pay and dismissals are concerned heightens 
both issues for platform workers. The concept of dismissal in traditional labour law 
implies full termination of an employment relationship on the initiative of the employer. 
In platform work practices, very different modalities of termination exist which may or 
may not be considered as equivalent measures of ‘dismissals’, such as access denial, 
temporary or more permanent suspension, reduced allocation of tasks or volume of 
work, or account closure.     
Both Directive 2000/43/EC and Directive 2004/113/EC ensure equal treatment in access 
to goods and services which are publicly available. In a situation where a platform is only 
providing information society services to connect the platform worker and the customer, 
this digital service appears to be part of the material coverage of both directives and 
equal treatment on grounds of gender and race or ethnic origin needs to be ensured. 
The provisions would in such cases cover the relationship between the platform digital 
service provider and the platform worker as the former is providing services that are 
publicly accessible. The provisions also cover the relationship with the clients or 
consumers who buy goods or services through the digital application. In cases of 
discriminatory approaches when offering these goods and services, the question is raised 
as to whether it is the platform, the platform worker or both who are liable and 
accountable.  
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Of particular interest is the triangular relationship characterising platform work and the 
use of performance rating systems which function on the basis of clients’ evaluations. 
When customers assess the provider’s performance, discrimination may occur, with 
sometimes far-reaching consequences for the platform worker’s new job prospects. This 
may happen in cases of on-location platform work where there is personal contact 
between the platform worker and the client, but also in online platform practices. 
Evaluations and rankings may be kept internal but still result in lower chances for new 
work for the individual platform worker, or if such evaluations are shared publicly they 
may lead to more systemised discrimination by other or potential new customers. 
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 The P2B Regulation 6.1.5
Introduction 
On 20 June 2019 the Platform to Business or P2B Regulation on promoting fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation services was adopted.320 This 
new EU Regulation was not included in the original scope of this study because it does 
not concern working conditions or social protection as such and is not part of the EU 
labour and social acquis. 
The material provisions of the Regulation, however, bear some clear similarities with the 
subject of our analysis. It aims equally at regulating a triangular relationship in 
which digital applications or platforms ‘intermediate’ between a professional 
(which possibly could be a platform worker) and the end consumer or client. As the title 
of the P2B Regulation suggests, its material provisions mainly focus on the relationship 
between the platform and the ‘business user’ and on the conditions applicable to this 
relationship. As set out below, the business user is not a worker or employee of the 
platform, but an independent professional or legal person. In accordance with the 
definitions used in the study, self-employed platform workers can be considered 
as business users in the meaning of the Regulation, which would imply that the 
material provisions are applicable to the contractual relationship between the platform 
and the self-employed platform worker.   
For these reasons a comparison between the provisions that apply to an employment 
relationship/contract between a platform and a platform worker (with the status of 
worker) and those that govern a contractual relationship between the same platform and 
self-employed platform workers can be fruitfully explored, and we present a preliminary 
analysis.  
Personal and material scope of the P2B Regulation 
The purpose of the P2B Regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the 
internal market by introducing rules that ensure that business users of online 
intermediation services are granted appropriate transparency, fairness and effective 
redress possibilities.321 The P2B Regulation applies from 12 July 2020 and is directly 
applicable in all Member States.  
The Regulation therefore applies to a very particular type of platform work as 
defined for the purposes of the present study, that is, platform work which is 
facilitated by online intermediation services. Not all online intermediation services fall 
within the scope of the Regulation nor are all online intermediation services covered 
under the Regulation necessarily involving platform work as defined under the present 
study.322,323 The Regulation concerns only online information society services which 
facilitate the initiating of direct transactions between business users and consumers 
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(irrespective of whether the transaction has effectively been concluded and regardless of 
the form of the transaction, which does not need to be based on a contract between the 
business user and the consumer) and which are provided on the basis of a contractual 
relationship between the provider of the intermediation services and the business users 
which offer goods or services to the consumers.324 As a consequence not all online 
platform businesses and hence platform ‘work’ are covered under the scope of the 
Regulation. Critical in this respect is the assessment of whether the platform’s service is 
an information society service or not. Such an assessment seems to be closely 
connected with the questions as to (1) whether the platform is operating in a particular 
business sector or only providing information society services in support of other 
(individual) service providers with a view to connect the latter with their clients or 
customers, and (2) whether the platform is an employer of that individual service 
provider or not, in which case there is only a business relationship between the platform 
and the independent service provider. The very question of whether the digital 
applications and platform businesses are pure information society services, or are part of 
other business sectors such as transport or cleaning, has been the subject of much 
contestation and court rulings across the EU.325  
Business users are ‘any private individual acting in a commercial or professional capacity 
or any legal person who/which, through online intermediation services, offers goods or 
services to consumers for the purposes relating to its trade, business, craft or profession 
(Article 2(1)). The notion of consumer refers only to natural persons, where they are 
acting for purposes which are outside of their trade, business, craft or profession (Article 
2(4)). Pure peer-to-peer intermediation services, without the presence of business 
users, and business-to-business intermediation services for goods and services which 
are not offered to consumers, are not covered under the Regulation.326  
A self-employed platform worker who offers their services through the online 
intermediation of an app to a private person not acting in a professional capacity 
appears to be included within the scope of the Regulation: this may be a self-employed 
person who provides services on location, for example plumbing services or 
childminding, or from a distance and purely online, for example graphic design or 
advisory services. Less clear is the situation of self-employed platform workers who 
offers their services to both private consumers and to companies and ‘individuals who 
act for the purposes of their trade, business, craft or profession’, for example cleaning or 
accounting.  
The Regulation applies to all providers of the online intermediation services regardless of 
whether they are established in or outside the EU on two cumulative conditions: the 
business users have to be established in the EU, whereas the ultimate consumers, who 
are targeted by the business users when selling their goods or services, have to be 
located in the EU irrespective of their place of residence or nationality. 
Whereas the new Regulation is not directly concerned with working conditions and social 
protection of platform workers stricto sensu, its provisions have a direct impact and 
hence relevance for the ‘contractual relationship’ between a business user who is a self-
employed platform worker and the platform offering online intermediation services, 
provided they are covered by the scope of the Regulation. The main purpose of the 
Regulation is to ensure that business users, who in practice are the persons who are 
depending on the platform’s intermediation services to be connected with consumers 
with the aim of concluding a transaction and hence delivering goods or providing 
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services to these consumers, are treated in a transparent and fair way and that they 
have access to effective redress in case of disputes.  
Platforms or the providers of online intermediation services have to have ‘terms and 
conditions’ that are clear and available to the business users during all stages of their 
commercial relationship and hence also before they enter into an effective contractual 
relationship. The terms and conditions must state the grounds for decisions to 
suspend, terminate or impose any other kind of restriction upon the provision of 
the online services to the business user. The providers shall also notify the changes to 
the terms and conditions on a durable medium and a notification period of minimum 15 
days needs to be respected while allowing the business user to terminate the contract 
before the expiry of this notification period.  
Furthermore, providers of online intermediation services are obliged to establish a free 
of charge internal complaint-handling system and identify two or more impartial 
and independent mediators who can be engaged for dispute settlement in case the 
matter is not resolved following the internal complaint-handling system. The internal 
complaint procedure is especially relevant for platform workers challenging customer 
ratings. The Regulation finally reserves the right of representative organisations or 
associations of business users, as well as public bodies that are set up in the Member 
States, to take providers of online intermediation services to court in case of non-
compliance with the requirements it sets out. Such organisations or associations shall be 
set up in accordance with national legislation, be not-for-profit, and pursue objectives 
that are in the collective interest of the business users. Member States can also 
designate existing organisations. Lists of the designated organisations and associations 
have to be communicated to the Commission. 
Comparison between the Directive on Transparent and predictable working conditions and 
the P2B Regulation 
The TPWC Directive and the P2B Regulation (the P2B) were both adopted in summer 
2019 but for varying policy concerns. Both legal instruments contain nonetheless very 
similar approaches and material provisions when it comes to the conditions that have 
to be respected by platform businesses in their contractual relationship with 
professional individuals who are making use of the digital apps when delivering 
their services. However, the core legal difference between them, being their legal 
nature, must be acknowledged. On the one hand, directives are binding as to the result 
to be achieved by each Member State to which it is addressed, but leave the choice of 
form and methods to the national authorities.327 Regulations, on the other hand, have 
general application, are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all Member 
States.328  
The TPWC Directive aims at improving transparency and predictability in the working 
conditions for all workers, while it also introduces new material provisions and labour 
rights. Platform workers are included in the personal scope of the Directive as long as 
they have an employment relationship with a platform/employer (which is determined by 
national law, practice or collective agreement and with consideration of the CJEU case 
law). It does not apply to the self-employed (including platform workers). The P2B 
equally aims to increase the transparency and fairness in the contractual relationships 
between a platform and professionals (business users, be they individuals or legal 
persons), but the latter are not in an employment relationship with the platform. Insofar 
as they provide services, individual business users could have the status of self-
employed platform workers as defined for the purposes of this study.  
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In a study concerned with the working conditions and protection of platform workers 
irrespective of their labour market status, a comparison between the two EU 
instruments, while acknowledging their different objectives and scope of application, 
seems therefore appropriate. In what follows, an attempt is made at such a comparison 
with a view to drawing some relevant conclusions, even if preliminary and not all-
embracing. 
Platform ‘work’ as defined in the study typically concerns triangular relationships 
between a platform (the possible ‘employer’ or possible ‘provider of online intermediation 
services’), the platform worker (the possible ‘worker’/‘self-employed’ or the possible 
‘business user’) and the client (the possible ‘consumer’). 
Table 16: Comparison between the Directive on transparent and predictable working 
conditions and the P2B Regulation 
 Directive on transparent 
and predictable working 
conditions  
P2B Regulation 
Personal scope Workers who have an 
employment relationship or 
contract (including platform 
workers who are ‘workers’ but 
excluding self-employed 
platform workers) 
Business users (including self-
employed platform workers who are 
‘business users’), who have a contract 
with providers of online intermediation 
information society services 
(platforms) 
Obligation and 
provision of 
information 
Art. 3-4 
Essential aspects of the 
employment relationship to be 
provided  
Art. 3 & Art. 8 
Terms and conditions 
Timing and 
means info 
Art. 5  
In written (paper or electronic 
form) within one week or one 
month after start employment 
Art. 3 
Must be available at all stages of the 
contractual relationship on a durable 
medium (including in pre-contractual 
stage) 
Modification 
contract 
Art. 6 
Written document provided at 
the earliest opportunity and at 
the latest on the day it takes 
effect 
Art. 3 (2) & Art. 8 (a) 
Notification period of at least 15 days 
Parallel ‘work’ Art. 9 
Employers cannot prohibit 
work for another employer 
(only on objective grounds) 
Art. 10 
Restrictions have to be mentioned in 
the terms and conditions 
Restriction/ 
suspension/ 
termination/ 
dismissal/ 
equivalent 
measure 
Art. 18 
‘dismissals or equivalent’; 
Written reply with duly 
substantiated grounds for the 
dismissal or equivalent 
measures upon request from 
platform workers; change of 
burden of proof to platforms  
 
Art. 3 (1) (c) & Art. 4 & Art. 8 
Grounds for 
restriction/suspension/termination 
must be mentioned in terms and 
conditions; written statement; prior 
notification in case of suspension and 
at the latest on the day it takes effect; 
30 days notification in case of 
termination; conditions under which 
platform workers can terminate the 
contractual relationship must be 
mentioned in the terms and conditions 
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Redress Art. 16-17 
Right of platform workers to 
bring complaint before court 
or competent authority; right 
to redress 
Art. 11-14 
Internal complaint-handling system, 
mediation, special mediators, judicial 
proceedings by representative 
organisations or associations and by 
public bodies 
Both instruments contain provisions that govern the contractual relationship between the 
platform and the platform worker and install an obligation on the side of the 
platform to provide information concerning the contractual relationship in 
writing and to make that information available to the platform worker at certain 
times. The P2B uses the concept of the ‘terms and conditions’, while the TPWC Directive 
lists the type of information that has to be at least provided in writing to the platform 
worker by enumerating the essential aspects of the employment relationship. 
The terms and conditions have to be easily available at all stages of the commercial 
relationship and hence also in the pre-contractual stage, that is, before they make use 
of the services provided for by the platform. The terms and conditions have to be written 
in a plain and intelligible language. The TPWC Directive on the other hand requires 
that the information is provided either within one week or within a month after the 
start of the employment, and does not specify that this information must be presented in 
an accessible way, as is the case under the P2B. Under the Directive platform workers 
may already have started their employment before they are informed about the essential 
aspects and no reference is made to the obligation to have a contract and hence 
agreement on the essential aspects prior to the start of the employment. 
The P2B requires that the terms and conditions include information on the grounds for 
decisions to suspend, terminate or impose any other kind of restrictions upon, in 
whole or in part, the provision of their online intermediation services to the platform 
workers. This is a matter of particular relevance for platform workers who are confronted 
with various forms of account termination such as access denials prior to the start of the 
co-operation, (temporary) suspension or closures of accounts, reduced access to work 
assignments, and indefinite termination of the accounts. Under the Directive, a similar 
obligation is absent from the list of essential aspects of the employment relationship the 
employing platform is bound to provide information about. The Directive does, however, 
contain other information requirements that are specifically relevant for an employment 
relationship, such as the working time, payment and place of performance. 
Changes and modifications to the contractual terms between the platform and the 
platform worker are differently addressed under the Directive and the Regulation. With 
regard to the modifications of contractual provisions, the P2B specifies a notification 
period of 15 days and excludes the possibility for any retroactive change. Changes can 
only be applied once the notification period has expired and terms and conditions (or the 
specific provisions thereof) which do not comply with these requirements are considered 
null and void. The notification period can even be longer when this is necessary, to allow 
the platform workers to make technical or commercial adaptations to comply with the 
changes. The self-employed platform worker has the right to terminate the contract 
without consequences during the notification period. The TPWC Directive on the other 
hand states that in case of any change to the essential aspects of the employment 
relationship a document must be provided at the earliest opportunity but at the latest on 
the day that the change takes effect. In other words, the P2B ensures that changes to 
the contractual relationship are being notified to the platform worker in advance, hence 
allowing the platform worker to react. This appears not to be the case under the 
Directive, which provides that the written document introducing the changes can be 
supplied on the day it takes effect. 
Under the Directive, Member States have to ensure that employing platforms cannot 
prohibit workers from taking up employment with other employers outside the work 
schedule established with that employer. Member States may regulate conditions for the 
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use of incompatibility restrictions by employers on objective grounds such as health and 
safety, protection of business confidentiality, the integrity of public service or the 
avoidance of conflicts of interests. When platforms operating under the P2B are 
restricting the ability of platform workers to offer the same services to consumers by 
other means than through their online services, they are obliged to mention the grounds 
for such restrictions in the terms and conditions, and the grounds shall include the main 
economic, commercial or legal considerations for those restrictions. The obligation shall 
not, however, affect prohibitions or limitations on the imposition of these restrictions 
that result from the application of other acts of EU or national legislation to which the 
platforms are subject. Both instruments seem to allow platforms to impose certain 
restrictions on the possibility of platform workers offering their services through/to other 
platforms or business under certain conditions. 
In what regards the suspension or termination of the contractual relationship, the 
Directive provides protection to the platform worker from dismissal on the grounds that 
they have relied on one of the rights in the Directive. Platform workers who consider that 
they have been dismissed or been subject to equivalent measures on grounds that 
they have exercised their rights provided for in the Directive have the right to request 
duly substantiated grounds for the dismissal or equivalent measures, which the platform 
has to provide in writing. The platform has the burden of proof when the case is 
submitted to the court or competent authority. The P2B, on the other hand, demands a 
statement of reasons from the platform prior to or at the time of the suspension or 
restriction to be provided on a durable medium. If the platform decides to terminate the 
provision of its online services to a platform worker, the platform is obliged to provide a 
statement of reasons at least 30 days prior to the termination on a durable medium. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, the potential grounds for suspension/termination must 
be included in the terms and conditions. The P2B appears to be more specifically 
oriented to the different modalities of a possible account interruption platform workers 
are confronted with in practice, while the TPWC Directive’s focus is predominantly on the 
termination of the contractual (employment) relationship (in spite of the inclusion of the 
concept of equivalent measures). The P2B requires platforms to have an internal 
complaint-handling system, which has to be used in cases of suspension or termination 
when the platform worker desires. The Directive remains silent on the obligation of the 
platform to notify the platform worker in advance when a termination or suspension is 
considered, but requires that the platform provides a written justification ex post and 
upon request of the platform worker (without, however, specifying the timeline for doing 
so). 
In terms of administrative and judicial redress in cases of disputes between the 
platform worker and the platform, the Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
(platform) workers have access to effective and impartial dispute resolutions and a right 
to redress in case of infringements of their rights arising from the Directive. Member 
States have to take measures necessary to protect workers, including those who are 
workers’ representatives, from any adverse treatment by the employer (platform) and 
from any adverse consequences resulting from a complaint lodged with the employer or 
resulting from any proceedings initiated with the aim of enforcing compliance with the 
rights provided for in the TPWC Directive. The P2B, however, appears to consider judicial 
dispute settlement before courts as a means of last resort. It requires platforms to have 
an internal system for handling complaints from the platform workers, the access to and 
the functioning of which has to be described in the terms and conditions. Platforms are 
furthermore obliged to identify two or more mediators in the terms and conditions, 
whom they are willing to engage with a view to reaching an agreement in case of 
disputes with the platform workers. Platforms are furthermore encouraged to set up 
specialised organisations aimed at providing mediation services for the specific purpose 
of facilitating out-of-court dispute settlement. Finally, the P2B envisages a role for 
organisations and associations representing the interests of platform workers as well as 
for public bodies to take action before national courts in case of non-compliance by 
platforms. 
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Further differences between the TPWC Directive and the P2B Regulation which have 
relevance for the working conditions of platform workers can be discerned. The P2B 
contains a provision on ranking systems in its Article 5. Platforms are obliged to set 
out in the terms and conditions the main parameters determining the ranking of 
platform workers as well as the reasons for the relative importance of these main 
parameters in comparison with others. However, platforms are not required to disclose 
the algorithms. The P2B also has a data protection provision under its Article 9, which 
states that the terms and conditions must contain a description of the contractual and 
technical access that platform workers have to personal and other data provided by 
platform workers and consumers when using the online services. The description in the 
terms and conditions has to contain information on whether the platforms have access to 
personal and other data that are provided by the platform workers and the consumers 
and whether any data are provided to third parties. The P2B encourages the drawing up 
of codes of conduct by the platforms in cooperation with (representative organisations 
of) the business users/self-employed platform workers.  
 Platform work and the General Data Protection Regulation 6.1.6
As established in Section 4,329 data protection is an important issue in the context of 
platform work and has been identified as such in the literature and by many of the 
experts and stakeholders consulted in the fieldwork. Platforms rely heavily on the 
processing of personal data, including behavioural data, from platform workers to enable 
automated or semi-automated decision-making.330 The gathering of (personal) data is 
done through complex computational processes. The subsequent enormous data flow 
and constant digital monitoring allows for a deep intrusiveness into the lives of platform 
workers which is in no way comparable to traditional working relationships. Moreover, 
the decisions which are based on this data collection and processing are mostly 
implemented by automated or semi-automated processes with minimal human 
involvement. Another challenge related to data protection are the rating and review 
systems, which result in a ranking of the individual platform workers. The assignment of 
the next task by the app’s algorithms is for several platform workers directly linked to 
the ratings and reviews they receive from the customers through the platforms’ digital 
applications. What’s more, bad scores or a performance below the algorithm’s standards 
can lead to a lower ranking in the pick-order for new assignments and in some cases to 
the temporary or permanent exclusion (‘deactivation’ or delisting) of the platform worker 
from the platform.  
The GDPR331 lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data (Article 1(1)). It provides platform workers with a range 
of rights concerning their personal data. These rights are inter alia the right to be 
informed if, how, why and by whom your data are being processed; the right to 
access and get a copy of your data; the right to have your data corrected or 
supplemented if it is inaccurate or incomplete; the right to have your data deleted or 
erased; the right to limit or restrict how your data are used; the right to data 
portability; the right to object to processing of your data; and the right not to be 
subject to automated decisions without human involvement, where it would 
produce legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him 
or her.  
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In a landmark test case of the right to access to personal data under the GDPR, four 
current and former Uber drivers are currently taking legal actions against the ride-hailing 
app in the UK.332 The drivers claim that Uber has breached their rights by declining 
access to their personal data Uber holds (Article 15 GDPR). Part of their claim is the right 
to access their performance data including personal data concerning their suspensions 
from the platform, which would enable them to understand how their performance was 
monitored and managed over time. The case illustrates how important a considerable 
right to access of personal data is for platform workers and for the protection of their 
working conditions.  
Article 15 GDPR clearly provides a right to access of personal data. However, what 
exactly constitutes ‘personal data’? The GDPR defines personal data as ‘any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”) […]’.333 Since the 
definition includes ‘any information’, one must assume that the term personal data 
should be as broadly interpreted as possible. This broad scope is also affirmed in CJEU 
case law334 and in Opinion 4/2007 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party.335,336,337 It is also in line with the general aim of the GDPR, which intends to give 
more power to data subjects as regards their personal data. This in turn restores to a 
certain extent the power balance between the platform and the platform worker, which 
can only influence working conditions in a positive way. 
However, this does not imply that issues of enforcement and uniformity of interpretation 
won’t arise in the future. Platforms are logically very reluctant to interpret ‘personal 
data’ as broadly as they should despite CJEU case law and Opinion 4/2007 of the Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party. Moreover, it may very well be that divergent 
interpretations of ‘personal data’ among different Member States’ data protection acts 
(DPAs) will lead to divergent enforcement levels, again despite the broad and uniform 
interpretation provided by CJEU case law, Article 29 Working Party and the GDPR. 
The GDPR also contains the right for people not to be subject to a decision based on 
automated processing which produces legal effects concerning them or similarly 
significantly affects them (Article 22(1)). Many decisions affecting platform workers are 
in fact based on automated processing, for example the deactivation or suspension from 
their accounts. However, the right not to be subject to a decision based on automated 
processing does not apply if it is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a 
contract between the data subject and a data controller (Article 22(2)(a)). This 
exception seems to apply to the platform economy. Platforms deal with an enormous 
quantity of data that is being processed, which makes routine human involvement 
impractical or even impossible.  
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However, even if automated decision-making is allowed, the platforms are still obliged to 
provide meaningful information to platform workers on the existence of automated 
decision-making. As it stands, opacity seems to be at the core of these algorithms.338 If 
you are a recipient of the output of the algorithms, rarely do you have any concrete 
sense of how or why a specific decision has been reached from the inputs.339 One 
example is the fact that platform workers are routinely unable to see how their pay rates 
are calculated. Similarly, ride-hail drivers are often left clueless as to how the algorithm 
assigns their rides.340  
Articles 13, 14 and 15 GDPR, which contain information rights for the data subjects, all 
state that in ‘the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to 
in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about 
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences 
of such processing for the data subject’. 
According to Article 29 Working Party341 ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ 
means that the platform must find simple ways to tell the data subject about the 
rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision. The information 
provided should be sufficiently comprehensive for the data subject to understand the 
reasons for the decision.342,343 The terms ‘significance’ and ‘envisaged consequences’ 
suggest that information must be provided about intended or future processing, and how 
the automated decision might affect the data subject.344 According to Article 29 Working 
Party it means that the controller should provide the data subject with information about 
‘the envisaged consequences’ of the processing, rather than an explanation of a 
particular decision.345 Real tangible examples of the type of possible effects should be 
given to make this information meaningful and understandable.346  
In addition, Article 29 Working Party states that the controller should provide data 
subjects with general information (…) which is also useful for them to challenge the 
decision. In fact, Article 22(3) obliges the data controller to implement suitable 
measures to safeguard data subjects’ rights and freedoms and legitimate interest, at 
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express 
their point of view and to contest the decision. The minimal safeguards laid down in 
Article 22(3) necessarily involve an exchange of views - a dialogue - between the data 
subject and the controller. 
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The GDPR, therefore, as interpreted by Article 29 Working Party, does support an 
extensive right to an explanation for data subjects. The platforms will need to provide 
the platform workers with general information which is useful for them to challenge the 
decision. Platform workers will only be able to challenge these decisions or express their 
views if they fully understand how they have been made and on what basis.347 Whether 
this amounts to a fully-fledged right to an explanation of a particular decision is 
debatable, but in any case the information provided to the platform worker must be 
sufficient and useful to effectively challenge any decision that affects them (e.g. 
deactivating their account). However, it remains to be seen how the platforms will apply 
these rules in practice. Issues of enforcement may arise in the future.  
Next, the GDPR provides a right to data portability (Article 20 GDPR), which favours the 
sharing and transfer of the data between different platforms. If platform workers are 
allowed to transfer their personal data to another platform, it could in theory open up 
competition in the platform economy. First, it could prevent platform workers being 
locked in and bound by one single platform. Effective transfers of data between 
alternative platforms would furthermore boost the transparency and fair competition as 
it would allow platform workers greater power to choose the platform with the best 
working conditions. In other words, it would give platform workers more control over 
their personal data, which is one of the cornerstones of the GDPR. The same 
considerations are echoed in the Preliminary Opinion on ‘Privacy and Competitiveness 
in the age of big data’ of the European Data Protection Supervisor, where it is said 
that the right to data portability ‘would potentially empower individuals while also 
promoting competitive market structures’.348  
Article 20 GDPR provides this right to data portability in a twofold structure. First, 
platform workers can obtain a copy of their data ‘in a structured, commonly used and, 
machine-readable format’ (Article 20(1)). Second, it provides the right ‘to have the 
personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically 
feasible’. Thus, the GDPR clearly provides a right to data portability which would in 
theory soften the lock-in effect experienced by platform workers today. However, as 
elaborated below, there are still some important barriers to a fully fledged right to data 
portability in the current GDPR framework.  
First, Article 20(2) GDPR clearly states that the right to have the personal data 
transmitted directly from one platform to another is only obligatory where it is 
technically feasible.349 This is affirmed in Recital 68 stating that there is no obligation 
for the controllers to adopt or maintain processing systems which are technically 
compatible. It further states that data controllers should be encouraged to develop 
interoperable formats that enable data portability. This is worrying given the fact that 
the dominating platforms do not have a real incentive to enable platform workers to 
switch to other platforms, as this would jeopardise their own position.  
Second, the portability right applies to provided data and to observed data. It does not 
apply, as Article 29 Working Group refers to, to the inferred or derived data. Provided 
data includes personal data that the platform worker has actively provided to the 
platform, for example, the information on the profile that the platform workers have 
provided, such as their photos. Observed data are the data provided by the platform 
worker by virtue of the use of the app. By this we mean the behavioural data which have 
been gathered by observing the platform workers’ behaviour such as activity logs, traffic 
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data, and so on. Finally, inferred data are the data then developed by the platform from 
the first two categories. Inferred data are the result from the analysis of the provided 
and observed data. In other words, these data are produced by the platform itself (e.g. 
through data mining) and on the basis of its own software applications. 
The interpretation as to whether the data are provided, observed or inferred is therefore 
crucial in opening a right to data portability. Yet it is easy to imagine that the boundaries 
between these different kinds of data will be very hard to establish in practice. Let’s 
take, for example, the case of reputational data (through ratings and customer reviews), 
which is very relevant in the platform economy.  
Portability of reputational data (through customer reviews/scores) can be crucial for 
platform workers, as the reputation is among the main criteria potential customers will 
consider when choosing between different offers on a platform. If a platform worker 
needs to start building their reputation from scratch on the new platform, it will only 
amplify the lock-in effect on the current platform.  
We could easily imagine that the individual customer reviews/scores are part of the 
observed data. However, one could at the same time argue that the agglomerated score 
is created by the platform itself and forms part of the so-called inferred data which are 
not portable to another platform.350  
Nonetheless, it is very likely that the distinction between provided, observed and 
inferred data will only prove to be a false dilemma the platform worker faces. As 
elaborated above, the scope of the right to access (Article 15 GDPR) is very broad and 
includes all types of data concerning the platform worker. Thus, under the right to 
access, the worker can obtain all data (e.g. reputational data) concerning them. This 
includes inferred data. The platform worker can make an access request and then share 
it with another platform (provided it does not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of 
others). That way, the platform worker bypasses the distinction between provided, 
observed and inferred data under the right to data portability. 
Finally, the right to data portability ‘shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of 
others’ (Article 20(4)). In the case of the potential portability of reputational data, this 
could be the consumers of the app who expressed their evaluation on the service.351 In 
theory, this would permit the platform to refuse a portability request as soon as personal 
data of these consumers are involved.352 However, it must be noted that Article 29 
Working Group has also tried to extend the application to the data which involve more 
than one data subject. Concretely, they have stated that when a data controller 
processes ‘information that contains the personal data of several data subjects’, one 
‘should not take an overly restrictive interpretation of the sentence “personal data 
concerning the data subject”’.  
 Preliminary conclusions 6.1.7
In what follows an attempt is made to summarise the analysis of the existing EU 
legislation concerned with working conditions and social protection on their relevance for 
platform work and platform workers. We have tried not to structure the summary on the 
basis of the individual legal instruments but have instead taken the labour rights and 
working conditions as the main starting point. Before presenting the material 
provisions covered by the EU labour and social protection legislation, we first consider 
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the main issues related to the personal scope of application of the legislation - the key 
challenge typical for platform work. 
Personal scope of EU labour legislation and labour market status of platform 
workers 
EU legislation regulating working conditions and social protection primarily concerns 
workers who have an employment relationship or contract. The self-employed are 
not covered by the personal scope of application. The classification into the binary divide 
between workers and self-employed, for decades the cornerstone of traditional labour 
legislation at domestic and international level, is challenged by the growth of platform 
work and businesses. The latter is characterised by a triangular relationship between the 
platform, the platform workers and the customer, and the prominent role of digital and 
automated applications in the work allocation, organisation and appraisal.   
EU legislation does not contain a definition of the concept of worker and often refers to 
national Member States’ legislation, collective agreements and practices. Through its 
extensive case law the CJEU has, however, steered this process, which has resulted in a 
gradual development of an EU-wide concept of worker characterised by the 
‘subordination’ dimension as one of its main criteria. While most recent EU labour 
legislation is now explicitly referring to CJEU case law when it concerns the concept of 
worker, it also has clarified that various non-standard forms of employment including 
platform work are within its remit. This is the case with the TPWC Directive, which 
includes workers who have no guaranteed working time such as those on zero-hour 
contracts or some on-demand workers in its scope. However, legal definitions of the 
concept of worker still vary between Member States, some of which apply wider 
concepts than the EU definition, while others have introduced a third category distinct 
from ‘workers’ and self-employed. 
The classification of a platform worker as worker or self-employed is ultimately done 
by national courts, which will judge on the factual circumstances in which platform 
workers are delivering their services and on the concrete operational relationship they 
have with the platform and/or with the customer. Subject to an individual case-by-case 
assessment of the circumstances of their relationship to the platform and/or to the end 
user, self-employed platform workers should be, if found ‘bogus’ or ‘false’ self-employed, 
reclassified into workers (in the EU meaning of the concept) on the basis of CJEU case 
law, national legislation or court rulings irrespective of the status agreed to by the 
contractual parties or by national legislation. Evidence from this study suggests varying 
approaches and interpretations between Member States but also within Member States 
between different national courts in terms of the labour market classification of platform 
workers.  
The assessment of the factual circumstances in which individual platform workers are 
delivering their services is likely to remain subject to interpretation and hence 
considerable national case law, due to the continuous changing business operations in 
platform work and modes of cooperation and contracting between the platforms, 
platform workers and customers. This especially holds true in situations when the end 
user could be classified as an employer as well as the platform, and/or when the 
prerogatives of employers are shared between the platform and the end user (firm) as is 
the case in crowdwork.  
The classification of a platform worker into a worker or self-employed has considerable 
consequences in terms of the protection of their working conditions and social risks. EU 
labour legislation concerned with individual working conditions and collective rights do 
not apply to self-employed platform workers. Social protection arrangements, a prime 
responsibility of Member States, have very different access and protection levels for both 
categories.  
 Platform workers who are classified as workers (including bogus self-employed 
platform workers) fall within the remit of EU labour legislation. 
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 Platform workers who are self-employed fall outside of the scope of EU labour 
legislation. Individual self-employed platform workers who are economically 
depending on a single platform and who have low income from platform work 
appear to be the most vulnerable and least protected category of platform 
workers when it concerns individual labour rights and social protection. 
Platform work and non-standard forms of employment 
Workers in non-standard forms of employment, such as part-time, fixed-term and 
temporary agency work have over the years been covered by EU legislation that aims to 
remove discrimination between these non-standard workers and workers in 
full-time employment contracts for indefinite periods of time. The different EU 
directives concerning non-standard forms of employment have hence potential relevance 
for platform work, being a specific type of non-standard work provided the employment 
contract of the platform worker falls within the scope of the directives concerned. 
‘Part-time work’, ‘fixed-term work’, and ‘temporary agency work’ are all established 
legal concepts enshrined in EU labour legislation, but they have lost most of their 
relevance where platform work is concerned because of its wide-ranging application 
modes, the often very fragmented breakdown of work in small-scale tasks, and the more 
open-ended, on-demand contractual relationships platform workers are in practice 
engaged in. The non-standard work directives have therefore a theoretical relevance for 
platform workers in an employment relationship, but may need further adjustment to 
cater for their actual needs and ensure equal treatment between platform workers in 
precarious situations and full-time peers in permanent positions where working 
conditions are concerned. The legally required comparison with full-time or 
permanent workers in the same job and undertakings, and its fallback option with a 
wider comparison in the sector or nationally, often seem to have little practical 
relevance because of the absence of a comparable reference point, especially when the 
platform business is operating in new business markets.  
The Temporary Agency Work Directive regulates a triangular relationship similar to the 
one characterising platform work, but it presupposes the existence of a user 
undertaking under which direction and supervision the temporary agency worker is 
assigned, whereas in platform work the end users are often customers acting in a private 
capacity, making the Directive less relevant for those types of platform work. In cases 
where the end user is a firm and/or could be classified as an employer (such as in 
crowdwork), the Directive can serve as a potentially interesting framework for 
application, provided the platform can be classified as the temporary work agency and 
the end user as the user undertaking in the meaning of the Directive. However, the 
Directive applies only to basic working and employment conditions and Member States 
have considerable room to derogate from the equal treatment provisions. 
The Part-time Work Directive allows for an exclusion of casual work (but only on 
objective grounds and after consultation with social partners), a characteristic feature of 
the platform work of many platform workers who consider it a secondary activity, a side 
business or as a means to earn income to supplement a main source of income. The 
importance of this possibility for Member States to exclude ‘casual platform work’ from 
the remit of the equal treatment provisions appears, however, to be somehow 
counterbalanced in another related context by restricting this possibility under the TPWC 
Directive to very small-scale platform work.  
Some of the provisions of the non-standard work directives, should they be applicable to 
platform work, appear to be very relevant in order to guarantee minimum levels of 
protection for the platform workers, for example the prohibition of unfair dismissals 
on the sole basis of the platform work activity’s scale or working time, the possibility to 
increase and decrease working hours without the risk of dismissal, the 
prevention of abusive practices of successive fixed-term contracts, and access 
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to training opportunities, vacancies and career mobility. Member States are also 
allowed to implement more favourable provisions. 
Individual working conditions 
Obligatory information provision on individual working conditions 
The new 2019 TPWC Directive is key in advancing the minimum requirements that 
employers have to respect in relation to their workers when it concerns their information 
obligation. It also introduces some new rights for all workers not previously regulated at 
EU level. The Directive covers platform workers as long as they have an employment 
relationship and is particularly relevant for them as it contains an information 
obligation when work is mainly unpredictable and specific conditions that are applicable 
to on-demand contracts.  
Employing platforms are obliged to inform their platform workers in writing on the 
essential aspects of the employment relationship, and at the latest one week or one 
month after the platform worker has started work.  
The enumeration of the essential aspects has been extended in comparison with the 
Written Statement Directive and has in several ways significant relevance for platform 
workers (such as the inclusion of the principle that a worker can freely decide their place 
of work as an option, the length of standard working day or week and arrangements for 
overtime in case of work patterns that are entirely or mostly predictable, and conditions 
that apply in case the work pattern is entirely or mostly unpredictable). 
However, there are some aspects characteristic (and considered essential) of 
platform work which have not been included into the list of essential aspects of 
the employment relationship: information on the existence of potentially harmful 
tasks or environment; on the use of equipment, vehicles and tools that are necessary to 
conduct work assignments; on the protection in case of work accidents and occupational 
diseases; on the collection and processing of personal and behavioural data and data 
concerning the work performance; on the use of electronic surveillance mechanisms; on 
the evaluation, rating and ranking mechanisms; on possibilities to challenge automated 
company decisions that affect the work of the platform worker; on conditions governing 
the termination or suspension of the contract; on (internal and/or external) mechanisms 
for complaint handling, mediation or dispute resolution; on procedures for advance 
notification in cases of suspension or termination, on procedures other than those 
related to formal dismissals and the corresponding notice periods (mentioned under 
Article 4.2(j)) when the employer is in breach of the contract, such as in cases of non-
payments of particular tasks; on representation rights; on rights to conclude collective 
agreements; on the clients and customers, and so on. Most of these enumerated aspects 
are of key concern to platform workers and an information obligation on these matters 
could be considered timely in the future. 
The deadline by which the employing platform has to inform the platform worker on the 
essential aspects of the employment relationship is still maintained for a date after the 
platform worker has started work. There is currently no obligation for platforms to 
inform platform workers on the essential aspects of the employment relation before 
they start working. 
Any change to the essential conditions has to be notified in writing at the earliest 
opportunity and at the latest on the day it is taking effect. Ideally this information 
obligation should be set on a date prior to the date it is taking effect. 
Of specific relevance for platform work are those provisions that apply in case of mainly 
or entirely unpredictable work which specify the conditions the platform has to 
respect when initiating an assignment and that grants the right to the platform worker to 
refuse the assignment when not all conditions are met. A notice period has to be 
respected by the platform and in cases of a late assignment, the platform worker has the 
right to a compensation.  
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The 2019 P2B Regulation installs a similar information obligation for platforms that 
provide online intermediation (information society) services facilitating business users 
(including self-employed platform workers) to conclude transactions with private 
consumers. Terms and conditions and modifications thereof have to be communicated in 
advance and made available to the self-employed platform workers. The modalities of 
this information obligation appear to exceed what employing platforms have to adhere to 
in relation to their platform workers.  
Self-employed platform workers who are not relying on platforms that are purely 
providing digital intermediation information society services to consumers, and who are  
not subject to a reclassification into workers, appear to be the least protected category 
of platform workers in terms of the information obligation vested with the platforms, 
when compared to platform workers who have an employment relationship under the 
TPWC Directive and to self-employed platform workers under the P2B Regulation.  
Protection against ‘dismissal’ 
Protection against dismissal for workers is ensured under various directives including the 
Part-time Work Directive, the Fixed-term Work Directive, the Pregnant Workers 
Directive, the Information and consultation Directive and the Work-life Balance Directive. 
The provisions under these directives apply to dismissals in the more traditional meaning 
of the word, implying a full termination of the employment relationship. Platform 
workers who have an employment relationship fall within their scope of application and 
are protected under the respective provisions of these directives. When exercising their 
rights under the respective directives they enjoy protection against dismissals by the 
employers, including while being pregnant or on maternity leave, when breastfeeding 
upon return from maternity leave, during or as a consequence of requesting parental 
leave, paternity leave or carer’s leave and flexible working arrangements for caring 
purposes, and by taking up a representative function in the worker’s organisation. 
Platform workers who fall within the scope of the Part-time Work Directive or the Fixed-
term Work Directive cannot be dismissed for the sole reason of having requested 
different work schedules. Platform workers are, however, subject to various other types 
of measures that have similar consequences for their allocated work volume or work 
schedules, such as a temporary suspension or a reduction in work allocation. The 
protection of platform workers in such situations does not seem to be adequately 
ensured under the directives concerned. 
The TPWC Directive has widened the scope of dismissals and also includes measures of 
an equivalent nature, which is highly relevant for platform workers with an 
employment relationship as it provides protection when they exercise their rights under 
the Directive. The Directive does not explicitly require platforms to notify the platform 
workers in advance when dismissals or equivalent measures are considered, but as it 
concerns a change of the listed essential aspects of the employment relationship, it 
needs to be ultimately communicated on the day it is taking effect or the day of 
dismissal. Nevertheless, platform workers have the right to ask for a statement of 
reasons ex post. The Directive obliges platform employers to reply with duly 
substantiated grounds for the dismissal or equivalent upon a request from the 
dismissed platform worker. However, no timeframe has been specified which the 
platform has to respect when being requested. The Directive ensures that the burden of 
proof is on the platform when the dismissal is being challenged before the courts or 
competent authorities.  
The Directive also explicitly mentions that representatives of workers should be 
protected. 
Unlike in the case of the P2B Regulation, grounds for decisions to dismiss (in all its 
varieties) are not part of the mandatory information provision, and reasons for 
dismissals or equivalent measures have not to be communicated within a certain 
notice period prior to the dismissal. The P2B Regulation appears therefore to have 
more advanced and more customised provisions protecting self-employed platform 
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workers relying on the specific types of platforms against the various forms of contract 
termination and suspension than that which is currently regulated under the new TPWC 
Directive. For self-employed platform workers who fall outside of the scope of the 
P2B Regulation and of the Directive, no similar protection against dismissals or 
equivalent measures seem to be ensured under current EU legislation.  
Working time and rest periods 
The organisation of working time is specifically relevant for platform workers, who can 
often choose when they work and how much time they want to spend working. The 
effective working time platform workers perform can in some instances be very limited 
and/or fragmented and it does not always follow logical patterns. But platform workers 
can, in practice, equally prefer to stay logged on or work for more hours than those set 
as a maximum under the Working Time Directive.  
The concept of ‘working time’ as enshrined in the Working Time Directive and interpreted 
by the CJEU is profoundly challenged by platform work practices. The same applies to 
the concepts of ‘rest breaks’, ‘rest periods’, ‘night work’, and ‘standby time’. 
Member States can derogate from most of the provisions of the Working Time Directive 
when the duration of working time is not measured and/or predetermined, or when the 
working time can be determined by the workers themselves. This is the case for most 
platform work practices. It is for the moment unclear if Member States will make use of 
the possibility to exclude platform work from the application of the Working Time 
Directive. 
The TPWC Directive introduces specific requirements employers have to include in the 
mandatory written information provision in both instances, when the working pattern 
(and hence the working time) is mainly or entirely predictable, or mainly or entirely 
unpredictable and establishes specific minimum conditions the employers have to 
respect when work patterns are unpredictable, such as determining the reference hours 
during which assignments can be requested.  
Under the Pregnant Workers Directive, platforms cannot oblige their female workers who 
are pregnant or have recently given birth to perform night work. 
Right to paid annual leave 
The Working Time Directive applies to platform workers who have an employment 
relationship with the platforms or the customers. They are entitled to at least four weeks 
paid annual leave a year. 
Health and safety measures 
Health and safety protection is perhaps the most important dimension of any working 
relationship, and even more so for platform workers who are providing their services 
outside of traditional workplaces and often without proper human supervision. The 
health and safety directives apply to workers only, and their provisions relating to the 
information provision, training and surveillance are equally relevant for platform workers 
in a self-employed capacity, especially in a context where the platforms appear to 
deliberately shift risks and the costs for health and safety protection onto the individual 
platform workers. 
The Pregnant Workers Directive is highly relevant for platform workers who are pregnant 
or have recently given birth as it provides for obligatory risk assessments and decisions 
about changes to working conditions, hours or even tasks when risks have been 
identified. Pertinent questions remain as to how to enforce its provisions in platform 
business practices with virtual relationships and little human supervision. 
Right to training 
The TPWC Directive states that when an employer is required by law to provide training 
to a worker to enable them to carry out the work for which they are employed, the 
training has to be provided to the worker free of any cost, that the training time 
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shall be counted as working time and, where possible, take place during the working 
hours. While platform workers who are employed by platforms are entitled to training 
when required by national legislation, the same provisions do not apply to self-employed 
platform workers.  
Right to parallel employment 
The TPWC Directive installs the right of (platform) workers to work for a second 
employer (outside the work schedule of the employment relationship with the first 
employer) and obliges Member States to regulate the conditions for the use of 
incompatibility restrictions by the employers. Conflicts of interest or protection of 
business confidentiality are mentioned as possible objective grounds by which Member 
States can allow platforms to restrict the right to parallel employment. 
Limitation of probation period 
The TPWC Directive determines that when probationary periods are envisaged under 
national law, the probationary period shall not exceed six months, and that in 
situations of fixed-term employment, the probationary periods must be proportionate to 
the expected duration of the contract and nature of work, but in the case of a renewal of 
a fixed-term contract, no new probationary period can be applied.  
Right to advance notification and right to refusal when work is unpredictable 
Of particular relevance for platform work are the provisions of the TPWC Directive 
concerning situations where the work pattern of a worker is entirely or mostly 
unpredictable. In such a situation, the worker shall not be required to work unless 
two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the work takes place within predetermined reference 
hours and days, and (2) the worker is informed by their employer of a work assignment 
within a reasonable notice period established in accordance with national law, collective 
agreements or practice. When one of the conditions is not fulfilled, a platform worker 
has the right to refuse a work assignment without adverse consequences. The worker 
even has the right to a compensation when the employer cancels a work assignment 
that was previously agreed between the employer and the worker after a reasonable 
deadline.  
Right to ask for a more predictable work schedule 
Under the provisions of the TPWC Directive, workers who have worked for at least six 
months with the same employer may request from their employer a form of employment 
with more predictable and secure working conditions where available, and are entitled to 
receive a reasoned written reply. Employers are obliged to give a reasoned written 
reply within one month of the request. 
This provision allows platform workers with unpredictable or irregular work schedules 
who are employed by the platforms to request a more regular and predictable 
organisation of their work. 
Right to administrative and legal redress 
The TPWC Directive requires Member States to ensure that (platform) workers have 
access to effective and impartial dispute resolution, a right to bring a complaint 
before a court or a competent authority and a right to redress in case of infringements of 
their rights arising from the Directive.  
The Directive furthermore establishes that when a worker has not received the 
mandatory written information on essential aspects of the employment relationship or on 
the modifications thereof, within the time limits that have been set by the Directive, 
Member States may either regulate that the workers shall benefit from favourable 
presumptions defined by the Member State which employers can rebut and/or ensure 
that workers can file a complaint to a competent authority and receive adequate redress 
in a timely and effective matter. 
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Alternative mechanisms for out-of-court and less costly dispute resolution have as such 
not been mentioned in the Directive. The P2B, however, obliges platforms to have an 
internal system for the handling of complaints, the appointment of at least two 
mediators, and the setting up specialised organisations aimed at providing mediation 
services for the specific purpose of facilitating out-of-court dispute settlement. It also 
initiates the possibility of establishing not-for-profit associations of business users 
(including self-employed platform workers) which can take legal action against the 
platforms in case of a breach of their obligations as specified under the Regulation. 
Prevention of abusive practices in case of on-demand employment contracts 
The TPWC Directive aims to prevent abusive practices concerning on-demand 
employment contracts, where the employer has the flexibility to call a worker to work as 
and when needed. Member States which allow the use of such contracts are required to 
take one or more measures including (a) limitations of the use and duration of on-
demand or similar contracts, (b) a rebuttable presumption of the existence of an 
employment contract with a minimum amount of paid hours based on the average hours 
worked during a given period, and (c) other equivalent measures that ensure effective 
prevention of abusive practices.  
It’s abundantly clear that this provision is of high relevance and importance for platform 
workers who have an employment relationship. 
Right to compensation in cases of a late cancellation 
The TPWC Directive installs the right to compensation for platform workers in cases of 
a late cancellation by the platform when work patterns are mainly or entirely 
unpredictable.  
Collective labour rights 
Information obligation and consultation 
The three collective labour rights directives contain material provisions that are of high 
relevance for platform workers in increasingly competitive and globalised markets, 
but they also apply to workers only, and are insufficiently adjusted to the peculiarities 
platform work is often characterised by, such as the spatial distribution of workers and 
workplaces and the virtual relationship between workers and the platform or between 
peers. 
The right to be informed and consulted on the business performance of the 
platforms, the employment forecasts, including possible employment reduction, and 
decisions that may affect the work organisation are all very relevant for all 
platform workers including those with a self-employed status.  
The same applies in cases where platforms consider collective redundancies or decide 
to cease activities in a particular market or country. The Information and 
consultation Directive and Collective Redundancies Directive definitely have high 
relevance for platform workers who are employed by the platforms, but their provisions 
appear insufficiently or not at all adapted to the platform work’s digital business 
environment, making it relatively easy to circumvent these obligations.  
Platform workers should be entrusted with rights regarding informing and organising 
structured consultation with other platform workers in platform businesses that are 
operating in different Member States or even globally on transnational issues, but 
they seem to be insufficiently protected by means of the existing European Works 
Council Directive. 
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353
 A reflection paper on the collective rights of platform workers and its relation with EU antitrust legislation is 
annexed to the main study.  
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Platform workers who are workers or self-employed have a right to set up associations 
to represent themselves in accordance with international labour law. Collective 
agreements concluded by representative bodies of workers with employers in view of 
improving their working conditions are not considered a breach of EU competition rules. 
This follows rulings by the CJEU, which has also extended this approach to the ‘false’ 
self-employed in its case law, thereby using the ‘dependency’ criterion instead of the 
traditional ‘subordination’ criterion, which is key for determining the EU concept of a 
worker in EU labour legislation.  
However, the collective bargaining capacity of associations of self-employed platform 
workers may be affected by the EU antitrust legislation, which prohibits agreements 
between undertakings or decisions of associations of undertakings that prevent, restrict 
or distort free competition in the internal market. Since the self-employed are 
considered as undertakings, agreements they or their representative bodies are 
concluding with other undertakings, such as the platforms covering, for instance, their 
fee minimum rates or supplementary pension schemes, may be considered as limiting 
free trade and competition and a breach of EU antitrust legislation. ‘Collective’ 
agreements that are not interfering with the competition acquis, such as those that 
govern the terms and conditions applicable to the contractual relationship between the 
parties on matters dealing with the obligatory information provision, data protection or 
rating systems seem possible, however.   
Protection in case of insolvency of the employer 
The Insolvency Directive aims to regulate the functioning of the guarantee institutions 
while ensuring the rights of employees that their claims arising from their employment 
contract will ultimately be paid in cases of insolvency of the platform and at the final 
stage of liquidation. The Directive applies explicitly to non-standard forms of 
employment, such as part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency work. Platform 
workers who have an employment relationship with the platforms are covered in case of 
insolvency of the latter, whereas the self-employed are not. 
Social Protection 
Access to social protection 
The Recommendation on access to social protection covers both workers and self-
employed and is particularly relevant for persons transitioning between a different 
labour market status and/or between various forms of non-standard work. Member 
States are recommended to provide access to adequate social protection and to adopt 
minimum standards for the formal and effective coverage, the adequacy and 
transparency regarding six statutory branches of social security (when they are 
provided by the Member States) for all workers (regardless of the type of employment 
relationship) on a mandatory basis, and for the self-employed at least on a voluntary 
basis and where appropriate on a mandatory basis. 
The Recommendation has some limited or indirect relevance for platform workers. As 
one of the types of non-standard work, platform work performed under an employment 
relationship will benefit from the minimum standards and provisions which aim to reduce 
differences in treatment between full-time permanent workers and workers in non-
standard forms of employment (or with atypical careers) when accessing social security 
benefits during and after their professional careers. For self-employed platform workers 
the Recommendation has some relevance, but its impact may be low, owing to the fact 
that the Recommendation is (1) a soft instrument, (2) applies only to some statutory 
social security schemes, that (3) are provided in Member States (and hence not to 
schemes that do not exist, such as an unemployment protection scheme for self-
employed in many Member States), and (4) their mandatory coverage is not required. 
The Recommendation does not apply to social assistance or minimum income protection 
schemes. 
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Maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave, carer’s leave, right to flexible 
working arrangements for caring purposes  
The Work-life Balance Directive, which is repealing the older Parental Leave Directive, 
strengthens the right to (paid) parental leave but also introduces new rights such as 
(paid) paternal leave, carer’s leave and the right to flexible working arrangements for 
caring purposes. Minimum requirements relating to maternity leave are governed by the 
(older) Pregnant Workers Directive, and the directives on gender equality in employment 
and gender equality of the self-employed. All directives apply to workers, but not to the 
self-employed. 
As the right to maternity leave and parental leave (contrary to paternity leave), the right 
to an allowance during paternity leave and the right to flexible working arrangements for 
caring purposes can be made subject by Member States to minimum qualification 
periods (one year, one year, six months and six months respectively), issues may arise 
as to the application of the Directive for platform workers with very fragmented or 
irregular work schedules.  
The main concern relates, however, to the enforcement of the directives in the 
platform business context, with regard to: the possibility for platforms to postpone the 
granting of the parental leave for a reasonable period of time in cases where it would 
seriously disrupt the functioning of the business; the prohibition of dismissal when the 
platform worker has applied or exercised their rights; no less favourable treatment when 
the platform worker returns to their job; the right to more flexible working arrangements 
for caring purposes; the right to more flexible forms of parental leave; the maintenance 
of rights that were acquired on the moment the leave is exercised; transfer of the 
parental leave between the parent platform worker and the other parent; granting of 
leave on grounds of force majeure for urgent and unexpected family reasons; 
introduction by social partners of voluntary certification systems assessing work-life 
balance; the right to antenatal examinations without a loss of pay, and so on. 
Non-discrimination of platform workers on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation 
EU non-discrimination legislation applies to workers and/or to the self-employed, 
depending on the personal scope of the instrument concerned and hence also to 
platform workers. Equal treatment on the six main grounds of discrimination (gender, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation) should be 
ensured in the employment field and provide protection of platform workers during all 
stages of the employment in terms of access to employment (including self-
employment), working conditions, vocational training and participation in representative 
bodies on the basis of three different EU directives. Platforms cannot directly or indirectly 
discriminate against platform workers on the mentioned grounds during the recruitment, 
and neither during the assignment nor when considering dismissals. This has particular 
relevance for platform work which is often, depending on the type of platform business, 
characterised by specific recruitment, work organisation and contract termination 
features: online application for registration and opening of accounts, the specific task 
allocation and acceptance procedures of piecework, possibilities for temporary 
suspension and account deletion. Non-discrimination regarding the remuneration that is 
paid to platform workers deserves specific attention given the reportedly low payment 
rates in some specific types of platform businesses which may disproportionally be 
relying on specific categories of workers, such as women or persons with a different 
ethnic origin. As the notion of ‘pay’ has been given a wide interpretation by the CJEU and 
is not only confined to the basis salary as such, this may be of particular relevance for 
some types of platform work with more complex payment modalities. The concept of 
‘dismissal’ is furthermore challenged by platform work practices in cases of access 
denials, temporary suspensions, reduced work allocation and account closures, which are 
often based on (semi)automated decisions that are in turn based on clients’ subjective 
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evaluations. Discriminatory approaches can sneak into such digital work allocation 
mechanisms.  
Platform workers often perform their services individually, at home or in atypical 
environments rather than standard work situations, without any form of social control by 
peers or representative bodies and with only online contact with the platform and/or 
with the customer. This may create environments in which discrimination may more 
easily go unnoticed (and hence under-reported). The economic dependency of the 
platform worker on the platform or on the income gained through the platforms may 
furthermore discourage reporting by victims who are often already in a precarious work 
situation. The typical triangular relationship characterising platform work and the often 
diffused relationships between the three actors may furthermore blur the lines of liability 
and accountability where discrimination is concerned. 
The directives concerned with equal treatment on the basis of gender in self-
employment and in social security do not seem to pose specific challenges for platform 
workers. 
Gender and race discrimination regarding access to goods and services that are publicly 
available is also prohibited. The prevailing provisions seem to be relevant for platform 
business in two dimensions: access to the platform service itself (from the perspective of 
the platform worker and/or from the end user) as well as access to the services provided 
by the platform workers through the platforms. The widespread practices of client 
evaluations in platform work and its consequences for subsequent work allocation 
deserves special attention, as discriminatory approaches based on subjective opinions of 
end users may sneak in. In cases where platform work is delivered to end users through 
the digital platforms, questions arise as to whether the platform and/or the platform 
worker are liable and accountable when discrimination would occur.  
Equal treatment of platform workers irrespective of their gender, religion or belief, racial 
or ethnic origin, disability, age or sexual orientation has not yet been the subject of 
extensive studies, and more dedicated research is needed. Whereas platform work may 
create job opportunities for those who are constrained to enter or participate into the 
traditional labour market, and is conducive to a more flexible organisation of one’s work, 
our findings point to the risk of low pay rates, job insecurity and low protection levels of 
some types of (both on-location and online) platform work, especially those that require 
low skills for the execution of small-scale and/or repetitive tasks. This may disfavour 
particular categories of workers. 
The situation of women is of particular interest given that STEM and ICT education and 
jobs are still male dominated, care responsibilities are primarily taken on by women and 
cyber-harassment disproportionally affects women. 
Other issues relevant for platform workers 
Platforms rely heavily on extensive data collection of platform workers to enable 
automated or semi-automated decision-making. This enormous data flow allows for a 
deep intrusiveness into the lives of platform workers, which is in no way comparable to 
traditional working relationships. The GDPR provides the platform worker with a range of 
rights concerning their personal data such as a right to access of personal data. The 
GDPR defines personal data as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (“data subject”) […]’. The term ‘personal data’ should be as broadly 
interpreted as possible. This broad scope is also affirmed in CJEU case law and in an 
Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party. 
Second, in line with GDPR provisions, in particular the transparency principle, the 
platforms will need to provide the platform workers with information which is 
concise, transparent, intelligible and in easily accessible form, using clear and 
plain language. In other words, the information provided to the platform worker must 
be sufficient and useful in case they would want to effectively challenge the decision 
affecting them (e.g. deactivation of the account). Again, the lack of relevant case law 
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leaves it uncertain as to how these information requirements will practicably be played 
out for platform workers. Issues of enforcement may arise in the future.  
Finally, the GDPR installs a right to data portability, which allows platform workers to 
transfer their (provided and/or observed but not the inferred) personal data or work 
history to another platform. It must be noted that this distinction between provided, 
observed and inferred data will be hard to establish in practice. For instance, the 
individual customer reviews/scores may be considered part of the observed data, but it 
could also be argued that the agglomerated score is created by the platform itself and 
forms part of the inferred data, which are not portable to another platform.  
Nonetheless, it is very likely that the distinction between provided, observed and 
inferred will prove only a false dilemma for the platform worker. Under the right to 
access (Article 15 GDPR), the worker can obtain all data concerning them (e.g. 
reputational data). This includes the inferred data. The platform worker can make an 
access request and then share it with another platform (provided it does not adversely 
affect the rights and freedoms of others). That way, the platform worker bypasses the 
distinction between provided, observed and inferred data under the right to data 
portability. 
The algorithmic management, automated decision-making in work allocation and client-
induced rating systems are generally of high concern for platform workers, regardless of 
their labour market status, and appear to be key challenges that are not yet sufficiently 
or systematically tackled. The right to fair and transparent evaluation and rating systems 
is in this regard a priority for individual platform workers, irrespective of their 
employment status. 
The recent P2B Regulation (which is applicable to a very specific type of platform and 
used by, among others, self-employed platform workers) has tackled part of these 
challenges to some degree. It establishes that the terms and conditions should contain 
the main parameters determining ranking and the reasons for the relative importance of 
those main parameters as opposed to other parameters. Platforms are nevertheless not 
required to disclose the algorithms. The P2B also has a data protection provision, which 
states that the terms and conditions must contain (1) a description of the contractual 
and technical access that platform workers have to personal and other data which are 
provided by platform workers and consumers when using the online services, and (2) 
information on whether the platforms have access to personal and other data that are 
provided by the platform workers and the consumers, and whether any data are 
provided to third parties. The P2B encourages the drawing up of codes of conduct by the 
platforms in cooperation with (representative organisations of) the business users/self-
employed platform workers. While these provisions are certainly a step forward, they 
appear not entirely sufficient in ensuring adequate protection of individual platform 
workers. Moreover, as they apply to information society services only and to a specific 
category of self-employed platform workers, it appears this specific category of self-
employed platform workers is, in some crucial domains, better protected than platform 
workers who are employed by platform businesses and other self-employed platform 
workers who provide services to platforms that are not purely providing online 
intermediation services as defined by the P2B. 
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Table 17: Overview of working conditions and social protection of platform workers as protected by EU legislation 
 List of key challenges covered by EU legal instruments Applicable EU legislation Personal scope Relevance Adequacy Issues (+) and (-) 
1 Equal treatment non-standard work and standard work           
 Part-time work  Part-time Work Directive Workers  Partially Moderate 
(+) prohibition of unfair dismissals on sole basis of the scale of work or working time (Fixed-
term Work and Part-time Work Directive) 
 Fixed-term work Fixed-term Work Directive       
(+) protection against dismissal when increasing or decreasing working time (Fixed-term 
Work Directive and Part-time Work Directive) 
 Temporary agency work  Temporary Agency Work Directive       
(+) prevention of abusive practices of successive fixed-term contracts (Fixed-term Work 
Directive and Temporary Agency Work Directive) 
           
(+) access to vacancies, training opportunities and career mobility (Fixed-term Work 
Directive, Part-time Work Directive and Temporary Agency Work Directive) 
(+) recognition of the temporary work agency as an employer (Temporary Agency Work 
Directive) 
(+) more flexible comparator to ensure equal treatment provisions (Temporary Agency 
Work Directive) 
           (+) review of existing obstacles by MS 
           
(+) MS may introduce more favourable provisions (Fixed-term Work Directive, Part-time 
Work Directive and Temporary Agency Work Directive) 
           (-) concepts (part-time, fixed-term, temporary agency work, pro-rata temporis principle) 
           (-) concept of the user undertaking (Temporary Agency Work Directive)  
           
(-) comparison with full-time employment in permanent contracts in the same 
establishment with fallback option to compare more generally (Part-time Work Direcitve 
and Fixed-term Work Directive) 
           (-) possibility to exclude casual work (Part-time Work Directive) 
           
(-) limited to basic working conditions (Temporary Agency Work Directive) 
(-) derogations by Member States (Temporary Agency Work Directive)  
           
(-) possibility to make access to particular employment conditions dependent on length of 
service (Part-time Work Directive) 
 Possibility for Member States to exclude casual work  Part-time Work Directive Workers  Partially Low (-) possibility to exclude casual work (Part-time Work directive) 
   
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High 
(+) limitation of 'casual work' derogation to employment contracts with predetermined 
working time (guaranteed paid work) of on average maximum 3 hours per week and 
exclusion of employment contracts where no guaranteed amount of paid work is 
predetermined prior to start of employment 
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 Protection against abusive practices 
Fixed-term Work Directive / 
Temporary Agency Work Directive Workers  Partially Moderate 
(+) prevention of abusive practices of successive fixed-term contracts (Fixed-term Work 
Directive and Temporary Agency Work Directive) 
   
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High 
(+) protection in case of on-demand or similar employment contracts requiring MS to adopt 
measures to prevent abusive practices such as measures limiting use and duration of on 
demand contract, measures to install rebuttable presumption of the existence of an 
employment contract with a minimum amount of paid hours or other equivalent measures 
aimed at the effective prevention of abusive practices 
2 Working conditions           
 Obligatory information provision on essential aspects of 
employment relationship 
 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive  
  
  
Workers  
 
  
  
High 
 
  
  
High 
  
 
  
(+) obligatory documented and timely information provision within one week or one month 
after start of employment 
(+) specific information obligation in case of mainly or entirely unpredictable work 
(confirmation of variable work, reference hours, minimum paid guaranteed hours, notice 
period, right to compensation) 
(-) information obligation can be exercised after start of employment 
(-) information obligation does not cover all aspects of the employment relationship that are 
important for platform workers: information on the existence of potentially harmful tasks or 
environment; on the use of equipment, vehicles and tools that are necessary to conduct 
work assignments; on the protection in case of work accidents and occupational diseases; 
on the collection and processing of personal and behavioural data and data concerning the 
work performance; on the use of electronic surveillance mechanisms; on the evaluation, 
rating and ranking mechanisms; on possibilities to challenge automated company decisions 
that affect the work of the platform worker; on conditions governing the termination or 
suspension of the contract; on (internal and/or external) mechanisms for complaint 
handling, mediation or dispute resolution; on procedures for advance notification in cases 
of suspension or termination, on procedures other than those related to formal dismissals 
and the corresponding notice periods (mentioned under Article 4.2(j)) when the employer is 
in breach of the contract such as in cases of non-payments of particular tasks; on 
representation rights; on rights to conclude collective agreements; on the clients and 
customers 
 
   
   
 
Right to be informed about changes to the employment 
relationship 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive       
(+) obligatory information provision in case of changes to the essential employment 
conditions at the latest on the date it is taking effect 
           (-) no obligation for advance notification as is the case under the P2B Regulation 
 Right to parallel employment 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High (+) employers cannot prohibit parallel employment 
           
(-) incompatibility restrictions on objective grounds are possible such as conflicts of interest 
and confidentiality considerations 
 
Protection against 'dismissal' (suspension, termination, 
other restrictions)           
 Part-time work Part-time Work Directive Workers  High Moderate (+) protection against dismissal when increasing or decreasing working time 
           (-) traditional concept of dismissal 
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 Fixed-term work  Fixed-term Work Directive Workers  High Moderate (+) protection against dismissal when increasing or decreasing working time  
           (-) traditional concept of dismissal 
 Pregnant workers  Pregnant Workers Directive Workers  High Low (+) protection against dismissal in case of pregnancy, maternity, when breastfeeding 
           (-) traditional concept of dismissal 
 Work-life balance  Work-life Balance Directive Workers  High Low 
(+) protection against dismissal in case of paternity leave, carer's leave, flexible working 
arrangements 
           (-) traditional concept of dismissal 
 Information and consultation of workers 
Information and consultation 
Directive Workers  High Low (+) protection against dismissal for worker's representatives 
           (-) traditional concept of dismissal 
 Transparent and predictable working conditions 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High (+) protection against dismissal when exercising rights under TPWC Directive 
           (+) protection against dismissal and measures with equivalent effect 
          (+) right to receive a statement of reasons on the grounds of dismissal or equivalent 
           (-) no timeframe specified by which statement of reasons has to be provided 
           
(-) grounds for decision to dismissal or equivalent is not part of mandatory information 
provision on essential aspects of the employment relationship 
           
(-) a dismissal or equivalent constitutes a modification to the essential aspects of the 
employment relationship and needs to be communicated at the latest of the date it is taking 
effect and thus on the date of dismissal; no advance notification as is the case in the P2B 
Regulation 
           
(-) burden of proof is on the employer when decision is challenged before court or 
competent authority 
           
(+) protection in case of on-demand or similar employment contracts requiring MS to adopt 
measures to prevent abusive practices such as measures limiting use and duration of on-
demand contract, measures to install rebuttable presumption of the existence of an 
employment contract with a minimum amount of paid hours or other equivalent measures 
aimed at the effective prevention of abusive practices 
 Working time and rest periods           
  Working Time Directive Workers  High Moderate (-) concepts of working time, rest period, rest breaks, night work, standby time  
           (-) application per contract or per worker? 
           
(-) derogations by MS are possible when duration of working time is not measured or 
predetermined or when working time can be determined by workers 
   
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High 
(+) the mandatory written information provision contains specific minimum conditions 
related to 'working time' in both cases when work patterns are predictable ('working hours', 
'overtime') or unpredictable (determining the reference hours during which assignments 
can be requested).  
 Right to paid annual leave Working Time Directive Workers  Moderate Moderate (+) right to paid annual leave for at least 4 weeks also applicable to platform workers 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
196 
 Limitation probation period 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High Moderate (+) maximum limit to 6 months and provisions for fixed-term contracts 
 
Right to notification and refusal when work pattern is 
unpredictable 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High 
(+) conditions applicable when work patterns are unpredictable are part of the mandatory 
information provision including notice period and right to refusal 
 
Right to compensation in case of late cancellation by 
employer when work pattern is unpredictable 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High (+) right to compensation in case of late cancellation 
 Right to ask for a better work schedule 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High High 
(+) right to request more secure and predictable working conditions after 6 months of 
service 
           (+) right to receive written reasoned reply within 1 month after request 
 Right to training 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  Medium Moderate 
(+) training provided by law to be made available free of cost also to platform workers while 
training time is considered as working time 
            
 Health and safety measures 
Health and safety for fixed-term 
work Directive Workers  High Moderate (-) concepts (fixed-term work) 
   Pregnant Workers Directive Workers High Low (-) specific situation of pregnancy 
           (-) enforcement of protective measures under the directives on platform work 
 Right to legal redress 
Transparent and predictable 
working conditions Directive Workers  High Moderate (+) access to effective and impartial dispute resolution and right to redress 
           
(+) Member States can apply more favourable rebuttable presumptions in cases when 
employers fail to submit the written information on the essential aspects of the 
employment relationship at the beginning of the employment and in case of modifications 
and/or can determine that workers can file a complaint before competent authorities and 
receive adequate and timely redress 
           (+) change of burden of proof in case of dismissals or equivalent measures 
           
(-) absence of specific reference to alternative out-of-court dispute-resolution mechanisms 
as is the case under the P2B Regulation (internal complaint-handling systems and 
mediation) 
           
(-) not part of the mandatory information obligation on essential aspects of the employment 
relationship 
           
(-) no reference to possibility of workers' organisations to be involved in dispute-resolution 
mechanisms 
3 Collective labour rights           
 Information obligation and consultation           
             
 
Business performance, employment forecasts, work 
organisation:  
Information and consultation  
Directive Workers  High Moderate 
(+) right to have information and consultation on business performance, employment 
forecasts, work organisation  
           (-) not adapted to virtual relationships, isolation 
           (-) lack of representation due to isolation 
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 Collective redundancies:  Collective Redundancies Directive Workers  High Moderate (+) right to have information and consultation on collective redundancies 
           (-) not adapted to virtual relationships, isolation 
           (-) lack of representation due to isolation 
           (-) protection in case of withdrawals or cessation of activities 
 Transnational issues:  European Works Council Directive Workers  High Moderate (+) right to have information and consultation on transnational issues 
           (-) not adapted to virtual relationships, isolation 
 Representation and collective bargaining 
  
Several directives and CJEU case 
law – EU competition law 
  
Workers  High  High (-) lack of representation due to isolation 
(+) Platform workers who are employed can conclude collective agreements aiming to 
improve their working conditions and the latter are not considered a breach of EU 
competition rules 
(+) CJEU established that 'false' self-employed have the same rights as workers 
(+) Platform workers who are self-employed are considered undertakings under EU 
competition law 
(?) possibility for self-employed platform workers to conclude agreements on the terms and 
conditions of their contractual relationship with the platforms when it is not preventing or 
distorting free trade and competition 
 
           
           
           
 Protection in case of Insolvency employer Insolvency Directive Workers  Moderate Moderate (+) includes part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency work 
           
(+) establishment of guarantee institutions protecting claims of employees arising out of 
their employment contract 
           (-) enforcement in platform work practices 
           (-) lack of representation due to isolation 
4 Social protection           
 Access to social protection 
Recommendation on access to 
social protection 
Workers and self-
employed High Low 
(+) applicable to non-standard forms of employment and when persons are transitioning 
between different labour market statuses 
           (-) soft law instrument 
           
(-) only 6 traditional social security schemes 'when they are provided' by Member States,  no 
obligation to ensure all schemes mentioned 
           (-) voluntary schemes for self-employed 
           (-) not applicable to social assistance and minimum income protection schemes 
 
Maternity leave, paternity leave, paternal leave, carer's 
leave Work-life Balance Directive Workers  High Moderate 
(-) minimum qualifying period of maximum 1 year for parental leave and for maternity leave 
(6 months payment paternity allowance and 6 months’ right to flexible working 
arrangements for caring periods …) 
           (-) cases of parallel employment  
           (-) enforcement of postponement of granting parental leave by platforms 
           (-) enforcement of prohibition of dismissal 
           (-) enforcement of less favourable treatment upon return 
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           (-) enforcement of more flexible working arrangement for caring purposes 
           (-) enforcement of maintenance of rights acquired on the start of the leave 
           (-) enforcement of voluntary certification system assessing work-life balance 
           (-) enforcement of transfer of transferable parental leave periods between parents 
           (-) enforcement of prenatal examinations without loss of pay 
5 Non-discrimination           
 
Non-discrimination on grounds of gender, racial or ethnic 
origin, disability, age, religion or belief and sexual 
orientation 
Various non-discrimination 
directives 
Workers and self-
employed High Moderate 
(+) applicable to access to employment and self-employment, working conditions including 
pay, vocational training and membership in representative bodies 
6 Other relevant rights for platform workers         (-) very limited research on discrimination in platform economy 
 Right to have access to personal data GDPR  Natural persons     (+) GDPR establishes right to access personal data  
           (+) obligation of platform to ensure access to personal data 
   P2B Regulation 
Self-employed 
platform workers     
(+) Terms and conditions need to contain description of access by platform workers to 
personal data of platform workers and consumers 
           
(+) Terms and conditions need to contain description of access by platforms to personal 
data of platform workers and consumers and provision of these data to third parties 
 Right to have access to data concerning work allocation  GDPR Natural persons High High (+) GDPR establishes right to access personal data  
           (+) obligation of platform to ensure access to personal data 
           
(?) application to platform work especially when it concerns data based on algorithmic 
management and automated decision-making concerned with the work allocation, 
organisation and evaluation; concepts of provided, observed, inferred data 
 
Right to have access to data concerning work 
performance and evaluation 
GDPR Natural persons High High 
(?) application to platform work especially when it concerns data based on algorithmic 
management and automated decision-making concerned with the work allocation, 
organisation and evaluation; concepts of provided, observed, inferred data 
 
  
P2B Regulation 
Self-employed 
platform workers Moderate High 
(+) Terms and conditions have to contain main parameters of ranking and reasons of 
relative importance of these parameters compared to others 
 Right to have access to information about the clients GDPR Natural persons Moderate Moderate   
   P2B Regulation 
Self-employed 
platform workers     
(+) Terms and conditions need to contain description of access by platforms to personal 
data of platform workers and consumers and provision of these data to third parties 
 Right to data portability - transfer of work history GDPR Natural persons High High 
(?) application to platform work especially when it concerns data based on algorithmic 
management and automated decision-making concerned with the work allocation, 
organisation and evaluation; concepts of provided, observed, inferred data 
 
Note: MS refers to Member State. 
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6.2 Other EU actions 
 Communications 6.2.1
The European institutions began developing a framework for platform work in 2015 
(Aloisi, 2018). This seems to have originated with the Single Market Strategy (October 
2015), after which the European Commission began consultations with stakeholders, 
including platform representatives, policymakers, scholars, entrepreneurs, and platform 
workers. Specific information-gathering efforts included two Eurobarometer surveys. Two 
communications on online platforms and the collaborative economy354 were released in 
early summer 2016. 
These communications form an important part of European institutions’ official position 
on platform work. The Communication on a European agenda for the collaborative 
economy undertook an initial assessment355 of platforms in May 2016 (European 
Commission, 2016b). One month afterwards in June 2016, the European agenda for the 
collaborative economy was adopted.356 This is non-binding guidance responding to the 
Single Market Strategy, adopted in October 2015, announcing that the Commission ‘will 
develop a European agenda for the collaborative economy, including guidance on how 
existing EU law applies to collaborative economy business models’. 
The European agenda for the collaborative economy aims to provide clarity on applicable 
EU rules and policy recommendations ‘to help citizens, businesses and EU countries fully 
benefit from the new business models and promote the balanced development of the 
collaborative economy’ (Cauffman and Smits, 2016; Aloisi, 2018). The Agenda focuses 
on five main issues: 1) market access requirements and underlying services, 2) liability 
regimes, 3) protection of users, 4) labour law and worker classification, and 5) taxation. 
Furthermore, the document announces that the European Commission would 
continuously review developments in the European collaborative economy. It concludes 
by advocating Member State interventions, ‘assessing the adequacy of national 
employment legislation’ in relation to ‘the different needs of workers and self-employed 
individuals in the digital world as the innovative nature of collaborative business model’ 
and to ‘provide guidance on the applicability of their national employment rules in light 
of labour patterns in the collaborative economy’ (page 13, English version).  
Other communications may also be seen to complement the goal of addressing 
challenges associated with platform work, though their scope may be broader. For 
example, a communication adopted in June 2016357 put forth a ‘new skills agenda for 
Europe’. While this communication is broader in scope, it explicitly highlights platform 
work, saying ‘The collaborative economy is changing business models, opening up 
opportunities and new routes into work, demanding different skill sets, and bringing 
challenges such as accessing upskilling opportunities’. (page 7). 
 Information gathering and dissemination 6.2.2
The lack of reliable evidence is a frequently discussed barrier to designing policy 
response to the challenges associated with platform work. To this end, the European 
institutions have funded a great deal of research. Among these initiatives include 
Eurobarometer surveys, the COLLEEM survey from the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and 
reports from EU-OSHA and Eurofound.  
                                           
354
 The term ‘collaborative economy’ is still sometimes used in place of platform economy, even by EU 
institutions. However, the terms ‘collaborative’ and ‘sharing’ have generally fallen out of favour in this context 
due to their normative connotations. See the European Parliament Opinion 2017/2003(INI), p. 4.  
355
 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0288&from=EN 
356
 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2016%3A356%3AFIN  
357
 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0381&from=EN 
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The Eurobarometer surveys on the collaborative economy have provided particularly 
helpful data. Flash Eurobarometer 438: The use of collaborative platforms (European 
Commission, 2016a) was conducted in March 2016 and released in July 2016. It looked 
at awareness of platforms, usage as clients of service providers, and their perceived 
advantages and drawbacks. Flash Eurobarometer 467: The use of the collaborative 
economy was carried out in April 2018 and published in October 2018 (European 
Commission, 2018a). It covered awareness and frequency of use of collaborative 
platforms, their perceived advantages and disadvantages, and their impact on 
purchasing behaviour. It also looked at the platform worker side, including frequency of 
offering services on platforms, reasons for doing so, and reasons why some do not. 
A useful initiative for information is Eurofound’s platform economy repository.358 The 
repository is an online resource for data and literature on platform work, mostly but not 
exclusively with a European focus. Eurofound has been very active in producing research 
and increasing awareness of platform work in Europe, and the repository partly realises 
this goal.  
European institutions have also held numerous conferences and discussion forums. For 
example, the high-level conference Collaborative economy: Opportunities, challenges, 
policies was held on 11 October 2018 (European Commission, 2018b). This conference 
presented employment issues and research on platform work, such as COLLEEM 
research, Eurofound’s study Employment and working conditions of selected types of 
platform work, and so forth. 
Platform work is on other agendas besides specific events and committees. For example, 
the high-level expert group on the Impact of the Digital Transformation on EU Labour 
Markets has a broader mandate than platform work, but it makes frequent reference to 
‘online labour platforms’, ‘platform-mediated work’, and related concepts in the ‘gig 
economy’ (European Commission, 2019). The high-level expert group finds that at the 
level of workers and human resources policies, challenges of the digital transformation 
(2019: p.9): 
…mainly related to workers’ skills to keep people employable in the future. At the 
level of businesses and labour relations, the challenge is to provide decent work 
by creating high-quality jobs and safeguarding worker well-being and a healthy 
work-life balance. Finally, at the most aggregate level of markets and their 
institutions, the challenge is to build a more inclusive society by preventing 
economic and social polarisation in labour markets. 
Two particularly relevant recommendations of the high-level expert group concern the 
employment status of platform workers (2019: p. 39): 
(4.2.2) Equalise the (administrative) treatment of standard and non-standard 
work arrangements e.g. by providing equal access to government services, credit 
lines and limited mobility of benefits regardless of employment status. 
(4.3.1) Ensure neutral social protection against unemployment, sickness and 
other life circumstances independent of employment status. The increasing 
number of Europeans with non-standard employment should have access to 
social protection e.g. through portable benefits attached to the worker rather 
than the job or the establishment of an ‘underemployment insurance’ to smooth 
out fluctuating incomes in the ‘gig economy’. 
Related to funding social protection, the high-level expert group further notes the need 
for ‘a Digital Single Window for reporting employment contributions and taxes’. This 
would reduce the total cost of compliance as ‘Instead of workers having to file manual 
reports, the data should come automatically from platforms in a standardized digital 
format.’ (ibid., p. 43). 
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 See https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/platform-economy 
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Finally, European-level social partners have taken up the topic of platform work to 
different degrees. UNI Europa, for example, was involved with the platform research of 
Huws et al. (2019; 2016), as well as joint research initiatives with the World 
Employment Confederation – an employers’ union for the temporary work agency sector. 
 European Pillar of Social Rights 6.2.3
The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) is a joint institutional effort of the European 
Parliament, European Council and European Commission interinstitutionally proclaimed 
on 17 November 2017. It is a soft law instrument without legally binding force, though 
numerous authors discuss its importance in the platform economy. 
The EPSR intends to achieve ‘upward convergence’ in three parts: 1) equal opportunities 
and access to the labour market, 2) fair working conditions, and 3) social protection and 
inclusion. According to EU-OSHA (2017), the EPSR aims, in part, to ‘provide new and 
tangible minimum protection and security for workers in atypical employment and for 
the (dependent) self-employed’. Furthermore, the initiative could entail expanding the 
personal scope and increase the level of (social) protection for groups of people on the 
margins of the labour market (Rasnača, 2017). These aims are consistent with the 
challenges associated with platform workers, who often find themselves in situations of 
atypical employment or dependent self-employment. 
It is likely that the EPSR will result in indirect impacts, notably the revision of existing 
legal acquis, rather than producing direct legal consequences from the documents that 
constitute it (Hendrickx, 2017). Additionally, the EPSR has resulted in accompanying 
initiatives, namely the proposal for a new Directive on transparent and predictable 
working conditions (December 2017) and proposal for a Council Recommendation on 
access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (March 2018).359 
 European Labour Authority 6.2.4
The recently established European Labour Authority (ELA)360 is part of the rollout of the 
EPSR. Its objectives are to contribute to ensuring fair labour mobility across the EU and 
assist Member States and the European Commission in the coordination of social security 
systems within the EU (Article 2). To achieve these objectives, the ELA shall carry out 
different tasks ranging from facilitating access to information (Article 5 Regulation), 
coordinating and supporting concerted and joint inspections (Articles 8 and 9), carrying 
out analyses and risk assessments on issues of cross-border labour mobility (Article 10), 
supporting Member States with capacity building regarding the effective application and 
enforcement of relevant EU law (Article 11), supporting Member States in tackling 
undeclared work (Article 12), and playing a mediating role in disputes between Member 
States on the application of relevant EU law361 (Article 13). 
Section 4 noted how most experts consulted have pointed to the lack of data and strong 
empirical evidence on the prevalence of (undeclared) platform work, notably in the case 
of online work. Likewise, there are only limited data available on the prevalence of cross-
border platform work. Besides limited intelligence on those two key aspects in relation to 
platform work, in practice, the lack of efficient information sharing between Member 
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 Both of these are discussed in depth earlier in this study. 
360
 Regulation 1149/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour 
Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/2004, (EU) No 492/2011, and (EU) 2016/589 and repealing 
Decision (EU) 2016/344 
361
 The scope of the activities of the ELA shall cover the following Union acts: Directive 96/71/EC, Directive 
2014/67/EU, Regulation 883/2004 (and Regulation 987/2009), Regulation 1408/71, Regulation 574/72, 
Regulation 1231/2010, Regulation 859/2003, Regulation 492/2011, Directive 2014/54/EU, Regulation 
2016/589, Regulation 561/2006, Directive 2006/22/EC, Regulation 1071/2009. 
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States could further contribute to the incidence of fraud, abuses or deprivation of rights 
in the operation of cross-border work, including when it is platform-based.  
ELA could play a role here as it will take over permanently the activities of the European 
Platform tackling undeclared work.362 This Platform shall continue its work within the 
comprehensive remit of the ELA to further enhance cooperation363 between Member 
States’ relevant authorities and other actors involved to tackle more efficiently and 
effectively undeclared work (Article 12(a)). It shall also improve the capacity of Member 
States’ different relevant authorities and actors to tackle undeclared work with regard to 
its cross-border aspects (Article 12(b)). Additionally, the Platform itself shall seek to 
improve the knowledge of undeclared work by means of shared definitions and concepts, 
evidence-based measurement tools and promotion of comparative analysis and develop 
mutual understanding of the different systems and practices to tackle undeclared work 
and analysing the effectiveness of policy measures (Article 1 Annex). It shall establish 
tools, for instance a knowledge bank, for efficient sharing of information and 
experiences, and develop guidelines for enforcement to tackle undeclared work (Article 3 
Annex). Thus, the Platform shows great potential to alleviate the current lack of data 
available on undeclared platform work in the Member States and increase opportunities 
for Member States to mutually learn on their approaches on this particular subject.  
Likewise, in relation to cross-border (platform) work, the ELA shall facilitate the 
cooperation and acceleration of exchange of information between Member States and 
support their effective compliance with cooperation obligations (Article 7(1)). 
Furthermore, the ELA itself has been given the competence to carry out analyses 
regarding labour mobility and social security coordination across the EU. The ELA may 
also carry out focused in-depth analyses and studies to investigate specific issues 
(Article 10(1)). Through peer review among Member States, it will prove possible to 
examine any questions, difficulties and specific issues which might arise concerning the 
implementation and practical application of EU law within the ELA’s competence (Article 
10(2)(a)), or improve the knowledge and mutual understanding of different systems and 
practices (Article 10(2)(c)). Again, all these provisions could support a greater 
understanding of cross-border platform work in terms of data-building in the European 
Union.  
Last but not least, one of the objectives of the ELA is to ensure a fair, simple and 
effective application and enforcement of EU law. It has the competence to facilitate and 
enhance cooperation between Member States in the enforcement of the relevant EU law 
(Article 2(a)), while also supporting a timely exchange of information between the 
Member States. One aspect of the effective application and enforcement is the 
coordination and support of concerted or joint inspections (Article 8 and 9), which should 
help national authorities in ensuring protection of persons exercising their right to free 
movement and in tackling irregularities with a cross-border dimension.364 Moreover, the 
ELA may facilitate a solution in the case of a dispute between two or more Member 
States regarding individual cases of application of relevant EU law (Article 13). Thus, the 
ELA could play a role in ensuring a more effective application and enforcement of 
relevant EU law in the field of cross-border platform work. 
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 The European Platform tackling undeclared work, created in 2016, enhances cooperation between EU 
countries. It brings together relevant authorities and actors involved in fighting undeclared work, to tackle this 
issue more effectively and efficiently, while fully respecting national competences and procedures. 
363
 The Platform shall encourage cooperation between Member States through (Article 12 (2)):  
a) Exchanging best practice and information 
b) Developing expertise and analysis, while avoiding any duplication 
c) Encouraging and facilitating innovative approaches to effective and efficient cross-border cooperation 
and evaluating experiences.  
364
 Concerted and joint inspections are subject to the agreement of the Member States concerned. They should 
not replace or undermine national competences. 
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 Case law 6.2.5
The CJEU has concluded one court case directly concerning platforms. In December 
2017, it ruled whether Uber services had to be regarded as transport services, 
information society services, or a combination of both.365 The Court determined that 
intermediation services such as those provided by Uber (UberPop in this specific case) 
must be classified as ‘a service in the field of transport’ within the meaning of EU law 
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017).366 
In its reasoning the Court found that the Uber-application was central in the 
intermediation service provided by Uber without which ‘those drivers would not be led to 
provide transport services’ and ‘persons who wish to make an urban journey would not 
use the services provided by those drivers’.367 Moreover, the judgment finds that Uber 
provides more than just an intermediation service, noting that ‘Uber exercises decisive 
influence over the conditions under which the drivers provide their service (ibid., p. 
2).368 This led the Court to conclude that intermediation services like those provided by 
Uber must be classified as ‘a service in the field of transport’ within the meaning of EU 
law (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017).369 
Still, this court case is primarily concerned with whether or not Uber services fall under 
the scope of Article 56 TFEU (freedom of services), Directive 2006/23 and Directive 
2000/31, rather than the working conditions and social protection of Uber drivers. No 
other EU-level court cases concerning platform work, and in particular the labour 
dimension, could be identified as of summer 2019. 
 Preliminary conclusions 6.2.6
Taken together, findings indicate that European institutions are very aware of platform 
work, though it is often considered alongside more general labour market issues. 
European institutions have released communications and initiated research specific to 
platform work.  
Furthermore, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted 
Regulation 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of 
online intermediation services.370 While slightly broader than platform work, this 
Regulation very clearly addresses many of its associated challenges. The Regulation will 
be regularly evaluated and monitored, and a large part of this role falls on the group of 
experts for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy.371 Thus, while European 
institutions generally prefer to handle platform work’s associated challenges alongside 
broader labour market issues, they have also taken specific action. 
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7. GAP ANALYSIS: WHICH CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED? 
Gap analysis is an analytical tool for assessing the difference (or gap) between the 
desired and actual state of affairs. 
The actual state of affairs is defined in the previous sections, which conceptualised 
platform work, then mapped corresponding challenges, and tools and responses at 
national and EU level. 
The desired state of affairs is that all the important challenges for platform workers 
concerning the working conditions and social protection are addressed, either through 
national or EU tools and responses. 
The gap analysis considers the developments up to autumn 2019, based on the available 
evidence. 
7.1 Conceptual framework 
The gap analysis consists of three main elements: i) identification of the main 
challenges, ii) identification and assessment of the national and EU responses, and iii) 
assessment of the extent to which the challenges are addressed and whether there is 
room for the EU to act. 
Figure 15: Graphic expression of conceptual framework gap analysis 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
 
First, gaps in addressing the most important challenges are assessed. These are rated 
‘high’ or ‘medium’, in accordance with the summary tables for work, employment, 
social relations dimensions and other challenges. 
Table 18: Most important challenges for platform workers 
Dimension 
(WES model) Challenge name Priority Specific to platform work? 
Work 
Autonomy in the allocation 
of tasks High Specific to platform work 
Work 
Autonomy in work 
organisation Medium General labour market 
Work Physical environment High Specific to platform work 
Work Surveillance, direction and High Specific to platform work 
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performance appraisal 
Employment Employment status High 
Common for non-standard 
work 
Employment Contracts High Specific to platform work 
Employment 
Determination of 
employer High Specific to platform work 
Employment Social protection Medium 
Common for non-standard 
work 
Employment Earnings Medium 
Common for non-standard 
work 
Employment Working time Medium 
Common for non-standard 
work 
Social 
relations Representation High 
Common for non-standard 
work 
Social 
relations Adverse social behaviour Medium General labour market 
Other Undeclared work Medium 
Common for non-standard 
work 
Other Cross-border work Medium General labour market 
Other Data protection Medium Specific to platform work 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on Section 4. 
Note: Each challenge depends on factors such as the type of platform work considered and the amount of 
control exercised by platforms versus the platform worker’s autonomy. Moreover, over half of these challenges 
are not particular to platform work but common to non-standard work or the general labour market. 
 
Second, for each of the main challenges, the national responses are assessed through 
expert surveys for all 30 countries (EU28, Norway and Iceland). Experts identified the 
top-down and bottom-up responses at national and regional level that target the 
challenges relevant to platform work. For each of the national responses it is determined 
which challenges were intended to be addressed and the extent to which the response 
has been implemented. 
 
Table 19: Frequency of national responses to most important challenges 
 
Top-
down
Bottom-
up
Other Total
Social relations Representation 8 32 2 42 15
Employment Social protection 12 14 0 26 13
Employment Earnings 4 22 1 27 12
Employment Employment status 36 9 1 46 11
Employment Determination of employer 36 9 1 46 11
Work Physical environment 8 17 1 26 10
Employment Contracts 2 4 2 8 7
Employment Working time 4 13 1 18 7
Other Undeclared work 11 0 0 11 6
Work Surveillance, direction & performance appraisal 5 8 1 14 6
Other Cross-border work 3 0 0 3 3
Social relations Adverse social behaviour 0 3 0 3 3
Other Data protection 3 3 0 6 2
Work Autonomy in the allocation of tasks 0 0 0 0 0
Work Autonomy in work organisation 0 0 0 0 0
Response count*
Challenge name
Dimension
(WES model)
Countries 
with 
responses
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Source: authors’ elaboration. 
* Excluding ‘purely informational’ responses, e.g. conferences or research publications that are unlikely to 
directly address the challenges. 
Note: Maximum of 30 countries (EU28, Norway and Iceland). A single response can address multiple 
challenges. Counts for ‘determination of employer’ and ‘employment status’ are identical because in practice, 
responses handle them in tandem. 
 
It is important to note that in some cases it is difficult to attribute the responses to the 
most important challenges. For example, the national responses contain dozens of 
instances where platform workers protest or negotiate for ‘better working conditions’, 
without specifying which particular working conditions (e.g. allocation of work, autonomy 
in work organisation, physical environment, or some combination of these). In the 
identification of the national responses, only those responses relevant to the challenges, 
according the national experts, are considered. 
The national responses consist of top-down (legislation, case law, administrator and 
inspectorate actions), bottom-up (actions from platforms, platform workers, and 
collective agreements), and ‘other’ responses (any other relevant response). Top-down 
responses tend to be ‘harder’ and more intrusive, whereas bottom-up agreements rely 
on the agreement of involved parties.372 Responses addressing ‘representation’, ‘working 
time’, ‘earnings’ and ‘physical environment’ are usually bottom-up. This is because 
platform workers (and social partners aiding them) tend to focus on their immediate 
concerns. Conversely, responses addressing ‘employment status’ and ‘undeclared work’ 
are mostly top-down.  
The count of the responses in combination with a qualitative assessment is used as a 
measure to assess the extent to which the national responses have addressed the 
challenges. This is necessary, as the mere count of responses does not necessarily tell us 
about their scope. For example, a single court case might resolve the employment status 
challenge for all platform workers in a country, whereas a dozen court cases might 
provide limited additional clarity. 
Moreover, platform work remains a relatively new phenomenon, for which the responses 
are only quite recently taken. This means that it is currently impossible to assess the full 
extent to which all the national responses addressed the most important challenges in 
practice. Indeed, the analysis is limited to whether or not one or more relevant 
responses exist in a given country, and which type of platform workers is addressed 
(e.g. all, online and/or on-location). 
Similarly, for each of the challenges it is determined whether they are addressed by any 
of the potentially relevant EU tools. For each of the EU tools it is determined which 
platform workers may be impacted and under which circumstances (i.e. personal scope), 
the relevance of the legislation (i.e. material scope) and the extent to which it addresses 
the challenge (i.e. adequacy). 
Note that the assessments at national and EU level are somewhat different in nature. 
The objective of the national responses analysis is to create a complete mapping of all 
responses, whereas the objective of the EU analysis is to assess only a selection of 
tools. 
Third, based on the challenges and responses at national and EU level, the extent to 
which the challenges have been addressed by existing tools and responses is assessed. 
Indeed, there is a gap when the challenges are not fully addressed at national and EU 
level. 
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Based on the assessment, each of the challenges receives a rating for the extent the 
national responses and EU tools and responses addresses it. There are five different 
ratings (fully addressed, largely addressed, partially addressed, not addressed, and 
indeterminate). For the national responses, the rating is based on the share of countries 
that have taken measures to address the challenge  For the EU tools, the assessment is 
based fully on a qualitative assessment of the extent to which the selection of EU tools 
are applicable to each of the challenges. See Table 20 for detailed definitions of the 
ratings. 
Table 20: Gap analysis assessment key 
 
The remainder of this Section assesses the gaps for the most important challenges. 
7.2 Responses to platform-specific challenges 
Platform-specific challenges include those in the ‘work’ and ‘employment’ dimensions. 
Physical environment and determination of employer are most relevant for on-location 
platform workers, and here they have received a significant amount of attention at 
national level. Data protection is very relevant at EU level, and it is the only challenge 
deemed to be fully addressed. 
 Autonomy in the allocation of tasks 7.2.1
Autonomy in the allocation of tasks is primarily about the flexibility (or lack of) to 
determine which tasks to do. It is a key motivating factor for platform workers. While 
relevant for all platform workers, the challenge is most problematic for platform- or 
client-determined work, as well as lower-skilled work. 
At national level, no responses specifically address this challenge per se. However, this 
challenge was probably a part of broader responses aiming to improve ‘working 
conditions’, representation, surveillance, direction and performance appraisal, or 
employment status. Therefore, the challenge is not addressed at national level. 
At EU level, the Working Time Directive373 and the TPWC Directive374 are most relevant. 
In personal scope, both cover workers but not the self-employed. Therefore, they only 
impact a low number of platform workers. 
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 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain 
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 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent 
and predictable working conditions in the European Union (OJ L186/105 11.07.2019) 
National responses EU tools
Fully addressed
Responses exist in >80% to ≤100% of surveyed 
countries
Surveyed tools are highly applicable to the 
challenge
Largely addressed 
Responses exist in >50% to ≤80% of surveyed 
countries
Surveyed tools are moderately applicable to the 
challenge for most platform workers
Partially addressed 
Responses exist in >20% to ≤50% of surveyed 
countries
Surveyed tools are partially applicable to the 
challenge
Not addressed 
Responses exist in 0 to ≤20% of surveyed 
countries
Surveyed tools have low applicability to the 
challenge
Indeterminate 
Available information cannot allow a 
determination
Available information cannot allow a 
determination
Definition
Rating
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However, both directives are deemed to be highly relevant to the challenge. The main 
issue with the Working Time Directive is that notions such as working time, rest periods, 
rest breaks, night work, and standby time are profoundly challenged by platform work. 
Therefore, it is only moderately adequate. The TPWC Directive is assessed to be highly 
adequate. For example, the mandatory written information provision contains minimum 
conditions375 for ‘working time’ whether work patterns are predictable or not. Overall, 
assessed EU tools have moderately high adequacy. 
 Physical environment 7.2.2
Physical environment mostly entails health and safety risks and required materials or 
equipment for an occupation. While relevant for all platform workers, it has been 
especially noted as a challenge for lower-skilled on-location platform work. 
The responses of 10 countries376 were directly relevant to this challenge. The scope of 
responses reflects the importance for on-location platform workers; roughly 80% of the 
30 responses impacting physical environment target only on-location platform work. 
Additionally, most physical environment responses address platform workers providing 
food delivery services. 
A total of eight top-down responses are spread across five countries.377 These actions 
were from inspectorates or administrative bodies, national or regional legislation, or case 
law. These aim to better control the working environment for specific platform workers 
(mostly Uber drivers or food couriers), or non-standard workers more generally 
(including platform workers). 
Seventeen bottom-up responses appear across nine countries.378 These largely consist of 
actions by trade unions on the health and safety of platform workers, and collective 
agreements which have either concluded or continue to be negotiated. These cover the 
physical environment for specific platforms (either providing food delivery, cleaning or 
interpretation services), or the food delivery sector. Additionally, platform workers have 
either staged demonstrations, joined trade unions, or negotiated with platforms for 
improved working conditions.379 
A number of these responses have created improvements in the physical environment 
for couriers. We observe further progress as some inspectorates, such as Spain and 
Denmark, are better empowered (through funding, legal authority, or new pilot projects) 
to verify safety for some platform workers. However, few national responses address 
fundamental difficulties related to the physical environment, such as clarifying when 
platforms must provide accident insurance, or specifying if and how labour inspectors 
can ensure safe working conditions (e.g. for cleaners in a client’s home). 
At national level overall, we determined that physical environment challenges are 
partially addressed for on-location platform workers, and not addressed for 
online platform workers. 
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At EU level, the most relevant surveyed tools380 for physical environment are those 
concerning health and safety: the Health and safety for fixed-term work Directive,381 and 
the Pregnant Workers Directive.382 While other relevant tools exist they were not 
covered, and this research focuses on labour law rather than OSH per se.  
As discussed, both of these directives only concern workers and exclude the self-
employed from their personal scope. Because most on-location platform workers, and 
virtually all online platform workers, are self-employed, they are not included in the 
personal scope of assessed EU legislation. The Health and safety for fixed-term work 
Directive has a further problem in application to platform workers, insofar as it 
establishes equal OSH conditions for fixed-term employees, in comparison to permanent 
employees for the same job and in the same company, or in comparison with reference 
to collective agreements, legislation, or practices that may exist. No evidence of such 
arrangements was found in the national surveys. Thus, assessed EU tools only cover a 
low number of platform workers. 
Nevertheless, these directives are assessed as highly relevant to the challenge, though 
ultimately deemed to be of low adequacy. 
 Surveillance, direction and performance appraisal 7.2.3
This challenge refers to the extent to which the platform and/or client monitors the 
platform worker, which plays a powerful role in determining the organisation of work. It 
can also impact direction, evaluations, and even penalties for the platform worker. This 
challenge is relevant for all platform workers, but especially for lower-skilled platform 
work. 
Six countries383 have responses relevant to this challenge. Most responses (11 out of 14) 
also concern representation of platform workers, or the intention to give platform 
workers a say in the appraisal process. Most responses target only on-location platform 
workers. 
The most interesting and wide-reaching top-down responses come from Italy, both in 
regional and national legislation (Iudicone and Faioli, 2019).  
Eight bottom-up responses address this challenge across four countries. Most of these 
are in Italy, where collective agreements and platform worker protests have addressed 
surveillance and rating mechanisms, among other issues. In France, Estonia, and 
Sweden, platform workers have also protested or negotiated on the issue.384 
These responses mostly address suspension of a platform worker’s account, 
requirements for reputational or ratings systems (fairness, transparency, portability, 
forbidding ratings from impacting working time, etc.), and the right to disconnect.385 
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Overall, at national level, surveillance, direction and performance appraisal is not 
addressed. 
At EU level, two pieces of assessed legislation are particularly relevant to this challenge: 
the GDPR,386 and the P2B Regulation.387 The challenge is furthermore closely linked with 
the employment status and the criteria that are being used when assessing employment 
status such as the ‘subordination’ criterion. 
The GDPR may provide the platform worker with a range of rights concerning their 
personal data. These could prevent many abuses associated with algorithmic 
management and performance appraisal and ensure the rights of platform workers to 
have access to their personal data and receive information from the platforms on 
automated decisions that are affecting them. The P2B ensures business users (certain 
self-employed platform workers) are treated in a fair and transparent way and have 
effective redress in case of disputes with the online intermediation service (certain 
platforms) or consumers. 
However, some uncertainties remain for the applicability of these tools, such as which 
data may be withheld by the (platform) data controller in exceptional cases, and which 
platform workers are covered by P2B. Further important questions concern the 
enforcement of the EU’s (recent) legislation concerning platforms. Therefore, we find it 
indeterminate how assessed EU tools address the challenge at this time. 
 Contracts 7.2.4
Challenges pertaining to contracts entail the existence of a written contract, the type of 
contract used, information provision, and the terms under which a platform worker’s 
contract can be terminated or suspended. Contractual challenges are relevant for all 
platform workers. 
Seven countries388 have responses directly relevant to contracts. Most of these 
responses (six out of eight) are only relevant for on-location platform workers. 
Only two top-down responses, both legislation, directly address contracts. These are 
found in Portuguese389 and UK law (BEIS, 2018). 
Four relevant responses are bottom-up. In Italy, Spain, and Sweden, collective 
agreements include clauses addressing the challenge. In Estonia, platform workers 
protested against a new pay structure connected to an allegedly intransparent and unfair 
rating system (Ärileht, 2018).390 
In general these responses are very narrow in scope and have done little to effect 
systemic change. Contracts (or platforms’ terms and conditions) were rarely addressed 
per se, though responses to employment status, collective agreements, and others may 
have considerable impact on what is permissible in platform contracts. Thus, at national 
level, challenges related to contracts are not addressed. 
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Two EU-level tools require close consideration for contractual challenges: the P2B,391 and 
the TPWC Directive.392 
In personal scope, the P2B may very well apply to a substantial portion of self-employed 
platform workers, but how many remains to be seen. For those platform workers to 
whom P2B does apply, many contractual challenges would be addressed.  
In personal scope, the TPWC Directive clarifies the EU concept of ‘worker’ by explicitly 
referring to CJEU case law. This mentions that platform workers are workers when the 
criteria set by the CJEU rulings are met,393 and restricts the possibility for Member States 
to exclude workers in various precarious non-standard forms of employment.394 
However, while platform workers are explicitly mentioned in the preamble recitals of the 
Directive, the genuine self-employed fall outside its remit. In practice, it is therefore 
likely to cover a low number of platform workers. 
Materially, the TPWC Directive contains substantial improvements for the employment 
protection of workers, including rights that address contractual challenges. However, it 
has just been adopted, and its provisions must now be transposed by Member States, 
and it is therefore difficult to assess its adequacy in addressing contractual challenges. 
The P2B, if deemed applicable to (some) platform workers, would directly address many 
important contractual challenges, such as transparency of terms and conditions and 
dispute resolution procedure. Platforms’ terms and conditions must be clear and 
available to platform workers during all stages of their commercial relationship.  
For workers (covered by the TPWC Directive) and ‘business users’ (covered by the P2B 
Regulation), the challenge is more thoroughly addressed. However, given the 
uncertainties of the P2B, we find contractual challenges are indeterminate at EU 
level. 
 Determination of employer 7.2.5
Determination of employer is related to employment status. The key distinction between 
the challenge ‘employment status’ and ‘determination of employer’ is that the latter is 
primarily concerned with whether the client or platform can be categorised as an 
employer. This challenge is relevant for all types of platform work, but especially for 
platform workers with little autonomy, under strong surveillance direction by the 
platform or by the end user, and who depend on platform work for income. These tend 
to be lower-skilled on-location platform work. 
In practice, national responses and EU tools address this challenge alongside 
‘employment status’ – not as a distinct challenge. Therefore, the assessment is 
taken exactly from the employment status below. 
At national level, determination of employer is partially addressed for on-location 
platform workers, and not addressed for online platform workers.  
In personal scope, assessed legislation is relevant for workers and bogus self-
employed, who are subject to reclassification on the basis of CJEU case law. Overall, we 
find the assessed EU tools to have only moderately low relevance to the challenge of 
employment status of platform workers, and of moderately low adequacy. 
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 Data protection 7.2.6
The challenge of data protection refers to how platforms collect, process and use 
personal data, and how platform workers’ rights with respect to these data are upheld or 
infringed. This issue is relevant for all platform workers. 
At national level, six responses seem to directly target data protection for platform 
workers: five from Italy and one from Estonia.  
One top-down response is relevant: in Italy, legislation395 obliges platforms to use a 
transparent algorithm and ensure portability for worker data.  
Five bottom-up responses include collective agreements signed by food delivery 
platforms (Covelli, 2018),396 and a platform worker strike against a new pay deal, loss of 
transparency of algorithms, and a new rating system (Ärileht, 2018). 
These national initiatives have mostly highlighted the importance of data protection for a 
limited subset of platform workers, whereas the challenge is very relevant for all. 
Overall, the challenge of data protection is not addressed by national responses. 
At EU level, the GDPR397 is the tool assessed for data protection. In personal scope, the 
GDPR applies to all natural persons. 
We assessed two aspects highly relevant to platform workers’ data protection: 1) the 
right to access personal data, and 2) the right to data portability.398  
Specifically, the data of platform workers fall under the broad notion of ‘personal data’. 
At present, a landmark court case is pending in the UK399 which will help determine 
platforms’ responsibilities to allow platform workers’ access to their personal data. 
Concerning data portability, in the first instance, platform workers can obtain a copy of 
their data ‘in a structured, commonly used and, machine-readable format’ (Article 
20(1)). Second, it provides the right ‘to have the personal data transmitted directly from 
one controller to another, where technically feasible’. However, at least three legal 
barriers400 exist to effective data portability for platform workers. 
The GDPR is an ambitious and wide-reaching tool. Moreover, pursuant to its Article 88 
(processing in the context of employment), ‘Member States may, by law or by collective 
agreements, provide for more specific rules to ensure the protection of the rights and 
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freedoms in respect of the processing of employees' personal data in the employment 
context’. It may therefore lead to further protections at national level, where they are 
currently quite lacking. 
While some legal questions remain to be clarified and effective enforcement has to be 
ensured, the GDPR represents a significant step to assuring data protection for platform 
workers. Therefore, the GDPR is highly relevant and highly adequate for the 
challenge of data protection for platform workers. 
7.3 Responses to challenges common in other forms of non-standard work 
Challenges common in other forms of non-standard work are mostly in the ‘employment’ 
dimension. Three such challenges – employment status, representation, and social 
protection – are some of the most salient and debated topics in platform work. 
Because these challenges are common in other forms of non-standard work, we might 
expect responses to have broader impact than just platforms. However, this is not 
usually the case. Most responses only narrowly target specific (types of) platforms, 
rarely focusing on online forms of platform work. For example, only a single country 
(Germany) has taken any relevant response concerning earnings and working time for 
online platform workers. 
 Employment status 7.3.1
The challenge of employment status means a lack of clarity on platform workers’ 
employment status and the issues this causes. Employment status largely determines 
rights and obligations for workers, for example concerning labour protection, social 
protection, taxation, and collective rights. While employment status is relevant for all 
platform workers, it is most problematic for platform workers with little autonomy, under 
significant direction from the platform, and high economic dependence on platform work. 
Most commonly this is lower-skilled platform work performed on-location. 
In total, eleven countries have responses directly relevant to employment status.401 Most 
of these (31 out of 45) are particular to on-location lower-skilled platform work. 
Most responses to employment status (36 out of 45) are top-down. Case law, legislation, 
and administrator/inspectorate actions have occurred. National courts have in many 
instances tried to fine-tune the concept of worker as defined under national law, and in 
some countries this has led to a more elaborated set of criteria that needs to be 
considered when establishing the status of worker. Still, most evidence suggests that 
substantial legal uncertainties on platform workers’ employment status remain within 
Member States and across the EU. When legal uncertainties remain, or some platforms 
continue to use self-employment contracts in spite of an apparent, factual employment 
relationship, national courts have become involved. Administrators and inspectorates 
have also challenged the legality of certain platform workers’ employment status and 
issued decisions on employment status as it concerns labour or social law. 
Fewer bottom-up responses (nine out of 45) directly confronted the employment status 
of platform workers. Platform workers in several countries402 organised demonstrations 
and engaged in negotiations seeking, among other changes, to be recognised as 
employees. In Germany, Finland, and Denmark, a few platforms began formally 
employing some or all of their platform workers. 
We observe that national responses address employment status with mixed success. 
National legislation has helped clarify employment status in a few countries, but mostly 
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for particular on-location platform workers.403 In most instances, case law has not 
removed the legal uncertainty of employment status for platform workers, or resulted in 
reclassification of many platform workers with an improper employment status. At 
national level overall, the challenge of employment status is partially addressed 
for on-location platform workers, and not addressed for online platform 
workers. 
The EU instruments covered in the study are not primarily aimed at defining employment 
status, or otherwise addressing the challenge as it is here discussed.404  
Most recent EU directives do refer to a consolidated European ‘worker’ concept 
progressively developed through CJEU case law, which was firstly initiated when 
interpreting Article 45 TFEU on the free movement of workers. In its rulings, the CJEU 
confirmed explicitly that the term ‘worker’ in Article 45 TFEU may not be interpreted 
differently according to the law of each Member State, but that the term ‘worker’ has an 
EU meaning.405,406,407 
The EU definition of the concept of worker is, however, primarily construed on the 
subordination requirement, and it is exactly this dimension which is profoundly 
challenged by platform work practices. Platform workers typically have a greater degree 
of freedom to decide whether to accept a task or not and when and where the service 
will be delivered when compared with more traditional work environments. Enforcement 
of CJEU case law remains a primary consideration for this challenge. 
In personal scope, assessed legislation is relevant for workers and bogus self-
employed, who are subject to reclassification on the basis of CJEU case law. 
Overall, we find the assessed EU tools to have only moderately low relevance to the 
challenge of employment status of platform workers, and of moderately low 
adequacy. 
 Representation 7.3.2
The challenge of representation refers to whether workers have a say on aspects of work 
organisation, formally or informally, at the level of the platform or as platform workers. 
Representation is relevant for all platform workers, but particularly for those with higher 
risk of being misclassified as regards their employment status, such as lower-skilled on-
location platform workers who cannot set their own prices, determine how they do the 
work, or choose their clients. 
Representation is one of the most frequently addressed challenges. A total of 42 national 
responses are relevant across 15 countries.408 
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At top-down level, case law, legislation, and administrator or inspectorate actions are 
relevant. Mostly these address food delivery couriers, though legislation in France409 and 
Italy410 impact broader categories, including all platform workers. Court cases in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK have ruled on aspects of representation. 
The majority of responses (32 out of 42) to the challenge are bottom-up. In many 
examples, platform workers have established works councils for their platform, become 
trade union members, spontaneously engaged in demonstrations, or formed 
cooperatives or collectives. Platforms themselves have variously resisted or welcomed 
such efforts. In a few instances, platforms initiated platform representation by creating 
‘forums’ to voice concerns. Collective agreements have also formalised representation 
for certain platform workers.411 Overall, representation efforts have created a substantial 
impact, but this is mostly limited to food delivery couriers.  
Therefore, representation is largely addressed for on-location platform workers. 
For online platform work, representation is not addressed. 
At EU level, four assessed directives concern collective labour rights, mostly information 
and consultation, and thus indirectly relate to representation. These are the Information 
and consultation Directive,412 the Insolvency Directive,413 the Collective Redundancies 
Directive,414 and the European Works Council Directive.415 Furthermore, the P2B 
Regulation416 includes provisions on the rights for business users to form representative 
organisations or associations in Member States, in accordance with national 
legislation.417 However, the P2B Regulation is not yet in force, and its applicability to 
platform workers is still unclear. 
The personal scope of these tools (except for the P2B) is limited to workers and is 
therefore only applicable to a low number of platform workers. As an additional 
note, EU competition law provisions may interfere with and restrict the right of self-
employed platform workers to collectively take action and bargain on their conditions, 
including on price when it prevents or restricts fair competition. The self-employed are 
generally considered as undertakings under EU competition law. However, when it 
concerns matters that do not distort competition, self-employed platform workers can 
collectively negotiate and conclude agreements with the platforms. 
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Overall, we conclude that assessed EU tools are highly relevant to the challenge of 
representation, but of moderately high adequacy. 
 Social protection 7.3.3
This challenge largely means that platform workers tend to have less access to social 
protection. It is relevant for all platform workers, but crucially depends on the platform 
worker’s employment status – both on the basis of platform work, and any other work 
performed. 
Social protection is relevant for 31 responses across 13 countries.418 It is therefore one 
of the most addressed challenges. Just over 50% of responses are limited in scope to 
lower-skilled on-location platform work. 
At the top-down level, twelve responses are relevant. These include new or modified 
legislation expanding access to social protection to additional types of workers,419 and 
administrative decisions impacting platform workers’ access to social protection. The 
legislation frequently pairs social protection with assuring proper taxation of income 
earned from self-employed activities. 
Fourteen bottom-up responses address this challenge. For example, trade unions have 
challenged administrative courts on unemployment benefits for workers between jobs 
under umbrella companies.420 In Denmark and Italy, collective agreements have 
increased social protection access for certain platform workers. In Norway, Foodora 
riders have joined the nation’s largest trade union, and a collective agreement expected 
to impact social protection is under negotiation (Mortensen, 2018). Similar agreements 
were concluded in Austria (De Groen et al., 2018b). Platform workers providing food 
delivery services in France and Belgium have created or joined cooperatives or 
collectives, in part to facilitate access to social protection (Akguc et al., 2018; Vandaele, 
2017). In Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Romania and the UK, some platforms 
(especially those in food delivery and personal transport) have voluntarily (or under 
pressure from workers, trade unions, or the government) established schemes to 
provide social protection to platform workers. Mostly these concern accident and liability 
insurance.  
Governments seem to be increasingly aware of the challenge social protection represents 
for platform workers (and other non-standard workers), as well as the risk of under- or 
unreported income. To some extent, platforms, platform workers, and social partners are 
filling in where statutory coverage is lacking. Most progress is evident for platform 
workers engaged in lower-skilled on-location tasks, and more progress has been made in 
accident and liability insurance than in other types, such as pension and unemployment 
insurance. A larger challenge seems to remain in social protection for online platform 
workers (and non-standard forms of work generally). Overall, at national level, social 
protection is partially addressed for on-location platform workers, and not 
addressed for online platform workers. 
At EU level, several selected directives concern social protection. These are mainly the 
Pregnant Workers Directive,421 and the Work-life Balance Directive422 (repealing the 
Parental Leave Directive). A set of non-discrimination directives ensures equal treatment 
on different grounds and include social protection within their remit such as the Race 
Directive, the Gender equality in social security Directive, the Gender equality in 
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Employment Directive and the Gender equality of self-employed Directive.423 Of these 
tools, few include the self-employed in their personal scope. Thus, they cover a low 
number of platform workers.  
The Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-
employed424 aims to ensure access to six branches of social security for both employees 
and the self-employed. In personal scope, it would therefore apply to all platform 
workers regardless of employment status. This is a form of soft law, intended to provide 
direction to Member States, but not legally enforceable. Even so, the Recommendation 
clearly indicates that Member States are to move to provide more social protection for 
the self-employed. 
While assessed EU tools are of high relevance for social protection, they are overall 
deemed to be of low adequacy. 
 Earnings 7.3.4
The challenge of ‘earnings’ mostly relates to fair and liveable earnings for a given 
amount of work, and the ability to determine or negotiate how much one earns. Earnings 
are relevant for all platform workers, but the challenge is especially problematic for 
those who cannot set their own prices. 
Earnings were addressed in 27 responses across 12 countries.425 The majority of these 
(18 out of 27) concern only food delivery couriers, who are generally unable to set their 
own prices. Only three responses are relevant beyond lower-skilled on-location platform 
work.  
Only four responses relevant to this challenge are top-down. Of these, three are 
legislation from Italy. In the Netherlands, a court case426 determined that earnings for 
food couriers are subject to the minimums established by collective agreement. 
Twenty-two out of twenty-seven responses are bottom-up. In most of these, platform 
workers or social partners negotiated with or pressured platforms on the price of 
services. Relevant responses include platform worker demonstrations, collective 
agreements, and the creation of cooperatives or collectives.427 
These responses have certainly raised general awareness of low earnings from platform 
work but have less often resulted in systemic changes. For many on-location workers, 
negotiations between platform workers and platforms, often with trade union 
involvement, are unresolved and ongoing. In most cases, platforms still set the 
(external) price of services, and any concessions to platform workers is on a voluntary 
basis. Even less progress is evident for online platform workers. 
Overall, the challenge of earnings is partially addressed at national level for on-
location platform workers, and not addressed for online platform workers. 
Assessed EU tools generally approach earnings from an equal treatment perspective in 
the context of an employment contract or relationship, namely that discriminatory 
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practices on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age, disability and type of 
contract are forbidden. However, they tend to address different types of earnings 
challenges than those identified as most relevant for platform workers. For example, the 
tools assessed forbid unequal pay for equal work and work of equal value performed by 
men and women, but do not set a minimum or baseline level of pay, since the EU lacks 
the competence to do so.428 
Assessed EU tools on non-standard work429 forbid discrimination of remuneration based 
on an employee having a part-time, fixed-term or temporary agency work contract. 
However, these are unlikely to apply to platform workers because most platform workers 
are contractually self-employed, and because platform workers are unlikely to have a 
comparator (e.g. full-time contract equivalent, indefinite contract equivalent or other) 
with which a comparison can be made. Thus, the selected EU tools apply to a low 
number of platform workers as regards personal scope. Moreover, the selected EU 
tools are assessed to be of low relevance and low adequacy for the challenge of 
earnings. 
 Working time 7.3.5
The challenge of ‘working time’ is mostly about the flexibility to choose when and how 
much to work. This also concerns the availability of work and unpaid time while 
searching or waiting for tasks. While working time is relevant for all platform workers, it 
appears especially problematic for those who work on fixed times – especially lower-
skilled on-location tasks such as food delivery. 
A total of 19 national responses in seven countries430 address working time specifically. 
Generally, responses address this challenge alongside employment status, 
representation, and earnings. More than half of responses to working time directly 
targeted food couriers. 
Four top-down responses address working time. These include legislation and inquiries 
from labour and social affairs inspectorates, which consider working time in addition to 
working conditions more broadly. 
A total of 13 national responses are bottom-up, either platform worker actions or 
collective agreements. Working time is clearly an issue that platform workers and trade 
unions are concerned about. In fact, all concluded or pending collective agreements on 
platform work directly address working time.431 
Generally, responses pertaining to working time also concern remuneration and the 
ability to set one’s own prices or negotiate for better earnings. A frequent point of 
contention, especially in platform worker protests, is earnings for hours worked rather 
than per tasks completed. The challenge has only been addressed narrowly, for platform 
workers of specific platforms (almost exclusively food couriers), in a handful of countries. 
General working-time issues or ambiguities such as how to monitor working time or what 
constitutes working time (e.g. waiting on a task), are largely unresolved. Overall, at 
national level, working time challenges for on-location platform workers are 
partially addressed, and not addressed for online platform workers. 
                                           
428
 Article 153, paragraph 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
429
 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Annex : Framework Agreement on part-time work (OJ L 14, 
20.1.1998, p. 9–14); Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ L 175, 10.7.1999, p. 43–48); Directive 2008/104/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work (OJ L 327, 
5.12.2008, p. 9–14) 
430
 BE, DK, ES, FR, IT, NO, and SE 
431
 Two ‘other’ responses address working time as well. These are an Italian parliamentary question on Foodora 
riders raised in 2016, and IG Metall’s Ombuds Office run from Germany. 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
219 
At EU level, a number of selected tools have relevance to working time for platform 
workers: the Working Time Directive,432 the Work-life Balance Directive,433 the TPWC 
Directive,434 the Part-time Work Directive,435 and the Fixed-term Work Directive.436 Each 
of these are limited in personal scope to workers, and thus only apply to a low number 
of platform workers. 
However, these tools are assessed to be of high relevance to the challenge of working 
time, and moderately high adequacy. 
 Undeclared work 7.3.6
The challenge of undeclared work implies non-compliance with labour, social security or 
taxation legislation or regulations in the country and distorts fair competition. 
Undeclared work is relevant for all types of platform work. 
Six countries437 have taken measures to address the challenge. Unlike most other 
challenges discussed here, responses to undeclared work often apply to all platform 
work, as the measures mostly target broader groups of non-standard workers. 
All 11 responses came from top-down actors, suggesting that undeclared work is 
primarily a domain concerning national authorities rather than platform workers, 
platforms, and social partners. 
In these observed cases, legislative or administrative actions aim to combat undeclared 
work, ensure proper income tax declaration, ensure an effective tax declaration system 
for non-standard work arrangements, and support effective social protection. Overall, 
the challenge of undeclared work is not addressed at national level. 
At EU level, the assessed legislation has little to do with the challenge of undeclared 
work as discussed here.  
Moreover, we still lack a good empirical understanding of the challenge, which makes 
assessment problematic. The objectives of the EU platform tackling undeclared work, as 
well as the ELA, entail combating fraud and abuses. However, these tools are very new, 
and were largely beyond the study’s scope of analysis. 
Therefore, the challenge of undeclared work is indeterminate at EU level at this 
time. 
7.4  Responses to challenges found in the general labour market 
Challenges relevant in the general labour market include one in the ‘work’ dimension, 
one in ‘social relations’, and one ‘other’. Because these are the widest in scope, we may 
expect more top-down responses, or more relevance for EU tools.  
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These issues are some of the least addressed by national responses. However, adverse 
social behaviour and equal treatment, and cross-border work, are two of the most 
relevant challenges for the EU level. 
 Autonomy in work organisation 7.4.1
Autonomy in work organisation is the ability to determine the order, method, and tempo 
of tasks. It is strongly related to subordination and hence to employment status. The 
challenge is relevant for all platform work, but particularly lower-skilled types. 
At national level, no responses specifically address this challenge per se. It may have 
been addressed through responses dealing with employment status; surveillance, 
direction and performance appraisal or others, but not definitively so. Therefore, the 
challenge is not addressed at national level. 
At EU level, selected legislation is not applicable to autonomy in work organisation per 
se. However, we considered this issue above with employment status. 
 Adverse social behaviour and equal treatment 7.4.2
Adverse social behaviour concerns asocial behaviour of colleagues, supervisors, or others 
who come into contact with platform workers, as well as equal treatment. It is an issue 
for all platform workers, but particularly those interacting with on-location clients.  
Only three national responses in three countries directly concern this challenge.438 All of 
these responses are bottom-up initiatives addressing either Uber drivers or food delivery 
couriers. 
Generally, these responses are about discrimination or harassment against certain 
platform workers based on their nationality or ethnicity. One response was a protest by 
Deliveroo riders in Ireland aiming to raise awareness of and prevent targeted attacks 
against foreign-born riders. A second response is a voluntary charter signed by several 
food delivery platforms in Italy, containing provisions against discrimination. The third 
response is the UK’s GMB union recruiting Uber drivers. Part of their motivation in doing 
so was to prevent charges being levied on minority Uber drivers in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner. 
Despite the low number of specific responses, adverse social behaviour is often covered 
together with representation and employment status. However, this is difficult to directly 
observe. Thus, at national level, the challenge of adverse social behaviour is not 
addressed. 
At EU level, six assessed tools are directly relevant to adverse social behaviour (and 
particularly non-discrimination): the Employment Directive,439 the Race Directive,440 the 
Gender equality in employment Directive,441 the Gender equality in access to goods and 
services Directive,442 the Gender equality of self-employed Directive,443 and the Gender 
equality in social security Directive.444 
Each of these directives has a broader personal scope than workers. The Employment 
Directive, Race Directive, Gender equality in employment Directive, and Gender equality 
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in social security Directive apply to employees and self-employed. However, pursuant 
to the personal scope of application, the directives grant different material rights. The 
Gender equality of self-employed Directive applies to self-employed and their 
spouses. The Gender equality in access to goods and services Directive applies to 
women and men who are not employed. In principle, the inclusion of self-employed 
would imply that the majority of platform workers are in the personal scope of most of 
these directives. 
Yet platform workers’ protection from most of these directives is probably limited for 
other reasons. One practical difficulty is that they were drafted in consideration of 
discrimination in more traditional business sectors. In platform work, digital and online 
forms of harassment and discrimination are more prominent – especially for online 
platform workers. These may or not be blatant and traceable, and it is likely that 
discriminatory cases, especially concerning gender, are structurally under-reported.445 
Additionally, the possibility and extent of contact between platforms, platform workers, 
and clients differs a great deal even within the same platform type.446 Overall, these 
tools apply to the challenge for a moderately high number of platform workers. 
The practical application of these tools is complex when applied to the various forms of 
platform work, and significant uncertainties remain. While the assessed pieces of 
legislation are assessed to be highly relevant to the challenge of adverse social 
behaviour, they are only moderately high adequacy. 
 Cross-border work 7.4.3
The challenge of cross-border work is related to the choice of jurisdiction and applicable 
law, as well as social security coordination. Cross-border work can also increase risks for 
fraud, abuses, deprivation of rights and undeclared work. These challenges may affect 
any type of platform work, but especially tasks performed online. 
At national level, this was found to be a very marginal issue, as only Hungary, Spain and 
Slovakia have relevant responses. These mostly aim to ensure fair competition, 
especially between Uber and the taxi industry. Thus, at national level, the challenge of 
cross-border platform work is not addressed. 
At EU level, cross-border work may present particular challenges regarding the 
application of law related to freedom of movement (of workers and services), choice of 
jurisdiction and applicable law (Rome I447 and Brussels I448 Regulations), and social 
security coordination. These challenges potentially exist both in relation to the 
application of the rules and the resolution of disputes in cases of ill- or non-application.  
The complexity usually created by cross-border situations and the lack of efficient 
information-sharing processes between countries increase the risks of fraud, abuses and 
deprivation of rights regarding social security law and labour law.  
However, there is little evidence on the specific size of these issues in relation to 
platform work, and its exact policy and legal implications. More research and analysis of 
the regulatory implications are needed, while at the same time, with the creation of the 
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ELA, the EU is preparing for tighter enforcement of the rules.  Therefore, the challenge 
of cross-border platform work is indeterminate at EU level at this time. 
  
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
223 
7.5 Summary: challenges that are not fully addressed at national/EU level 
Overall, the most important challenges remain largely unaddressed. However, some 
countries and the EU have responded to some of the challenges that the emergence of 
platform work poses. This means that there are still important policy gaps that could be 
addressed at national or EU level. 
The work-related challenges are largely or intermediately unaddressed. Indeed, there 
are no national and limited EU responses addressing the autonomy in the allocation of 
tasks and in work organisation, while a minority of the countries addressed the physical 
environment and surveillance, direction and performance appraisal.  
The employment-related challenges are in general more addressed at national level than 
the work-related challenges. However, except for contracts that are somewhat 
addressed, they are largely unaddressed. 
Similarly, the social relations-related challenges are also largely unaddressed, except for 
undeclared work that is somewhat addressed.  
Finally, the most important ‘other’ challenges form the exception, as they are to some 
extent, or largely, addressed. Indeed, with the creation of the ELA, cross-border work is 
especially addressed and data protection is addressed overall with the introduction of the 
GDPR. 
In addressing the remaining challenges at national or EU level, the specificity to platform 
work is also important. Indeed, the platform-specific challenges can be addressed solely 
for platform work, whereas, because of their nature, other challenges require a more 
general approach that also addresses other forms of non-standard work or general 
labour market policies. 
In interpreting the findings, a few additional caveats are noteworthy. 
First, the extent to which a challenge is addressed does not imply that either 
the countries or the EU are necessarily responsible or competent for addressing 
the challenge. Therefore, ‘not addressed’ does not necessarily imply that Member 
States or the EU should do more to address a given challenge. Moreover, the assessed 
EU tools are primarily applicable to those who are contractually ‘workers’, which excludes 
most platform workers outright. 
Second, certain aspects, such as enforceability, are not considered in the gap 
analysis. This is an area where future research would be very valuable, especially as 
new legislative tools come into force, have time to make an impact,449 and new 
enforcement mechanisms450 become more active. 
Third, the gap analysis is necessarily a simplification of several very complex 
topics. Platform work is still developing and changing rapidly. Moreover, most responses 
are relatively recently introduced, which makes it difficult to assess their effectiveness, 
as the measures have not been fully established. 
Table 21: Summary of gap analysis 
                                           
449
 For example, the Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions replacing the Written 
Statement Directive must be transposed by 1 August 2022. 
450
 Particularly the European Labour Authority and European Platform tackling undeclared work. 
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Source: authors’ elaboration. 
 
Note: The P2B and the GDPR could significantly influence these assessments, especially for those deemed 
indeterminate.  
N/A: Assessed tools are not applicable to the challenge, NP: natural persons, W: workers, SE: self-employed.  
* Workers and self-employed are both in the personal scope of legislation, but certain additional limitations 
may effectively limit which platform workers are covered.  
** Determination of employer is assessed in tandem with employment status. 
  
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
225 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY POINTERS 
The ongoing digital transformation is changing both the content and nature of jobs. The 
greater availability, acceptance and capacity of digital technologies, together with a large 
degree of automation, allows for differently organised work. Digitalisation can drive 
down transaction costs, which allows for smaller jobs (units of work) to be intermediated 
separately. When the intermediation of these paid jobs between the worker and the 
client is performed by an online platform, it is considered platform work.  
This study provides an evidence-based analysis of the challenges faced by platform 
workers with regard to their working conditions and social protection, as well as 
proposed or implemented policy and legal responses to those challenges at national and 
EU level, and to inform policymakers at EU level about the need for legislative or non-
legislative action. 
We have assessed the extent to which platform work is a challenge to the working 
conditions and social protection of platform workers, as well as how stakeholders have 
responded at national level. Additionally, we have analysed the extent to which national 
and EU tools and responses address these challenges. The findings reveal significant 
diversity in types and prevalence of platform work, and the extent to which it remains a 
challenge, across the EU28, Norway and Iceland. However, a number of commonalities 
can be generalised. 
8.1 Takeaways from the gap analysis 
Challenges specific to personal transportation and (food) delivery platforms are 
widespread, as are national responses. 55% of all responses target one of these two 
platform types specifically, and even more target other forms of lower-skilled on-location 
platform work, for example domestic cleaners. Taken together, these responses tend to 
focus on employment status, collective bargaining rights, health and safety, and social 
protection.451 The significance of personal transportation and food delivery platforms is 
remarkable, given the diversity of platform work in Europe, and data suggesting that 
these only represent a minority of platform workers.452 One could conclude that, at 
present, personal transportation and delivery platforms are more problematic, or simply 
more visible and better known. At the very least, stakeholders are active on the issue.  
Few responses target working conditions and social protection for platform 
work as a whole – this reflects the responses from surveyed experts, who remarked on 
the lack of awareness of online platform workers. Many responses that do target 
platform work more broadly are simply enquiries or information-gathering efforts. In 
many cases these target broader groups such as non-standard workers in general. The 
more concrete tools and responses relevant for all platform workers often relate to 
taxation and social protection provision for all or a portion of non-standard workers, or 
only to the minority of platform workers who are employees. Only one piece of national 
legislation currently in force453 specifically addresses the working conditions and social 
protection of all platform workers.  
Many responses are driven by grassroots organisations of platform workers or 
social partners, either explicitly so, or from behind the scenes. This might indicate that 
a gap is more likely in contexts where self-employed platform workers face more 
                                           
451
 Many focus on competition law as well. However, these are not so much about the working conditions of 
platform workers. Instead, they are largely cases of the taxi lobbies ensuring that platforms do not have an 
unfair advantage. 
452
 See discussion of COLLEEM data in Section 3.3.2 
453
 Specifically, the French Loi El Khomri: Loi n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, à la 
modernisation du dialogue social et à la sécurisation des parcours professionnels [Law on work, modernising 
social dialogue and securing career paths] (2016-1088, 8.08.2016) 
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barriers to organise and collectively bargain. Furthermore, the high number of responses 
targeting representation may indicate that national authorities prefer empowering 
platform workers to organise, rather than resorting to top-down measures such as new 
legislation. However, these bottom-up responses are not as concrete as top-down 
measures, as they often rely on the continued cooperation of platforms, platform 
workers, and social partners. 
Most of the assessed EU-level tools only marginally impact most of the 
challenges for platform workers. In most cases this is a direct result of employment 
status. Most significant challenges identified in the study are, from a legal perspective, 
either directly connected with the determination of labour market status,454 or they 
concern the scope and substance of the labour and social rights.455 The latter category of 
challenges are in fact secondary challenges, as they largely derive from the classification 
of a platform worker as a ‘worker’ or as self-employed. Simply stated, most assessed EU 
tools afford much less protection to the self-employed than to employees. 
An important exception is for self-employed platform workers who fall under 
the P2B Regulation. While the P2B is limited in scope to a specific type of platform, it 
regulates certain basic aspects of the relationship between the platform and the self-
employed platform worker (business user), who delivers products or services to private 
clients. In this way, it may have important implications for a number of challenges, 
especially those specific to platform work and related to algorithmic management. 
In short, the gap analysis suggests that: 
1) except for data protection, no significant challenges are entirely resolved 
by national or EU tools and responses; 
2) most significant challenges for on-location platform workers are at least 
somewhat addressed by national responses; 
3) national responses do very little to address the challenges of online 
platform workers; 
4) in spite of recent positive steps, the assessed EU tools do little to address 
the working conditions and social protection challenges of (self-
employed) platform workers at present. 
8.2 General conclusions and policy implications 
 
Conclusion 1: Many significant challenges related to platform work are not new. 
The most discussed and addressed challenges related to platform work include 
employment status, representation, and social protection. Each of these issues appear in 
other forms of non-standard work. Put another way, platform work has brought 
challenges corresponding to non-standard work to the fore, especially through highly 
visible platforms. 
National responses for these platform workers’ challenges often focus on a single 
platform or a single service provided by platforms. Responses usually have minimal 
systemic effect because they do not intend to address the roots of the challenge (e.g. 
little or no right to collective bargaining, and reduced access to social protection for the 
self-employed).  
Traditional means of enforcing regulations in the area of working conditions, such as 
labour inspections, are less suitable for platform work. Among other reasons, this is 
                                           
454
 Including determination of the employer, allocation of tasks, autonomy in work organisation, surveillance, 
direction and performance appraisal. These can even serve as criteria to determine factual employment status. 
455
 Particularly contracts, earnings, working time, physical environment, social protection and collective rights. 
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because the work does not typically occur in the physical premises of an employer. While 
this is usually the case for platform work, it is a growing phenomenon in standard 
employment relationships as well, bearing in mind the increasing possibilities to telework 
from home or elsewhere. 
Policy implications: Addressing certain challenges of working conditions and 
social protection for platform work is very difficult without consideration of 
broader frameworks. 
Properly addressing challenges such as employment status, representation, and social 
protection likely requires broader changes to the labour and social protection frameworks 
of non-standard work. Specific examples include increasing the level of social protection 
afforded to the self-employed, as promoted by the Council Recommendation on access 
to social protection for workers and the self-employed.456 An additional strategy would 
be to support stronger enforcement of rules for non-standard workers such as platform 
workers, for example clarifying and increasing labour inspectorates’ authority to inspect 
platform work for legal compliance. The ELA could play a role in this regard, particularly 
given platform work’s frequent cross-border nature and relevance to undeclared work. 
Furthermore, the European Commission could clarify cartel and competition law as it 
applies to platform workers. This would help ensure that platform workers can negotiate 
collective agreements with platforms, or collectively or individually bargain with clients, 
regardless of employment status. Lastly, increasing the labour protections applicable to 
the self-employed would benefit platform workers. 
 
Conclusion 2: Employment status remains a core challenge at national and EU 
level.  
The legal concepts of ‘worker’ or employee at EU and national level are not entirely clear 
and consistent. The assessment is based on the factual relationship between the 
platform and the platform worker, or the client and the platform worker. These 
assessments are subject to interpretation and rapid change. 
Determining whether platform workers are genuine or bogus self-employed is frequently 
challenging. National judiciaries’ interpretation of the employment is not unanimous and 
sometimes contradictory within and between Member States. At the same time CJEU 
case law is only gradually evolving and clarifying the concept of ‘worker’. These legal 
developments are slow and seem to continuously lag behind the fast-changing business 
practices characterising platform work. Some platforms seem to operate at the margins 
between self-employed and employee, adjusting practices to maximise control over 
platform workers without unequivocally assuming the role of employers. 
CJEU case law has defined the ‘worker’ concept with a central focus on the subordination 
requirement, the economic and genuine character of the service and its remuneration 
requirement. CJEU case law limited the scope of marginal and ancillary work activities 
which fall outside its remit, whereas the new TPWC Directive has greatly reduced the 
possibility to exclude small-scale work from its scope, especially when it concerns 
unpredictable work. However, platform work may still be slipping through these 
requirements, as do other forms of non-standard work performed in economic 
dependency, and the Directive only covers specific working conditions. Unless Member 
States widen the concept of employee or introduce a rebuttable presumption on the 
employment status of platform workers,457 platforms are likely to continue or expand 
their reliance on labour from self-employed individuals. Reclassification of individual 
cases may happen on the basis of EU law or on national legislation, but it is unlikely that 
                                           
456
 Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-
employed (2019/C 387/01 of 15.11.2019 
457
 Through legislation or through case law. 
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this will drastically reverse the main trend. Actions aimed at protecting self-employed 
platform workers who are economically dependent on the platforms to ensure some 
minimum standards as to their ‘working conditions’ seem advisable. 
Policy implications: The EU and Member States should consider clarifying which 
platform practices are incompatible with self-employment for platform workers. 
This is of particular relevance for platform workers who are economically dependent on 
work assignments, while subject to surveillance, assessments and payments steered by 
the platform, and without control over the price of their services and work organisation. 
Such platform workers are more vulnerable and in a weaker position relative to the 
platform: a market failure that can be addressed by legislative measures or collective 
bargaining. 
The goal of legislative measures could be to ensure that contractually self-employed 
platform workers are also factually self-employed (e.g. prevent bogus self-employment). 
This can be accomplished by reclassifying bogus self-employed platform workers, but 
also if certain platforms better align their practices with self-employment, for example 
refraining from non-compete clauses and allowing platform workers to set their own 
prices and determine time and manner of service provision for themselves. 
 
Conclusion 3: Some challenges most specific to platform work are some of the 
least resolved. 
The defining feature of platform work is the digital mode of intermediation between 
platform worker and client. Challenges related to intermediation (e.g. surveillance, 
performance appraisal, data protection, and intransparent contracts) appear to be more 
difficult to address or are at least less known, particularly at national level, where very 
few responses exist. One reason is the complexity in algorithmic management, which 
requires significant technical expertise to understand, and the difficulty in observing how 
algorithmic management works. The cross-border dimension also presents an 
enforcement challenge for individual countries, as platforms are likely to be based 
beyond national jurisdiction. Nevertheless, digital intermediation, transparency, and data 
usage are challenges that continue to grow in and beyond platform work.  
Policy implications: EU authorities should consider further action on digital 
intermediation and algorithmic management, both within and without platform 
work. 
These issues have begun to be addressed by new pieces of EU legislation, including the 
GDPR, the P2B Regulation,458 and the TPWC Directive (EU) 2019/1152. These tools are 
found to address highly relevant challenges for platform workers.  
While the actual impact of these tools on platform work is not yet fully clear, it appears 
many or most platform workers would only marginally benefit, with the exception of the 
GDPR. EU authorities may consider further modifications or clarifications to these tools, 
together with enhanced enforcement in the Member States, to ensure more platform 
workers benefit from them. 
 
Conclusion 4: Online platform workers remain less known and protected, 
especially by national responses. 
Online platform workers face a number of working conditions challenges, including non-
payment, intransparent and disadvantageous terms and conditions, and a lack of dispute 
                                           
458
 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and the Council on promoting fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation services (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57–79) 
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resolution. Many of these are highly specific to platform work, rather than more broadly 
shared with non-standard forms of work.  
Very few national responses address online platform workers, either with specific 
measures, or by addressing all forms of platform work holistically. This is not unexpected 
for several reasons. First, online platform work is more likely to take place in the 
worker’s home and is thus more difficult to control. Second, online platform work is often 
inherently cross-border, as clients use these platforms to outsource work where labour is 
cheaper. In many cases, the platform, platform worker, and client are based in different 
countries, which makes it much more difficult to resolve disputes and enforce rights for 
platform workers.  
Nevertheless, online forms of platform work deserve further attention. Online platform 
work is likely to be most prevalent in Europe,459 and most experts interviewed for this 
research expect online forms of platform work to experience particular growth well into 
the future. Their cross-border nature makes these platforms a more natural fit for EU 
action.  
Policy implications: More attention is required for online platform work at both 
national and EU level.  
However, cross-border considerations make EU-level action particularly appropriate for 
online platform work. An especially important way to reduce vulnerabilities for online 
platform workers is to address algorithmic management and digital intermediation. 
 
Conclusion 5: Our understanding of platform work remains limited because of 
insufficient data. 
Despite many efforts to assess the size, prevalence, and expected evolution of platform 
work, a lack of reliable, comprehensive data on platform work has a negative effect on 
evidence-based policymaking and informed public discourse. No standard definition 
exists for platform work, which contributes to confusion and inaction. 
Policy implications: Additional action to gather data on platform work would be 
helpful for informed policymaking.  
This requires a standard definition of platform work, which could draw from the definition 
of ‘business user’ used in the P2B Regulation.460 Drawing the definition from existing 
legislation also creates the benefit of additional coherence between EU policies. 
One strategy is to incorporate further questions on platform work into labour surveys at 
national and EU level. This can build on the work of the COLLEEM surveys, which 
generated very useful data for a portion of Member States. An even stronger option 
would be to require platforms to provide certain data to an appropriate EU authority, 
which would help ensure coordinated and effective data collection in spite of the cross-
border nature of platform work. National level authorities could require platforms to 
register with them, which may help ensure adequate data collection and avoid 
undeclared work. 
 
Conclusion 6: Many national responses and EU tools are too new to adequately assess 
their impact on platform workers. 
                                           
459
 See Section 3.3.2 
460
 Three necessary changes would be: 1) specifying that a platform worker provides services, rather than 
services and goods, 2) broadening the scope of client to include natural persons, and 3) expanding the scope 
beyond ‘pure’ online intermediation services. 
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Many national and EU-level responses are very new, and therefore it is difficult to 
observe concrete impacts. At national and regional level, legislation in France,461 Italy,462 
and Portugal463 may have a significant impact on the well-being of platform workers. 
Ongoing court battles may result in some platform workers being declared employees, 
and thus receiving further protection under labour and social law. 
At EU level, new regulations may also prove to apply to how platforms use the data of 
platform workers. The GDPR and the P2B could significantly impact the working 
conditions and social protection of platform workers. However, it remains for a pending 
court case464 to clarify if platform workers’ data is protected ‘personal data’. It is not yet 
clear how many platform workers will benefit from the P2B. 
Policy implications: New national and EU legislation identified by this study 
should be closely monitored to understand if they are sufficient, or if 
amendments or entirely new instruments are required.  
At EU level, both the P2B and the GDPR provide new ways to observe the ‘black box of 
intermediation’ which is characteristic of platform work. This transparency could allow 
new insight into the internal workings of platforms and may prove key to improving 
working conditions for platform workers. Two existing groups may be well-positioned to 
monitor the evolution of these tools and advise the European Commission: the Expert 
group to the EU Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, and the high-level expert 
group on the impact of the digital transformation on EU labour markets. 
 
Conclusion 7: Voluntary and non-legislative actions have produced positive effects for 
some platform workers. 
Certain platforms have cooperated among themselves and with social partners to 
commit to decent working conditions. Examples in Germany465 and Italy466 demonstrate 
that such arrangements can be put into practice and improve conditions for online and 
on-location forms of platform work.  
Policy implications: National and EU authorities may consider organising and 
promoting voluntary and non-legislative actions. 
One possibility is to introduce a dispute-handling mechanism for platform workers. The 
P2B could provide the basis for such a tool for platforms, or an EU mechanism could be 
created. The EU and Member States could also consider promoting voluntary codes of 
conduct or charters for platforms to commit to ensuring fair working conditions.  
                                           
461
 Loi n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la 
sécurisation des parcours professionnels [Law on work, modernising social dialogue and securing career paths] 
(2016-1088, 8.08.2016) 
462
 Decreto Legge 3 settembre 2019, n. 101, contenente “Misure urgenti per la tutela del lavoro e la risoluzione 
di crisi aziendali” 
463
 Lei n.º 45/2018 Regime jurídico da atividade de transporte individual e remunerado de passageiros em 
veículos descaracterizados a partir de plataforma eletrónica [Legal regime of individual transport activity and 
paid passengers in unregistered vehicles from electronic platforms] (Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 154 
10.08.2018, p. 3972-3980)  
464
 See Judgment of the Court of Appeal London, Case (2018) EWCA civ 2748, Uber BV vs Yaseen Aslam, 
James Farrar and others, (29.12.2018). Uber is currently challenging the decision of the Court of Appeal before 
the Supreme Court but the 4 drivers filed a new lawsuit against Uber for withholding data which in their 
opinion is contravening Article 15 of the GDPR; See also 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/08/uber-drivers-lawsuit-personal-data-ride-hailing-gig-
economy/594232/ 
465
 Deutsche Crowdsourcing Verband [German Crowdsourcing Association], see Section 5 
466
 Carta dei diritti fondamentali del lavoro digitale nel contesto urbano [Charter of fundamental rights of digital 
work in the urban context], see Section 5 
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1. Introduction 
Platform workers, defined as workers providing work through, on or intermediated by 
online platforms, are often classified by the platforms as self-employed.468 Provided they 
are genuine self-employed, platform workers fall outside the protective scope of EU 
labour and social protection legislation applicable to workers. Indeed, labour law has 
always distinguished between workers (employees) and the self-employed to delimit its 
scope of application (the so-called ‘binary system’). While workers (employees) benefit 
from the whole range of labour rights – including collective labour rights – the self-
employed are excluded.  
The hybrid nature characterising the labour market status of platform workers is posing 
challenges regarding the application of existing legal frameworks.469 While some platform 
workers are genuine self-employed, working independently and for their own account, 
others may work under contractual relationships which share the very characteristics 
that are typical of employment relationships, such as being subjected to the directional 
power and/or an economic dependency of the employer (platform or end user), which 
often unilaterally determines the terms and conditions of work without any scope for 
negotiation.470  
The legal uncertainty about the employment or labour market status of platform workers 
has raised questions regarding their right to freely associate, lawfully negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements under EU legislation.471 Under EU competition law, any 
agreement between undertakings which affects the conditions under which these 
undertakings compete with one another may fall under the cartel prohibition as it may 
be detrimental to other businesses and consumers. When self-employed individuals 
directly carry out an economic activity on a market, they are considered as 
undertakings, and hence fall within the remit of EU competition rules. 
The primary objective of EU competition law has always been to protect consumers from 
anti-competitive agreements and practices between undertakings, such as price fixing or 
market sharing. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), however, made an 
important exception to the application of EU competition law when the latter contradicts 
social policy and labour law objectives aimed at protecting workers and the working 
conditions through collective agreements. Collective agreements between organisations 
representing employers and workers fall outside the scope of competition law.472 This 
exception may also apply if the individual service providers are in fact ‘false self-
employed’.473,474 
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Hence, the CJEU, while retaining the prohibition on collective bargaining for genuine self-
employed when this is affecting free trade and fair competition, opened the possibility of 
granting such rights to the ‘false’ self-employed. However, as the legal labour market 
classification of platform workers is depending on a case-by-case basis, uncertainty 
remains as to whether platform workers can lawfully exercise collective rights and 
bargaining.  
In this context of legal uncertainty, initiatives of various nature have been adopted at 
the national level to provide platform workers, or more generally, dependent self-
employed workers, with collective rights and better working conditions. These initiatives 
include the adoption of legislation; negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements 
by trade unions; other trade union initiatives; initiatives from grass-root organisations; 
and action taken by the platforms. 
This paper focuses on the right to collective bargaining for platform workers. It will 
proceed as follows: First, it looks at CJEU case law in relation to the right to collective 
bargaining for the workers and the self-employed, the limits posed by competition law 
and its relevance for platform workers. Second, it presents the various initiatives taken 
at the national level to provide platform workers, or more generally, dependent self-
employed workers, with collective rights as was reported by the national experts under 
the main study during 2019. Finally, it draws preliminary conclusions on the relation 
between antitrust limits to collective bargaining and its application to platform workers 
with the aim to clarify whether platform workers can lawfully bargain collectively and 
conclude collective agreements. 
2. EU competition law and the right to collective bargaining  
2.1. The Albany case: The right to collective bargaining for employees as an 
‘exception-to-the-rule’ approach 
The key anti-cartel provisions relevant for this paper are enshrined in Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which prohibits under (1) ‘all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market and in particular those which (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions’ […] and which declares under (2) ‘all such 
agreements or decisions automatically void’. The main purpose of competition law is to 
protect consumers from agreements and practices which affect the competitive process 
to their detriment.  
The CJEU had the opportunity to discuss the application of Article 101 (1) TFEU to 
collective agreements in the landmark case C-67/96, Albany.475 In the case at issue the 
CJEU was asked whether the decision taken by employers’ and employees’ organisations, 
in the context of a collective agreement in the textile sector, to set up in that sector a 
single sectoral pension fund responsible for managing a supplementary pension scheme 
and to request the public authorities to make affiliation of that fund compulsory, was to 
be considered an agreement between undertakings and thus contrary to Article 101 (1) 
TFEU. The Court, after explaining the reason why the collective agreement could 
potentially infringe Article 101 TFEU, recalled that the Treaties do not only ensure that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted, but they also pursue social policy 
objectives. Thus, ‘the activities of the Community are to include not only a “system 
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ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted” but also “a policy in the 
social sphere”’.476 
The Court went on by stating that:  
 
‘It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective 
agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the 
social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if 
management and labour were subject to Article [101 (1) TFEU] of the Treaty when 
seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment.  
It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole 
which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of 
collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives 
must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of 
Article [101 (1) TFEU] of the Treaty.’477  
Hence, by following an ‘exception-to-the-rule’ approach,478 the CJEU held that an 
agreement can be excluded from the scope of application of Article 101 (1) TFEU and 
consequently not be contravening EU competition law, as long as it fulfils two cumulative 
conditions, namely: 1) being concluded by management (employer) and labour (workers’ 
representative bodies); and 2) aiming at improving work and employment conditions. In 
the case at issue, the Court concluded that as the agreement was entered into by 
employers’ and employees’ organisations and sought to guarantee a certain level of 
pension to all workers in a given sector – thus contributing directly to improving their 
working conditions as it concerned the workers’ remuneration – it did not fall within the 
scope of 101 (1) TFEU.479 
Relevance for platform workers 
The Albany case is relevant for platform workers as it implies that platform workers 
who are considered as ‘workers’ under EU law are excluded from the application of 
the antitrust provisions of EU competition law and, consequently, permitted to conclude 
collective agreements with the employing platforms (or end users) when the Albany 
conditions are met. The recourse to collective action and the possibility to conclude 
collective agreements is crucial for platform workers who often work under precarious 
working conditions. Bargaining collectively to obtain fundamental labour rights 
complementing those that are guaranteed by EU and national labour legislation, such as 
minimum wage, insurance against accidents at work, protection against unfair dismissal, 
working time and rest periods, is all the more relevant for platform workers. Collective 
bargaining allows them to adapt working conditions to their needs in a more flexible and 
pragmatic and fair manner, than that entailed by changing labour law.480  
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2.2. The FNV Kunsten Informatie case: the right to collective bargaining for ‘false 
self-employed’ persons 
In another landmark case, C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie,481 the CJEU addressed 
the compatibility with competition law of a collective agreement applying to both 
employees and the self-employed. The Court had to decide whether a collective 
agreement negotiated by the Dutch trade union FNV setting minimum fees not only for 
substitute musicians hired under an employment contract but also for substitute 
musicians performing the same work as that of employees under a contract for services 
was compatible with Article 101 (1) TFEU.  
Referring to the Albany case, the Court recalled that an agreement concluded by 
management and labour and improving work and employment conditions is excluded 
from the application of Article 101 (1) TFEU. However, it considered that an organisation 
acting on behalf of self-employed persons ‘does not act as a trade union association and 
therefore as a social partner but as an association of undertakings.’482 It follows that: 
‘A provision of a collective labour agreement, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, in so far as it was concluded by an employees’ organisation in the name, 
and on behalf, of the self-employed services providers who are its members, does not 
constitute the result of a collective negotiation between employers and employees, and 
cannot be excluded, by reason of its nature, from the scope of Article 101 (1) TFEU’.483 
Therefore such an agreement has to respect EU competition rules. 
However, the Court added that:  
‘That finding cannot prevent such a provision of a collective labour agreement from being 
regarded also as the result of dialogue between management and labour if the service 
providers, in the name and on behalf of whom the trade union negotiated, are in fact 
‘false self-employed’, that is to say, service providers in a situation comparable to that of 
employees.’484 
In order to understand whether a worker is in fact false self-employed, the Court made 
the following two considerations.  
First, it stated that ‘the term “employee” for the purpose of EU law must itself be defined 
according to objective criteria that characterize the employment relationship’ and 
recalled that, according to settled case law, ‘the essential feature of that relationship is 
that for a certain period of time one person performs services for and under the direction 
of another person in return for which he receives remuneration’.485 It is important to 
point out that, although the reference to the criterion of ‘direction’ could be misread as 
limiting the right to collective bargaining to workers who would be classified as 
‘employees’ under a strict test of control and subordination,486 the CJEU interpreted such 
criterion broadly. In Danosa,487 the Court stated that ‘the fact that [a person] is a 
member of the Board of Directors of a capital company is not enough in itself to rule out 
the possibility that she was in a relationship of subordination to that company’.488 The 
fact that Ms Danosa received a remuneration, reported on her management to the 
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supervisory body which was able to dismiss her and, thus, took decisions contrary to her 
wishes, where all circumstances that pointed to the existence of an employment relation 
under EU law.489 
Second, the Court clarified that a service provider can ‘lose’ its undertaking status ‘if he 
does not determine independently his own conduct on the market, but is entirely 
dependent on his principal, because he does not bear any of the financial or commercial 
risks arising out of the latter’s activity and operates as an auxiliary within the principal’s 
undertaking’.490 This consideration, rather than focusing on the traditional EU law test for 
a self-employed service provider to be considered as a worker, considers the situation 
where a service provider would not be regarded any longer as an undertaking in view of 
their dependence on another undertaking.491 However, it is not clear whether these 
service providers would be regarded as workers for the purpose of EU labour law in such 
case. Interesting to note is that the criterion relating to the dependency of workers and 
reference to the financial and commercial risk sharing and auxiliary capacity has been 
used by the CJEU in the context of competition law and not in cases that concern EU 
labour legislation.492 
The Court added that ‘the classification of a “self-employed person” under national law 
does not prevent that person being classified as a worker within the meaning of EU law if 
his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship’.493  
Relevance for platform workers 
The FNV case is relevant for platform workers because it extends the right to collective 
bargaining to false self-employed service providers, who are to be considered as workers 
under EU legislation even if in practice they may be classified as self-employed by the 
platforms and/or by national legislation. Collective agreements concluded by or on behalf 
of platform workers who are either clearly workers, or can prove that they should be 
considered as such since they are actually false self-employed service providers vis-à-vis 
the platform, do not fall under the application of Article 101 (1) TFEU if they meet the 
cumulative conditions as set out in the Albany case. In spite of the fact that the CJEU 
confirmed its opinion in the FNV case that self-employed are to be considered as 
undertakings and that the Treaties do not contain provisions encouraging self-employed 
service providers to open up a dialogue with the employers to which they provide 
services and hence to conclude collective agreements with a view to improving their 
terms of employment and working conditions,494 it equally recognised that false self-
employed service providers should be considered as workers. In doing so, the CJEU 
seems to have paved the way for recognising the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining of many platform workers who are in such a situation. The rapid development 
of platform work and businesses with an increasing variety of platform work 
implementation forms may imply that a growing number of platform workers would 
become classified as false self-employed or as workers and be entitled to collective 
labour rights.  
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The FNV ruling, however, pointed to the need to consider and evaluate the factual 
circumstances of the individual cases when establishing whether a self-employed service 
provider is an undertaking or not, using thereby some criteria or indices: the fact that 
the self-employed person is (not) determining independently their own conduct on the 
market, is (not) sharing any financial or commercial risk, is working or not as an 
auxiliary within the business’ operations and has (or not) a relation of subordination with 
the entity they provides their services to. The assessment and decision on the labour 
market status and a possible (re)classification into ‘false self-employed’ are as a 
consequence subject to an interpretation by national judges. As our main study has 
revealed, assessments and classifications of platform workers who were contracted as 
self-employed service providers by platforms have different outcomes in EU countries 
but also national courts and individual judges have different opinions on sometimes 
identical cases, demonstrating the complexity that is characteristic of platform 
businesses’ operations.495 Legal uncertainty may therefore still persist and increase the 
possibility for arbitrary decisions. A platform worker who is contracted as a self-
employed service provider by the platform, does not have an own business structure nor 
have workers under employment contracts and is working under precarious working 
and/or payment conditions, may still be considered to be an independent self-employed 
person, in which case they are excluded from the collective bargaining rights under EU 
competition legislation, unlike what would be the case if they were to be reclassified as a 
false self-employed. 
Furthermore, the CJEU’s position on the right of the self-employed to collective 
bargaining as expressed and confirmed in the FNV case when referring to the absence of 
provisions in the Treaties and a legal basis, appears to be mainly motivated by the 
overall objective as enshrined in the Treaties, for example, to ensure free trade and fair 
competition in the internal market. Provided this overall goal is maintained, the question 
remains as to whether self-employed platform workers can set up associations and 
conclude agreements with the platforms on other aspects of their collaboration which are 
not affecting competition.  
The main study revealed that several other conditions of the contractual relationships 
between the platforms and the platform workers are of high concern to the latter, such 
as the algorithmic management and automated decision-making based on digital 
applications that affect the work allocation, organisation and evaluation, the right to 
have access to the personal and behavioural data that are being collected and processed 
by the platforms, the right to receive an adequate and timely explanation in cases of a 
temporary suspension or (more) definite closure of the accounts, or the right to have 
access to clients’ evaluations on the platform worker’s performance and to the ratings or 
ranking of the latter. In those instances, collective agreements between self-employed 
platform workers and platforms may not be regarded from an EU competition law 
perspective as having a restrictive effect on the competitive process. 
3. Collective rights for platform workers in Member States 
The majority of the countries which were analysed under the main study (EU28 as well 
as Norway and Iceland) pointed to EU competition law as an obstacle for self-employed 
platform workers to organise and bargain collectively on matters related to their working 
conditions including pay rates. Such agreements, which are concluded between self-
employed and/or between self-employed and the companies which are buying the 
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services rendered by the self-employed, face the risk of being considered an 
infringement of EU competition law.  
However, whereas legal uncertainty exists about the employment status qualification of 
many platform workers – whether to be considered as self-employed, ‘false self-
employed’, or employees – uncertainty also exists about the application of competition 
law and the prohibition of collective bargaining for platform workers. In this context, 
several initiatives have been taken in the national contexts with the aim to provide 
platform workers, or more generally, dependent self-employed workers, with collective 
rights and better working conditions. Such initiatives are particularly addressed to 
platform workers in the transport, food delivery and cleaning sectors, thus, work 
performed on-location and generally requiring lower skills.  
Initiatives that have been reported on by the national experts include the adoption of 
statutory legislation extending collective rights to platform workers or, more generally, 
to economically dependent self-employed workers (see Section 3.1); the negotiation and 
conclusion of collective agreements by trade unions and/or other organisations (see 
Section 3.2); other trade union initiatives (see Section 3.3); grassroot organisations’ 
initiatives (see Section 3.4); and action taken by the platforms themselves (see Section 
3.5).496 
3.1 Statutory law 
In Germany, Spain, Italy, Ireland, France, and Sweden legislation exists or has been 
adopted to extend collective rights to platform workers or, more generally, to some 
categories of self-employed.  
In Germany, the Collective Agreement Act (‘Tarifvertragsgesetz’), which regulates the 
rights and obligations of collective bargaining parties and establishes rules on the 
content, conclusion and termination of employment relationships, extends the right to 
collective bargaining to employee-like persons (‘arbeitnehmeraehnliche person’), namely 
economically dependent self-employed workers (Section 12a (1)).497 
Similarly, in Spain, Law 20 of 11 July 2007 on the Self-Employed Workers’ Statute, gives 
economically dependent self-employed workers (‘trabajador autonomo economicamente 
dependiente’ or ‘TRADE’) the right to collective bargaining. Article 19 entitled ‘Basic 
collective rights’ establishes that ‘self-employed workers are entitled to: a) join a trade 
or business association of their choice, b) affiliate and find professional associations 
specific to self-employed workers without prior authorization, and c) exercise the 
collective action to defend their professional interests’.498 Article 13 of the Self-Employed 
Workers’ Statute sets out rules on the conclusion of collective agreements for 
economically dependent self-employed workers (see box below). 
Article 13 of the Spanish Statute of Autonomous Work 
Article 13 entitled ‘Agreements of professional interest’ of the Self-Employed Workers’ 
Statute establishes as follows: 1) the agreements of professional interest set forth in 
Section 2 of Article 3 of this Law, concluded between the associations or unions 
representing the economically dependent self-employed workers and the companies for 
which they carry out their activity, may establish the conditions of the time and place of 
execution of said activity, as well as other general contracting conditions. In any case, 
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the agreements of professional interest will observe the limits and conditions established 
in the antitrust legislation; 2) agreements of professional interest must be concluded in 
writing; 3) the clauses of the agreements of professional interest contrary to legal 
provisions of necessary law will be considered null and void; and 4) the agreements of 
professional interest will be agreed under the provisions of the Civil Code. The personal 
efficacy of these agreements will be limited to the signatory parties and, where 
appropriate, to the members of self-employed associations or signatory unions that have 
expressly given their consent to do so. 
In Ireland, the Competition Act was amended on 7 June 2017 to clarify the notions of 
‘false self-employed’ and ‘fully dependent self-employed’ and exempt them from the 
prohibition of collective bargaining and collective agreements.499 
France is the first country in the European context which adopted statutory legislation to 
provide social security and individual and collective rights specifically to self-employed 
platform workers. The El Khomri Act of 8 August 2016 on work, modernisation of social 
dialogue, and on securing career paths added Articles L. 7341-1 to L. 7342-6 to the 
Labour Code whereby providing self-employed platform workers who are in an 
economically and technically dependent relationship with an online platform with the 
right to (i) insurance for accidents at work, (ii) professional training and validation of 
their work experience, and (iii) constitute a trade union, be a member of a union, and 
take collective action (see box below).500,501 
The French case: El Khomri law and the right to collective rights for dependent platform 
workers 
Articles L. 7341-1 to L. 7342-6 of the El Khomri Act apply to ‘self-employed persons 
using, for the exercise of their professional activity, one or more electronic contacting 
platforms […]’ (Article L. 7341-1). Article L. 7341-1 must be read in combination with 
Article L. 7342-1 which further specifies that ‘when the platform determines the 
characteristics of the service provided or the good sold and fixes its price, it has, with 
respect to the workers concerned, a social responsibility […].’ Thus, although Article L. 
7341-1 would make the reader think that the provisions apply to all platform workers 
who are (genuine) self-employed, Article L. 7342-1 specifies that the provisions only 
apply to those workers deprived of the distinctive prerogatives of an entrepreneur, i.e. 
that of setting prices and terms and conditions of service provision.502 It has been argued 
that even though the French legislator has never established an intermediate category 
between employees and the self-employed, these provisions can be seen as an attempt 
to create a third status without actually naming it.  
The El Khomri Act accords platform workers social security and labour rights. With 
regard to social security and individual labour rights, the legislator introduced a 
corporate social responsibility of the platform by establishing that (i) when the worker 
takes out insurance covering the risk of industrial accidents or adheres to the voluntary 
insurance for accidents at work, the platform bears its contribution, within the limit of a 
ceiling set by decree (Articles L. 7342-2); and (ii) the worker has the right of access to 
continuing vocational training the contribution of which is covered by the platform, and 
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the right to obtain, at his request, validation of the working experience with the platform 
(Article L. 7342-3).  
With regard to collective labour rights, the legislator accords platform workers’ very 
similar collective rights to those of employees. This has been considered as ‘a first step 
toward a common labour law, as advocated by part of the French doctrine’.503   
L. 7342-5 of the El Khomri Act accords the right to collective action to platform workers 
by establishing that ‘Movements aimed at collectively refusing to provide their services 
organised by workers in defence of their occupational claims may neither incur their 
contractual liability – except in cases of their abusive use – nor constitute grounds for 
terminating their business relations with the platforms nor justify measures penalising 
them in the exercise of their work’. This provision seems to give platform workers the 
right to strike. It is important to stress that the right to strike in France is a 
constitutional right guaranteed to all workers regardless of their employment status 
which has been exercised by such self-employed workers as truck driver, lawyers, etc.504 
However, this is the first time that the French legislator recognised it as a particular 
category of self-employed workers.505  
Article L. 7342-6 of the El Khomri Act additionally establishes that ‘the workers 
mentioned in Article L. 7341-1 enjoy the right to form a trade union, to join it and to 
assert through it their collective interests’. Although the legislator has not expressly 
mentioned the right to collective bargaining, it is debatable whether the wording ‘assert 
through it their collective interests’ also encompasses the right to collective bargaining. 
It could be assumed that given the sensitiveness of the issue derived from the fact that 
competition law prohibits collective bargaining for the self-employed and the fact that 
platform workers find themselves in a grey area between employment and self-
employment, the legislator decided to remain silent on this point,506 thereby neither 
explicitly allowing collective bargaining for platform workers nor excluding it.  
The French Loi d’Orientation des Mobilités (LOM),507 currently being discussed in 
Parliament, confers to platform workers in the transport sector who are self-employed 
additional rights such as the right to disconnect from the app without retaliation and the 
right to refuse to take a ride. It also introduces information obligations on the platform 
such as information on the distance of each ride and the minimum price. Platforms are 
also encouraged to adopt (voluntary) charters dealing with working conditions, social 
protection, fees, and so on. It has been argued that France is moving towards a third 
employment status in between self-employment and employee in a similar way to the 
workers’ status in the United Kingdom or the TRADE in Spain. 
The Italian region of Lazio adopted regional legislation on 20 March 2019 which aims to 
regulate remuneration, health and safety, and social protection of all types of platform 
workers regardless of their employment status. It is unclear whether the law also covers 
collective rights. However, the Lazio regional legislation is worth mentioning as it 
purportedly has an exceedingly broad scope. It applies to all platform workers 
throughout all market sectors and covers many working conditions and social protection 
challenges that platform workers face. In spite of its novel approach in covering the 
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working conditions and social protection rights of all platform workers, the regional 
legislation is likely to be challenged on the grounds of its constitutionality given its broad 
scope. 
Finally, the Swedish labour law contains the notion of a ‘third or in-between category’ of 
workers for the purpose of collective labour law.508 Labour law extends to dependent 
contractors the right to collectively organise and conclude collective agreements. 
However, in light of the expanding concept of employee, this concept has lost its 
practical importance. Most workers that were meant to be covered by this concept at the 
time of legislation are now considered employees. 
For reason of completeness, it is worth mentioning that Slovenia and the UK also have 
an intermediate category of workers, but workers defined as such do not benefit from 
collective rights. 
3.2 Collective agreements  
In Germany, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Norway and the UK collective agreements for 
platform workers have been negotiated by different bodies, such as traditional trade 
unions, local administrations, and non-profit organisations.  
In Germany, the trade union NGG (German Food, Beverages, and Catering trade union) 
organised the Köln-based workers of Foodora, a food delivery platform, into a works 
council which then concluded a collective agreement with Foodora. The agreement 
applies to Foodora platform workers operating in the city of Köln, and provides for better 
working conditions and better remuneration.  
In Denmark, trade unions concluded two remarkable collective agreements with two 
different platforms. In 2018, the 3F trade union entered into a company-level collective 
agreement with Hilfr.dk, a Danish platform providing cleaning services, which granted 
platform workers minimum wage, sick pay, holiday allowance, a contribution to their 
pension, and protection against dismissal.509 The agreement applies to the platform’s 
employed platform workers. It tries to bestow an employer role to the platform in a 
number of ways. Basically, the agreement leaves it up to the platform worker to choose 
whether to work for the platform as an employee, in which case the collective agreement 
applies, or as a self-employed person, in which case the agreement would not apply.510 
The agreement also sets out a sort of rebuttable presumption of ‘employment’ after the 
self-employed platform worker has performed 100 hours of work for the platform. In 
such a case the collective agreement applies unless the platform worker opts out. 
Platform workers who wish to transfer their status from self-employed to employee 
before having worked 100 hours must notify Hilfr. In this case, the collective agreement 
will cover new work assignments agreed after the time of notification. Platform workers 
who wish to remain self-employed after 100 hours’ work facilitated by the platform must 
inform Hilfr of this decision well in advance of the expiry of the 100 hours. They will then 
not obtain employee status and will not be covered by the collective agreement. It has 
been stressed that although the worker is hired by Hilfr as ‘employee’, his employment 
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status could still be legally challenged. The agreement entered into force on 1 August 
2018 and expired on 31 July 2019. The agreement was prolonged until the end of 
October and negotiations are currently ongoing in order to expand its scope to all digital 
platforms concerned with cleaning services for private households (see box below). 
The Danish case: Collective agreement between 3F and Hilfr.dk 
In a conversation with the political communication advisor of 3F held in Brussels in July 
2019, the numerous challenges they encountered to reach such a collective agreement 
with Hilfr.dk were explained. First, as it was the government that encouraged the parties 
to enter into negotiations, there was a lack of mandate from platform workers. This 
raised problems in terms of legal representation as trade unions have always found their 
legitimacy to collectively bargain on the basis of the mandate received from their 
members. Second, before being able to negotiate, they faced the difficulty of 
understanding Hilfr’s platform work model and detect the challenges it posed for the 
workers performing cleaning services. Third, they had to come up with new strategies to 
avoid the violation of competition law. Thus, as applying the collective agreement to self-
employed platform workers would have infringed competition law, they decided to leave 
it up to the worker to decide whether to work for the platform as employee or self-
employed. The collective agreement applies only in the case where they decide to work 
as an employee.  
That same year, the Danish HK Privat trade union and Vocaali.com, a platform providing 
online interpretation services, entered into two collective agreements, one applying to 
the platform’s employed workers and the other to the platform’s self-employed workers. 
The former agreement extends to future workers employed by the platform under the 
Danish Salaried Employees Act for Trade, Knowledge and Service. At the same time, 
Voocali and HK Privat concluded a freelance agreement applying to freelance interpreters 
(self-employed) who find assignments through Voocali's platform.511 The latter 
agreement covers all work that is either performed at Voocali's platform, or which 
Voocali provides for performance for a user business, and which is not covered by the 
salaried employees' collective agreement for trade, knowledge and service. The 
agreement addresses several aspects of the working conditions. Most notably, it 
introduces hourly minimum fees by establishing that services provided through Voocali 
may not underprice the general salary level for permanently employed interpreters on 
the Danish labour market. The Danish national expert involved under the main study 
indicated that the price setting of the agreement may infringe antitrust laws. 
The Danish case: Collective agreement between HK and Voocali.com 
A consultant of HK explained that they entered into a collective agreement with 
Voocali.com not knowing the status of the workers.512 Indeed, HK and Voocali.com 
acknowledged that freelance interpreters working for Voocali.com are in a grey area 
between employment and self-employment, and that, regardless of their employment 
status they needed some protection.  
In 2018 the municipality of Bologna in Italy promoted a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
for Platform Work which was signed by trade unions, delivery riders’ autonomous 
representatives and some platforms operating in the city of Bologna. Acknowledging that 
platform work raises questions about the application of existing legal frameworks as it 
blurs the boundaries between employment and self-employment, the Charter establishes 
minimum protection standards that apply to all platform workers operating within the 
territory of the metropolitan city of Bologna, independent of their employment status. 
The Charter sets out a fixed hourly rate in line with the sectorial minimum wage, 
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compensation for overtime, holiday, and conditions in case the work is performed under 
special weather, the right to organise and the right to industrial action.  
Also in Italy, the 2018 national collective bargaining agreement in the logistics service 
sector applies to delivery riders who are classified as employees. The collective 
agreement sets out, among others, minimum hourly pay, working time, rest period, 
insurance for damage against third parties, and rules on the reputational system. 
In Spain, the non-profit association ASO riders supported by the trade union UGT and 
Deliveroo, a food delivery platform, concluded a collective agreement setting minimum 
rates of pay, daily/weekly rest periods, holiday and annual leave, and so on.  
In early 2019 the British courier company Hermes negotiated a new agreement in the UK 
with the GMB union, offering its drivers a guaranteed minimum wage and holiday pay.  
Finally, in Norway, Foodora riders organised by the Norwegian Transport Union are 
currently negotiating a collective agreement demanding, among others, hourly rate, 
equipment reimbursement and increased working time.  
3.3 Other trade union initiatives 
Traditional trade unions have undertaken a number of actions and initiatives that aim to 
organise and represent platform workers. Most often, because of the limits imposed by 
competition law, these initiatives do not aim at collective bargaining but to provide 
information and awareness raising among platform workers. Such initiatives have been 
reported in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, and the UK. More information 
on selected initiatives is provided in the box below. 
In Germany, IG Metall (the German Metalworkers' Union) created the Platform ‘Fair 
Crowd Work’ which collects information about crowdwork, app-based work, and other 
platform-based work from the perspective of workers and unions. It also offers ratings of 
working conditions on different online labour platforms based on surveys with workers. 
The platform was joined by the Austrian Chamber of Employees (Arbeiterkammer) and 
the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) in 2016. 
Similarly, in Spain, in 2018 platform workers affiliated to the traditional union UGT 
(Unión General de Trabajadores) created – in collaboration with the union – a new and 
specific platform for information, vindication, organisation and denunciation for platform 
workers.513 
A network of trade unions in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US 
issued a declaration on platform-based work in Frankfurt on 6 December 2016.514 The 
declaration calls for transnational cooperation between workers, worker organisations, 
platform clients, platform operators, and regulators to ensure fair working conditions and 
worker participation in governance in the growing world of digital labour platforms.  
3.4 Grassroot organisations’ initiatives 
Besides traditional trade unions initiatives, grassroot organisations’ initiatives have 
emerged in several countries. These are bottom-up initiatives organised by the platform 
workers themselves with or without the support of trade unions. Grassroots 
organisations aim to make their demands heard in different ways, such as through 
strikes, boycotts, petitions, mass disconnection, flash-mobs, and reaching out to the 
media. Such initiatives have been taken in Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and the UK. 
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In Belgium, riders organised themselves into the ‘Koeriers Kollektief’, an autonomous 
organisation through which they have been advocating for their rights. In Estonia, 
around 100 Bolt (former Taxify) drivers went on strike in 2018 over a new pay deal. The 
drivers called the strike ‘an evening coffee’. The same drivers went on another strike 
later that year which they called ‘rush-hour coffee’. These bottom-up initiatives were 
organised by platform workers through social media. In Finland, the couriers of food 
delivery platforms Foodora and Wolt have created the website ‘justice4couriers’515 to 
share their work experiences, raise awareness and campaign to improve their working 
conditions. In France, Uber drivers created the VTC association to negotiate over wage 
and working conditions. At the same time, delivery workers have created the delivery 
workers cooperative (CLAP) aimed at raising awareness and negotiating with delivery 
platforms on working conditions and social protection. Drivers and couriers have also 
organised a number of strikes and demonstrations. In Spain, the ‘Riders por Derechos’ 
organisation and ASO riders, representing respectively Deliveroo riders and riders of 
different platforms, have been advocating for better working conditions. Platform 
workers in collaboration with the trade union UGT have also created an online platform 
for information and organisation purposes. In Italy, a number of boycotts, mass 
disconnection and flash mobs have taken place in Bologna, Milan, and Turin. Riders in 
the city of Bologna have set up a union, Rider Union Bologna, through which they 
organise and campaign for better working conditions. The sharing of information and 
work experience is facilitated by the Rider Union Bologna Facebook group page. In 
Ireland, Dublin-based Deliveroo riders have been protesting and campaigning for better 
working conditions, in particular for better health and safety at work. In the Netherlands, 
Deliveroo riders with the support of FNV created the Riders Union FNV which has been 
advocating for the rights of meal-deliverers. In Slovakia, Bolt drivers are organised 
through social networks such as Facebook and Whatsapp to give voice to their mutual 
problems and dissatisfactions. In the UK, Deliveroo riders with the involvement of GMB 
and IWGB trade unions campaign for better working conditions. Grassroot organisations 
were also reported in Germany and Croatia. 
3.5 Action by platforms  
A number of initiatives have also been taken by the platforms themselves. For example, 
in Germany, the crowdsourcing platform Verbant agreed to abide by certain principles as 
laid down by the Crowdsourcing Code of Conduct. In Belgium, since 2015 Uber has 
collaborated with insurance companies to provide its workers with insurance against 
accidents at work. Similarly, in Romania, Uber collaborated with AXA insurance company 
to cover workers against accidents at work as well as providing them with maternity and 
parental leave. Uber also launched an AXA insurance in Portugal for drivers and food 
delivery workers. In the United Kingdom, Uber and Deliveroo have set up a rider 
accident insurance scheme. In the Netherlands, Deliveroo created a rider forum to give 
all riders a formal voice within Deliveroo. Finally, in Czechia, companies operating in the 
platform economy have created the Czech Sharing Economy Association (Česká asociace 
sdílené ekonomiky (ČASE)) aimed at negotiating with the authorities on fair working 
conditions for business.  
Some preliminary conclusions 
This reflection paper examined the relation between antitrust limits to the freedom of 
association, collective action and collective bargaining rights and their application to 
platform workers with the aim of bringing more clarity as to whether platform workers 
are permitted to collectively organise themselves and conclude collective agreements 
with the platforms on their working conditions and social protection.  
Under EU competition legislation self-employed persons are considered as undertakings, 
and organisations of self-employed as associations of undertakings. Agreements 
between undertakings which may affect the conditions of trade and competition, such as 
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(collective) agreements concluded between self-employed and undertakings, which rely 
on the services of these self-employed, may be considered as anticompetitive and thus 
restrictive of competition.  
In its Albany judgment the CJEU ruled that collective agreements which are concluded 
between employers and workers’ representatives are excluded from the application of 
the antitrust provisions of EU competition law when they are aimed at improving the 
working conditions. The CJEU argued that the social policy objectives which are 
enshrined in the Treaties would be seriously undermined if management and labour were 
subject to Article [101 (1) TFEU] of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures 
to improve conditions of work and employment. The Albany cumulative conditions 
require (1) an agreement between employers and the workers’ representative bodies 
concluded through collective bargaining and (2) with the specific aim to improve the 
working conditions of the workers. 
The CJEU ruled furthermore in the FNV judgment that collective agreements which are 
concluded by or on behalf of false self-employed do not fall under the application of 
Article 101 (1) TFEU and are not to be considered as a distortion of competition law 
provided both conditions of the Albany case are met. ‘False self-employed’ are service 
providers who, in spite of being contracted or considered by national law or by the 
contracting parties as self-employed, ‘are in a situation comparable to that of employees’ 
as they are not independently determining their own conduct on the market and are 
dependent on their principal. The subordination requirement which is the main 
determining factor for establishing an employment relationship under EU law may be 
seen, at least in the context of EU competition legislation, as being complemented by a 
criterion relating to economic dependency.516 
In practice many individual platform workers are in a situation of subordination and/or 
dependency and act without any commercial risk sharing and/or as a mere auxiliary of 
the platform’s operations. On the basis of the above-mentioned criteria and taking into 
account the factual circumstances, an assessment will be made by national courts to 
determine whether these platform workers can be considered as false or bogus self-
employed and have recourse to the ruling of the CJEU and initiate collective action with a 
view to improve their working conditions. 
The key question as to whether platform workers can collectively negotiate with the 
platforms on their working conditions is hence closely related to their labour market 
classification as either workers or self-employed. Platform workers who are employed by 
platforms and have the status of workers can conclude collective agreements with the 
platforms on their working conditions including on matters that concern their wages or 
supplementary pension schemes, whereas, because of competition rules, self-employed 
platform workers in principle cannot, unless they are considered to be false self-
employed in accordance with the CJEU rulings.  
The ultimate assessment is done by national courts and based on the factual 
circumstances leaving room for interpretation, which in turn is leading to varying 
outcomes between countries but also between courts within the same national 
jurisdiction. Legal uncertainty is likely to persist given the continuously developing new 
modes of operation in the platform business. The labour market classification of the 
platform worker is moreover intrinsically connected with the interpretation of the type of 
services the platforms are providing. Are the latter purely online information society 
services intermediating between the self-employed and their clients, and hence 
facilitating direct transactions between the self-employed and their clients (in the 
meaning of the recent P2B Regulation), or are they part of the entire business of the 
platform and merely an operational instrument serving the internal work allocation and 
organisation?  
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The question remains as to whether (genuine) self-employed can set up associations, 
take collective action and negotiate with the platforms on their working conditions, a 
right that has been recognised by international labour law.517  
The CJEU has thus far maintained its position that the self-employed are to be 
considered as undertakings and that the Treaties do not contain provisions encouraging 
self-employed service providers to open up a dialogue with the employers for which they 
provide services with a view to improving their terms of employment and working 
conditions. A self-employed platform worker even when working in a precarious situation 
falls within this remit. The Court’s position was, however, embedded into a specific 
reasoning and in the context of EU free competition rules as one of the cornerstones of 
the internal market.  
Agreements on matters that concern the terms and conditions laying down the rules for 
the organisation of work, depending on the circumstances of each case, may be 
considered as not restrictive of competition – as opposed to price fixing. Therefore, in 
certain situations, the self-employed or their associations could engage in collective 
negotiations with the platforms and conclude agreements to that end.  
The results of the main study reveal that some of the high priority concerns of platform 
workers may not be related to competition issues but are often concerned with the way 
platforms are operating, such as the algorithmic management and on-line applications 
for the work allocation, organisation and evaluation.  
It follows that self-employed platform workers may set up associations and conclude 
agreements with the platforms on issues that relate to the personal or behavioural data 
protection of the platform workers, on the right to receive an adequate explanation from 
platforms in cases of a suspension or termination of the account or on the way that their 
work is being evaluated by customers.  
The issue of collective labour rights for platform workers has been at the centre of policy 
debate in a limited number of Member States. Some Member States have initiated 
legislation granting collective rights to (some categories of) dependent self-employed 
whereas in others collective agreements have been concluded between some platforms 
and the platform workers (including self-employed) often concerned with basic working 
conditions and rights such as the protection against accidents at work, minimum pay 
rates, working time and rest periods. Traditional trade unions in Member States are 
(still) cautiously but increasingly embracing the needs of platform workers, whereas the 
latter often take recourse to collective action in situations of conflict. Platform workers 
have created representative organisations in a few Member States. The mentioned 
actions taken by Member States vary to a large extent and there is no uniform approach 
when collective labour rights for platform workers are concerned.  
In summary, platform workers, regardless of their labour market classification as 
workers or self-employed, may for certain purposes set up associations and conclude 
(‘collective’) agreements as long as these agreements do not prevent, restrict or distort 
competition. The lawfulness of collective agreements which may prevent or restrict 
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competition, for example when they concern minimum payment rates or the setting up 
of supplementary social protection schemes, depends on whether they cover only 
workers or also include self-employed service providers. The CJEU considered collective 
agreements as perfectly legitimate and not in breach of the EU competition rules when 
they have been the result of social dialogue between employers and worker’s 
representatives with the aim of improving the working conditions of the workers. The 
CJEU included in this reasoning also the ‘false’ self-employed – those who, on the basis 
of their actual working conditions are in a situation comparable to workers – as they 
cannot be considered as undertakings because of their dependency on another 
undertaking. As a consequence, many platform workers who are in such a situation are 
likely to be regarded as ‘false self-employed’ service providers. 
However, since the assessment is done by national judges and based on an 
interpretation, legal uncertainty may yet persist. EU antitrust legislation and CJEU rulings 
still seem to restrict the possibilities for independent self-employed platform workers to 
conclude agreements on matters that may prevent or distort free competition even when 
they are single self-employed and perform their services in very precarious situations. In 
the context of platform business practices, which is characterised by the often 
extrapolated differences in power relations between the platform business and the 
individual platform worker, unilateral enforcement of conditions of pay and service 
provision by the platforms with no degree of contract negotiation, and cooperation based 
on (semi)automated decision-making with no human interventions, access to the right to 
associate and right to conclude agreements that concern at least minimum payment 
conditions and labour and social protection levels for individual self-employed platform 
workers appear to be an essential social policy consideration that would deserve the 
necessary attention from policymakers. 
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Reflection Paper 2 
 
The GDPR518 and its potential role for the (data) protection of platform workers519 
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1. Algorithmic management in the platform economy 
1.1  General considerations 
Algorithmic management is a diverse set of technological tools and techniques to 
remotely manage workforces.520 It is a system where algorithms rather than humans 
decide how business operations should be performed. The app itself seems to be the 
main management tool.521 It relies heavily on data collection of workers to enable 
automated or semi-automated decision-making.522 Many actors in the platform economy 
are some of the most prominent developers of this novel algorithmic management.  
Platforms exert continuous digital monitoring through massive data collection of platform 
workers’ behaviour, which may be fed into automated performance reports and work 
allocation decisions. For instance, drivers’ movements are tracked using GPS location. 
Moreover, the actual working time, break habits, speed of performance and aggregated 
income are tracked through the digital apps.  
Another component of this algorithmic management are the rating and review systems, 
which result in a ranking of the individual platform workers. The assignment of the next 
task by the app’s algorithms is for several platform workers directly linked to the ratings 
and reviews they receive from the customers through the platforms’ digital applications. 
What’s more, bad scores or a performance below the algorithm’s standards can lead to a 
lower ranking in the pick-order for new assignments and in some cases to the temporary 
or permanent exclusion (‘deactivation’ or delisting) of the platform worker from the 
platform.  
Algorithmic management is also characterised by the growing use of ‘nudges’ and 
penalties to indirectly incentivise worker behaviour. For example, an Uber driver may 
receive notifications to travel to certain surge areas where there is higher passenger 
demand without the certainty of an effective assignment. Similarly, the Uber app shows 
at all times how much money the driver has made, accompanied by a graphic of an 
engine gauge with a needle that comes tantalisingly close to, but is still short of, the 
euro sign.523 All this aims to shape the platform workers’ behaviour. 
In a sense, these management techniques do not dramatically differ from the techniques 
used by traditional employers. Traditional employers also collect data from their 
employees and exert control through monitoring their job performance. However, the 
platform economy is posing some new challenges. 
First, the gathering of (personal) data is done through complex computational processes. 
The subsequent enormous data flow and constant digital monitoring allows for a deep 
intrusiveness into the lives of platform workers which is in no way comparable to 
traditional working relationships.  
Second, the decisions which are based on this data collection and processing are mostly 
implemented by automated or semi-automated processes with minimal human 
involvement. In a way, it dehumanises the decisions that affect employees negatively 
and makes it easier for managers to behave ruthlessly as they do not feel the direct 
effect of the decision. It allows them to hide behind the argument that they did not make 
the decision; the algorithm did.524  
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Third, platforms rely heavily on rating and review systems as a source for decisions 
about the deployment of platform workers for new assignments and for the suspension 
and termination of the cooperation. In other words, platforms analyse ratings and 
reviews to measure the professional reputation of each worker in order to exercise the 
typical employer’s power of decision and control. This reliance on the customers to 
inform decisions which affect platform workers signifies an important departure from 
traditional structures which relied on middle management to direct workers.525 It is 
basically a form of outsourcing the performance evaluation of platform workers to the 
customers.526   
1.2  Impact on employment or labour market status classification 
The far-reaching intrusiveness in terms of access to personal data, digital monitoring and 
subsequent power and control over platform workers has important implications on the 
employment status classification.  
As we know, many platform workers are considered, certainly by the platforms 
themselves, to be self-employed. The situation of a genuine self-employed platform 
worker is characterised (but not exhaustively) by the lack of subordination towards their 
employer. The question stands as to whether this extensive digital monitoring and 
(semi)automated evaluations can be equated to some sort of subordination or 
direction527 as the latter is one of the key criteria that determine the status of a worker 
in accordance with the prevailing EU legislation and CJEU case law.528  
It is clear by now that the platforms face a conundrum. On the one hand, the platform 
economy deals with platform workers who perform their work out of the direct sight of 
their supervisors. Platforms have a dispersed workforce and no common physical 
workplace, and if they want to maintain maximal labour performance, they use extensive 
control through the app as elaborated above.529 On the other hand, platforms consider 
the platform workers as self-employed, which does not fit the reality of the extensive 
control and supervision which is applied by the platforms. 
Irrespective of the previous considerations, to make a solid assessment of the 
employment status, one needs to have adequate insight into the workings of the 
algorithm and more specifically which personal data from the platform worker it collects 
and what it in turn does with these data. This is exactly where the GDPR comes into 
play. 
2. The GDPR and its implications for platform workers 
The GDPR provides the platform worker with a range of rights concerning their personal 
data. These rights are inter alia the right to be informed if, how, why, and by whom 
your data are being processed; the right to access and get a copy of your data; the 
right to have your data corrected or supplemented if they are inaccurate or incomplete; 
the right to have your data deleted or erased; the right to limit or restrict how your data 
are used; the right to data portability; the right to object to the processing of your 
data; and the right not to be subject to automated decisions, without human 
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involvement, where it would produce legal effects concerning the platform 
worker or ‘similarly significantly affecting’ the platform worker.  
As this is a reflection paper, and space is limited, we will focus on two issues which are 
especially relevant for platform workers. First, we will discuss the right to access to 
personal data for the platform worker, followed by an analysis of whether the GDPR 
provides a right to an explanation of a decision by the platform which (legally) affects 
them. Second, we will analyse whether the GDPR provides a comprehensive right to data 
portability for the platform worker. 
To conclude, we will briefly explore the potentially discriminatory biases underlying the 
algorithms that are making decisions which affect platform workers. 
2.1  The right to access personal data (Article 15 GDPR) 
In a landmark test case of the right of access to personal data in relation to platform 
workers, four current and former Uber drivers are taking legal actions against the ride-
hailing app in the UK.530 The drivers claim that Uber has breached their right by declining 
access to their personal data Uber holds on them (Article 15 GDPR). This personal data 
includes: 
1) duration of time logged on to the platform (this would enable calculation of 
potential pay owed to the drivers in holiday pay and minimum wage back pay 
claims); 
2) GPS data (this would enable drivers to calculate total operating costs including 
revenue and non-revenue earning time and distance);  
3) performance data including suspensions from the platform (this would enable 
drivers to understand how their performance was monitored and managed over 
time); 
4) profiling information and details on how such data is processed, for example in 
automated dispatch decision-making (this would enable drivers to understand how 
they were profiled by the firm and the impact this may have had on the quality, 
quantity and value of work offered over time);  
5) trip ratings (drivers are dismissed when their rating dips below a certain level, so 
the ability to legitimately appeal unfair ratings on a journey-by-journey basis can be 
crucial to maintaining employment). 
This case shows how important a considerable right of access to personal data is for 
platform workers and for the protection of their working conditions. Article 15 GDPR 
clearly provides a right of access to personal data. However, what exactly constitutes 
‘personal data’? The GDPR defines personal data as ‘any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”) […]’.531 The definition includes 
‘any information’, and thus the term personal data should be as broadly interpreted as 
possible. This is also suggested in CJEU case law. In Nowak532 the Court has clarified 
that: 
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33   As the Court has held previously, the scope of Directive 95/46 is very wide and the 
personal data covered by that directive is varied (judgment of 7 May 2009, Rijkeboer, 
C‑ 553/07, EU:C:2009:293, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). 
34   The use of the expression ‘any information’ in the definition of the concept of 
‘personal data’, within Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46, reflects the aim of the EU 
legislature to assign a wide scope to that concept, which is not restricted to 
information that is sensitive or private, but potentially encompasses all kinds of 
information, not only objective but also subjective, in the form of opinions and 
assessments, provided that it ‘relates’ to the data subject. 
35   As regards the latter condition, it is satisfied where the information, by reason 
of its content, purpose or effect, is linked to a particular person. 
The final sentence explaining when the data ‘relates’ to the data subject is especially 
crucial for the right to access for platform workers. In its Opinion 4/2007533 on the 
concept of personal data, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party534 has (more or 
less) clarified what it entails. In general terms, information can be considered to ‘relate’ 
to an individual when it is about that individual. Concretely, the data ‘relates’ to an 
individual when there is a ‘content’ element or a ‘purpose’ element or a ‘result’ element 
present. These three elements must be considered as alternative conditions, and not as 
cumulative ones. 
 The ‘content’ element is present in those cases where information is given about 
a particular person, irrespective of any purpose on the side of the data controller 
or the impact of that information on the data subject. 
 The ‘purpose’ element can be considered to exist when the data are likely to be 
used, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the precise case, with 
the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the status or 
behaviour of an individual.  
 The ‘result’ element is present whenever the data can be considered to have an 
impact on a certain person’s rights and interests, taking into account all the 
circumstances surrounding the precise case. It is sufficient if the individual may 
be treated differently from other persons as a result of the processing of such 
data. 
We may conclude that the scope of personal data is very broad. In our opinion, this 
encompasses all the claims made by the four Uber drivers in the current UK landmark 
test case. It is also in line with the general aim of the GDPR, which intends to give more 
power to the data subject as regards personal data. Indeed, Article 4(1) GDPR defines 
‘personal data’ as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. 
An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identifier.535 The broad definition of ‘personal data can in turn restore 
to a certain extent the power balance between the platform and the platform worker, 
which can only influence their working conditions in a positive way.536  
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However, this does not imply that issues of enforcement won’t arise in the future. 
Platforms are logically very reluctant to interpret ‘personal data’ as broad as they should 
despite case law of the CJEU and Opinion 4/2007 of the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party. Moreover, it may very well be that divergent interpretations of ‘personal 
data’ among different Member States’ DPAs will lead to divergent enforcement levels, 
again despite the broad and uniform interpretation provided by CJEU case law, the 
Article 29 Working Party and Article 4(1) GDPR. Indeed, the GDPR experts consulted for 
this study pointed out that in practice these different interpretations across Member 
States’ data protection acts DPAs) are a real issue. An update of the European Data 
Protection Board of the Guidelines on the concept of personal data could prove helpful in 
this regard.  
The P2B Regulation 
The new Regulation (EU) 2019/1150537 may have some relevance in this context as it 
obliges providers of online intermediation services to include in their terms and 
conditions a description of the technical and contractual access, or absence thereof, of 
business users to any personal data or other data, or both, which business users or 
consumers provide for the use of the online intermediation services concerned or which 
are generated through the provision of those services (Article 9). The Regulation applies 
only to some very specific types of platform work, for example pure information society 
services aimed at the conclusion of a direct transaction between the business user (as 
for instance a self-employed platform worker providing services) and the consumer, and 
hence not to platform businesses where the online facilitation is merely auxiliary to the 
overall services that are offered to the customer or consumer, such as is the case in the 
personal transport services or food delivery sector.  
 
2.2  The right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing 
(Article 22 GDPR) 
The second issue in our analysis explores the right not to be subject to a decision based 
on automated processing, including the need for the data controller to provide 
meaningful information on the existence of automated decision-making. As it stands, 
opacity seems to be at the core of these algorithms.538 If one is a recipient of the output 
of the algorithms, rarely does one have any concrete sense of how or why a specific 
decision has been reached from the inputs.539 One example is the fact that platform 
workers are routinely unable to see how their pay rates are calculated. Similarly, ride 
hail drivers are often left clueless as to how the algorithm assigns their rides.540  
According to Article 22(1) GDPR ‘the data subject shall have the right not to be subject 
to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.’ It follows 
from this paragraph that the GDPR sets a prohibition on automated individual decision-
making when the different conditions are met.541  
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First, for the prohibition on automated processing to apply, the decision must produce 
legal effects (or similarly significantly affect the platform worker).542 A legal effect may 
be something that affects a person’s status or their rights under a contract. For example, 
the deactivation of the account of a platform worker would fall under this condition. 
Another example may be the refusal of the app to assign a new or higher-paid task to 
the platform worker. 
Difficult in this regard is the term ‘solely’ which is used. This means that there is no 
human involvement in the decision process. Nevertheless, Article 29 (A29) Data 
Protection Working Party has clarified that this human involvement must be meaningful, 
rather than just a token gesture.543  
The prohibition on automated decision-making does not apply if the decision is 
‘necessary for entering into, or performance of a contract between the data subject and 
a data controller’ (Article 22(2)(a)) or ‘is based on the data subject’s explicit consent’ 
(Article 22(2)(c)).544 Platform workers, if they are to be considered employees, can only 
fall under the first derogation, as the Article 29 Working Party has stated that 
‘employees are almost never in a position to freely give, refuse or revoke consent, given 
the dependency that results from the employer/employee relationship’.545 However, 
many platform workers are self-employed. A fully independent self-employed worker 
would in principle be in a position where to give consent freely. Whether this is the case 
for all self-employed platform workers is questionable. Imbalances of power are not 
limited to employers and consent can only be valid if the self-employed platform worker 
is able to exercise a real choice, and there is no risk of deception, intimidation, coercion 
or significant negative consequences if they do not consent.546 In our opinion this 
imbalance of power is surely present for many self-employed platform workers in their 
relationship with the platform.  
The other option the platforms have at their disposal to bypass the prohibition on 
automated decision-making is Article 22(2)(a). Indeed, the prohibition does not apply if 
the decision is ‘necessary for entering into, or performance of a contract between the 
data subject and a data controller’. Platforms may wish to use solely automated 
decision-making processes because they believe it is the most appropriate and efficient 
way to achieve their objective. Platforms deal with an enormous amount of data that is 
being processed, which makes routine human involvement impractical or maybe even 
impossible. However, even then the platforms must take into account whether a less 
privacy-intrusive method could be adopted.547 The question remains if this assessment is 
properly made in the current platform economy. Likewise, the GDPR obliges platforms to 
establish appropriate safeguards when automated decision-making is implemented. One 
of these rights is the right to meaningful information about the logic, significance and 
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envisaged consequences. The next section will further explore this right in relation to the 
platform economy. 
2.2.2  The right to meaningful information about the logic, significance and envisaged 
consequences. 
Articles 13, 14 and 15 GDPR, which contain information rights for the data subjects, all 
state that in ‘the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to 
in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about 
the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences 
of such processing for the data subject.’ 
According to Article 29 Working Party548 ‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ 
means that the platform must find simple ways to tell the data subject about the 
rationale behind, or the criteria relied on, in reaching the decision. The information 
provided should be sufficiently comprehensive for the data subject to understand the 
reasons for the decision.549,550 The terms ‘significance’ and ‘envisaged consequences’ 
suggest that information must be provided about intended or future processing, and how 
the automated decision might affect the data subject.551 According to Article 29 Working 
Party it means that the controller should provide the data subject with information about 
‘the envisaged consequences’ of the processing, rather than an explanation of a 
particular decision.552 To make this information meaningful and understandable, real 
tangible examples of the type of possible effects should be given.553  
In addition, Article 29 Working Party states that the controller should provide the data 
subject with general information (…) which is also useful for him or her to challenge 
the decision. In fact, Article 22(3) obliges the data controller to implement suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interest, at 
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his 
or her point of view and to contest the decision. The minimal safeguards laid down in 
Article 22(3) necessarily involve an exchange of views, a dialogue, between the data 
subject and the controller. 
Therefore, the GDPR does support an extensive right to an explanation for the data 
subject. The platforms will need to provide the platform workers with (general) 
information which is useful for them to challenge the decision. Platform workers will only 
be able to challenge these decisions or express their views if they fully understand how 
they have been made and on what basis.554 Whether this amounts to a fully fledged right 
to an explanation of a particular decision is debatable, but in any case the information 
provided to the platform worker must be sufficient and useful to effectively challenge 
any decision affecting them (e.g. deactivation of their account). It remains to be seen 
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how the platforms will apply these rules in practice. Issues of enforcement may arise in 
the future.  
 
The P2B Regulation 
Again, the new Regulation (EU) 2019/1150555 may have some (albeit limited) relevance 
here as it obliges providers of online intermediation services to issue a statement of 
reasons when a decision is taken to suspend or terminate its services (Article 4). If the 
platform decides to terminate the provision of its online services to a platform worker, 
the platform is obliged to provide a statement of reasons at least 30 days prior to the 
termination on a durable medium. Moreover, the potential grounds for 
suspension/termination must be included in the terms and conditions.  
 
Furthermore, as specified in the WP29 (now EDPB) Guidelines on automated processing 
and profiling,556 ‘controllers should consult the WP29 Guidelines on transparency 
(WP260) for general transparency requirements. In addition to the general 
requirements, when the controller is processing data as defined in Article 22, they must 
provide meaningful information about the logic involved. Instead of providing a complex 
mathematical explanation about how algorithms or machine-learning work, the controller 
should consider using clear and comprehensive ways to deliver the information to the 
data subject, for example: the categories of data that have been or will be used in the 
profiling or decision-making process; why these categories are considered pertinent; 
how any profile used in the automated decision-making process is built, including any 
statistics used in the analysis; why this profile is relevant to the automated decision-
making process; and how it is used for a decision concerning the data subject.’  
On a final note, concerns may also be raised at a fundamental level regarding the 
technical feasibility in the platform economy to obtain a sufficient (general or specific) 
explanation of a decision reached by the algorithms.557 In its current state, it seems that 
there is a mismatch between high-dimensionality characteristic of machine-learning 
algorithms and the demand of human interpretability.558 Machine-learning algorithms 
possess a degree of unavoidable complexity which does not lend itself easily to human 
semantic explanations.559 Nonetheless, the rules laid down in the GDPR as explained 
above need to be complied with.  
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2.3  The right to data portability 
As it stands, the platform economy landscape is generally dominated by a few players. 
One factor leading to this dominance are the substantial switching costs560 that platform 
workers face when considering changing to another platform.  
These switching costs are amplified by the network effects of the platforms. The more 
people (be it the platform worker or the client/customer) use a certain platform, the 
more valuable the platform itself becomes, which will make it harder to leave the 
platform. Add to this the fact that the dominating platforms have access to huge 
amounts of data of their users thanks to the advances in data mining and analytics and a 
massive increase in computing power and data storage capacity, which in turn helps 
them to optimise their services. As a result, many platform workers ‘suffer’ from a lock-
in effect. In such a situation, the costs of changing to another service are so high that 
platform workers will remain with their current platform, to the detriment of competition 
in the platform economy.561 
If platform workers were to be allowed to transfer their personal data to another 
platform, it could in theory open up competition in the platform economy. First, it could 
help prevent platform workers being locked in and bound by one single platform. 
Effective transfers of data between alternative platforms would furthermore boost the 
transparency and fair competition as it would allow platform workers greater power to 
choose the platform with the best working conditions. In other words, it would give 
platform workers more control over their personal data, which is one of the cornerstones 
of the GDPR.  
This is exactly where the right to data portability comes into play, which favours the 
sharing and transfer of the data between different platforms. The same considerations 
are echoed in the Preliminary Opinion on “Privacy and Competitiveness in the age of big 
data” of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) where it is said that the right 
to data portability ‘would potentially empower individuals while also promoting 
competitive market structures’.562  
Article 20 GDPR provides this right to data portability in a twofold structure. First, 
platform workers can obtain a copy of their data ‘in a structured, commonly used and, 
machine-readable format’ (Article 20(1)). Second, it provides the right ‘to have the 
personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically 
feasible’. Thus, the GDPR clearly provides a right to data portability which would in 
theory soften the lock-in effect experienced by platform workers today. However, as we 
will elaborate upon in the coming paragraphs, there are still some important legal 
barriers to a fully fledged right to data portability in the current GDPR framework.  
First, it is to be feared that without common fixed standards between the platforms, the 
right to data portability will have issues in its practical implementation stemming from 
technical interoperability.563 Article 20(2) GDPR clearly states that the right to have the 
personal data transmitted directly from one platform to another is only obligatory where 
it is technically feasible. This is affirmed in Recital 68 stating that there is no obligation 
for the controllers to adopt or maintain processing systems which are technically 
compatible. It further states that data controllers should be encouraged to develop 
interoperable formats that enable data portability. This is worrisome given the fact that 
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the dominating platforms do not have a real incentive to enable platform workers to 
switch to other platforms, as this would jeopardise their own position. The response of 
the data protection officer from Deliveroo to our question asking to clarify their position 
toward the right to data portability is that they do not transmit personal data from their 
platform to another, as there is no obligation to do so.564 
Second, per Article 20(1) GDPR the ‘data subject shall have the right to receive the 
personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller’. 
Article 29 Working Party has interpreted the term ‘provided’ broadly, ultimately including 
provided and observed data and excluding inferred or derived data.565 Provided data are 
personal data that the platform worker has actively provided to the platform. For 
example, the information on the profile that the platform workers have provided, their 
photos, and so on. Observed data are the data provided by the platform worker by virtue 
of the use of the app. By this we mean the behavioural data which have been gathered 
by observing the platform workers’ behaviour such as activity logs and traffic data. 
Finally, inferred data are the data developed by the platform on the basis of the first two 
categories. Inferred data are the result from the analysis of the provided and observed 
data. In other words, these data are produced by the platform itself (e.g. through data 
mining) and on the basis of its own software applications. 
The interpretation as to whether the data are provided, observed or inferred is therefore 
crucial in opening a right to data portability. Yet it is not hard to imagine that the 
boundaries between these different kinds of data will be very hard to establish in 
practice. Let’s take, for example, the case of reputational data (through ratings and 
customer review), which is very relevant in the platform economy.  
Portability of reputational data (through customer reviews/scores) can be crucial for 
platform workers, as the reputation is among the main criteria potential customers will 
consider when choosing between different offers on a platform. If the platform worker 
needs to start building their reputation from scratch on the new platform, it will only 
amplify the lock-in effect on the current platform. We could easily imagine that the 
individual customer reviews/scores are part of the observed data. However, one could at 
the same time argue that the agglomerated score is created by the platform itself and 
forms part of the so-called inferred data which are not portable to another platform.566  
Nonetheless, it is very likely that the distinction between provided, observed and inferred 
data will only prove to be a false dilemma the platform worker faces. As elaborated  
above, the scope of the right to access (Article 15 GDPR) is very broad and includes all 
types of data concerning the platform worker. Thus, under the right to access, the 
worker can obtain all data (e.g. reputational data) that concerns them. This includes the 
so-called inferred data. The platform worker can make an access request and then share 
it with another platform (provided it does not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of 
others). That way, the platform worker bypasses the distinction between provided, 
observed and inferred data under the right to data portability. 
Third, the right to data portability ‘shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of 
others’ (Article 20(4)). In the case of the potential portability of reputational data, this 
could be the consumers of the app who expressed their evaluation on the service.567 In 
theory, this would permit the platform to refuse a portability request as soon as personal 
                                           
564
 Interview conducted in the framework of the main study summer 2019. 
565
 A29 Data Protection Working Party, “Guidelines on the right to data portability”, 13 December 2016 (as last 
revised and adopted on 5 April 2017), 10 
566
 A. INGRAO, “Assessment of feedback in the On-demand era” in Working in digital and smart organizations, 
Springer International, Switzerland, 2018, 93-111 
567
 A. INGRAO, “Assessment of feedback in the On-demand era” in Working in digital and smart organizations, 
Springer International, Switzerland, 2018, 93-111 
Study to gather evidence on the working conditions of platform workers 
272 
data of these consumers are involved.568 However, it must be noted that Article 29 
Working Group has also tried to extend the application to the data which involve more 
than one data subject. Concretely, they have stated that when a data controller 
processes ‘information that contains the personal data of several data subjects’, one 
‘should not take an overly restrictive interpretation of the sentence “personal data 
concerning the data subject”’.   
A final general consideration concerning the right to data portability is the position of the 
receiving platforms. The whole discussion around data portability is currently centred on 
a possible obligation of the platform holding the original data. Not much attention is 
given to the fact whether the receiving platforms are indeed willing to take on the data 
of every platform worker. Are they generally willing to integrate the personal data from a 
platform worker into their own algorithm? Do they have an incentive to do so? For 
example, is it really that simple to assume that Lyft will integrate the agglomerated 
reputational score from an Uber driver in its own algorithm? In the current GDPR 
framework, the receiving platform has no obligation to do so.  
2.4  Discriminatory biases underlying the algorithm 
The idea that algorithmic management is purely objective and bias-free is problematic. 
The risk exists that the algorithms reflect the biases of the human programmers.569 This 
risk becomes even greater when the algorithm is based on machine-learning artificial 
intelligence (AI), which depends upon data that have been collected from society. To the 
extent that the society contains inequality, traces of discrimination will taint the data.570 
If traces of discrimination are found in the pilot data set, then by design, the algorithm 
will reproduce those same traces of discrimination. Biased decisions will then be 
presented as objective algorithmic results.571  
Moreover, what is even more pressing in the context of the platform economy is the 
omnipresent use of consumer-sourced ratings and review that fuel (semi)automated 
algorithmic decision-making.572 As is logical, any evaluation responds to a personal 
perception or experience that, in turn, is evaluated from subjective parameters.573 This is 
problematic if we follow the mainstream social science research which has established 
that racial and gender bias commonly creeps into ratings of all sorts.574 Although as of 
now we cannot determine whether this is the same in the platform economy, the 
likelihood that it will be the case seems rather high. Offline platform work performed on 
location in particular, where there is a direct personal contact between the customer and 
the platform worker, will pose the greatest danger in that regard.  
If a platform bases its decisions concerning its platform workers on such ratings, such as 
the decision to deactivate the account of the platform worker, these systems, while 
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appearing neutral, can become vehicles through which consumer bias can adversely 
impact protected groups of platform workers. The fact that this bias is introduced by the 
consumer rather than the platforms themselves could create an environment where the 
platforms are able to deflect accountability.575 The legal protection of anti-discrimination 
law may be difficult to apply when consumer-sourced ratings drive decisions affecting 
platform workers.576  
The GDPR does answer these concerns, but in a limited way. Article 22(4) GDPR states 
that the automated individual decision-making ‘shall not be based on special categories 
of personal data referred to in Article 9(1)577’. Moreover, Recital 71 does mention that 
data controllers should use ‘appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures for the 
profiling, implement technical and organisational measures appropriate to ensure, […] 
and prevent, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or 
health status or sexual orientation […]’.  
The difficulty lies in the opacity of the current algorithms in the platform economy. The 
necessary premise to combat discriminatory practices in the algorithmic management is 
to make such an algorithm more understandable and transparent. As it stands, it will 
prove very difficult to assess whether the algorithm is tainted by discriminatory biases 
and subsequently to enforce non-discrimination law. As data sets of the platform become 
increasingly large, discriminatory correlations can become increasingly complex and 
difficult to detect.578 
Next to a general call on more transparency and auditability579 of the algorithms, one 
could imagine some ad hoc solutions to minimise discriminatory biases creeping into 
ratings. It is possible to design a rating system where the information about the platform 
available to the consumer raters is reduced to the absolute necessary. Or one could 
imagine increasing the reporting burden on consumers giving low ratings.580 Another 
option could be to give the platform worker an opportunity to reply to every rating, 
which the platform must take into account. Another solution could be to oblige platforms 
to scan the ratings for potentially discriminatory differences and subsequently oblige 
them to develop ways to combat this. A more extreme solution could be to eliminate the 
link between ratings and decisions of platforms affecting platform workers altogether. In 
any regard, more research is needed to effectively combat discriminatory practices in the 
platform economy. 
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ANNEX I: SYNOPSIS REPORT OF CONSULTATIONS 
This synopsis report covers the results of the different consultation activities that took 
place. It provides a concise overview and conclusions of the consultation work carried 
out in accordance with the Better Regulations Guidelines.581 
Overview of fieldwork activities  
Fieldwork was conducted in each Step with a view to consult relevant stakeholders 
and incorporate their feedback into the study. The group of stakeholders comprised a 
range of EU-level and national-level stakeholders, including academics, experts, social 
partners, national administrations, labour inspectorates and occupational safety and 
health (OSH) authorities more broadly, businesses, sector associations, platforms, and 
platform workers.  
Fieldwork comprised: 1) semi-structured expert interviews, 2) a country experts survey, 
3) country-specific focus groups, and 4) a validation workshop. The consortium 
combined four kinds of fieldwork because these methodologies deliver different types of 
information. For example, replies to an interview generally only cover the stated 
questions, while a focus group discussion allows participants to reflect upon their 
perspective and refine their opinion after interaction with others. Moreover, some 
fieldwork methods are better suited for a wide coverage, while others allow deeper 
consideration of a specific issue. 
For all fieldwork activities, the research team prepared a list of stakeholders to consult 
(including backups). The identification of participants for field research activities was 
done by the research team responsible for each task, with the support of all consortium 
partners. Each stakeholder was sent an invitation to participate, along with a letter on 
behalf of the European Commission addressed to the potential participants, and a data 
protection notice and privacy statement. The list of stakeholders, as well as other 
supporting materials for the field work, were shared with the steering group two to three 
weeks prior to the scheduled activities to receive feedback. 
The treatment of data protection and privacy were carefully considered, 
particularly with regard to the fieldwork relying on interviews, and focus groups. This is 
especially necessary to ensure that participants582 feel comfortable expressing 
themselves, and to ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) no 2018/1725. Information 
and data gathered throughout the study has been treated with utmost care and stored in 
a secured cloud location. Prior to each interview, all interviewees explicitly consented 
(via return email or signed letter of consent) allowing the consortium to record the 
interview, while ensuring their anonymity. The same treatment has been given to those 
taking part in focus groups. The data protection notice and privacy statement is provided 
in Annex 2. 
Step 1 fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders to 
contextualise platform work. Interviews also sought to lay the foundation of 
understanding the challenges related to working conditions and social protection facing 
platform workers. An initial list of interviewees was made by the consortium, then 
refined with input from the European Commission.  
Step 2 fieldwork consisted of country surveys and national focus groups. The country 
surveys provided an overview of national level developments that have emerged to 
address existing challenges of platform work. Such national developments were 
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investigated for the EU28, Norway and Iceland, via surveys for socio-economic and legal 
experts in each country. This step of the fieldwork generated country-specific literature, 
as well as a great deal of raw data on the challenges and responses facing platform 
workers in each country. 
Furthermore, six countries with particular relevance to platform work challenges and 
responses were investigated in depth via focus groups of platform work experts and 
stakeholders. These six countries were especially interesting for novel and experimental 
approaches to platform work, and for this reason were expected to offer lessons for the 
other countries and the EU generally. Each focus group consisted of stakeholders 
including platform workers, platform representatives, policymakers, social partners, and 
academics/legal experts. The focus group organisers were given extensive instructions to 
ensure that focus groups covered the most interesting and novel points in their 
respective country, while touching on common themes to allow comparability. 
Step 3 fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews with key experts on particular 
EU legislation covered. This aimed to fill gaps, particularly where very little literature is 
available (e.g. the significance of the GDPR for platform work). An initial list of 
interviewees was made by the consortium, then refined with input from the European 
Commission. 
Step 4 fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews with EU-level stakeholders. 
This aimed to gather final inputs into the analysis (including gap analysis), and to ensure 
that no significant issues were insufficiently covered. An initial list of interviewees was 
made by the consortium, then refined with input from the European Commission. Step 4 
also consists of a validation workshop, which brought together stakeholders to discuss 
and validate the main findings of this research.  
Summary of findings from fieldwork activities 
Country-expert surveys 
The research team developed two interrelated surveys: one focusing on legal aspects, 
and one on socio-economic aspects. Two country experts filled in the survey per country 
based on their respective expertise. The research team identified country experts 
through its existing network of experts and informal consultations.  
The surveys were developed to have both unique and shared questions. This allowed the 
research team an additional level of certainty for findings, while also allowing respective 
experts to go more in depth where they are most competent. 
Findings from the country expert surveys included a systematic assessment of the 
challenges related to platform work at national level. Experts also identified relevant 
literature, including both academic and grey literature, at the national level. Experts 
were asked to specify what sources information was derived from, for instance through 
desk research, participation in conferences or informal interviews with stakeholders. 
Experts were also asked to report relevant national responses and tools, based on the 
typology described in Section 5. 
The most important outputs of this exercise were: 
 a ‘miniature literature review’ for each country in the EU28, Norway and Iceland 
 an assessment of the severity of individual challenges facing platform workers for 
each country 
 a mapping of the most relevant responses and tools for each country. 
These materials provided a crucial basis for the body of the study, which required a 
thorough mapping of challenges and responses in each country. These materials also 
verified important differences and commonalities in platform work throughout Europe, as 
also discussed in the body of the study. 
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Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews informed several research steps. The interviews for Step 1 
were mainly used to provide conceptual clarity and to develop the definition of platform 
work, to set the stage for the subsequent mapping of challenges and responses and to 
understand which challenges would be most relevant to look out for.  
Step 1 topics raised by interviewees included: 
 the need for better data on platform work 
 the shared and diverging conditions between platform work and other forms of 
non-standard work 
 the need for a higher baseline of protection for ‘all workers’ regardless of the 
specific work or contract 
 how platform work is a test case (and opportunity) for the EU’s handling of the 
future of work 
 how platform work challenges labour and social law throughout Europe 
 the merits and limitations of collective bargaining for platform workers 
 the importance of skills and career progression possibilities for platform workers. 
 
Step 3 interviews focused on the consequences of the GDPR regulation for platform work 
and how the European Data Protection Board might proceed.583 This discussion is 
developed in Reflection Paper 2. 
Interviews in Step 4 were conducted for the purpose of verifying the results of the 
research and ensuring that there were no important aspects that had been previously 
overlooked, as well as getting feedback on identified policy pointers and the results of 
the gap analysis.  
Step 4 topics raised by interviewees included: 
 the need for better data and an EU definition on platform work 
 the likelihood of online forms of platform work to grow more than on-location 
forms 
 the sense that policymakers are overly focused on food delivery and personal 
transportation platforms, which are the most discussed but not the most 
prevalent forms of platform work 
 the role that the EU should play in platform work versus Member States 
 the idea that Member States should focus on action for on-location platform work 
while the EU should focus on action for online platform work 
 the potential for the EU to take further action on intermediation aspects of 
platform work 
 the potential for the EU to facilitate data gathering on platform work, and require 
platforms to be more transparent 
 the need for more platform workers to be able to collectively bargain 
 the advantages and disadvantages of a third employment status 
 the potential for the P2B Regulation and the GDPR to improve working conditions 
for platform workers 
 the limitations of the P2B in personal scope for platform workers 
 the strengths and limitations of EU soft law approaches to addressing the 
challenges of platform work 
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 the merits of two strategies in addressing the challenge of employment status: 1) 
raising the baseline protection for self-employed, and 2) taking action to reassign 
more self-employed as employees 
 the likely outcomes if the EU does not take further action on platform work 
 the positive effects of voluntary agreements between platform workers and 
platforms. 
 
Table 22: Participants in semi-structured interviews 
Type of interviewee Gender Step 
Academic expert M 1 
Academic expert F 1 
European agency 
representative 
M 1 
European agency 
representative 
F 1 
Platform representative M 1 
Social partner (employees) F 1 
Social partner (employers) F 1 
Social partner (employees) M 3 
Academic/expert M 3 
Academic/expert F 4 
Academic/expert F 4 
Academic/expert M 4 
EU policymaker M 4 
EU policymaker M 4 
EU policymaker M 4 
Platform representative M 4 
Platform representative F 4 
Social partner (employees) F 4 
Social partner (employer)  F 4 
Social partner (employer) M 4 
 
Focus groups 
The focus groups covered both common themes as well as country-specific topics. The 
main topics of conversation are listed for each country. 
Denmark: 
 Lack of certainty on how to conceptualise platform work and its prevalence 
 Expectation of growth in sectors including cleaning and transportation 
 Most platform workers are self-employed 
 Uncertainty of tax obligations for many platform workers 
 How algorithms and ratings challenge fair working conditions 
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 The increasing involvement of social partners in platform work 
 The utility of collective agreements, which in Denmark are mostly pushed by 
companies rather than platform workers 
 The prevalence of company-level bargaining rather than sector-level bargaining in 
platform work 
 Pilot projects on tax registration and insurance schemes seem promising to 
several attendees. 
 
Estonia 
 The lack of certainty on how to conceptualise platform work and its prevalence 
 The prevalence of on-location platform work in Estonia 
 The positive effects of platform work, such as increasing labour market access for 
individuals, helping provide short-term access to labour for businesses, 
formalising labour that has always existed, and facilitating entrepreneurship 
 The large disruptive effects of platform work in accommodation and housing, and 
household tasks and childcare 
 The pros and cons of flexibility, particularly regarding wages, insurance and OSH 
 The ambivalence of some Estonian stakeholders on the employment status 
challenge of platform work 
 The benefits of Estonia’s digital strategy to simplify tax declaration584 
 The benefits of reducing administrative burdens for platform workers and 
platforms 
 The largest risks seem to be low wages and a lack of insurance options for 
platform workers 
 Estonians generally see platform work as a positive development. 
 
Spain 
 The growing relevance of platform work of all types 
 Relevance of platform work in regions with high unemployment, and how 
platform work interacts with structural labour market issues 
 Platform work has received mostly negative press in Spain 
 Platforms’ data collection and usage, the need for transparency, and the problems 
of algorithmic management over platform workers 
 The expenses self-employed (including platform workers) face in registration 
 The sense of policy paralysis; national authorities are lagging behind 
developments in the platform economy 
 The inability of labour inspectors to address platform work, and the delays of 
courts 
 The dissatisfaction of trade union representatives towards the TRADE status 
(economically dependent self-employed worker) 
 The anti-union sentiments and actions of certain platforms, particularly in food 
delivery. 
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France 
 The consequences of Loi El Khomri,585 and how it did not implement a third 
employment status as originally envisioned 
 The merits and problems of a third employment status 
 The challenges of working conditions and social protection facing on-location 
platform workers, especially in food delivery 
 The need to clarify who is responsible for contributions, ensuring sustainable 
funding for France’s social protection system 
 The potential merits of a new preferential tax system for platform workers, 
similar to that of Belgium’s Loi De Croo586 
 The sense that France is a leader regarding legislation on platform work and 
collective actions from platform workers. 
 
The Netherlands 
 The lack of national evidence of platform work 
 The most known platform workers are in food delivery, personal transportation, 
and various on-location services 
 The interest of temporary work agencies in the model of platform work 
 The debate in the Netherlands has focused on food delivery platforms, driven by 
trade unions and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
 The preference of many platform workers to pay less taxes and have less 
protection from side activities on platforms 
 The potential need for reducing the difference between self-employed and 
employees, especially to make the current regulatory framework ‘future-proof’ 
 The critical perception of trade unions on how labour inspectorates and the 
judiciary have approached platform work 
 The potential for platform work to present unfair competition to existing 
industries 
 The challenges of platform work in the Netherlands are largely based on the 
distinction between self-employed and employees. 
 
Slovenia 
 The growth of platform work, especially in sectors that require no special material 
and equipment 
 The connection between platforms and outsourcing labour to self-employed 
platform workers 
 The presence of some transportation platforms that exclusively use employees 
 The presence of some food delivery platforms that use both self-employed and 
employed platform workers 
 The lack of data on online forms of platform work, and the inability of tax 
authorities to view many cross-border transactions 
 The sense that platform work is simply an expansion of existing concepts in the 
labour market, such as teleworking arrangements with independent contractors 
                                           
585
 Loi n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la 
sécurisation des parcours professionnels [Law on work, modernising social dialogue and securing career paths] 
(2016-1088, 8.08.2016) 
586
 See overview of the law at https://economie.fgov.be/fr/themes/entreprises/economie-durable/economie-
collaborative/les-plateformes-actives-en 
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 The opposition of trade unions to platforms providing food delivery and personal 
transportation 
 The importance of bogus self-employment and overwork (e.g. 70+ hours weekly) 
for some platform workers 
 The disparity between a clear definition of employee in Slovenian law, versus a 
relatively weak ability to enforce the definition in practice, especially for platform 
work 
 Some platform workers seem to be at risk of cyclical poverty and social 
marginalisation. 
 
Table 23: Participants in country focus groups 
Type of interviewee Country Gender 
Academic/expert France F 
Academic/expert France M 
Platform representative France M 
Platform workers/social partner 
(employees) 
France M 
Platform worker France M 
Private sector consultant France M 
Policymaker France F 
Social partner (employees) France F 
Academic/expert The 
Netherlands 
M 
Academic/expert The 
Netherlands 
M 
Platform representative The 
Netherlands 
M 
Platform worker The 
Netherlands 
M 
Policymaker The 
Netherlands 
M 
Social partner (employees) The 
Netherlands 
M 
Social partner (employers) The 
Netherlands 
M 
Academic/expert Slovenia M 
Platform representative Slovenia M 
Platform representative Slovenia M 
Platform representative Slovenia F 
Platform representative Slovenia M 
Platform worker Slovenia M 
Policymaker Slovenia M 
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Policymaker Slovenia F 
Social partner (employees) Slovenia F 
Social partner (employers) Slovenia M 
Platform representative  Denmark M 
Platform worker Denmark M 
Platform worker Denmark M 
Policymaker Denmark F 
Social partner (employees) Denmark F 
Social partner (employers) Denmark M 
Academic/expert Estonia M 
Academic/expert Estonia M 
Academic/expert Estonia M 
Platform worker Estonia M 
Policymaker Estonia F 
Policymaker Estonia F 
Policymaker Estonia F 
Policymaker Estonia M 
Social partner (employees) Estonia M 
Academic/expert Spain F 
Platform representative Spain F 
Platform representative Spain M 
Platform worker Spain M 
Policymaker Spain M 
Social partner (employees) Spain M 
Social partner (employees) Spain M 
 
Validation workshop 
The validation workshop consisted of ten guests (listed below) as well as the entire 
research team and a selection of members of the European Commission. 
To begin, the research team briefly presented the main findings of the research, 
recapping conceptualisations, methodology, and the gap analysis results. The research 
team asked participants for their thoughts – particularly whether the report accurately 
reflects their understanding of the main challenges concerning working conditions and 
social protection of platform workers. Conversation proceeded and covered topics 
including: 
 The importance of algorithmic management and its spread beyond the platform 
economy 
 The importance of fair and transparent intermediation and terms and conditions 
of platforms 
 The importance of cross-border challenges, particularly in determining which 
court has jurisdiction (where to sue in case of disputes), intellectual property 
rights (which rely on diverging national frameworks) 
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 The relationship between employment status and job quality 
 The need to not lose nuance in ‘lower-skilled’ and ‘higher-skilled’ forms of 
platform work, as this is too simple for how it actually takes place 
 The difficulties in applying traditional means of oversight to platform work, e.g. 
platform work takes place in both physical and virtual spaces. 
The research team then presented findings with a legal focus. This covered the 
difficulties in applying certain EU legislation based on personal and material scope, 
although many of the challenges facing platform workers are more broadly applicable for 
atypical workers. Overall, Member States have a variety of approaches towards platform 
work, but working conditions are rarely addressed directly. This contributes to legal 
uncertainty. Platform workers face particular problems in countries where the labour law 
and social protection coverage is significantly different between employees and self-
employed. Discussion proceeded on topics including: 
 Court cases in platform work have shifted; initially they focused on competition 
aspects, and more recently, they consider employment status.  
 Courts are very slow in addressing the needs of platform workers, and platforms 
change very quickly 
 In any action on platform work, one should always consider the heterogeneity of 
platforms to avoid unintended effects 
 The P2B Regulation covers a broad swathe of challenges for platform workers 
(particularly relating to algorithmic management and transparency), but it is far 
from clear how many platform workers it applies to 
 The GDPR requires certain clarifications to ensure that platform workers benefit 
from protection – it would be helpful if the EDPB issued guidance on what 
constitutes personal data and when it can be exceptionally withheld by data 
controllers 
 Any future policies must be adaptable. 
The research team then briefly presented then-current policy pointers and a discussion 
followed: 
 Certain strategies, such as broad changes to employment status, are seen as 
potentially desirable but politically not feasible, especially at EU level 
 Any potential recommendations need to consider both the political feasibility, as 
well as enforceability 
 Workplace representation is different from collective bargaining, and individual 
bargaining with clients is different from collective bargaining with platforms; at 
least one option should be possible 
 The right to bargaining is especially important for platform workers who cannot 
set their own prices 
 The GDPR and the P2B are probably important to provide insight into how 
platforms intermediate and use algorithms, though this is speculative at present 
 ‘Softer’ recommendations such as establishing voluntary charters and codes of 
conduct may have concrete benefits for platform workers, and are more easily 
achievable than systemic changes. 
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Table 24: Participants in the validation workshop 
Type of interviewee Gender 
Academic/expert M 
Academic/expert M 
EU agency representative F 
Platform representative M 
Platform representative F 
Policymaker M 
Social partner (employees) F 
Social partner (employees) M 
Social partner (employers) M 
Social partner (employers) F 
Note: this excludes the research team and a number from DG EMPL. 
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ANNEX II: A NOTE ON WHAT IS NOT PLATFORM WORK 
A great variety of online platforms, including social networks such as Facebook, e-
commerce websites such as Amazon and Etsy, and sharing services such as 
CouchSurfing, are discussed under the umbrella of platform economy (Fabo et al., 
2017). By this study’s understanding, these are a part of the platform economy in the 
broadest sense but are not examples of platform work. 
The distinction is as follows. Social networks can be used as posting boards and thus 
facilitate finding paid work, but the websites’ role is more passive than that in platform 
work. The websites essentially act as digital bulletin boards.587 By this study’s 
understanding, platform work requires a platform with a more active role, as in the 
‘black box of intermediation’ described in Figure 3. Many people use e-commerce 
websites to sell goods, and even make a living doing so (which requires some element of 
labour). However, e-commerce websites intermediate supply and demand for goods 
rather than services, and thus fall beyond the scope of this study’s understanding of 
platform work. CouchSurfing and other platforms may intermediate and facilitate 
sharing,588 but this is not a commercial activity where services are exchanged for 
payment. 
A borderline case worth noting is Airbnb. Some influential literature on platform work 
includes Airbnb,589 while other literature excludes it.590 The logic for excluding Airbnb is 
that it is primarily for renting a space – providing access to accommodation – rather 
than paying a natural person for a service. On the other hand, preparing, cleaning, and 
renting out a room/flat requires labour throughout. Good arguments exist for both 
including and excluding Airbnb from consideration of platform work. However, this study 
does not consider Airbnb a clear example of platform work because clients are not 
paying for the labour per se, but rather the accommodation; a client does not use Airbnb 
to search for flat-cleaning services, but rather the flat itself. Nevertheless, the fieldwork 
clearly shows that regulatory authorities, consumers, and other stakeholders implicitly or 
explicitly group Airbnb alongside Uber and other platforms that do clearly qualify as 
platform work.591 Therefore, some literature coverage and discussion of Airbnb is 
unavoidable when considering platform work at European level, though Airbnb is not a 
focus of this study. 
                                           
587
 If this understanding were synonymous with platform work, then virtually any website could be an online 
labour platform. Thus, it is too broad, and moreover the challenges arising from the ‘black box of 
intermediation’ are largely absent. 
588
 This example illustrates how the term ‘sharing economy’ can be misleading. Uber was often discussed as 
part of the sharing economy, though its business model has little to do with ‘genuine sharing’. See Frenken et 
al. (2015) for discussion of the terminology of sharing vis-a-vis platforms that intermediate labour. 
589
 E.g. “The Platformisation of Work in Europe: highlights from research in 13 European countries, from Huws 
et al. (2019). 
590
 For example, see “Digital age - Employment and working conditions of selected types of platform work” 
from De Groen et al. (2018: p. 9) 
591
 For example, Uber drivers, and landlords using AirBnB, organised initiatives to petition the city council of 
Budapest. See Meszmann (2018) 
  
 
